



THE OPERATIONS
OF
THE MALAKAND FIELD FORCE
AND
THE BUNER FIELD FORCE
1897-98

COMPILED IN THE INTELLIGENCE BRANCH, UNDER THE ORDERS OF THE
QUARTER MASTER GENERAL IN INDIA.

BY

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SIMLA:
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1900.

REFERENCE 2004

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



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GLOSSARY OF FOREIGN TERMS.

- Badmash*.—A blackguard.
- Barani*.—Dependent on rain.
- Duffadar*.—A Sergeant in the native cavalry.
- Durbar*.—A native leveé held by a high English official.
- Ghaza*.—A Muhammadan religious war.
- Ghazi*.—A Muhammadan religious fanatic.
- Ghi*.—Clarified butter.
- Havaldar*.—A Sergeant in the native Infantry.
- Jehad*.—A Muhammadan holy war.
- Jemadar*.—A Lieutenant in the native army.
- Jezail*.—A matchlock fire arm.
- Jirga*.—An assembly, deputation, council.
- Kafir*.—An unbeliever.
- Kashars*.—The young men of a Pathan tribe. "The young-bloods."
- Khalifa*.—
- Kotal*.—A pass or saddle back, where a road crosses a range of hills.
- Lashkar*.—An army: a gathering of armed men.
- Malik*.—Headman of a Pathan Section or village.
- Maliki*.—Pertaining to a Malik.
- Naick*.—A Corporal in the native army.
- Nullah*.—A ravine.
- Ressaidar*.—A troop commander in the native cavalry, but of lower rank than a Ressaldar.
- Ressaldar*.—A troop commander in the native cavalry.
- Sangar*.—A breastwork constructed of stones.
- Sepoy*.—A private in the native infantry.
- Serai*.—A rest house.
- Sheikh*.—A disciple of a saint.
- Sowar*.—A trooper in the native cavalry.
- Stupas*.—A Buddhist building covering relics.
- Subadar*.—A company commander in the native infantry.
- Tehsil*.—A sub-division of a district.
- Thana*.—A subordinate police station.
- Tomtoms*.—Native drums.
- Wahabi*.—A follower of the doctrines of Shekh Abdul Wahab, an Arabian reformer of Muhammadanism.
- Ziarat*.—A shrine.

CHAPTER I.

EVENTS IN SWAT AND ADJACENT STATES FROM AUGUST 1895 TO THE EVE OF THE OUTBREAK AT MALAKAND IN JULY 1897.

On the 9th August 1895, while the troops of the Chitral Relief Force were still occupying Chitral and the approaches leading to it from the Swat Valley, Her Majesty's Government sanctioned the retention of Chitral. This matter had been under consideration ever since the Relief Force had entered the country. In May 1895 the Government of India had forwarded a despatch to Her Majesty's Government unanimously recommending this step and setting forth in detail proposals for carrying it out. The main difficulty in regard to this scheme lay in the safeguarding of the line of communication from India, and for a time Her Majesty's Government were in doubt whether the security of the road could be maintained without employing a large number of regular troops, and otherwise imposing an intolerable burden on the Indian revenues.

The Government of India, however, stated that the reports of the political officers on the spot warranted a confident expectation that by the employment of tribal levies peaceful arrangements could be made for keeping open at all times of the year a road between Malakand and Chitral *via* the Panjkora route, as such road would traverse only the country belonging to the Khan of Dir and the Swat Khans, who were already friendly to us; and thus only at Chakdarra and Malakand would regular troops be required.

On receipt of this information all doubt as to the possibility of keeping the road open by peaceful means was removed, and formal assent was forthwith given to the recommendations made by the Government of India.

As soon as this decision was made known orders were immediately issued for carrying it into effect.

These orders were briefly as follows:—the garrison of Chitral was to consist of two battalions of Native infantry with two guns of a mountain battery, two maxim guns, and a company of sappers. The head-quarters were to be at Kila Drosh, with three companies of infantry and a maxim gun at Chitral itself and one company at Gairat situated between Kila Drosh and Chitral. The Malakand was to be held by a brigade of four battalions Native infantry, one Native mountain battery, one company sappers and miners, and a squadron Native cavalry. A fortified post was to be constructed at the Malakand, and another at Chakdarra; the latter, capable of holding 200 Native infantry and 25 Native cavalry, was to protect the suspension bridge crossing the Swat river. The road from the British frontier to Chitral was to be guarded by locally raised levies.

These arrangements were completed by the end of October 1895 when the troops composing the Chitral relief force were demobilized; and on the 27th of that month Brigadier-General H. G. Waterfield assumed command of the Malakand Brigade and of all troops remaining across the frontier; while Major H. A. Deane, I.S.C., Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, who had been serving throughout the Chitral operations as chief political officer, remained at the Malakand, on special duty in connexion with political affairs in Swat and Dir, and also to watch all the arrangements for keeping open the new road to Chitral.

With regard to the future administrative arrangements for Chitral it was decided that—Kashmir should retain suzerain rights over both Katur * and Kushwakt † countries; Shuja-ul-Mulk should be confirmed in his appointment as Mehtar of Chitral; Katur country should be divided from Kushwakt country, and the Mehtar's authority restricted to Katur, in accordance with the frequently declared wishes of the inhabitants.

On the 2nd September 1895, before the withdrawal of the Chitral Relief Force, a public Durbar was held at Chitral at which Sir George Robertson, K. C. S. I., British Agent at Gilgit, in the name of the Maharaja of Kashmir, formerly installed Shuja-ul-Mulk as Mehtar of all the Katur country.

At this Durbar Sir George Robertson publicly declared the decision of Government with regard to the future relations of the country as above set forth. He moreover announced that it was the intention of Government to keep troops in Chitral, and also retain there a British political officer, on whom the Mehtar, who was a mere boy, might call for advice and assistance. Henceforth the Mehtar would receive an annual subsidy of Rs. 12,000, and a further sum of Rs. 8,000 per annum would be paid him to compensate him for loss of revenue arising from the removal of Kushwakt country from his control.

With regard to the Kushwakt country it was explained that in future the British Agent at Gilgit on behalf of the Kashmir State would appoint and pay the Governor and headmen of that country and maintain direct relations with the inhabitants, and that the Mehtar in future should not have any control whatever over it.

On hearing these terms all expressed themselves satisfied with the arrangements decided upon.

The Khan of Dir was also quickly informed of the decision arrived at by Government. Throughout the late operations he had given loyal and valuable assistance to Government. On becoming acquainted with the new terms he signed an agreement promising to keep open and to repair that portion of the new road from the British frontier to Chitral which traversed his territory, to keep it available for the use of the Chitral annual reliefs, to make postal arrangements, to protect the telegraph line when put up, and to make arrangements for sites for the accommodation of troops on Laram or Dosha Khel should Government wish this at any future time. The Khan for these and other services was to receive an annual subsidy of Rs. 10,000; and a like sum was also paid him annually in commutation of his right to levy tolls throughout his country.

For the payment of maliki allowances to the tribes and for the Dir levies a sum of Rs. 60,000 per annum was sanctioned. Eight posts were to be maintained, *viz.*, at Kolandi, Dir, Darora, Warai, Robat, Sado, Sarai, and Chakdarra. It was arranged that these should be held by 310 locally raised levies. A sum of Rs. 28,000 was sanctioned for the construction of these posts, which were to be erected by local labour.

An additional sum of Rs. 1,500 per mensem was also allowed for the postal arrangements between Chakdarra and Chitral.

Similar agreements to the above were also made with the various Khans of Swat, and with the Khans of the Upper and Lower Ranizais, it being moreover especially stipulated that British officers should have free access to the country with the assistance and protection of the Khans themselves.

A levy scheme for Swat and Ranizai at an annual cost of Rs. 32,585 was sanctioned by Government, and the annual allowances enjoyed in years past by the Khans of Swat (Thana, Aladand, and Palli) were raised from Rs. 7,700 to Rs. 11,500; and a further sum of Rs. 10,000 per annum was paid to them for distribution amongst their land-owners in commutation of their rights to levy tolls on trade passing over the Malakand, Shakot, Morah, Chitral, and Swat roads.

* Lower Chitral.

† Upper Chitral including Yasin, Ghizar and Mastuj.

The whole of the Khans appeared to be highly pleased with the new arrangements; in fact they had previously sent in petitions to Government requesting that troops might be kept in their country, as they knew that the presence of a British force in their vicinity would bring peace and safety to their country instead of internal disputes and fights, and that they would moreover derive advantages in trade.

The representatives of the Adinzais of the Uch valley and Talash valley, in addition to the above, also strongly petitioned the Government to at once annex their country in order that they might be protected from their enemies, and that they might henceforth pass their lives in peace and safety. Oppressed for years past by the Khans of Dir, and later by Umra Khan, they had experienced, during the occupation of their country by our troops, a peace hitherto unknown to them. The whole population of these valleys came *en masse* to Chakdarra, and were most importunate on the subject.

In reply all were informed that Government had no intention of permanently occupying any of their country or interfering with their independence, but for a time troops would be left in their country to assist the Ranizais and Swatis in maintaining order along the road through their country.

In recognition of his services rendered to the Chitral Relief Force (services rendered somewhat tardily perhaps), Government granted the Khan of Nawagai an annual subsidy of Rs. 6,000. He was somewhat dissatisfied at this amount, and requested that he might at least receive the same as the Khan of Dir, *viz.*, Rs. 10,000. Government, however, were unable to accede to this request.

Numerous factions have for many years past existed in Upper and Lower Swat and in the Khan of Dir's territory; and there have also been constant feuds between the numerous Khans of Bajaur and Nawagai, and in order to thoroughly comprehend the situation in this part of the country some account of them is necessary. The factions which existed in the Swat valley were the result of the struggles which had existed since the death of Mullah Abdul Ghafur, better known as the Akhund of Swat, who died on the 12th January 1878. During the last years of his life, in spite of great pressure from without, urging him to adopt a hostile attitude towards the British Government, the Akhund persistently refused to depart from the neutral and almost friendly attitude he had adopted for some years past. Whatever his own personal feelings may have been, it is certain that after the Ambela Campaign in 1863, he used his great influence to support the British Government so long as they refrained from aggressive measures against any of the tribes in his neighbourhood, who all looked up to him as their spiritual guide. The best proof of the Akhund's wise restraint of the turbulent spirits of Swat and Buner is the almost total immunity of that portion of the border from raids and other serious offences for many years previous to his death.

The three main objects of the Akhund's policy during the later years of his life seem to have been:—to maintain the independence of Swat; to silence all his religious rivals; to get his son Abdul Manan, Mian Gul, elected King of Swat. In the first two he was successful, but he failed in the third.

The Akhund died leaving two sons to survive him, who were known throughout the country as the Mian Guls. The elder, named Abdul Manan, at the time of his father's death was about 22 years old. He was a man of naturally indolent and careless habits, and personally by no means popular with the Swatis. The younger son, Abdul Hanan, following the example of his father, led the quiet life of an ascetic, and to all outward appearances abstained from interference in politics. When the Akhund died, there were two great factions in Swat, each contending for supreme power; one of these was headed by Sherdil Khan of Aladand, the Khan of the Ranizais, supported by Rahmat Ullah, chief of Dir; the other was headed by the elder Mian Gul supported by Umra Khan of Jandol. All the principal men of Swat and the surrounding countries sided with one or other of these parties.

In April 1880 Sherdil Khan died and the chief political power in Swat came into the hands of Rahmat Ullah, the Khan of Dir, who continued to carry on a desultory contest with the Mian Gul party with varying success.

In March 1884 the two factions came to terms; the Mian Guls agreeing to acknowledge the authority of the Khan of Dir over Malizai, while Rahmat Ullah, on the other hand, pledged himself not to interfere, unasked, in the affairs of Swat proper. Meanwhile the Khan of Dir's influence was considerably lessened by the factions amongst his own followers, but more especially by the mutinous and unnatural conduct of his seven sons, whose constant feuds were a source of trouble not only to the Khan himself but to the country in general. Owing to the anxiety caused by these events the Khan of Dir's health broke down, and he passed away to an early grave in 1883, being succeeded by his son Muhammad Sharif Khan. The alliance between the elder Mian Gul and Umra Khan seems also about this period to have been somewhat strained, owing to double dealing on the part of Umra Khan and his relatives with those Khans of Thana and Aladand who were the hereditary enemies of the Mian Gul's nominees in those villages. By these and other intrigues Umra Khan of Jandol, with almost uninterrupted success, had steadily increased his influence to such an extent that he was now feared by all. For a time the Khan of Nawagai vigorously opposed Umra Khan, but as this was generally with a view to prevent him gaining further power in Bajaur and Nawagai country there is no need to follow in detail the wonderful ramifications of their constant hostilities. On the 2nd September 1887 the elder Mian Gul died of cholera and his place as leader of the Mian Gul faction was taken by his younger brother Abdul Hanan. This again split up the Mian Guls into still further factions, as many considered that the two sons of Abdul Manan (then aged 5 years and 3 years old respectively) should have succeeded to their father's position.

The whole of the Swat, Dir, Bajaur, and Nawagai districts were now greatly disturbed by the constant reports of the Amir's intention to annex the whole country to Afghanistan, and henceforth the Amir's agents never ceased openly intriguing in the country until the Durand Mission to Kabul in 1893 placed a check on their proceedings. Muhammad Sharif Khan of Dir was especially disturbed in his mind by the Amir's action, and although the inhabitants of the whole country boldly stated their firm determination of strenuously opposing any attempt of the Amir to impose his rule upon them, he, after maintaining a doubtful and uncertain attitude for a short time, was at last prevailed upon to pay a state-visit to the Amir at Jelalabad in the early part of 1888.

By this time the Amir had quelled the Ghilzai insurrection, and his fears concerning Ayub Khan had been set at rest by the capture of his rival and his detention by the Government of India. He thus found leisure to carry out his preconceived intentions of extending his influence amongst the independent tribes along the Indian frontier. Up to this time the Government of India had carefully abstained from any interference whatever amongst these tribes, and as long as they abstained from raiding British territory, no notice was taken of them or of their incessant factional fights. When, however, it was recognised that the Amir was contemplating the absorption of Bajaur, Dir, and Swat, it became the duty of Government to intervene to prevent the outpost of Chitral from becoming isolated, and they accordingly in 1888 informed the Amir, as they had informed his predecessors since the year 1857, that all interference in Dir and adjoining countries must cease. The Amir in reply openly asserted his right to the possession of Bajaur and Dir, but acknowledged that Swat was outside his jurisdiction. Knowing all this, it was but natural that Muhammad Sharif Khan should have had grave misgivings concerning the wisdom of his policy in attending the Amir's Durbar at Jelalabad. Accordingly with a view to ascertaining what the Government of India thought of his action he returned to Dir from Jelalabad *via* the Khyber pass in April 1888, and on reaching Peshawar visited the Commissioner of that district and assured him of his continued friendship towards the British Government.

The next few years are remarkable for the manner in which Umra Khan of Jandol fought his way to position, until he came to be the most powerful man in the

whole country. This, too, in spite of the most determined opposition from all the neighbouring Khans and Mullahs who were greatly assisted and encouraged by the Amir, who saw in Umra Khan a person who was likely to interfere with his ambitious aims in that portion of the frontier, and for this reason would have gladly seen him driven from the country. In June 1890, Umra Khan attacked Muhammad Sharif Khan of Dir and inflicted such a severe defeat on him that the latter was compelled to seek refuge in Upper Swat, where he remained in seclusion till the outbreak of hostilities in April 1895, when he offered his services to Government. Meanwhile Umra Khan retained possession of Dir territory, and placed his brother Muhammad Shah Khan in charge to rule the country in his name. In November 1891 he invaded parts of Asmar and appointed Ghulam Khan (half-brother of the late Khan of that country) to be Khan of Asmar. This brought him into direct contact with the Amir, who highly incensed at his audacity in advancing into country under his suzerainty, ordered Ghulam Haidar Khan, Sipah Salar, to advance with a force against Umra Khan and chastise him for his presumption.

In furtherance of these orders the Sipah Salar, having in April 1892 forced Umra Khan's nominees to flee from Asmar, threatened an invasion of Bajaur. This caused the greatest alarm throughout the whole of Bajaur, Dir, Swat, and other adjoining states, and all laying aside for a time their own feuds combined to resist the Amir's threatened invasion. Umra Khan openly defied the Amir to do his worst, and in collecting the forces of the tribesmen to resist him, stigmatized the Amir as being "as injurious as poison." The Government of India now intervened and warned the Amir that no interference on his part in that portion of the country could be allowed, and insisted that the Afghan force threatening Bajaur should be withdrawn. Umra Khan after this for a time remained quieter but still carried on aggressive attacks on all his neighbours, till at length in January 1895, seeing the unsettled condition of Chitral, owing to the murder of the Mehtar Nizam-ul-Mulk, he seized the opportunity of extending his influence in that direction, and boldly advanced with his whole force on Kila Drosh. This brought him into open hostility with the Government of India who had already frequently warned him to abstain from interfering in Chitral territory. The Chitral relief force was immediately mobilized and action was taken, which resulted in Umra Khan's overthrow and rapid flight to Kabul with his relatives, and in the reinstatement of Muhammad Sharif Khan as Khan of Dir.

After his overthrow Umra Khan remained at Kabul under the surveillance of the Amir. But towards the end of July several of his brothers and other relations, who had fled to Kabul with him, were deported by the Amir to Peshawar, whence they were allowed by the Government of India to return to Jandol and re-occupy their lands. Umra Khan's brother, Muhammad Shah Khan, also subsequently returned to Peshawar and was allowed to return to Bajaur.

It is necessary now to revert once more to the period at which the decease of the Akhund of Swat took place; and to say a few words as to the influence of the religious leaders in these parts. At the time of the Akhund's death the leading Mullahs were—

- (1) Abdul Wahab of Akora (the Manki Mullah Sahib);
- (2) The Mohmand Mullah, Khalil;
- (3) Sheo (or Shah) Baba Sahib, the religious leader of Dir;
- (4) Abu Bakr of Bajaur;
- (5) Mullah Najm-u-din of Mohmand (the Hadda Mullah);
- (6) Moulvi Abdullah, the leader of the Hindustani fanatics;
- (7) The Mian-Guls (sons of the Akhund of Swat).

All of these had recognized the Akhund as their spiritual leader, but on his death, instead of recognizing his sons as his spiritual and temporal successors, the Manki Mullah and others split the country into factions in their attempts to succeed to the position themselves. In these disputes the role of spiritual leader was almost forgotten in endeavours to obtain the temporal power.

After the Akhund's death in 1878 repeated attempts were made by the Mian Guls, the Mohmand Mullah Khalil, the Hindustani fanatics of Buner and others, to raise a *jehad* to assist the Afghans against the British army then invading Afghanistan. All of these, however, came to nought owing partly to the want of interest in the subject taken by the tribesmen, but more especially on account of the divisions among the religious leaders themselves, and owing to the state of constant civil war existing in the country, as above described.

But in 1887 the Mullahs became alarmed at Umra Khan's extending influence, and a religious revival took place, when they agreed to sink their own differences and combine to oppose Umra Khan, whom they stigmatized as a *Wahabi* and a *Kafir* on account of his favourable leanings towards the British Government; and on several occasions with the assistance of the Afghan officials they were frequently able to raise large forces numbering from 10,000 to 20,000 men to attack him.

This coalition of the Mullahs * was largely due to the influence of the Amir, who in June 1889 issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of Swat, Buner, Bajaur, Dir, and Chitral urging them to look to him for advice and obey him as "King of Islam." His object in thus declaring himself as head of the Mahomedan religion was undoubtedly to strengthen his temporal power as Amir of Afghanistan. For years past the Mullahs of the country had worked against him and preached on all sides that the Amir, as an ally of the British Government, could not be a true Mahomedan. By his assumption of the title "King of Islam" the Amir silenced many of these pestilential fanatics, as after this the tribesmen looked to him as their spiritual leader, and henceforth he lost no opportunity of increasing his spiritual influence, his book "*Taqwim-ud-din*" (Rectification of the Faith †) being published with this object. At length on the 17th August 1896 he adopted the title of "*Zia-ul-Millat-wa-ud-Din*" (*Light of the Religion and the Faith*). In formally announcing this fact to the Government of India, he wrote that it was the unanimous request of his people that he should be thus honoured in recognition of all that he had done for the country. The 17th August is now recognized as a public holiday throughout Afghanistan and is known as the "*Jashn-i-Muttafikya*" or the "*Festival of Unanimity*."

This new role of spiritual leader, however, caused the Amir much annoyance and anxiety, for the Mullahs and others, who had hitherto carried on all their fanatical propaganda against the Government of India and all its adherents, merely as religious leaders, henceforth proclaimed themselves emissaries of the Amir; thus obtaining greatly enhanced political, as well as spiritual, importance. All their machinations, however, availed them nothing in their attempts to overthrow Umra Khan. But when Umra Khan brought about his own overthrow in 1895, by entering into hostilities with the British Government, all the fanatical forces which had hitherto been more than fully employed against him were then brought to bear in causing trouble to that Government.

When our troops advanced into Chitral in 1895 the venerable Khalil Mullah of the Mohmand country and the Baba Sahib of Dir had both been dead some time, and the influence of the Manki Mullah, on account of his age and neutral attitude, was rapidly decreasing. The younger Mian Gul also had died in April 1893 and had been succeeded by the two sons of the elder Mian Gul. The influence of the Hadda Mullah, a bitter opponent of the Manki Mullah, had consequently greatly increased, and it was well known throughout Bajaur and the adjoining states that the Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar Khan was a firm adherent of this Mullah and was always intriguing with him.

During the operations of the Chitral relief expedition the Mullahs and other fanatics never ceased in their efforts to bring about a strong fanatical rising.

As soon as the operations of the Chitral relief force were completed, and the troops had departed from their country, the matter which concerned the Indian

* The Manki Mullah, however, was not so hostile to Government and henceforth assumed a neutral policy in accordance with the teachings of his late master. This attitude he maintained throughout the operations of the Chitral relief force and again during the Malakand disturbances.

† According to this work it is binding on all "Muslims," without exception, to wage "*Jehad*" under the banner of any king, no matter whether he be just or tyrannical, when a Mahomedan country is invaded by infidels.

Government most was the existence of very strong fanatical feeling amongst the tribesmen, which the Mullahs, and many others on both sides of the frontier ever desirous of causing trouble to Government, did their utmost to increase. Although a most careful watch was kept on this movement and everything that was possible was done to minimize its effects, it continued to make steady progress until, as the following chapters will relate, it broke out in a most unexpected quarter and plunged the whole Swat valley into war.

We now arrive at a period when our political officers came into closer touch with the inhabitants of these countries, and when their inter-tribal feuds and their actions in general became of greater importance to Government. Reports from Major H. A. Deane, Political Officer for Dir and Swat, received towards the end of 1895 showed that all the new arrangements were working smoothly. Since the breaking up of the field force nothing of moment had occurred in Chitral the garrison there had been busily employed in hutting themselves, and work on the new Chitral fort and the entrenched post at Gairat had been rapidly pushed forward. Matters had also progressed satisfactorily along the Chitral road; the levies had been raised, and the various levy posts, with the exception of Kolandi and Dir, had been completed. Trade along the route was largely increasing, the freedom from taxation being a great relief to all traders. The attitude of the people of Lower Swat was entirely satisfactory, and there also the levy arrangements were working well, the post between India and Chitral was running regularly, and stores were being passed through safely.

In Bajaur and Jandol faction fights still continued, and both sides appealed to Major Deane, who declined to interfere in any way whatever. In Upper Swat also the valley was torn by factional fights of almost daily occurrences. None of these were, however, of sufficient importance to cause the political officers the least anxiety.

During 1896 the jealousy between the Khans of Dir and Nawagai continued to increase, each being desirous of extending his influence amongst the small Khanates of Jandol and other adjoining valleys, which now lay at their mercy owing to Umra Khan's overthrow. At the end of 1895 the Khan of Dir was desirous of attacking and annexing Jandol under pretence of doing a service to Government; but Major Deane directed him not to interfere in Jandol affairs. During January 1896, however, disturbances broke out in the Jandol valley in which some of the Khan of Dir's men took part. The Khan was at once advised to withdraw his subjects, but before this advice could be carried out, fighting had become general in the valley, and it was reported that the men of Dir had taken Mundah and were attacking Miskini. By the end of January, however, the Khan of Dir had recalled all his men, and the Jandolis had re-occupied their former positions. The Khan of Nawagai meanwhile had moved up to Jhar with a large gathering ready to oppose the Khan of Dir, but withdrew on the cessation of hostilities. As it was reported that the Jandolis, with the exception of Muhammad Shah Khan, had come to an understanding with the Khan of Dir, Major Deane was of opinion that the disturbance, from a political point of view had been beneficial. The great danger, however, was that any interference by the Khan of Dir in this territory, which had all been under the influence of Umra Khan of Jandol, would raise a strong faction against the former, which might cause serious trouble along the Jandol side of the Chitral road.

During the spring the Khan of Nawagai also gave considerable trouble to the political officers by his endeavours to impose his influence over the Mohmands of the Mitai country. Eventually, however, he listened to Major Deane's advice and promised to refrain from interfering with the Mohmands in future.

The Chitral reliefs of 1896 took place during May without the slightest molestation or friction of any kind; although the numerous lying mischief-makers, always to be found in the Peshawar district, had done their best to circulate false reports, stating that Government intended annexing the country and that the power of the Khans in future would be merely nominal instead of real. But it is probable that the Mamunds, who had been sending small bands of raiders and *Ghazis* to the Swat valley and to Malakand, would have given trouble on this occasion had not the other clansmen combined to prevent them doing so. Considerable

anxiety was also felt about this time in the Jandol valley regarding the rumoured return of Umra Khan, whom the Amir of Afghanistan, with the knowledge and consent of the Indian Government, had allowed to leave Kabul and proceed on a pilgrimage to Mecca. On his return to Bombay from this pilgrimage in June, he was offered by the Government a suitable allowance and a residence near Quetta. This offer he, however, declined and returned to Kandahar *via* Quetta in August, whereupon the Amir granted him an allowance and a residence near Chardehi, about four miles from Kabul, where it is reported he is still living.

In the Nawagai valley towards the end of the year affairs were again in an unsettled state owing to the action of the Khan of Nawagai in attacking the Khan of Pashat. In December 1896 a small faction of Salarzais, favourable to the Nawagai Khan, appealed to him for assistance. Seizing the opportunity afforded by this appeal the Nawagai Khan collected his forces, and early in December captured two forts within a few miles of Pashat itself. The situation became further complicated by the desire of the Khan of Dir and of Said Ahmed Khan of Barwa to assist the Pashat Khan in defending himself. Further hostilities were only prevented by the intervention of the political officer for Dir and Swat, who represented to each of the opposing factions that they were acting in a manner opposed to the wishes and interests of Government. On the whole it may be said that during 1896 the Khan of Dir was acting in accordance with the agreement entered into by him with Government. Like the Khan of Nawagai, however, he was anxious to increase his influence, and it became necessary on more than one occasion for the political officer to intervene to prevent his interference with the independence of the Kohistanis and Upper Swatis.

Matters in Upper Swat were still disturbed by constant factional fights ; but otherwise affairs in Swat generally had been peaceful. Early in the year, however, there was serious fighting between the two factions in the large Ranizai village of Batkhela on the road between Malakand and Chakdarra, in which two maliks were killed and ten men wounded. The fight was brought to a close by the chance arrival on the scene of Mr. Davis, assistant political officer, with a troop of cavalry.

Throughout the year occasional acts of individual turbulence occurred, which were chiefly traceable to Mamund influence. But the general condition of the valley was highly satisfactory, and the inhabitants were continually evincing their satisfaction at the peace and plenty they were enjoying under the new régime. The trade of the country, both export and import, was increasing by leaps and bounds. For the six months, April to September 1894, the value of the exports to India from Bajaur and Swat had amounted to Rs. 2,22,744, while for the same period in 1896 they amounted to no less than Rs. 10,43,424. The imports from India had similarly increased ; their value during the above period in 1894 having been Rs. 2,91,920, while in 1896 they had risen to Rs. 16,15,892. To assist in the development of the country Government had advanced loans of money to the inhabitants for the construction of wells and water channels ; and the services of experts had been lent to them to assist them in the construction of such works. Major Deane had also supplied them with large numbers of fruit trees, and had imported large quantities of almond seeds to plant as an experiment, as in the Bajaur valley almonds of the best known quality are grown. A civil dispensary, with a British medical officer in charge, had been started at Chakdarra, which was greatly appreciated, and numerous cases were brought thither from all portions of the country. British officers moved freely through the country fishing, shooting, and visiting the old Buddhist ruins, and everywhere met with assistance and friendly treatment. Nowhere was there the slightest trace of any general feeling of hostility to Government : in fact, everywhere the inhabitants appeared to be happy and contented. The Bajauris in a letter to Major Deane even went so far as to express their regrets that a Government *Tehsil* and *Thana* had not been established in their valley.

But the policy of Government was to still adhere to the terms of the proclamation made to the tribes before the Chitral relief expedition started, and directions were issued to Major Deane to this effect ; although of course it was not intended or desired to preclude him from exercising in Dir, Jandol,

Nawagai and Swat, and among the neighbouring tribes, that personal influence which he had acquired for the object of maintaining peace and settling tribal disputes. These instructions Major Deane carefully observed, in spite of the great difficulty experienced in doing so, as the inhabitants were perpetually asking his advice and requesting him to arbitrate between them in all their village and factional disputes.

During the early part of 1897 affairs continued to progress as satisfactorily as could have been expected, and it looked as if the country was about to settle down to an era of peace, and that the sanguine expectations of increasing the productiveness of this rich country were about to be fulfilled. All this, however, could not be accomplished in a day, and the political agent* found that the principle of equal justice to all was scarcely in accordance with the customs or wishes of some of the Khans, who had themselves grown rich and prosperous by the oppression of those weaker than themselves. Principal among these were the Khans of Aladand, who had already given much trouble with their feuds and factions, and who now seemed to have combined to oppress weaker men. Some of the servants of Sharif Khan of Aladand even commenced robbing traders—acts which quickly brought them into displeasure with Government, and in consequence of which and other misdeeds Sharif Khan was punished by being made to refund his personal allowance from Government for six months. A troublesome disturbance also occurred between the Thana and Palli Khans and the leading land-owners and the peasantry. These Khans, thinking it no longer necessary to maintain fighting men on the old terms, claimed a share of produce instead of service, whereupon their tenants rose in a body and attacked Sarbiland Khan and some of the Khans of Palli, to whose assistance the Thana Khans then proceeded. Matters, however, finally quieted down.

At the commencement of the year there were not wanting indications that the movement of the reliefs to Chitral in the spring might meet with opposition, and the Hadda Mullah, the Manki Mullah, and the Palam Mullah were all said to be intriguing with this aim. These intrigues, however, received a temporary check by the death in January 1897 of Muhammad Saiyid, Sahibzada of Mian Killi, who was perhaps the most mischievous intriguer in the whole of Bajaur, and who during the progress of the Chitral relief expedition and almost incessantly ever since had worked actively against Government. Disquieting rumours too prevailed in the Bajaur country that Umra Khan was about to return, either by escaping from the Amir's guard or with His Highness' connivance; and in January several of Umra Khan's followers arrived in the valley from Kabul armed with breech-loading rifles, stating that they had the Amir's permission to leave Kabul thus armed, and also that Umra Khan was about to follow shortly afterwards. Major Deane also reported that most persistent efforts, said to have been instigated from Kabul, had for some considerable time past been made and were still being made to arouse Mahomedan fanaticism in Bajaur, Swat, and Dir against the Government, and that he considered it highly probable that the result of the working would come to a head during the passage of the reliefs. The Palam Mullah in fact sent one of his Sheikhs to raise the people to oppose the reliefs, but the Khan of Dir arrested the man and caused him to be soundly flogged by his headmen. The Khan of Dir himself was sounded by some of the mullahs, but he instantly rejected all their overtures and informed Major Deane that as soon as the reliefs were completed he intended dealing with the Palam Mullah who had been trying to induce the Dir levies to desert and to prevent others from enlisting.

In addition to the foregoing elements of mischief the Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar Khan at Asmar was doing his utmost, by persistent intrigues and the spreading of false reports, to work on the fanaticism of the tribes, and to prevent any understanding between these tribesmen and Government, and numbers of his emissaries were secretly moving about the country with this object. He, moreover, was undoubtedly endeavouring to persuade the Khan of Nawagai to embroil himself with the Khan of Dir and otherwise to disregard the wishes of Government. The fact that the Mohmand boundary line, as agreed

* The political officer, Dir and Swat, was styled "Political Agent, Dir, Swat, and Chitral" from February 1897.

upon by the Durand Mission to Kabul, still remained undemarcated was freely used by the Sipah Salar to stir up a feeling of unrest, and fabricated reports were freely circulated throughout the country that the Government of India contemplated handing over the whole of the Mohmand country and that of the adjoining tribes to His Highness the Amir. With the knowledge that all these elements of unrest existed in the country the responsible authorities of Government considered it very probable that a certain amount of trouble might arise during the passage through the country of the Chitral reliefs. They were, however, carried out without a hitch. The troops marching up left Chakdarra on the 2nd May and reached Drosh on the 11th; the troops returning to India crossed the Lowarai pass on the 17th May and reached Chakdarra on the 25th idem. Major Deane accompanied the troops as he feared trouble and also wished to interview the young Mehtar of Chitral.

The successful carrying out of the annual reliefs caused the general aspect of the situation to be regarded with some satisfaction; and in addition to this the spring crops in the country were reported to be excellent, while exports of grain were being sent over the Malakand to Peshawar. Trade too along the Malakand road continued to show a very satisfactory increase: during the six months which ended on the 31st March 1897, the exports from India totalled Rs. 17,70,684 and the imports into India Rs. 20,10,669. These figures spoke well for the opening up of the road under the levy system inaugurated less than two years ago.

During June the Khan of Dir reported that he was asserting himself against the fanatical party in Upper Swat; and as it was feared that unless this fanatical party was kept under control there was a risk of fanaticism spreading to the detriment of British interests, the Khan of Dir was allowed to take such action against the party as he might consider necessary to ensure the safety of the communications with Chitral.* He experienced very little trouble in entering Upper Swat by a ruse and in temporarily establishing his authority there, but his action, however, caused considerable local excitement, and soon afterwards the Upper Swati clans sent in messages to the political agent, asking to be saved from him. Major Deane replied that, if they desired his intervention, there was nothing to prevent their coming to him and establishing friendly relations with the British, but that if they failed to do this he saw no reason for moving. The Mian Guls also applied to Buner for aid against the Khan, but were told that the Bunerwals would on no account come over to them, even if the Khan of Dir or the British Government moved against Upper Swat.

In June also it was reported that Umra Khan's followers, acting on his behalf, had enlisted 600 men among the Salarzais and Mamunds, that they had 85 Martini rifles and that a large quantity of ammunition obtained from Kabul had reached the Jandol valley. All these reports were, however, seriously doubted by Government, as from the news received direct from Kabul it appeared that Umra Khan was not being treated by the Amir with the same consideration as formerly. The guard over his residence had been increased and he was only allowed to visit the Amir once a month.

On the 28th of June Major Deane telegraphed—"Khan of Dir reports that a *jirga* of some 400 men of Upper Swat tribes, on right bank of river, are coming in with him to see me: these represent his faction. The other faction, who have hitherto been with the Mian Guls, have sent in a *jirga* of some 200 men to me and are now at Chakdarra, in hopes that I will settle matters for the future between them and the Khan." Early in July, Major Deane received these *jirgas* at Chakdarra: the Shamozaï, Nikpi Khel, Sebujaï (including the villages on the Arnawai and Shor streams), and Shamizaï, who live on the right bank, and the Musa Khels who live on the left bank of the Swat river, were all represented. There were also present from the left bank the principal men of the Babuzai and a few of the Jinki Khels. The maliks numbered some 1,400 or 1,500, about one-third of whom accompanied the Khan of Dir, the remainder coming in direct, and in addition to the maliks were some 1,500 *khashars*. Major Deane reported that the *jirgas* accepted the fact of their being under Government influence in a good spirit, and looked

* The Palam Mullah has not been heard of since the Khan of Dir visited Palam on his way to Upper Swat.

to us now to have their country on the same footing as that already under us. They said that they wanted peace, they were ready to perform service if required, undertook to furnish fighting-men for Government, if called on to do so, and declared that the friends of the Government should be their friends and the enemies of Government their enemies. Their principal petition was that they might not be called on to perform unpaid labour, and that exiles, convicted by them of murder, might not be put back on the land against the wish of the *jirgas*. Major Deane explained to them that Government had no desire to interfere with their internal administration, but would assist them in settling their disputes if they brought them before the political agent; that Government did not intend to impose revenue on them and that all that Government wanted was to secure peace and order in Upper Swat, as had been done in Lower Swat and Ranizai. The main regret expressed by the tribesmen was that they had not entered into friendly relations with us before, so as to have excluded any interference by the Khan of Dir. All then parted very amicably; and Major Deane took this occasion to announce to Muhammad Sharif Khan, Khan of Dir, that the Government of India had been pleased to confer upon him the title of Nawab, and with his own hands bound a fine puggri on his head. The Khan was as pleased as a child and vowed that he valued this honour more than lakhs of rupees.

"The main point about the present position," Major Deane wrote on the 3rd July, "is that the power of the Mian Guls, trading on the old Akhund's name, is broken. The Mian Guls have been determined that the Upper Swat maliks should not come into direct contact with us, but they (the Mian Guls) are glad now to send in letters declaring themselves servants of Government and ready to do service. They have undoubtedly been guided in their former behaviour by the Amir and Hadda Mullah, and the combination formed by them with the Palam Mullah and Hadda Mullah for stirring up trouble is now broken up. It is satisfactory that it has been broken up without involving the movement of troops on the part of Government. The Swatis themselves say that, had they not made up their minds to 'lay hold of the skirt' of Government for good and all, they would have not come in."

CHAPTER 2.

EVENTS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE OUTBREAK OF JULY 1897.

In the preceding chapter the normal, and indeed progressive, state of the country during the previous twenty-one months has been detailed. Up to the middle of July the position of affairs in the Swat Valley and adjoining states was such that the political officer reported it to be stronger than he ever contemplated it could become : but the suddenness of the storm which broke so soon afterwards, constitutes one more example of the extreme difficulty of forecasting the possibilities of religious frenzy in the east. The fanatical combination which Major Deane had so long combated and which just before the Chitral reliefs of 1897 appeared so threatening, having been frustrated in all its efforts to bring about a tribal rising along the Chitral road, now started its intrigues in a fresh and most unexpected direction.

After his return to the Malakand from his interview with the young Mehtar of Chitral, Major Deane received information of the presence in Upper Swat of certain strangers who had arrived in the valley from Buner. There was good reason to believe that these men had lately been trying to stir up the Buners against Government ; they were accordingly carefully watched and their actions duly reported. Nevertheless it was not considered at all probable that these individuals would be able to cause any serious trouble, as the fanatical party had just received a severe check and the power of the Mian Guls had only just been broken. It was known, however, that several messages were passing from Kabul and the Sipah Salar in Asmar to the Nawab of Dir and the Mian Guls.

On the 20th July a man named Habib-ul-Rahman was arrested at the Malakand as a suspicious character. He stated that he was a Nekpi Khel, that he had been brought up in India, and that his object in visiting the Malakand was for the purpose of applying for Government service. The man was detained pending enquiries, and subsequently escaped from the serai during the night of July 26th as will appear later on.

About this time also a certain amount of uneasiness and excitement was caused in Lower Swat by the arrival of a *Fakir* from Buner who professed to be able to work miracles and who announced that he intended to do *ghaza* and to turn the British out of the country within eight days. At the time when information of this man's arrival was first received he was reported to be at Landakai, about 6 miles above Thana. As far as could be ascertained at the time, it appeared that the man's name was Sadulla, and that he was a brother of a Buner *zamin-dar* named Zardad, who some 15 years previously had accidentally killed Sadulla's only son, since which Sadulla had been mad. For some three or four months previous to his arrival in Swat he had been preaching a *jehad* in Buner, but had left discredited. How far the man was mad it is difficult to say, and at first it was considered best to take little or no notice of him ; he, however, continued his efforts to arouse the feelings of the people, and daily after evening prayer he addressed them on the righteousness of *ghaza* and read to them long extracts from the Amir's book on *jehad*, numbers of which, signed by the Amir himself, he distributed in the country. He gave out that he had been sent by "some one," but declined to say by whom, and also that four other emissaries were about to join him. He

declared that he required assistance neither in men nor provisions, as the heavenly hosts were with him, and that they would drive the infidels from the Malakand and from Peshawar. He, however, promised rewards of paradise equal to those granted to Mecca pilgrims to such as cared to assist in such meritorious work. He, moreover, assured his hearers that the mouths of the guns and rifles of the infidels had been stopped, and that their bullets would be as harmless as water; whereas he on his part, by merely throwing stones into the Swat river, could cause dismay in the enemy's ranks equal to that produced by the discharge of artillery. His principal stock in trade in his working of miracles appeared to be an inexhaustible pot of *ghi* and rice with which he professed to be able to feed multitudes. As his fame spread, large numbers of people, both from the trans-frontier and from the Peshawar districts, flocked to visit him.

The Thana Khans at length got into a nervous state about him and wrote to Major Deane, requesting him to issue an order forbidding people to visit him. Major Deane, however, declined to interfere in the matter and pointed out to the Khans that if they feared that any trouble was likely to arise from the man's preaching, it was their duty to turn the man out of the country. Up to the 25th July, although the man had caused a stir in the country the inhabitants appeared to have regarded him merely as a madman. On that day Major Deane interviewed the Thana Khans, the headmen of Khar, and some of the headmen of Uch, who all professed that there was nothing in the matter. The Thana Khans, moreover, showed Major Deane letters from the Pisani Mullah, who was the chief adviser to the Mian Guls, saying that if this mad Fakir was giving trouble, the Mian Guls would send their servants and remove him. Later on in the day it was reported that the Mian Guls had actually started their servants off to do this, as they began to fear that the man would bring ruin on Mahomedans. It was also reported on the 25th July that the Fakir had started off alone to come to the Malakand, but that the people had stopped him, telling him his action was mad folly. From these and all other reports received there appeared to be little cause to justify any movement of troops, as such action undoubtedly would have instantly caused a gathering to assemble around the Fakir. It was also still considered probable that the Khans and people would in their own interests themselves remove the man to prevent disturbances.

On July 26th the Fakir was joined by a small number of lads, who with some others fired shots at some of the Thana Khans' men: from this it was thought possible that the disturbance might be due more to the factional fights of Thana than anything else, and no serious alarm was felt.

Even up to the afternoon of that day the people of Khar remained unaffected, and the officers of the Malakand and Chakdarra garrisons met on the Khar polo ground as usual to play polo, while the inhabitants of Khar quietly looked on. In fact at 6-58 P.M. on this very day Major Deane, in telegraphing to Government concerning the presence of the Fakir in Swat and the nature of his workings, reported that, although the Fakir had undoubtedly obtained a great hold of the religious superstition of the people throughout the Swat valley and Dir territory, and that the movement of troops to Thana might become advisable, he did not personally anticipate that any such move would become necessary; but at the same time he pointed out the advisability of calling up the Guides from Mardan the moment the troops might be compelled to move.

Later on in the day, however, reports reached the Malakand, showing that the Fakir was obtaining a hold on the people that appeared to be almost incredible, and matters assumed so serious an aspect, that Major Deane warned Colonel Meiklejohn, commanding the Malakand brigade, that the immediate intervention of troops would probably be necessary; while Lieutenant Minchin, assistant political officer, was sent to Chakdarra to report as to actual occurrences, and to try and steady the Dir levies who were said to be panic-stricken. Shortly after his arrival at Chakdarra, Lieutenant Minchin telegraphed to Major Deane, reporting that the Fakir had moved towards Thana, and that the whole of the Thana people, with the exception of Inayat Khan (who had fled to Chakdarra), had joined the Fakir who, with a following of some 400 or 500 men, was then marching towards Aladand; and at the time that Lieutenant Minchin telegraphed to Major Deane they could be seen halted between Thana and Aladand, but they

did not appear to be armed. On receipt of this information Major Deane, at 8-25 P. M. telegraphed particulars to Government stating that none of the Swat Khans or people dare oppose the Fakir, that a column was moving out from the Malakand to Amandarra at 3 A.M. on the following morning, and that the Corps of Guides had been sent for.

At the time of these occurrences the Malakand brigade under the command of Colonel W. H. Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G., consisted of 1 Squadron, 11th Bengal Lancers, No. 8 (Bengal) mountain battery, No. 5 company Madras Sappers and Miners, the 24th Punjab Infantry, the 31st Punjab Infantry, and the 45th (Rattray's) Sikhs: while Chakdarra was held by 180 rifles of the 45th Sikhs and 20 of the 11th Bengal Lancers under the command of Lieutenant H. B. Rattray.

The Malakand position (see accompanying plan) was somewhat extended: the fort itself had been erected about 600 yards west of the kotal on a narrow spur running up towards the high hill known as Guides Hill. This fort was held by 200 men of the 24th Punjab Infantry with two 9-pounder smooth bore guns. Still further south-west of this post, at a distance of 1,100 yards from it, on the summit of Guides Hill was a small one-storied tower with a defensible roof, from whence signalling was maintained with Chakdarra signalling-tower, 9 miles distant in a direct line to the north-east. Immediately in front of the Malakand fort to the north is an irregular cup-shaped hollow of about 600 yards diameter called the Crater in and around which were located the camps* of the 24th Punjab Infantry, 45th Sikhs, No. 5 company Queen's Own Madras Sappers and Miners, as well as the engineer park, commissariat stores, and bazar. The northern slopes of the spur on which the fort was located were covered with trees and scrub jungle. The central position of this camp was a low rugged irregular-shaped mound, around which were located the Sappers and Miners camp, the engineer park, and the commissariat godown and office, the whole being surrounded by an irregular line of abattis and wire entanglement. The remainder of the troops with the transport were encamped on a flat open piece of ground some 1,300 yards to the north-west outside this hollow. This camp, which was called the North Camp, was protected by low breastworks and by abattis; communication between the two camps was by means of a broad road passing through a narrow dip in the spur which lay between the two camps.


Both positions were overlooked by the high hills on the east and west. It will be seen that two roads lead over the Malakand pass and after passing through the position run down to the Swat valley: the more easterly of these two is merely a rough track known as the Buddhist road; while that to the west is the newly constructed Chitral road called the graded road. Both roads passed down into the Swat valley through short narrow defiles separated by a small hill, known as Castle Rock, a steep eminence covered with huge rocky boulders, on the summit of which was a strongly-built bungalow occupied by the officer commanding. To the east rose the lofty and rugged range of hills which is the watershed between the Swat valley and the Yusufzai plain. Both the roads above mentioned connected the Malakand position with the post of Dargai, which lay seven miles south-south-west of the Malakand Fort at the foot of the Malakand pass. This post was a small earthwork surrounded by a ditch and held by 200 rifles, 31st Punjab Infantry.

* All the troops with the exception of those in the fort and signalling-tower were living in tents.

THE MALAKAND POSITION.

Scale 1 Inch = 800 Feet.

100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 Yards.



CHAPTER 3.

FIGHTING AT MALAKAND AND THE RELIEF OF CHAKDARRA.

As soon as Colonel Meiklejohn became aware that the situation was becoming so serious that the early intervention of the troops would probably be required he at once telegraphed to Mardan to the officer commanding the Queen's Own Corps of Guides directing him to proceed without delay with as many men as possible to reinforce the Malakand garrison, the troops of which were also warned to hold themselves in readiness to turn out at a moment's notice.

A little later, about 7 P.M., Major Deane reported that the Fakir had advanced to Aladand with a large gathering, whereupon Colonel Meiklejohn issued orders that a moveable column composed of 2 guns No. 8 Bengal mountain battery, 1 squadron 11th Bengal Lancers, 2 companies 31st Punjab Infantry, and the 45th Sikhs should march out at midnight under command of Lieutenant-Colonel H. N. McRae, 45th Sikhs, and seize the Amandarra pass which was about 7 miles away, to the north-east of the Malakand. The rest of the troops, with Colonel Meiklejohn himself in command, were to follow at 3 A. M. By this move it was hoped that the further advance of the Fakir and his gathering might be prevented. Such, however, was the intensity of the fanaticism and the blind belief of the tribesmen in their leader, that the hostile gathering by this time was already well on its way to the Malakand. As the Fakir advanced from Aladand the inhabitants of all the villages *en route* flocked madly to his standard; the Swat levies became panic-stricken and such of them as did not openly join in his gathering, after firing a few shots, fled wildly before him. At 9-45 P.M. a telegram was received from the officer commanding at Chakdarra saying that the Fakir with a large gathering had passed Khar and was rapidly advancing against the Malakand. This telegram was the last received from Chakdarra, as shortly afterwards the telegraph line was destroyed.

At 10 P.M. Major Deane informed Colonel Meiklejohn that a Jemadar of levies had just galloped in with news of the near approach of the Fakir with a rapidly increasing gathering of fanatically-mad Swatis, and that the hills to the east of the camp were swarming with hostile tribesmen. Colonel Meiklejohn instantly caused the "alarm" to be sounded, and all troops immediately hurried to the posts which had been previously allotted to them.

As soon as the alarm sounded Lieutenant-Colonel McRae collected a few of his men of the 45th Sikhs and hurried them off under command of Major Taylor to secure the gorge where the old Buddhist road passes over the top of the pass. Then having assembled a few more men he ran off with his little party after Major Taylor, leaving orders with the next senior officer that reinforcements should follow as soon as possible. The two officers above named on reaching the defile saw hundreds of tribesmen rapidly and silently advancing up to the gorge. The enemy, seeing that the position was already held, broke out into fierce shouts and yells and making a bold rush attempted to drive the small handful of Sikhs from their important position. The Sikhs, however, nothing daunted opened a hot fire on them at close range, and manfully held their ground

until the enemy clambering up on the rocky sides on the left of the defile commenced hurling down big rocks and firing on them. Major Taylor now fell mortally wounded, and shortly afterwards Lieutenant and Adjutant R. M. Barff arrived with a few more men of the 45th Sikhs. McRae thereupon sent him to hold the right flank which the enemy were now commencing to turn, and having thus checked the first impetuous rush of the enemy, McRae's little party now slowly fell back to more commanding ground about 50 yards in rear of the gorge, firing steadily and disputing every foot of ground. Here re-inforced by the remainder of the battalion they took up a position where they held the enemy at bay until, at about 2 A.M., the enemy finding all their efforts to enter the camp on this side unavailing withdrew, leaving the bodies of many of their killed on the ground.

Meanwhile the enemy had met with better success in their attack on the camp on the left. The troops had only just reached their allotted posts when the rattle of musketry all along the line intimated that the attack was general, while the star shells exploding over the North Camp showed that it too was being attacked. In the Crater Camp, as soon as the "alarm" was sounded, all piquets of the six companies of the 24th Punjab Infantry, which had been already posted, were instantly doubled. One company of the 24th was also sent under Lieutenant E. W. Costello to line the walls of the enclosure facing the gorge through which the road to the North Camp passes; while another company under Lieutenant Climo was sent to line the wall of the bazar facing the gorge up which the graded road leads. The remainder of the 24th Punjab Infantry were held as a reserve. The central position of the Crater Camp was occupied by No. 5 Company, Queen's Own Madras Sappers and Miners, and the reserve companies of the 24th Punjab Infantry. Here Colonel Meiklejohn had taken up his position with his staff officer, Major L. Herbert, Central India Horse.

Scarcely had the troops reached their allotted positions when a dense mass of the enemy came rushing through the gorge along the graded road. The piquets were driven back before them, and heavy fighting instantly became general. The enemy rapidly spread all over the ground between the defile and the various enclosures. The serai was the first enclosure to fall into their hands; this building was held by levies, who themselves opened the gateway and admitted the enemy who instantly rushed in and killed the political treasurer and burnt all property in the serai, including a large number of tents belonging to the Political Department. In this serai was confined Habib-ul-Rahman, who as mentioned on page 12 had been arrested on suspicion at Malakand and detained, pending enquiries concerning him, in charge of a levy-guard. This man, who was undoubtedly one of those concerned in organizing the outbreak, escaped when the enemy entered the serai and joining their ranks, took part with them in the attack and went away with them.

As the enemy were getting all round the bazar Colonel Meiklejohn directed the company there to withdraw to the commissariat enclosure. It was not long before the enemy, having overpowered the piquet of the 24th Punjab Infantry on the graded road, were able to get on to the high ground in rear of this enclosure from whence they kept up a most galling fire as long as the attack lasted.

Major Herbert was one of the first to fall here, shot through the leg while standing close to Colonel Meiklejohn, who also had a narrow escape of being hit, as a bullet tore open the back of his gaiter. Lieutenant-Colonel J. Lamb, commanding 24th Punjab Infantry, was also very shortly afterwards severely wounded in the thigh when attending to Major Herbert.

Early in the evening the enemy forced their way into the commissariat portion of the enclosure, where they killed Lieutenant L. Manley, commissariat officer of the brigade.

The enemy again and again with the utmost daring and recklessness now charged the abattis surrounding the Sappers and Miners position. Twice they forced their way through and, penetrating the enclosure, seized the guard tent of the Sappers and Miners with all their reserve supply of Martini-

Henry ammunition which had been loaded up on mules for removal to the fort. In attempting to stop one of these rushes Lieutenant F. W. Watling, R.E., was severely wounded by a sword-cut on the back of leg by a man whom he had run through with his sword. On receipt of Lieutenant Watling's report that the guard-tent was in possession of the enemy, Colonel Meiklejohn with Captain H. F. Holland and Lieutenant S. H. Climo, of the 24th Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant E. N. Manley, R.E., an orderly, and a few men of the 24th Punjab Infantry and Sappers and Miners made a most determined attempt to recover possession of the guard-tent. But it was not until several more men of the 24th Punjab Infantry came to their assistance that their efforts were successful; and by that time the mules with such ammunition as remained undistributed had been carried away by the enemy. The fighting was hand to hand and of the most desperate description. Colonel Meiklejohn was himself struck on the neck with a sword, but fortunately the stroke was not truly delivered; his orderly was killed by his side; Captain Holland was shot through the back at close quarters; and many men lay dead and wounded. The enemy, however, suffered severely, and no less than 29 bodies were counted in this portion of the enclosure next morning.

The enclosure was at length cleared of the tribesmen, but the enemy were by no means driven off and still carried on their attacks with great vigour. The night was still absolutely pitch dark and it was difficult to locate their exact positions. During a lull in one of these attacks cries for assistance could be heard from a lance-havildar of the 24th Punjab Infantry who was lying disabled in front of the enclosure. Thereupon Lieutenant Costello went out and with the assistance of two sepoys brought in the wounded man who was found lying 60 yards away in the open on the football ground, which was at the time overrun with swordsmen and swept by a heavy fire both from the enemy and our own men holding the Sapper lines. For this act of heroism Lieutenant Costello was awarded the Victoria Cross.

At 2-30 A.M. the sounds of pipes and tomtoms coming from the graded road indicated the arrival of fresh reinforcements for the enemy. As the garrison of the Crater Camp were already hard-pressed, Colonel Meiklejohn decided on sending to the fort for reinforcements, and Lieutenant Rawlins was accordingly despatched to the fort with orders to bring down 100 men, 24th Punjab Infantry. The duty was a dangerous one, as he had to make his way over broken ground infested by the enemy who were already on three sides of the enclosure. Lieutenant Rawlins, accompanied by three men, had scarcely got outside the enclosure when a man jumped up and struck him with a sword on the arm, but fortunately the blow was badly delivered and caused no wound. The man was instantly shot. The little party reached the fort without further molestation, and having obtained the reinforcements hurried back and rejoined the troops defending the Crater.

The enemy kept up a most stubborn fight till about 4-30 A.M. when they withdrew carrying nearly all their dead and wounded away with them. Some forty bodies were, however, left behind and many of these were at once easily recognised by the sepoys as men who had been in the habit of visiting the camp for the purpose of selling wood, grass, eggs, milk, old arms, etc., to the Malakand garrison.

As soon as it became light enough to see exactly the result of the night's attack, the troops set to work to put things straight, as well as to strengthen the position against further attack; for, although the enemy had been defeated with great slaughter in their first attempt to seize the Malakand kotal, and had withdrawn temporarily discomfited, it was by no means certain that they would not renew the attack as soon as they had obtained food and received reinforcements. In fact as the day advanced it became perfectly clear that such was their intention. The enemy when withdrawing had left a few marksmen with rifles carefully posted in the surrounding hills, who at long ranges kept up a desultory but annoying fire on the troops, clearing away the debris of the last night's attack. The bazar, which had been thoroughly ransacked and everything of value destroyed or carried away, was levelled and the front of the Crater Camp position cleared as far as possible.

The casualties of the night had been somewhat severe. They were—

Killed.

Honorary Lieutenant L. Manley, Commissariat Department.

Sergeant Byrne, R. E., No. 5 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners.

Twenty-one native ranks (including followers).

Wounded.

Mortally—Major W. W. Taylor, 45th Sikhs.

Severely—Lieutenant-Colonel J. Lamb, 24th Punjab Infantry.

Major L. Herbert, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General.

Captain H. F. Holland, 24th Punjab Infantry.

Lieutenant F. W. Watling, R.E.

Thirty-one native ranks (including followers).

During the night the North Camp had not been seriously attacked and the few prowling tribesmen were easily driven off by shells from the mountain battery. Colonel Meiklejohn, therefore, on becoming aware of this, determined to send the garrison of the North Camp out in pursuit of the retiring enemy, the majority of whom were returning to Khar and Butkhela, his object being to break up the gathering and to open up communication with the Chakdarra garrison, from whom a message had been received that they had been attacked during the night, but had driven the enemy back with heavy loss. Accordingly 2 guns of No. 8 Bengal mountain battery, one squadron 11th Bengal Lancers, and the 31st Punjab Infantry, under command of Major M. I. Gibbs, 31st Punjab Infantry, with a wing of the 24th Punjab Infantry in support, quickly started off in pursuit; but the infantry had scarcely reached Bedford hill, opposite Khar, when it became evident that to proceed any further would be useless, as the enemy were seen to be in considerable force on the hills all round, as well as in the valley beyond. Colonel Meiklejohn accordingly directed Major Gibbs to retire. This order was given reluctantly as it was feared that the adjoining clans, encouraged by this temporary success of the Swatis and noting the inability of the Malakand garrison to assume the offensive, would instantly join in the rising. Covered by the 24th Punjab Infantry the column under Major Gibbs retired to camp, though not without considerable opposition on the part of the tribesmen occupying the rugged hills to the east of the Buddhist road. Finding some of these men particularly aggressive, Lieutenant S. H. Climo (who had succeeded to the command of the 24th Punjab Infantry, both the senior officers being wounded) decided on a counter attack: boldly leading a couple of his companies against them, he turned them out of their position, and inflicted heavy loss on them, capturing a standard.

Meanwhile Captain H. Wright, with his squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers, had pushed his way as far as the Amandarra defile, when seeing that the Amandarra hill was held by the enemy, he made a sudden and unexpected move to his left, so as to avoid the defile and the village on the far side, and with the intention of skirting the end of the hill by the Swat river. The attempt in the face of the hordes of the enemy now everywhere visible was a desperate one, but it was the only course open if the squadron was to reach Chakdarra. The path was found to be far more difficult than was anticipated and indeed would have been difficult for infantry; the ground was much broken by watercourses and the foot of the hill was a mass of huge boulders. After scrambling over the rocks like goats, Captain Wright found that there was nothing else to do but boldly plunge into the river, which was then in high flood and the depth of which was unknown. To cover this crossing the two officers,* drawing their revolvers, turned to bay on the enemy, who had speedily raced over the rocks on the top of the hill and were by this time opening fire on the little party. The party crossed the main channel of the river in safety, and having landed on one of the numerous islands rode along it as far as possible; they then had to take to the river again, and land on the left bank among the rice fields. In this Captain Wright had his own horse and one or two others badly wounded; he thereupon dismounted a few men and kept the enemy at bay by carbine fire, while he himself went to the rescue

* Captain D. Baker, 2nd Bombay Grenadiers, the Brigade Transport Officer, accompanied Captain Wright.

of his hospital assistant, who being mounted on a small pony was being carried away by the swollen river. Remounting his men, Captain Wright continued his way to Chakdarra fort where he assumed command.

The gravity of the situation now became apparent to every one. The rising was not merely a small affair confined to the inhabitants of the Lower Swat valley, nor was the attack on the Malakand kotal simply an effort to do as much harm as possible and then retire. All day large bodies of tribesmen were seen to be collecting from different directions, and streams of men were seen to be crossing over from the right bank of the Swat river in the neighbourhood of Badwan and Barangola opposite Malakand. This was plainly the beginning of an important movement on the part of all the neighbouring clans to turn the British force out of the Swat valley and to regain possession of the Malakand pass. This news was immediately wired to Government and instant steps were taken by the garrison to prepare for another night attack, which from the attitude of the enemy now became certain.

The first thing that Colonel Meiklejohn decided upon was that the north camp should be evacuated and the whole of the troops concentrated in the Crater and on the kotal. Accordingly the withdrawal of the baggage and stores of that camp to the kotal was commenced at once. To remove the heavy E. P. tents, however, was under the circumstances impossible, as the camels of the Brigade, at the time of the outbreak, were on their way to Nowshera, and by this time had only been able to return as far as Dargai. The tents and other heavy baggage were accordingly left behind, but the work of evacuating the North Camp took considerable time; and at length, as the enemy were seen to be closing in on all sides, Colonel Meiklejohn was compelled to issue peremptory instructions ordering the immediate evacuation. As the last of the 31st Punjab Infantry were arriving at the Crater Camp, at about 6-45 P. M., a strong body of the enemy, estimated to number about a thousand, charged down from the hills on the west, drove in No. 2 piquet of the 24th Punjab Infantry, and attempted to rush the camp. Lieutenant Climo with two companies of the 24th, proceeded to resist this onslaught and, hurrying up the hills with fixed bayonets, drove them back with loss. Aided by this diversion the retirement into the Crater Camp was completed with the assistance of the remainder of the 24th Punjab Infantry and the Guides Cavalry, the latter of whom, in accordance with Colonel Meiklejohn's telegraphic order, had arrived at the Malakand 160 strong under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, at 8-30 A. M. that morning. The last of the North Camp troops reached the Crater Camp just before dark, when the enemy had already commenced their second night attack on the camp.

Meanwhile the Guides Infantry, 250 strong under command of Lieutenant P. C. Elliott-Lockhart, had safely arrived at Malakand, having left 50 rifles at Dargai, as an attack on that post was anticipated. The brilliant promptitude with which the Guides had responded to the call for their services deserves to be recorded. The officer commanding the corps had received the telegram calling him to Malakand at 9 P. M. on the 26th July; the cavalry of the corps left Mardan at 12-30 A. M., and arrived at Malakand at 8-30 A. M. on the 27th July having covered a distance of 32 miles in eight hours; the infantry left Mardan at 2 A. M. and reached the Malakand at 7-30 P. M., *i.e.*, in 17½ hours. The heat on the road between the Malakand and Mardan was intense, and the march redounds to the credit of the regiment.

The Guides Infantry were not able to obtain much rest after their long and trying march, for at 8-30 P. M. the enemy again attacked the camp in force all along the line.

The troops on the kotal on the night of the 27th July were disposed as follows: the 45th Sikhs with 2 mountain guns, and 100 Guides Infantry in support, held a position on the right flank, about 50 yards in rear of their second position of the previous evening. On the left were posted the 24th Punjab Infantry and two guns, holding the hill (marked No. 2 piquet in the sketch) over-looking the approaches from the North Camp. In the centre, holding the graded road and the enclosures occupied by the Sappers camp, commissariat and engineer park, were posted the remainder of the force. In order to check the advance of the enemy along the graded road, 25 men of the 31st

Punjab Infantry, with Subadar Sayyid Ahmad Shah in command, were posted in the fortified serai. The enemy commenced a most determined attack on this serai at about 8-30 P.M., but the garrison, having effectually blocked the only entrance, gallantly defended it until 3 A.M. when the enemy succeeded in obtaining an entrance by digging holes in the walls, and set the building on fire. Owing to the darkness and the noise of the firing, the desperate condition of this little party was not recognised by the troops in rear; otherwise assistance would have been sent to them. Seeing that further resistance in the serai was out of the question, Subadar Sayyid Ahmad Shah ordered a retreat. With the aid of a ladder the party let themselves down over the wall nearest to the camp, and retired to the enclosure carrying all their wounded with them. Nine of them, however, had unfortunately been killed and ten were wounded. Brigadier-General Meiklejohn* in bringing the gallant conduct of the Subadar to notice wrote that, "nothing could have been finer than the way these few men stuck to their post till it was made absolutely untenable".

Elsewhere along the line the attack was maintained vigorously all night, but the enemy were everywhere repulsed with heavy loss. In the early morning just as day was breaking the enemy, who had been all night hotly engaged with the 24th Punjab Infantry, began to press them closely from the heights on the west. Whereupon, Lieutenant Climo assumed the offensive and boldly advancing with two companies, under cover of the fire of the two guns on this flank and of another company of the 24th Punjab Infantry, attacked the enemy in their strong position. The enemy had many Martini rifles with them with which they kept up a heavy fire, and they held their ground most determinedly rolling down rocks and stones. Lieutenant Climo, however, continued his advance and, driving them from position to position, pursued them for a couple of miles inflicting a loss on them of 40 killed and some 50 or more badly wounded. Many of the enemy were seen to be taking refuge in the village of Jalalkot, whereupon the guns opened an accurate fire on the village causing several more casualties among the tribesmen. These offensive tactics had a most salutary effect on the enemy, as in future they invariably retired before daybreak.

The casualties on the night of July 27th were: Lieutenant E. W. Costello; 22nd Punjab Infantry (attached to 24th Punjab Infantry), dangerously wounded, 11 men killed, and 45 wounded.

Although the enemy had for a second time been driven off with great losses, they were not yet by any means dispirited with the results of their enterprise. The North Camp with all the tents and other articles left there had fallen into their hands, and the loot thus obtained was carried off to the villages of the surrounding country, while nearly all the tents were burnt. The sight of this conflagration, and the knowledge that every village contained loot carried off from the Malakand, at once decided thousands of the surrounding tribesmen, who probably till now had been maintaining a neutral attitude pending the result of the operations, to throw in their lot against Government, as they not unnaturally concluded that the British troops had suffered a severe defeat.

By this time, however, reinforcements were already on their way to succour the hard-pressed garrison of the Malakand. For as soon as Government recognised that the rising was general, orders were issued on the 27th July for one squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers, and the 38th Dogras, at Nowshera, the 35th Sikhs at Peshawar, and No. 7 mountain battery, R. A., in the Murree Hills, to proceed immediately to the Malakand. The 22nd Punjab Infantry, at Jhelum, and 2 squadrons 11th Bengal Lancers, were ordered to move to Mardan; and the 1st Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment at Peshawar were held in readiness to move if required. As it was known that the whole of the inhabitants of the villages between Mardan and the Malakand were in a most unsettled state, many of them having already in fact taken part in the attacks on the Malakand, it was considered necessary that the 35th Sikhs, the 38th Dogras, and the squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers, should move as a united force when advancing beyond Mardan. Colonel A. J. Reid, Colonel on the Staff at Rawalpindi, was directed to proceed at once to Mardan to take command of this column.

* Colonel Meiklejohn was granted the rank of Brigadier-General, on being appointed to command the 1st Brigade of the Malakand Field Force.

Meanwhile the troops at the Malakand were taking all possible steps to strengthen their position. Until the arrival of reinforcements it would be impossible to relieve Chakdarra, and all offensive movements against the Swat valley were entirely out of the question. As the day (28th July) advanced, it became evident that the Malakand position was practically besieged, as the enemy were in possession of all the neighbouring heights whence they kept up a constant fire on the camp. Telegraphic communication with India was also now interrupted, and news could only pass through by means of friendly natives. The whole of the 28th July was accordingly spent in improving the defences, and throwing up extra cover for the piquets: the ground all round the enclosures was cleared as far as possible, and the abattis and barbed wire were increased round these posts as far as means permitted: the wall between the Commissariat and Sappers enclosures was demolished. In all this work the transport drivers and other followers rendered valuable assistance, as the troops were already weary from want of sleep and rest. Up to the 28th the enemy attacking the Malakand had consisted of Ranizais of the Swat valley and a large miscellaneous gathering of Dush Khels, Talashis, Adinzais, and Utman Khels, with a few Upper Swatis, and also several Yusufzais of the Peshawar District. But on this afternoon it was seen that large numbers of Bunerwals (easily distinguishable by their dark blue clothing) had joined in the rising.

At 10 P.M. on the 28th July fighting recommenced and was carried on with great courage and pertinacity till 3 A.M. on the 29th. The position of the troops was the same as on the night of the 27th July. The enemy attacked all along the front of the position and several times charged right up to the breastworks and abattis; nowhere, however, were they successful in piercing the line, being invariably driven back with loss: the 45th Sikhs on the right were also vigorously attacked and lost two men killed. But the brunt of the fighting was in the centre, where Lieutenants Maclean, Swinley and Ford* were all wounded. On the left of the position the 24th Punjab Infantry were heavily assailed, but the enemy were kept at a distance by the artillery fire. About 3 A.M. the enemy withdrew to the Khar plain, leaving sharpshooters on the neighbouring heights to annoy the garrison during the day time, and as day broke they could be seen on the hills dragging away large numbers of killed and wounded. The troops, however, were far too exhausted to be sent out in pursuit.

The casualties during the night of 28th July were—killed two men; wounded, Lieutenant H. B. Ford, 31st Punjab Infantry, dangerously, Lieutenant H. L. S. Maclean, Guides Cavalry, and 2nd-Lieutenant G. D. Swinley, 31st Punjab Infantry, severely; and 13 native ranks.

On July 29th troops and followers were again employed all day in still further strengthening the position: the ground all along in front of the line was cleared of everything which afforded cover to the enemy, and the parapets and abattis were still further improved. In the centre the serai and bazar ruins were levelled, and large bonfires were prepared so that the enemy attacking by the graded road would be obliged to cross a line of light.

In the morning signalling communication was again opened with Chakdarra, by which it was learnt that constant attacks by night and day had been made on the post, but that everything so far was well: the ammunition there was, however, running short and more was urgently required. Information was also received from Lieutenant Minchin, assistant political officer at Chakdarra, stating that the Mian Guls had now joined the enemy with large numbers of Bunerwals. During the afternoon Major S. Beatson, Commanding 11th Bengal Lancers, arrived at the Malakand with a squadron of his regiment, bringing up a supply of 12,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, a most welcome addition to the reserve supply after the enormous nightly expenditure which had taken place. Towards evening large organised bands could be seen collecting on the hills to the west. As the day was *Fumarat* and the moon a new one, it was confidently expected that the enemy would on this night make their supreme effort.

* Lieutenant Ford's wound was dangerous, a branch of an artery being cut. Surgeon-Lieutenant J. H. Hugo, who took charge of the case, having no means at hand for securing the artery, for two hours stopped the bleeding by compressing it with his fingers; and early in the morning, thinking that the enemy had effected an entrance into camp, he picked up Lieutenant Ford with one arm, and still holding the artery with the fingers of the other hand, carried him to a place of safety.

At 9-30 P.M. the attack commenced, and it was maintained with greater ferocity and vigour than on any previous occasion. The brunt of the fighting fell on the two flanks, more specially on the left, as the enemy avoided the centre apparently on account of the light thrown on them by the bonfires, which acted admirably and were of the greatest assistance. The fires also facilitated the use of the 9-pounder gun in the fort, which being unexpected had a good effect.

During an interval in the fighting the enemy lying opposed to the 24th Punjab Infantry opened parley with the Afridis of that regiment, urging them to join their ranks and take part with them in the sacking of the Malakand, which they stated must inevitably fall into their hands. The Afridis pretended to consent to this arrangement and thereby put the tribesmen off their guard, whereupon they instantly shot those who were foolish enough to expose themselves.*

About 1-30 A.M. a most determined and reckless attempt was made to overpower the piquet of the 24th Punjab Infantry guarding the water nullah in rear of the position held by that battalion. The enemy in large numbers, absolutely regardless of consequences, rushed in on the piquet and many of them even succeeded in jumping into the piquet sangar only to be instantly bayoneted. This attack was successfully repulsed, but Lieutenant E. W. Costello, who, in spite of having been already dangerously wounded on the previous night, had still continued to carry on his duties, was again dangerously wounded by a bullet which fractured his left arm. At 2 A.M. another tremendous effort was made, the enemy actually approaching so close as to pull down some of the sangars and cut a deal of the barbed wire. The attack, however, was everywhere repulsed. At 2-30 A.M. the attack suddenly ceased and the enemy shortly afterwards withdrew carrying away large numbers of killed and wounded. From information subsequently received it was ascertained that the "Mad Fakir" had himself led the attack delivered at 2 A.M., but having been wounded in the hand had retired to Landakai. His principal companion and supporter was shot dead outside the 45th Sikhs line where the body was found on the following morning. This man, who was undoubtedly from India (probably from Delhi), is said to have had the Fakir's promise that he should be King of Delhi as soon as the British had been everywhere defeated.

The casualties for the night of the 29th July were—killed, one man; wounded—Lieutenant E. W. Costello, 24th Punjab Infantry, dangerously, Lieutenant F. A. Wynter, Royal Artillery, severely, and 17 native ranks.

At 6 A.M. on the morning of the 30th July, Brigadier-General Meiklejohn received a message from Colonel Reid stating that he was close at hand with reinforcements. Colonel Reid had reached Dargai at 10 P.M. the previous night with 424 rifles of the 38th Dogras, and 168 rifles and 39 sabres of the Guides. As all messages from the front insisted on the necessity of pushing on with all possible speed, he had decided not to delay his advance by waiting at Mardan for the 35th Sikhs from Nowshera, as he had been directed to do (see page 20). The 35th Sikhs were, however, then momentarily expected as they had left Nowshera at 10-30 P.M. on the 28th, and had started from Mardan at 5 P.M. on the evening of the 29th July. Later on in the day further information was received at the Malakand stating that the 35th Sikhs had arrived at Dargai at 8 A.M., after a most trying march, in intense heat; that they had lost 21 men from heat apoplexy, and that the remainder were terribly exhausted. On receipt of this information Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, feeling perfect confidence in his ability to hold his own on the kotal with the troops then at his disposal, directed Colonel Reid to remain for the day at Dargai and give his troops a day's rest.

However, in order to reinforce the Malakand as far as possible, Colonel Reid at 6-30 A.M. sent on the old Dargai garrison consisting of 200 rifles of the 31st Punjab Infantry under the command of Colonel H. A. Sawyer, 45th Sikhs, who with other officers was hurriedly returning from leave. These arrived without

* The Afridi rising in the Khyber did not take place until August 1897.

opposition at the Malakand where the troops as usual were busily employed in repairing the damages to their defences and strengthening their position. This work was less disturbed by the enemy than usual and it was now evident that the enemy were distinctly disheartened. They had not yet, however, given up all hope of capturing the position; and late in the afternoon it was seen that large reinforcements had joined their ranks, from which it became evident that Lieutenant Minchin's report of the Mian Guls having thrown in their lot against Government was true. During the day a report was received from Chakdarra stating that the fort had been vigorously attacked during the previous night, but that the enemy had been driven back with great slaughter; ammunition and provisions were, however, beginning to run short.

At 9-30 P.M. the attack on the Malakand commenced again as usual; but the enemy, although in greater strength than ever, failed to carry out their attacks with that spirit which they had hitherto displayed. The bonfires in front of the position (the arrangements for which had been greatly improved during the day) again acted admirably and were of the greatest assistance in repelling the attacks. Firing continued more or less on all sides during the whole night, but little harm was done to the garrison. Once during the night the enemy on the east, taking advantage of a heavy thunderstorm, made a determined attack on the 45th Sikhs, but were driven back with the bayonet with heavy loss. The casualties for the night were only two men wounded.

In the early morning of July 31st very large numbers of tribesmen joined the enemy who, posted on the neighbouring hills, kept up a harassing fire more or less all the day. At 9 A.M. Colonel Reid, having left 400 rifles and a few cavalry at Dargai, arrived at the Malakand with the 38th Dogras, 35th Sikhs, and details of the Guides, numbering in all 707 rifles. He also brought a fresh supply of ammunition amounting to 190,000 rounds. His march was unopposed, although the enemy had been seen between Dargai and Malakand during the previous evening, and though the wire had been cut and the levy posts along the road had been burnt.

During the morning a short message was received from Chakdarra asking for help as soon as possible, as the garrison there were getting worn out and supplies and ammunition were nearly expended. As soon, therefore, as Colonel Reid had arrived with his supports the possibility of relieving Chakdarra was anxiously discussed. Although the men were in excellent spirits and full of eagerness to be led against the enemy, all officers were agreed that offensive operations, however desirable and important they might be, were then absolutely impossible owing to the exhaustion of the troops. The garrison, moreover, was scarcely yet sufficient for such a move, as any column moving out into the Swat valley must necessarily be a strong one, while the Malakand kotal denuded of troops would be left to the mercy of the enemy who might then rush in on it and cut off the water-supply.

Large numbers of tribesmen surrounded the camps all day, and a considerable contingent of the Salarzai section of Bunerwals with standards joined their ranks; but the enemy had noticed the arrival of the reinforcements from Dargai, and evidently now realised that all chance of capturing the Malakand had vanished. Accordingly during the night of the 31st July, with the exception of a certain amount of desultory firing, there was nothing to disturb the troops, who thus for the first time for many days were able to obtain that rest which all so sorely required.

By daybreak on the 1st August it looked as if the gatherings had mostly withdrawn. This, however, boded ill for the Chakdarra garrison, and Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, considering that the tribesmen had probably withdrawn from the Malakand merely to concentrate their full force against Chakdarra, determined to make an effort to succour that outpost. A column composed of

Guides Cavalry.
1 Squadron 11th Bengal Lancers.
45th Sikhs.
24th Punjab Infantry.
Guides Infantry.
4 guns, No 8 Bengal Mountain Battery.
No. 5 Coy. Madras Sappers and Miners.

the marginally noted troops was accordingly detailed for this enterprise. At 11 A.M. the Guides Cavalry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, moved out of camp with the intention of advancing into the Swat valley by the road

leading past the North Camp. The orders given by Brigadier-General Meiklejohn to Lieutenant-Colonel Adams were that he was to make a dash for the Amandarra defile and seize it if possible: if, however, the enemy were met with in force, he was to reconnoitre their position and await reinforcements. Before the cavalry could reach the plain the enemy realised the nature of the movement, and immense numbers flocked from every direction to oppose them. The ground, cut up by deep nullahs and strewn with large boulders, was by no means suitable for cavalry movements; but in spite of this, the Guides made a most successful charge into a large number of the tribesmen and killed at least a hundred of them, with very slight loss to themselves. Captain G. M. Baldwin, D. S. O., received a severe sword cut on the head, and Lieutenant-Colonel Adams had his horse shot under him.

But Brigadier-General Meiklejohn now saw that further progress in face of the swarming masses of the enemy would be so seriously delayed that it would be impossible to reach Chakdarra that day. He accordingly decided to retire and to make another attempt at daybreak the following day. By the time that the order for this retirement had been conveyed to Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, the enemy were already working round the left flank and threatening the only line of retreat to camp. But the withdrawal was completed under cover of the 24th Punjab Infantry who inflicted numerous losses on the enemy and captured some of their standards and a few rifles; in spite of this, however, the enemy followed up in a spirited manner and attacked the camp from the north.

A short but urgent heliographic message, simply bearing the words "Help us", was now received from Chakdarra, to which a reply was sent, informing them that relief would reach them the following morning, and enquiring if the suspension bridge still remained uninjured. As no answer was received to this message, the greatest anxiety was now felt by all regarding the safety of this isolated post.

At midday on August 1st, Major-General Sir Bindon Blood, K.C.B., who had been appointed to the command of the expeditionary force (details of which are given in Appendix A) arrived at the Malakand and assumed the command there. In accordance with the orders of Army Head Quarters, where considerable anxiety regarding Chakdarra was now felt, Sir Bindon Blood had hurried on from Nowshera to the Malakand. Having made himself acquainted with the exact position of affairs Sir Bindon Blood telegraphed to Government, stating that he had found every thing at the Malakand in excellent order and the place absolutely secure; that nothing could have been more admirable than the bearing of the troops and the spirit pervading all ranks, who were full of eagerness to be led against the enemy.

The troops under Brigadier-General Meiklejohn having returned from their attempt to succour Chakdarra, all arrangements were made for carrying out the relief on the following day at dawn. Sir Bindon Blood, having ascertained what Brigadier-General Meiklejohn's proposals were for the movement, entrusted him with the sole charge of making the necessary preparations connected with it, and directed him to have everything ready before dark, and to bivouac for the night with the troops of the relieving column on Gretna Green. To prevent the chance of the enemy being able to make any successful counter attack against the Malakand position during the absence of this column it was decided to limit its strength to 1,000 rifles, 4 guns, all available cavalry, and the company of

4 guns, No. 8 Mountain Battery.
2 Squadrons, Guides Cavalry.
2 Squadrons, 11th Bengal Lancers.
400 Rifles, 24th Punjab Infantry.
200 " Guides Infantry.
400 " 45th Sikhs.
50 men No. 5 Coy., Madras Sappers and Miners.

Sappers and Miners. Orders were accordingly issued for the marginally noted force to be prepared to move at daybreak next morning under the command of Brigadier-General Meiklejohn. The relieving column was directed to carry with

it a large supply of rations and ammunition for the Chakdarra Garrison in addition to two days' supplies for itself; no tents or bedding were to be taken, as the transport available was not sufficient to permit of this. Colonel Reid was to take command of the Malakand Fort and position during the carrying out of the enterprise.

During the whole of the afternoon of the 1st August, while these preparations were in progress, large numbers of the enemy were seen to be in position to the north, north-east, and north-west of the Malakand. Several parties boldly advanced to within three or four hundred yards of the piquets, and kept up a considerable amount of firing, which was maintained with more or less vigour throughout the night; and between 11 P.M. and 12 midnight was 'so heavy that the Gretna Green troops got under arms. At 3 A.M. all firing ceased, and till 5 A.M. all remained quiet. At that hour, Sir Bindon Blood, having personally ascertained that everything was perfectly ready, as soon as it was sufficiently light, ordered the relieving column to advance, and himself quickly took up a position on Castle Rock from whence he could direct all operations. As soon as Meiklejohn had advanced two-thirds of each of the six piquets of the 35th Sikhs and 38th Dogras, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel T. H. Goldney, then holding the Castle Rock position, in accordance with the pre-arranged plan, advanced and seized the spur about 800 yards to the front, overlooking and commanding the graded road leading into the Swat valley. During the previous afternoon and all night there had been large numbers of the enemy on this spur, but most of them had retired by this hour. The 35th Sikhs, silently advancing unperceived, got to within one hundred yards of such of the enemy as had, as usual, remained to fire into the camp. These, startled from their slumbers, opened an irregular and ill-directed fire and rapidly retreated in all directions. The exact number of their casualties was not ascertained, but they left seven of their number dead, and one prisoner fell into the hands of Colonel Goldney's men, who captured this important position without a single casualty.

With two guns placed on Castle Rock and the 35th Sikhs holding the spur (since named Goldney's Hill) Sir Bindon Blood found that he was able to completely cover the advance of the relieving column as far as the junction of the graded road with the road from the North Camp.

At 5-10 A.M. the relieving column left its bivouac on Gretna Green, and advancing *via* the graded road met with no opposition and practically no delay till close to the junction of that road with the North Camp road. As at this point the ground begins to open out, Brigadier-General Meiklejohn was able to deploy his leading troops before the enemy had recovered from their surprise at being turned off Goldney's Hill, or had realised the nature of the operations. From Castle Rock the enemy could now be seen running hither and thither with standards from all directions and (to use Sir Bindon Blood's words) they looked like so many ants in a disturbed ant hill. At length they realized what was taking place, and under cover of a spur which concealed them from Goldney's Hill, they hurried down in hundreds from the hills to the right (east) of the road to occupy a position near the junction of the above mentioned roads. From this position they opened a heavy, but fortunately a comparatively ineffective, fire on the deploying infantry, who were now being slightly delayed owing to a bridge on the road having broken down. Seeing large numbers of the enemy rapidly approaching the position opposed to him, Brigadier-General Meiklejohn directed the Guides Infantry under Lieutenant Elliott-Lockhart, and the 45th Sikhs under Colonel Sawyer, to at once advance and capture the position at the point of the bayonet. This they succeeded in doing with the loss of two men killed and one severely wounded. The enemy having been driven off with heavy loss took up a second position 400 yards further on, known as the Bedford hill pass, which consisted of a number of knolls, on one of which was the strongly built village of Malakot. Brigadier-General Meiklejohn thereupon directed a portion of the Guides Infantry to attack the heights on the right (east) of the road and the 45th Sikhs and 24th Punjab Infantry to attack the centre and left (west) respectively. This second position was carried without difficulty. At these two spots the enemy left at least 160 dead bodies.

The enemy were now thoroughly panic-stricken, and having completely lost heart, streamed off in every direction from all parts of the position. Driven from the hills, large numbers sought refuge in their villages, for which purpose they had to cross the open Khar plain, thus affording an admirable object for the action of our cavalry. Up till this stage of the operations this arm had been kept in rear of the column, but on arriving near the level ground Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, seeing his opportunity, quickly moved his men forward and sent the two

squadrons of the 11th Bengal Lancers, under Major Beatson, to the left round the western slopes of Bedford hill, while with the two squadrons of the Guides Cavalry he moved by the road on to the Khar plain, and thence onward as far as the village of Bat Khela. Both parties encountered large numbers of the enemy in full flight and did great execution amongst them, spearing and cutting them down in every direction and leaving the ground strewn with dead bodies. Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, having reformed his cavalry, then pushed rapidly forward and at 7-20 A.M. seized the Amandarra position, meeting with only slight opposition *en route*.

Meanwhile the infantry had halted on the slopes of the hill above Khar plain for about 20 minutes to enable the baggage, etc., to close up, but on receipt of information from Lieutenant-Colonel Adams that the Amandarra defile was in his possession, Brigadier-General Meiklejohn ordered the infantry to advance. On arriving at Bat Khela, the 45th Sikhs were ordered to clear the village of the enemy, who had fired on the cavalry when passing their village. This was done in the face of stubborn opposition, and some 80 of the tribesmen were bayoneted there.

Lieutenant-Colonel Adams having reported from Amandarra hill at 7-30 A.M. that heavy firing was going on at Chakdarra, Brigadier-General Meiklejohn decided to hurry on as rapidly as possible, and he sent on the cavalry to ascertain what was happening there. Beyond Amandarra the whole valley was a mass of high rice crops with innumerable watercourses running through the fields, and the march of the column was much delayed, as the enemy had broken down all the bridges on the road between that place and Chakdarra, and there was one crossing which was particularly bad. At 9 A.M. the cavalry, arriving at the Swat bridge which was uninjured, found that Chakdarra was being heavily attacked, and that the enemy were evidently making a last desperate attempt to capture the fort ere reinforcements could arrive. On the approach of the cavalry, however, the tribesmen recognised that the attempt was futile and commenced their retirement. Lieutenant Rattray, with a few men, thereupon made a spirited sortie from the fort and driving some 30 men out of the Civil Hospital pursued them down the right bank of the river and shot them all down. On his return to the fort he found that some men in *sangars* on the hill above the river were delaying the cavalry crossing the bridge: he was then reinforced by Captain Baker with a few more men from the fort and the small party charged up the hill and quickly shot down all who opposed them. Lieutenant Rattray himself was the first into these *sangars*, and was severely wounded in the neck by a bullet. The cavalry having now effected a crossing, hurried in pursuit of the enemy and drove them in scattered parties up the Talash and Uch valleys. By this time the horses and men being greatly fatigued by their exertions, further pursuit was out of the question, and the whole force accordingly retired on Chakdarra.

At 10 A.M. Brigadier-General Meiklejohn with the remainder of the relieving column crossed the bridge and marched into the fort. Notwithstanding their trying experiences the little garrison were found to be in good health and excellent spirits.* Their losses during the past week had been three killed and nine wounded.

As soon as the infantry had crossed the Swat river, Brigadier-General Meiklejohn sent the 45th Sikhs to destroy the village of Chakdarra, and despatched the 24th Punjab Infantry under Major Ramsay to examine and clear the heights in the vicinity of the post: neither party met with any opposition. Later on in the day the demolition of the Civil Hospital was commenced, as the building had proved to be the source of considerable danger to the fort itself. The enemy during the day's operations had undoubtedly received a severe lesson, as quite 500 of them had been killed by the relieving column, and numbers had also been shot down by the Chakdarra garrison. The casualties for the day among the relieving column amounted to 5 men killed and 28 wounded, and 7 horses killed and 13 wounded.†

The column bivouacked for the night in the vicinity of Chakdarra fort, and returned to Amandarra on the following day, having left at Chakdarra 200

* They still retained, besides pouch ammunition, 25 boxes Martini-Henry ammunition and food supplies for 6 days.

† The total casualties of the Malakand troops between the 26th July and 2nd August are given in Appendix C (4-a).

additional infantry and rations for 5 days and 150 rounds of ammunition per man (in addition to pouch ammunition) for the increased garrison, now amounting to 480 men.

At Amandarra the relieving column was met by Sir Bindon Blood, with a force from the Malakand* consisting of 1 squadron 11th Bengal Lancers and 500 rifles under command of Colonel Reid, conveying further supplies and ammunition for Chakdarra. These supplies and ammunition having been passed through, Sir Bindon Blood proceeded with Brigadier-General Meiklejohn's troops to Aladand, whence with the cavalry he pushed on and thoroughly searched Thana. Both villages were found to be deserted and the enemy, who were seen on the hills above Thana, did not attempt to make the slightest resistance. On the following day the cavalry make a reconnaissance up the left bank of the Swat river and proceeded 5 miles beyond Thana without opposition; while Colonel Reid's force returned to the Malakand, and Brigadier-General Meiklejohn's column encamped in a strong defensive position at the Amandarra defile, where it remained until an advance was made into Upper Swat twelve days later.

* The 22nd Punjab Infantry arrived at the Malakand on the after noon of the 2nd August.

CHAPTER 4.

THE DEFENCE OF CHAKDARRA FORT.

During the operations of the Chitral relief force a suspension bridge of sufficient strength and width to carry field guns had been thrown across the swift and dangerous Swat river, which for many months of the year is a wide rushing torrent absolutely unfordable. This bridge is 948 feet long, 700 feet of it being hung from steel suspension cables of two spans of 250 feet and 110 feet in the clear, each span having two half-back spans of 125 and 55 feet respectively. To protect the bridge a strongly built post had been erected, close to it on the right bank of the river, which was called Chakdarra fort after the name of the village which lies about $\frac{3}{4}$ mile to the north-east of the post. This work was of stone and was erected around a small isolated rocky conical-shaped mound on the river bank and about 150 yards distant from the end of a spur running down from the main range of hills on the west. On the north-west and west the faces of this work consisted of double-storied barracks 25 feet high with rows of loop-holes and with flank defence in which were located the garrison. The north-east end of the mound, which was very steep and rocky, was scarped and protected by barbed wire entanglement and a low stone wall. On the south of the mound was a small hornwork protected by a stone wall, near approach to which was prevented by high barbed-wire entanglement. Five hundred yards to the west on the summit of a small knoll on the spur above mentioned there was a small square one-storied block-house with a defensible roof, held by 10 men of the 45th Sikhs, from whence signalling with the Malakand was maintained. The bridge on the left bank was closed by a pair of strongly constructed one-storied block-houses with defensible roofs with a double hung loop-holed iron gate between them. The armament of the fort consisted of one 9-pounder smooth-bore muzzle-loading gun (placed on the summit of the mound) and two Maxims, one of the latter, in July 1897, being placed in the block-house on the left bank.

When hostilities broke out in July 1897, the garrison of Chakdarra consisted of Lieutenant H. B. Rattray, 2nd-Lieutenant L. L. Wheatley and 180 men of the 45th Sikhs, 20 sowars of the 11th Bengal Lancers, and Surgeon Captain V. Hugo, I. M. S., in medical charge. On the 23rd July 1897 Major L. Herbert, D. A. A. G., at the Malakand, having informed Lieutenant Rattray that restlessness existed amongst the tribes, and that he must be prepared to resist any tribal attack, the latter officer told off his troops to their respective posts and practised them in taking up the positions assigned to them. The cavalry occupied the hornwork, but as their numbers were too few to man the defences of the work, they were reinforced by a few men of the 45th Sikhs. On Monday, July 26th, Lieutenant Rattray was playing polo at Khar with others of the Malakand garrison. On the completion of the game, when he was about to return to Chakdarra, a couple of sowars came galloping up to him with a letter from 2nd-Lieutenant Wheatley, informing him that large numbers of tribesmen with standards flying could be seen advancing on Chakdarra and Malakand along both sides of the river.* Lieutenant Rattray having safely reached Chakdarra and ascertained that the information was correct instantly wired the news to the Malakand, and

* The first man to bring to Chakdarra this news of the tribesmen's approach was a havildar of the 45th Sikhs, who had been out on the hills surveying and who returned in the evening reporting that the tribesmen had stopped him sketching and had robbed him of his binoculars, compass, and fifty rupees. Shortly after this Inayat Khan, one of the Thana maliks, with a few servants also came hurrying in from Thana, saying, that the whole of the inhabitants of his village had joined the Fakir, who now had a large gathering around him.

directed his men to put on their accoutrements ready to meet the attack. By this time Lieutenant A. B. Minchin, assistant political agent, who had arrived from the Malakand in accordance with Major Deane's orders, had sent a messenger to turn out the Aladand *lashkar* to stop the Fakir's progress, but this was without effect.

A havildar of the Dir levies had promised to give timely warning of the near approach of the enemy advancing to attack, by lighting a fire on a certain hill close by; and at about 10-15 P.M. a light on the hill shot up. The "alarm" was instantly sounded, and almost immediately afterwards, the enemy, chiefly composed of Adinzais and Shamozaïs of Upper Swat, opened fire and attacked the fort on the west side, but were easily repulsed. Moving round in the darkness, they then made a bold attempt to effect an entrance into the fort on the east side by means of a number of ladders, which they had taken from the civil hospital, which was situated immediately under the western wall of the fort. This attempt also was driven back. At about 4 A.M. they again made a vigorous attempt from the east to gain a footing in the hornwork, which was guarded by the cavalry. In this they were again defeated. Thereupon they withdrew, and at day break the little garrison, who had remained at their posts all night,* saw that the tribesmen had retired to Chakdarra village, and to the hills to the north and north-west. These heights completely commanded the work at a range varying from 500 to 950 yards, and the enemy were thus able to keep up a desultory but harassing fire into the interior of the fort, fortunately, however, without any result.

On Tuesday, the 27th July, at about 8 A.M. Captain Wright of the 11th Bengal Lancers, and Captain D. Baker, 2nd Bombay Grenadiers, arrived from the Malakand with 1 native officer and 39 sowars of the former regiment as described in the last chapter. This reinforcement was a very welcome addition to the garrison, which without it was scarcely sufficient to effectively man the whole perimeter. Captain Wright having thoroughly examined all Lieutenant Rattray's arrangements assumed command of the post. At 11-30 A.M. the enemy again renewed the attack with great determination in ever increasing numbers, and several Nekpi Khels were now observed in their ranks. They surrounded the north and east sides of the fort and kept up a heavy fire, displaying in several instances conspicuous gallantry. Single men with standards, one after another, came rushing straight up under the very walls of the fort in their attempts to plant their standards there. They were met by a hail of bullets, but persisted in their heroic attempts, apparently courting destruction, until they dropped dead. Again the enemy suffered heavily, and leaving their dead and wounded on the ground, withdrew to the hills whence they maintained a desultory and dropping fire. The breathing time thus granted to the garrison was principally spent in placing head-cover along the parapet walls of the fort, which had no loop-holes, and in providing cover for the gun detachments, who were also very much exposed. This work, which was carried out under the superintendence of Captain Baker, afterwards proved to be of the greatest value, and many lives were undoubtedly thereby saved.

On this day it was found to be impossible to maintain communication with the Malakand; for the telegraph wire had been cut, and signalling could not be carried on from the signalling tower, as the enemy had thrown up *sangars* all round it from whence they kept up a heavy fire on any man who showed himself. In the middle of the day the signal tower was reinforced by six men of the 45th Sikhs, and supplies sufficient for several days were sent up; also as much water as possible†. This was done under cover of the fire from both Maxims and from the infantry on the west face of the fort. In this same manner supplies of water were sent up daily until the 1st August, when the enemy succeeded in cutting off all access to the tower.

*It may be interesting to note here that at 2 A.M. after the attacks had been made on the Malakand position the troops at Chakdarra saw a fire balloon with a scintillating ball of intensely white light sent up from the top of a hill about 4 miles off adjoining the Swat valley. This was of course a pre-arranged signal for the tribes to rise. As such a signal was quite different to the usual tribal custom of signalling by means of lighting fires on the hill tops, and as moreover the balloon must have been an imported article, this strange occurrence is a proof that the idea of a rising did not originate in the Swat valley itself, but was instigated elsewhere.

† The tower itself contained a water-tank capable of holding 1,220 gallons of water, but owing to neglect this had not been kept filled.

CHAKDARRA FORT.

I. B., Topo. Dy. No. 2495.
 Exd. C. J. A., March 1899.

Enemy's Sangars


Signalling Tower

Swamp in
flood time

SWAT R.

Scale 8 Inches = 1 Mile.

100 50 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 Yards



No. 1,574-L, 99.

On the night of the 27th July* the enemy made two determined attacks, but were driven off on each occasion with heavy loss. During the day time 2nd-Lieutenant Wheatley had trained his guns on to certain spots over which the enemy would probably advance in any night attack. The firing of these guns was evidently successful, as the enemy's first attack, which commenced on all sides at 11 P.M., withdrew after the first discharge, and was not renewed for nearly two hours. Then they came on again, and made a fierce onslaught on the north-east corner of the work, as on the previous evening attempting to scale the wall with the ladders in their possession. This attack was also driven back, but the enemy kept up a steady fire till 6 A.M.

During the 28th July with the exception of a little desultory firing the garrison had a quiet day until the evening, and improvements were made to the head cover and the shelter for the gun detachments as far as possible. But at 5-30 P.M. the enemy reinforced by men of the Musa Khel, Abazai, and Khadazai again began their attack in their usual manner; small parties, and sometimes even single men with standards, making rushes at full speed for any natural or artificial cover. In this manner they got to within a couple of hundred yards of the fort, and at night-fall there were no less than two hundred standards arranged in an irregular semi-circle around the post. During the night the enemy's attacks were chiefly directed against the hornwork held by the cavalry, and some of them actually succeeded, by means of bundles of grass, in crossing the wire entanglement and getting to within 10 yards of the wall.

At dawn next morning (July 29th) the enemy again withdrew after suffering great losses. The usual dropping fire was kept up during the day but the garrison employed themselves in strengthening their defences; and traverses were put up to shelter the men near the fort gate from the fire of a rifleman, posted on the opposite side of the river, who considerably harassed the defenders by the accuracy of his aim. At 3 P.M. very large numbers of the tribesmen, amongst whom were now a lot of the Aba Khels, could be seen flocking out from Chakdarra village, carrying ladders and bundles of grass. Sending a small portion only of their force to occupy the attention of the fort garrison, they advanced with great determination, and made a supreme effort to capture the signalling tower. The guns and every available rifle in the fort were now directed against this attack, but in spite of the heavy losses inflicted on them, the enemy steadily advanced and set fire to a grass-roofed shed erected against the north wall of the tower. Seeing this, and thinking that the tower itself was on fire, the crowds of tribesmen on the neighbouring hills and around the fort raised a terrific howl of delight. At 8 P.M., however, they withdrew, as their losses had been enormous, so heavy indeed that they were unable to remove all their dead during the night, and no less than fifty bodies were lying close around the tower during the whole of the next day. For the remainder of the night of July 29th the defenders were undisturbed, except by a few of the enemy who kept up the usual desultory fire from their *sangars*.

On July 30th the garrison had a comparatively easy time, as the enemy, with whom a number of Bajauris were now observed, did not attack till 7-30 P.M. and even then, owing to very heavy rain, without much vigour. The troops were thus able to obtain a few hours of much needed rest, by this time many of them were almost worn out by want of sleep and fatigue.

On July 31st at 6 A.M. water was as usual sent up to the tower,—the last supply which the signallers received until after the relief of the post on August 2nd. On all these occasions of sending water to the signalling tower, the *bhistis* had behaved with the greatest courage: they had to draw their water under fire, and to climb up the steep face of the spur with it, as the pathway up to the tower was so commanded by the enemy's fire that no use could be made of it.

At 4-30 P.M. the enemy again attacked the north-east corner of the fort in large numbers, but having again suffered great losses, especially from the Maxim and 9-pounder fire, they withdrew to Chakdarra village at about 11 P.M., leaving merely a few riflemen in their *sangars*. Some Malizais were now observed to

* Just before dark on the evening of the 27th July, Inayat Khan and his followers, at their own request, were permitted to proceed to the Malakand to assist Government in any way possible.

have joined the enemy, and there was no doubt that the enemy's numbers had been very largely augmented by men from Malakand.

On August 1st matters began to assume a much more serious aspect, as during the previous night several of the enemy had occupied the civil hospital and had loop-holed the walls of that building facing towards the hornwork. Several riflemen now occupied the building and rendered movement in the hornwork exceedingly dangerous. Others had also occupied the spur between the fort and the signalling tower, and had erected substantial *sangars*, out of view from the signalling tower, from which they were able to maintain a heavy fire at 150 yards range right into the interior of the fort itself.* The enemy too in spite of their losses were now flocking round the post in thousands, and it was decided to send an urgent message for help to the Malakand. Signalling, however, was carried out with the greatest difficulty, and the signallers were exposed to great danger. In spite of this, however, they worked most courageously; one man, Prem Singh of the 45th Sikhs, especially distinguished himself by climbing through a port hole of the tower, at the risk of his life, carrying a heliograph, and by proceeding some way down the steep face of the hillside to send important messages. On this occasion, to make the message as pressing and yet as short as possible, only the words "help us" were sent. Owing to the near presence of the enemy the garrison were kept at their posts all day and all night.

On Monday August 2nd at 5 A.M., the enemy now numbering some 8,000 men advanced to the attack in a most determined manner carrying ladders and large bundles of grass. They had evidently made up their minds to capture the post whatever the cost might be. A very heavy fire was maintained by both sides, and although large numbers of the enemy were seen to fall, the united fire of the small arms, the Maxim, and the 9-pounder were only just sufficient to keep the enemy in check. The shooting on the part of the enemy was now better than it had been hitherto, and the havildar commanding the 9-pounder gun detachment was killed and two sepoy wounded. Still the enemy pressed on; but at about 7-20 A.M., just as matters were approaching a crisis, the cavalry of the relieving column appeared over the Amandarra ridge, and the welcome flash of the heliograph assured the hard pressed garrison of immediate assistance. The enemy too saw that flash, and recognised that help was approaching, but refused to desist in their attack until the cavalry were close at hand. At about 8-30 A.M., as the cavalry approached the bridge, the enemy rapidly retreated, and those occupying the hospital commenced creeping away in twos and threes. Lieutenant Rattray at this time was standing by the western gate of the hornwork and, having noticed the enemy creeping off from the civil hospital, he collected eight or ten men and making a sortie drove the remainder of the enemy (who numbered about 30) out of the building, and pursuing them down the river bank he killed them all. In this sortie one sowar of the 11th Bengal Lancers was mortally wounded, one sepoy of the 45th Sikhs was killed, and another was wounded. Reinforced by Captain Baker, 2nd-Lieutenant Wheatley and a few sepoy the party then drove the enemy off the hills, as described in the previous chapter.

The casualties of the Chakdarra garrison between July 26th and August 2nd inclusive were:—Lieutenant H. B. Rattray, 45th Sikhs, severely wounded in the neck; 5 men killed, and 10 wounded.

The enemy's losses in their attacks on Chakdarra were enormous. At the time it was computed that their number of killed alone fully amounted to 2,000; a computation which was more than confirmed by information afterwards obtained from the tribesmen themselves, who stated that they had lost over 2,300 killed at Chakdarra, as well as some 1,400 in their attacks on Malakand and in the fighting on the 2nd August during the relief of Chakdarra, besides many hundreds wounded. So certain were the enemy of being eventually successful, that during the siege of Chakdarra they made no attempt whatever to injure the bridge; nor did they attempt to shoot any of the cavalry horses or mules, which being in the hornwork were all exposed to their fire.

* Even before this, the interior of the fort was commanded in many places, and communications were difficult to keep up; but from this time there was hardly a spot not commanded by the enemy, and but for the head cover, barrels of earth, and traverses, which had been put up, the loss to the garrison must have been large.

The following statement showing the behaviour of the Dir levies during the attacks on the Malakand and Chakdarra may be of interest :—

At Chakdarra	...	8	stood firm.	44	mutinied or refused work.
" Sarai	...	15	"	22	" " " "
" Sado	...	0	"	48	" " " "
" Panjkora bridge	...	0	"	11	" " " "
" Robat	...	47	"	0	" " " "
" Warai	...	27	"	18	" " " "
" Darora	...	19	"	20	" " " "
" Dir	...	77	"	0	" " " "
Total	...	193	"	172	" " " "

The jemadar of the Dir levies stationed at Chakdarra fought on our side during the whole of the siege, and was killed at his post just before the relief of the post on 2nd August.

CHAPTER 5.

MOBILISATION OF THE MALAKAND FIELD FORCE UNDER THE COMMAND OF SIR BINDON BLOOD, K.C.B., AND MEASURES TAKEN TO PUNISH THE TRIBES IMPLICATED IN THE RISING.

As soon as the Government of India became aware that the attacks on the Malakand and Chakdarra garrisons were not merely the results of a small local disturbance, but that a deliberate attempt was being made by the combined tribesmen to turn our troops out of the country, immediate steps were taken to reinforce the Malakand; and orders were issued on the 30th July for the formation of a field force, consisting of two brigades with divisional troops, for the purpose of crushing the rising and otherwise punishing the tribesmen. This field force was composed of the troops already at the Malakand and those moving up to reinforce it, with the addition of the 1st battalion Royal West Kent Regiment, and the 1st battalion East Kent Regiment (The Buffs), and certain other troops. The command of this force was entrusted to Brigadier-General Sir Bindon Blood, K.C.B. (commanding the Bundelkhand district), with the temporary rank of Major-General, an officer who was already well acquainted with the Swat valley and neighbouring country, as he had served as Chief of the Staff to Sir R. Low, K.C.B., during the Chitral relief expedition.

The force was composed as under* :—

1ST BRIGADE (BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. H. MEIKLEJOHN, C.B., C.M.G.)

1st battalion Royal West Kent Regiment.
24th (Punjab) regiment of Bengal Infantry.
31st (Punjab) regiment of Bengal Infantry.
45th (Rattray's Sikh) regiment of Bengal Infantry.
Sections A and B of No. 1 British field hospital.
No. 38 Native Field Hospital.†
Sections A and B of No. 50 Native field hospital.

2ND BRIGADE (BRIGADIER-GENERAL P. D. JEFFREYS, C.B.)

1st battalion East Kent Regiment, (The Buffs).
35th (Sikh) regiment of Bengal Infantry.
38th (Dogra) regiment of Bengal Infantry.
Guides Infantry.
Sections C and D of No. 1 British field hospital.
No. 37 Native field hospital.
Sections C and D of No. 50 Native field hospital.

DIVISIONAL TROOPS.

1 squadron 10th Bengal Lancers.
11th Bengal Lancers.
Guides Cavalry.
No. 1 mountain battery, R. A.
No. 7 " " "
No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery.
22nd (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
2 companies 21st (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
No. 4 company Bengal Sappers and Miners.
No. 5 company Madras Sappers and Miners.
Section B of No. 13 British field hospital.‡
Sections A and B of No. 35 Native field hospital.

LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS.

Sections C and D, No. 3 British field hospital.‡
No. 34 Native field hospital.
Section B of No. 1 field veterinary hospital.

* The Commands and Staff of this force are given in Appendix A. (1).

† Relieved by No. 51, Native field hospital on 1st September 1897.

‡ Withdrawn in October to join the Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Three days after the issue of orders for the formation of the Malakand field force, *viz.*, on the 2nd August, Government sanctioned the formation of a Reserve Brigade under the command of Brigadier-General J. H. Wodehouse, C.B., C.M.G.,* to be held in readiness to support that force if required. The British units of this brigade were to concentrate at Rawal Pindi, and the native portion at Mardan.

Owing, however, to the rapid development of events on the Peshawar border, and the spread of the rising to the Mohmands, some of the units at first detailed to join this brigade were hurried to Peshawar to reinforce the garrison there.

The troops, etc., which actually came under Brigadier-General Wodehouse's command were—

- 1st battalion, West Surrey Regiment (The Queen's).
- 2nd „ Highland Light Infantry.
- 6 companies 21st (Punjab) regiment of Bengal Infantry.
- 39th (Garhwal Rifles) regiment of Bengal Infantry.
- No. 10, field battery, Royal Artillery.
- No. 3 company Bombay Sappers and Miners
- Section A, No. 13 British field hospital.
- No. 14 British field hospital.
- Sections A, B and D, No. 45 Native field hospital †.
- Section B, No. 46 Native field hospital.
- Sections B, C and D, No. 1 field medical depôt.

Chakdarra having been relieved on the 2nd August (as described in Chapter 3), and it having been ascertained by the following day's reconnaissances that the enemy, disheartened by their recent losses, had scattered in all directions and that no organised band existed anywhere in the Lower Swat valley, Sir Bindon Blood on the 4th August returned to the Malakand and for the next few days proceeded with the organisation of his force. As the Lower Swat country was suitable for the employment of field artillery, orders had been at once issued to No. 10 field battery to proceed immediately to the Malakand, where it arrived on the 6th August and thence proceeded to Khar. Orders had also been given for the 1st brigade to concentrate at Amandarra and the 2nd brigade at Malakand and Khar.‡ At the same time all superfluous stores and animals were cleared out of the Malakand and sent to Khar, forthwith steps were taken to thoroughly cleanse the Malakand position and put it into a state of defence for the now largely reduced garrison,§ the command of which was handed over to Colonel Reid. On the 6th August Brigadier-General Jeffreys, C.B., commanding 2nd brigade, arrived at the Malakand from Mardan, where up to that date he had remained to superintend the passage of troops through that station. By the 8th August the concentration of the whole force was completed, and a staging system of cart transport had been established between Nowshera and Khar, at which latter place the advanced Commissariat and Ordnance depôts were being formed. Field post offices also were in full working order; and telegraphic communication with Chakdarra was restored. The rapid concentration had, however, entailed severe trials on all, as the heat night and day was intense. Several fatal cases of sunstroke took place among the British troops, and No. 10 field battery also lost several horses from the same cause.

While this concentration was taking place, the troops already in the Swat valley made frequent incursions into the neighbouring country, and the cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Adams reconnoitred the left bank of the upper Swat river for several miles. In these reconnaissances no opposition was met with, only a few shots being fired from the right bank of the river. On the 7th August Brigadier-General Jeffreys, with four guns and two battalions, visited

* A list of the Staff of this brigade is given in Appendix A(2).

† A section withdrawn in October to join the Tirah Expeditionary Force.

‡ The divisional troops (with the exception of the 2 companies 21st Punjab Infantry, who were directed to hold Jalala, the 22nd Punjab Infantry, who had 4 companies at Dargai and 4 companies at Chakdarra, and the Squadron 10th Bengal Lancers, which was located at Jalala and Dargai) also concentrated in the Swat valley and were attached to brigades as necessity arose.

§ The Buffs, 38th Dogras, and 1 Squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers. On the 18th August, 6 companies of the 21st Punjab Infantry arrived from Mardan and relieved the 38th Dogras, who marched the same day to Khar.

the villages of Jalalkot, Derai, Jolagram and other villages on the left bank of the Swat river, west of Khar. All were found absolutely deserted with the exception that one man and a wounded lad—the former a sepoy of the 40th Bengal Infantry—were discovered in Jolagram. This sepoy stated that when the attack took place, the villagers bound him and prevented him proceeding to the Malakand. The wounded lad was sent to the Malakand hospita. Having destroyed all the village defences, the force returned to Khar without any opposition.

On August 8th information was received that many Bunerwals and Hindustani fanatics were moving into the Swat valley. The cavalry were accordingly sent to reconnoitre the Shahkot, Morah, and Cherat passes, while infantry detachments and No. 7 mountain battery in support were sent to suitable positions on the adjacent hills. Only a few of the enemy, however, were seen; a few shots were exchanged, and one of the enemy was killed. On this day information was received from Peshawar of the Mohmand attack on Shabkadar under the Hadda Mullah. This news naturally was received with the greatest interest, as it showed how far spreading this Pathan rising threatened to be, and how indefatigable the fanatical party were in their attempts to work on the religious feelings of the tribesmen.

While the Malakand field force was concentrating, Major Deane, who had been attached to the force as political officer, was busy making searching enquiries with regard to the extent to which the various sections of the surrounding tribes had been implicated in the late attacks. It was ascertained that some 12,000 men had joined in the attack on the Malakand position itself, while some 8,000 more were engaged in the attacks on Chakdarra; and that the following tribes were represented in the attacks:—Ranizais of Swat; Lower Swatis; Upper Swatis; Adinzai; Talash and Dosha Khels; Bajauris, including Maidan and Jandol; Utman Khels, both of Asil and other sections on the British border; Shamozaïs; and one, if not two, sections of Bunerwals (the Salarzais and Asharzais). A certain number of Sam Ranizais had also been implicated, but the maliks remained loyal and were successful in preventing any attack taking place on Dargai, which post was important for maintaining communication with India. It was also reported that about 2,000 British subjects from Yusufzai had been present in the attacks.*

Regarding the attitude of the more important personages, the following appeared to be the state of the case:—Sharif Khan of Aladand and the sons of Saadat Khan of Aladand had been taking a leading part in the attacks. It will be remembered that Sharif Khan had given much trouble to Major Deane in 1896, and that six months of his maliki allowance had been forfeited in consequence. It was at one time reported that he had been killed at the Malakand, but subsequent information proved this to be a mistake, and on the 2nd August he was seen taking a leading part in rallying men to resist the Malakand troops when advancing to relieve Chakdarra. The sons of Saadat Khan were directly responsible for inducing the Mian Guls to join: the Mian Gul faction had held aloof for several days, and only joined the enemy when they feared they would lose the little remaining influence left to them, if they still refused to do so.

Reports from Bajaur showed that the Khan of Nawagai had up to date maintained a neutral attitude in spite of strong pressure brought to bear on him by Mullahs and others.

At the time the disturbances broke out, the Nawab of Dir was in Kohistan. He had undoubtedly a difficult part to play, but there is no denying that he was much upset in his mind at the Fakir's preaching, and being a weak-minded man of naturally indolent inclinations he failed to exert that influence over his subjects which was reasonably expected from him. He, however, openly declared that he would not go back on the promises made to Government, and as soon as he saw that the fanatical rising was a failure, he re-asserted himself; and on the 5th August, having re-opened communication with Chitral, where every thing had

* Appendix F shows the punishment meted out to villages concerned.

remained quiet, and having posted a strong body of men at the Panjkora bridge to prevent any incursion from Bajaur, he visited Major Deane at Chakdarra. Thereupon, he undertook the immediate punishment of those of his subjects who had taken part in the rising and promised to disarm them and hand over their rifles to Major Deane. On this same day Major Deane caused malik Nadiri of Uch, the leading spirit of the rising in Adinzai to be arrested.

As stated above, the punishment of the lower Swatis was already in progress, early in August, by the two brigades encamped in the valley. The inhabitants of the lower Swat valley at once commenced to unconditionally surrender. The first to make overtures for peace were the Ranizais and Khan Khels, who sent in their *jirgas* to Major Deane on the 9th August. The sight of the steadily continued destruction of their villages had been too much for them, and all were quite ready to accept any terms rather than subject themselves to further punishment of this description; moreover the saving of their rice crop, which at this time was nearly fully grown was also of considerable importance to them, as in the lower Swat alone it was estimated to be worth $1\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs of rupees. The submission of these clans was accepted, and the poorer inhabitants were, thereupon, allowed to return to their villages on the following terms: payment of a money fine (amounting in all to Rs. 47,000), surrender of all arms; and surrender of all Government property in their possession. In addition to this Government declared that all allowances paid to them on account of compensation for abolition of tolls and for maliki allowances were henceforth forfeited. The headmen of the tribes, such as Sharif Khan of Aladand and others, were not included in these terms, as it was considered that their cases required special treatment.

On the 12th August the Shamozaï, Shamizai, Nekpi Khel and other tribes on the right bank, in reply to a summons sent them by the Nawab of Dir, sent in their *jirgas* to Chakdarra to sue for peace, which was granted them on terms similar to the above, with the additional understanding that free passage of troops through their country was to be granted if any such move might be considered necessary.

The mad Fakir was, however, still doing his utmost to collect the clans to attack our troops again. He constantly proclaimed that the Amir was sending assistance to the tribes, and that although the attack on the Malakand had this time failed, still the British must at last retire defeated, as attacks on other parts of the frontier were about to take place.

Government now had to decide how each of the tribes engaged in these attacks could be most effectively punished. First of all, in order to prevent further trouble, it was imperative that a force should rapidly advance into upper Swat by the left bank as far as Manglaor, and that a swift blow should be struck in that portion of the valley. As, however, the flank of the force making this advance would be exposed from the south to attack by the Bunerwals, amongst whom there was a *Khalifa*, as well as three or four Mullahs from India preaching *jehad* it was arranged that the reserve brigade under command of Brigadier-General Wodehouse should concentrate at Mardan, and that a part of it * should thence advance to Rustam at the foot of the passes leading into Buner from the Yusufzai plain and thus hold the Bunerwals in check. On the 12th August the sanction of Government was obtained to this proposal and by the 14th August everything was ready for Brigadier-General Meiklejohn and the 1st brigade with certain divisional troops to advance.

* 2 guns, No. 1 mountain battery, Royal Artillery (sent from Khar on the 18th August).

1 squadron 10th Bengal Lancers (temporarily lent from Mardan).
2nd battalion Highland Light Infantry.

39th Garhwal regiment.
No. 3 company Bombay Sappers and Miners.

On the 14th August all arrangements having been completed for the forward move into Upper Swat, Sir Bindon Blood and the divisional staff moved from Malakand to Amandarra and joined the troops there assembled. It was Sir Bindon Blood's intention to advance as far as Thana on the following day. But for many days previously the weather had been very unsettled and during the early morning and forenoon of the 15th August it rained so

heavily that the forward move was delayed until the next day. On the 16th August it again rained heavily nearly all the morning; but Sir Bindon decided to advance in spite of it; and at 1-30 P.M. the force as per margin started, carrying 12 days' supplies for men and two days' grain for animals. On arrival at Thana, 5 miles distant, the force encamped in a large open plain well away from the hills in an easily defensible position. Sir Bindon Blood then personally reconnoitred towards Landakai, in the neighbourhood of which several of the enemy were observed to be building *sangars*. As the reconnaissance

Guides Cavalry.
11th Bengal Lancers.
Royal West Kent regiment.
24th Punjab Infantry.
31st Punjab Infantry.
45th Sikhs.
10th field battery.
No. 7 mountain battery, Royal Artillery.
No. 8 Bengal mountain battery.
No. 5 Company Madras Sappers and Miners.

sance approached their position some 500 or 600 of the enemy with some 15 or 16 standards could be seen occupying the *sangars*, which were spread out for a mile or so along the crest of the Landakai spur. From their general appearance and their shouting it was evident that larger numbers, than those which were actually seen, were in the neighbourhood. As the Guides Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, and the 11th Bengal Lancers, under Major Beatson, had already reconnoitred the country beyond on the left bank of the Swat river for several miles, Sir Bindon Blood did not consider it necessary to push this reconnaissance any further, and as soon as he had taken a general view of the enemy's position and decided on his plan of attack for the following day, the whole party returned to camp. A few shots were exchanged with the enemy, and as soon as the retirement commenced several of the tribesmen, in accordance with their usual custom, followed up the rear guard.

The enemy's position* was undoubtedly a strong one, as the Landakai spur on which they were posted overlooked the valley to the west. This spur runs straight down from the rugged mountains on the south, right up to the banks of the Swat river (at this time swollen and unfordable), and completely commands the only means of approach into upper Swat, which lies along a narrow causeway at the end of the spur overhanging the river. This causeway, about a mile in length and only just broad enough for one man at a time to pass along, was called by the inhabitants the "Gate of Swat." The road from Thana to Landakai passes round the northern edge of the spur close by Thana and thence along the foot of the hills until Jalala is reached. Jalala is situated at the northern end of a spur, covered with old Buddhist ruins, which runs up to a peak completely commanding the Landakai spur. Between the Jalala spur and Landakai there is at first an open valley, about 900 yards wide at its northern end, then another spur, then a deep ravine, and finally the Landakai spur ending in the rough cliffs under which the causeway passed. Beyond the Landakai spur it was known, from the reconnaissances made by the cavalry, that the country was open but covered with rice crops.

On the 17th August at daybreak all baggage in excess of the "light scale" was sent back to Khar on camels with an escort of a squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers. The remainder of the baggage and stores with the unloaded mules, followers, etc., were thereupon parked at Thana, and left there in charge of 2 companies 45th Sikhs, 2 squadrons 11th Bengal Lancers, and 400 rifles 35th Sikhs borrowed for the day from Khar.

Punctually at 6-30 A.M. the advanced guard, headed by the Guides Cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, moved off from Thana, and pushing on to Jalala found the enemy's advanced scouts holding the Buddhist ruins on the Jalala spur. Here the 2 companies of the West Kent regiment, who formed the infantry portion of the advanced guard, engaged and occupied the attention of the enemy until the arrival of the main body of the regiment compelled them to evacuate the spur, which was the first line of their position. It was then seen that some 2,000 or 3,000 of the enemy strongly posted in *sangars*, with many standards, were occupying the Landakai spur a mile further on, their right resting on the steep cliffs which commanded the causeway, their left reaching up to the high hills towards the Morah pass.


* See Sketch of Landakai action opposite page 38.

While the West Kent were engaged in clearing this spur, No. 7 mountain battery, and No. 10 field battery had pushed forward and occupied positions on the Jalala spur, whence they opened fire on the enemy occupying the Landakai spur. The latter battery, under the command of Major C. A. Anderson, had been placed in rear of the column, as the road passing through Thana was very narrow and many of the turnings were very sharp, and although the Sappers and Miners had greatly improved these bad places the previous afternoon, Sir Bindon Blood feared that should the battery be unable to pass these places the rest of the force would be seriously delayed. But Major Anderson overcame all difficulties and brought his battery along at a trot, and at 8-50 A. M. his guns commenced the artillery bombardment. Under its cover Brigadier-General Meiklejohn with the remainder of the column, consisting of No. 8 mountain battery, the 24th and 31st Punjab Infantry, with 6 companies of the 45th Sikhs, was pushing his way up a rugged spur, with a view to delivering an attack on the enemy's left flank from the main ridge on the south. This ridge completely commanded the enemy's position, and it was hoped that, if Brigadier-General Meiklejohn's force could gain it, before the tribesmen became aware of his movements,* he would be able to envelope them and force them down the Landakai spur, so as to bring them under the cross fire of the West Kent and the batteries, and thus drive them into the rice-fields in the valley, where an opportunity would be given to the cavalry of carrying on the pursuit. After a long and arduous climb Brigadier-General Meiklejohn's force gained the summit.

Already demoralized by the severe artillery fire to which they had been subjected, and completely astonished at the extraordinary power of the 12-pounder field guns, the tribesmen now perceived that Meiklejohn was threatening their line of retreat to the hills and to the Buner passes. As soon as they had got over their astonishment at finding their left flank threatened, they made a feeble attempt to reinforce that flank from the centre and from the right of their first line, which, however, was easily frustrated by the fire of the batteries and the volleys of the West Kent on the Jalala spur. On seeing this, the right half-battalion of the West Kent moved further up the hill to their own right, in order that they might gain touch with the troops of the flank attack. The enemy now seemed to altogether lose heart, and large numbers rapidly made good their escape along the ridge in the direction of the Morah pass, before the flank attack could close on them. Nevertheless a few of them from the summit of the ridge made a plucky stand to cover the retirement of their friends, and delayed the leading line of the 24th Punjab Infantry, toiling up the rocky spur; but these were very quickly dispersed by a few shells from No. 8 Mountain Battery. Five of them, however, regardless of all fire, made a brave rush down the hill and were not stopped until one or two had actually reached the bayonets of the firing line. On reaching the summit of the hills the troops changed direction to the left, and moving along the ridge, joined hands with the West Kent and cleared the enemy out of some ruins on the ridge itself. At 11 A. M. the left wing of the West Kent advanced from the Jalala spur and assaulted the spur to their front causing the enemy to evacuate their last positions. This enabled No. 5 company Sappers and Miners to advance to the causeway and commence repairing it in places where the enemy had destroyed it, and to clear away the obstructions which in other places had been erected.

This was soon done sufficiently to admit of the advance of three squadrons of the Guides Cavalry, which had been kept there under Lieutenant-Colonel Adams. The causeway, though passable, was still in a very rough condition and the cavalry struggling along it in single file emerged at the other end in twos and threes. The infantry, by this time in possession of the Landakai spur, then shouted to the cavalry, who could not yet see the plain in front, that the enemy were in full retreat in the open valley beyond. Thereupon Captain H. I. E. Palmer, 5th Punjab Cavalry, who was attached to the Guides Cavalry, collected part of his squadron and started in pursuit. Emerging from the high standing crops of Indian-corn at the end of the causeway he saw the enemy a mile or so in front escaping towards the hills south of the village of Nawakilli, and started off at a gallop after them. But the ground, consisting of rice-fields, was very

* It was evident that the tribesmen had expected that the main attack would be made on their right flank close by the causeway, where they had consequently posted considerable reserves.



SKETCH OF THE ACTION

AT

LANDAKAI,

17th August 1897.

(Sd.) B. BLOOD, *Maj.-Genl.*,
Commanding M. F. F
18th August 1897.

heavy ; the squadron consequently got somewhat scattered, and Captain Palmer got rather ahead of his men. Close to Captain Palmer, and on his left, was Lieutenant R. T. Greaves, Lancashire Fusiliers, who was with the force as a newspaper correspondent. Further still to his left, and a little in rear, rode Lieutenant-Colonel Adams and Lieutenant Viscount Fincastle, 16th Lancers, the latter being also with the force as a newspaper correspondent. Lieutenant-Colonel Adams seeing that his cavalry had arrived too late to charge with any success, as nearly all the enemy had by this time reached the boulder-strewn slopes of the hills, instantly issued orders for them to occupy a small clump of trees east of Nawakilli, from whence they were to open dismounted fire. Not hearing these orders, Captain Palmer and Lieutenant Greaves dashed on in the attempt to cut off the few stragglers who had not yet gained a position of safety. Seeing a standard bearer in the open Captain Palmer cut him down ; but at the same moment he was himself disabled by a bullet through the right wrist, and his horse also was shot under him. Thus disabled, on the ground, and unable to draw his revolver he was vigorously attacked by the enemy's swordsmen and must have been cut down had it not been for the gallant conduct of Duffadars Hayath Mahomed and Bura Khan, who boldly charged the swordsmen and rescued Captain Palmer from his dangerous position. All this time the enemy from the hills were keeping up a heavy and rapid fire. Simultaneously with Captain Palmer being wounded Lieutenant Greaves was struck by a bullet in the body. Although apparently dazed by the wound, he kept on his course for a few paces and arrived almost at the very foot of the slopes, when his horse swerved and he fell off. The enemy's swordsmen instantly pounced upon him and commenced hacking him to death. Seeing this Lieutenant-Colonel Adams and Lord Fincastle, closely followed by Lieutenant and Adjutant Maclean, Jemadar Bahadur Singh and 4 men of the Guides Cavalry, dashed in to the rescue, and drove off the swordsmen. In this charge Lord Fincastle's horse was shot under him, and he himself was hurled to the ground. Regaining his feet he ran to Lieutenant Greaves and lifting him from the ground placed him on Lieutenant-Colonel Adams' horse with the assistance of Lieutenant Maclean. Unfortunately, while this was taking place, Lieutenant Greaves was again struck by a bullet and instantly killed, and Lieutenant Maclean was shot through both thighs and died almost immediately afterwards. Lieutenant-Colonel Adams also was slightly wounded in the hand, his horse was wounded and two troop horses were killed. Under heavy fire the bodies of the two officers were carried to the little clump of trees between Nawakilli and the hills, from which place, dismounted cavalry were by this time maintaining a heavy fire. For this gallant feat of arms, Lieutenant-Colonel Adams and Lord Fincastle were awarded the Victoria Cross, and the men with them obtained the Order of Merit. It was also officially announced in the *London Gazette* of the 9th November 1897, that Lieutenant Maclean would have been awarded the Victoria Cross had he survived.

While the cavalry pursuit was taking place the infantry and the two mountain batteries had pushed on to the Landakai spur, whence they witnessed the cavalry charge and their check at Nawakilli. Rapidly descending by numerous steep spurs into the valley, they advanced beyond Kota to the foot of the spurs to the east to the support of the cavalry. Lieutenant-Colonel Adams being thus supported, remounted his men, and with two squadrons continued the pursuit and reconnoitred as far as Abueh on the Barikot road, where he found about 150 of the enemy in possession of the village. Dismounting one squadron and opening fire he directed Captain G. P. Brazier-Creagh, 9th Bengal Lancers (attached to Guides Cavalry), to dislodge the enemy with the other squadron. This was done after slight resistance, in which the enemy lost six or eight men killed, without any further loss on our side. The cavalry then retired and at about 6-30 P.M. reached the camp, which had been placed close to Landakai at the foot of the hills.

Whilst these operations were in progress the troops left behind at Thana in charge of baggage and transport were not without occupation. It has been mentioned above that many of the enemy eluded Brigadier-General Meiklejohn's flank attack by a timely retreat along the crest of the hills towards the Morah pass. Continuing their retreat they came in sight of the baggage and transport

at Thana, and apparently believing it to be un-escorted, about a thousand of them descended from the heights with the intention of attacking. Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw, 35th Sikhs, commanding the detachments at the village, thereupon sent Major F. G. Delamain with two squadrons of the 11th Bengal Lancers to try and induce them to come on. They were, however, far too cautious to be thus caught and contented themselves with much shouting and *tom-tom* beating. As he could not induce them to advance, Major Delamain dismounted his men and opening fire on them drove them off with the loss of some 20 killed, without suffering any casualties himself. At the conclusion of the day's operations the two squadrons of the 11th Bengal Lancers, and the 400 rifles of the 35th Sikhs, escorted the 10th field battery back to the 2nd brigade camp at Khar.


The casualties during the day were :—killed, Lieutenant H. L. S. Maclean, Guides Cavalry, and Lieutenant R. T. Greaves, Lancashire Fusiliers ; wounded, Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, Captain H. I. E. Palmer, Guides Cavalry, and seven men.

It may be here noted that, while the engagement was in progress, the tribesmen on the right bank of the river were quietly occupied in the cultivation of their fields.

On the following morning the column continued its advance into Upper Swat to Ghalegai *via* Abueh and Barikot, a distance of about 10 miles. For a considerable distance the road, which passed over a rough *kotal* near Barikot, was very difficult and narrow, and the last of the baggage did not reach camp till nearly 4 P.M. No enemy were seen, and all the villages passed *en route* were deserted. At Ghalegai, however, the maliks and many of the people were found to be occupying their village. They at once made unconditional surrender, whereupon they were ordered to surrender all Government property in their possession, as well as all their arms and standards ; and they were also required to supply wood, grain, and fodder for the troops and transport. These orders were all fully complied with.

On the 19th August the column marched to Mingaora, a distance of about 10 miles. Between Landakai and Ghalegai the valley was only about a mile and-a-half wide, with wide valleys running down to it from both sides ; beyond Ghalegai it widens out very considerably and in parts is quite four miles wide, all covered with magnificent crops, with numerous large villages dotted about. The road was fairly good and all baggage was safely in camp by 4 P.M. Many of the inhabitants were occupying their villages ; and everywhere they appeared to have given up all idea of opposition, and to be anxious to propitiate the force by providing such supplies as they were able to produce. During the night, however, a few shots were fired into camp by a few marauders ; but the villages, doubtless fearing reprisals, quickly turned out and put them to flight.

The force remained halted at Mingaora till the 24th August, during which time Major Deane was busily engaged in enforcing the terms of submission on the tribes. Advantage was now taken to disarm the country as far as possible, and arms were taken, not only from the sections whose territory the troops had passed through, but also from those beyond Mingaora up to Kohistan, who had taken part in the disturbances against us. In all 41 breech-loading weapons, amongst which were some that had been lost at the Malakand on the night of the 26th of July, and some 800 guns, including a few *jezails*, were collected. In the Swat valley breech-loaders change hands at the price of Rs. 400 each, their seizure was, therefore, equivalent to a fine upon the people of Rs. 16,400 : the majority of the other fire-arms were worth to the tribesmen from Rs. 25 to Rs. 50 each. Nine Government mules and some equipment were also recovered, and 20 standards were brought in. As a means of still further enforcing submission from the tribesmen, the cavalry horses and transport animals with the force were maintained as far as possible at the expense of the people, who supplied such grain as could be procured, and all fodder, wood, etc., that was required. The tribesmen were, moreover, required to protect the letter post between Thana and Mingaora and to burn and demolish their own village towers.



I. B. Topo. Dy. No. 2,497.
Exd. C. J. A., April 1899.

VIEW OF BUNER FROM KARAKAR PASS.
From a photograph by Colonel Sawyer, 45th Sikhs.

In his many long interviews with the upper Swat *jirgas* Major Deane tried to ascertain from them the reason for their rising. All that they said showed that the whole affair was due to fanaticism; no complaints whatever were made against the action of Government or its officers. Nothing touches these tribes more than an idea of breach of faith, and it seems certain that, had they held any such idea at this time, it would surely have then found expression. But when Major Deane asked them direct why they attacked the Malakand, they replied with the very original remark that they were "not aware that Government had issued any orders forbidding them to do so".

On the 22nd August the *jirgas* signed a document expressing their unconditional surrender to Government; and they were informed that Government had no intention or desire to interfere with them or their country, but merely insisted on the maintenance of peace on its border.

Meanwhile the Mian Guls had so far only submitted by letter. On the 16th August the eldest Mian Gul fearing the punishment about to be meted out to the Upper Swatis, sent in the Pisani Mullah to Major Deane at Thana and asked for advice. Major Deane replied that if Mian Guls had anything to say they were perfectly free to come in themselves to interview him, and that he would give them safe conduct to enable them to do so: beyond this he would not guarantee anything. Again on the 18th August a letter was also received from the Mian Guls in which they expressed general submission and a desire for peace, laying the blame of the previous day's fight on the Bunerwals. They now moved up to Ilam on the Buner border, where it was thought best to leave them as they were already quite discredited in upper Swat. The mad Fakir was reported at this time to be at Mahaban in Buner, also absolutely discredited, and the people were cursing him for bringing such calamities upon them.

About this time too numerous reports were received showing that the tribesmen, especially the Bunerwals, Gaduns and Chagarzais, had suffered severely in the late fight at Landakai, and a rough estimate showed that at least 300 were killed and wounded.

While Major Deane was dealing with the above mentioned tribes, the troops were employed in making reconnaissances in all directions. This country was to a very great extent an unknown land, and it is probable that no European had entered it since the invasion of Alexander the Great. The upper Swat valley was found to be exceedingly beautiful and fertile; the Musa Khel, Aba Khel, Babuzai and Matorizai valleys up to and beyond Charbagh are wide and open with good supplies of water, while on the opposite bank the Shamozaï, Nikpi Khel and Shamizai valleys are open and well cultivated, but the hills for the most part approach nearer the river. The road through the valley is that made by the former Buddhist inhabitants; it is still a good one and follows an excellent alignment, though it can be now seen that the river must have changed its course since their time, as the old road between Mingaora and Manglaor is now covered by the river. Throughout the valley extensive ruins of forts, habitations, *stupas*, and monasteries exist. The four great strongholds were evidently in the neighbourhood of Kota, Barikot, Mingaora, and Manglaor. The villages in the valley are for the most part strong and well built, and in cleanliness and general care are superior to those in the lower part of the valley or in Bajaur. The further one journeys up the valley, the wilder and more mountainous becomes the scenery. On either side are ranges of hills rising to heights of 3,000 or 4,000 feet above the river-bed. Beyond these are ranges after ranges of fir-clad mountains, behind which again can be seen rugged and snow covered peaks rising to altitudes of 16,000 or 17,000 feet, conspicuous amongst which stands the great Nangaperbet.

On the 24th August the whole force marched back to Barikot, where they halted on the 25th August; and on the latter date a reconnaissance was made by Sir Bindon Blood with a squadron of cavalry and six companies of infantry to the top of the Karakar pass, about 8 miles from camp, from which a fine view of the Salarzai Bunerwal country was obtained. With the exception of a couple of shots fired by two men, who decamped as soon as the troops approached, the summit was gained without any opposition. The Bunerwals were evidently watching their passes on the side of the Yusufzai plain, whither they had been drawn away

by the advance of Brigadier-General Wodehouse's troops to Rustam on the 16th August. The Karakar pass was found to be quite easy and only some 1,500 feet above the level of the Swat valley. The descent into Buner also appeared to be easy, and the country beyond was an open, richly cultivated valley surrounded by rough hills of a considerable size.

On the 26th August Sir Bindon Blood moved his force to Thana, and on the following morning to Khar and Malakand, thus bringing the expedition into upper Swat to a satisfactory conclusion. In concluding his report on these operations, Sir Bindon Blood expressed his admiration of the manner in which the troops employed had carried out their various duties in spite of the burning sun by day and the heavy rain in their bivouacs by night. The health of the force had been very satisfactory, and only 53 men all told were in hospital when the force returned.

While the 1st brigade was in upper Swat the 2nd brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General Jeffreys, had remained encamped at Khar. As soon as the submission of the lower Swatis had been accepted, they were all allowed to come back to their villages with their women and children, cattle and household goods, from the hills where they had taken refuge as our troops entered the valley. Their attitude was perfectly submissive, and they at once employed themselves in making good the damage done to their villages. From the date of their submission the fodder, taken from their villages and fields for the transport animals, was paid for.

Before proceeding to upper Swat, Sir Bindon Blood had decided on visiting the Utman Khel country on the left bank of the Swat river, and he intended to punish the inhabitants of that country as soon as he returned from Mingaora, if Government would sanction such operations. But the only approach leading into the Utman Khel country from the lower Swat river was by means of a very rough path leading through Jolagram, and thence round the end of a very rugged spur which ran down from the Malakand right up to the river, which here flowed in a succession of deep pools. As the path then existed, it was impossible to take a column that way with transport. Accordingly, during the time that the 2nd brigade remained at Khar, the Sappers and Miners attached to the brigade were daily employed in blasting a road suitable for mules out of the rocky sides of the spur. By the 24th August the track was sufficiently improved as far as Matkanai to admit of the passage of troops; and on that day Brigadier-General Jeffreys with 1 squadron 11th Bengal Lancers, 4 companies 35th Sikhs, 4 companies 38th Dogras, and 4 guns No. 1 mountain battery made a reconnaissance in force to Matkanai and thence up towards the Digar pass as far as Pir Khel. A reconnaissance was also made by a couple of staff officers with a few sowars to within a mile of the junction of the Swat and Panjkora rivers. The inhabitants were everywhere very submissive, but evidently much disturbed by the presence of the troops.

On August 27th the 2nd brigade marched to Thana, passing the 1st brigade on its way to Khar *en route*. At Thana the Buffs from the Malakand joined the 2nd brigade and a movable column was formed there ready to move in any direction necessary.

In accordance with his intention of punishing in turn each of the tribes concerned in the unprovoked attacks on our posts, Sir Bindon Blood proposed that he should now be permitted to deal with the Bunerwals, as the opportunity was a most favourable one. With Brigadier-General Wodehouse threatening the Ambela and other Yusufzai passes, Sir Bindon Blood reckoned that he would be able to enter Buner by the easy Karakar pass, and with Brigadier-General Jeffreys' brigade to overrun and thoroughly subdue the whole country within ten days. But during Sir Bindon Blood's stay in upper Swat matters along the frontier had assumed a far more serious aspect. The fanatical rising had spread to the Afridis and Orakzais, and both these tribes had thrown over their allegiance to the British Government, and had actually attacked the British forts and posts in the Khyber pass and on the Samana. Government therefore were unable to accept Sir Bindon Blood's proposal to visit Buner, and he was directed to proceed with the punishment of the Utman Khels on the left bank of the Swat river, if he still considered such action desirable and timely.

Accordingly on the morning of the 28th August the 2nd brigade marched back again past Khar into camp at Jolagram, and preparations were now made for the marginally noted force to advance into the Utman Khel country on the 30th August. As the country was known to be exceedingly difficult, only mule transport was to be taken and the "light scale" of baggage allowed, *viz.*, 40 lb. per officer and 10 lb. per man, without any tents. Arrangements were also completed for carrying 5 days' rations, 2 days' grain for animals, and 150 rounds per rifle.

While these preparations were in progress, orders were issued for the marginally noted troops to concentrate on the 29th August at Chakdarra, and thence on the 30th idem under the command of Colonel Reid, commanding at the Malakand, to proceed to Uch. The object in moving this column to Uch was with a view to strengthen the position of the Nawab of Dir in dealing with his own subjects and to bring pressure on the Adinzais and the upper Swat clans on the right bank of the river to surrender the arms demanded of them. The Nawab of Dir was entrusted with the collection of fines and arms from these clans, and in due course Rs. 20,000, 40 breech-loaders and several hundred *jezails* and swords were handed over to Major Deane.

As previously mentioned (see page 36) Brigadier-General Wodehouse, simultaneously with the advance of the 1st brigade into upper Swat, had moved to Rustam (about 4 miles south of the Buner border) with a force consisting of 2 guns No. 1 mountain battery Royal Artillery; one squadron 10th Bengal Lancers; 2nd battalion Highland Light Infantry; 39th Garhwal Regiment; and No. 3 company, Bombay Sappers and Miners. The presence of this force had the desired effect of preventing those sections of the Bunerwals, who had already committed themselves, from harassing the flank and rear of the 1st brigade. By his instructions Brigadier-General Wodehouse was prevented crossing the Buner border, but advantage was taken of the presence of the force at Rustam to thoroughly reconnoitre the various passes. The Ambela and Malandrai passes were found to be held in force, but as the Bunerwals contented themselves with remaining on the defensive, no hostilities took place. On August 27th Lieutenant Down, the political officer with Brigadier-General Wodehouse, received a submissive letter from several leading maliks asking for pardon. As, however, the latter was by no means representative, and as the Bunerwals had moreover been instructed to send in their representations to the Commissioner at Peshawar, no reply was sent them.

When Government decided on postponing the punishment of the Bunerwals to a more favourable time, Sir Bindon Blood decided to concentrate a portion of the 3rd brigade in the Swat valley. Orders were issued accordingly; and on the 3rd September Brigadier-General Wodehouse with the whole of his force except the Highland Light Infantry and 1 squadron 10th Bengal Lancers who remained at Mardan, arrived at Uch and there assumed command.

Meanwhile on the 30th August, the 2nd brigade started off to enter the cis-Utman Khel country, and camp was formed to the west of Kalangai at the foot of the Ingzri pass. During the day the pass was carefully reconnoitred, the winding path was considerably improved as far as the Ormullo Sar, and a large tract of country was surveyed by the survey party. Not the slightest opposition was offered to any of these movements. News, however, of the movements of the Hadda Mullah, which reached Sir Bindon Blood this day, induced him to countermand all Brigadier-General Jeffreys' movements and direct him to return at once to Khar on the following day; and also to hasten the concentration of the 3rd brigade at Uch. The Hadda Mulla, it appeared, was highly incensed with the Nawab of Dir for the assistance he had given to Government in the late rising and subsequent operations. To punish him for having failed to assist in upholding the standards of Islam, the Hadda Mullah had raised a large

* Replaced at Chakdarra and Dargai by 24th Punjab Infantry.

gathering, and it was reported that he was already on his way through Bajaur to Dir territory. But the gathering quickly dispersed on hearing of the presence of British troops at Uch.

On finding that the threatened attack on Dir had collapsed prematurely Sir Bindon Blood again made arrangements for the completion of the examination of the cis-Utman Khel country. But on the 3rd September, before the orders for this could be carried into effect, telegraphic instructions were received from the Government of India to the following effect—The troops under Major-General Sir Bindon Blood were to advance by Sado and Nawagai to Kamali in the Mohmand country; while a field force under command of Brigadier-General Elles was to advance from the Peshawar border directly into the Mohmand country.

The objects with which these movements were ordered were to destroy the Hadda Mullah's power and disperse his hostile gathering; to clear from the Mohmand country any hostile forces; and to give support to the Nawab of Dir and the Khan of Nawagai, against any threatened attack by the Hadda Mullah.

Sir Bindon Blood's force was not to remain in the Mohmand country for the purpose of making arrangements with the Mohmands for the future; but was to join hands with the force under Brigadier-General Elles and march out by the Peshawar border. The Government of India wished it to be understood and made known, that the advance was not made in order to deprive any tribes of their independence, but because the British Government must insist on due assurance that these tribes would not attack them again: they had no desire to injure any one who did not attack them. If the British forces should be opposed, and the opposing foe should retire before them, the retiring foe might, if necessary, be followed up; and, in particular, in such a case, the Hadda Mullah might be pursued into the Bohai Dag or other place on this side of the Kunar watershed and not beyond the line of the Durand Convention. The intentions of the Government of India, as above described, were explained to the Amir of Afghanistan.

The punishment of the Utman Khel, like that of the Bunerwals, was thus postponed until the far more serious revolts on other parts of the frontier had been adequately dealt with.

On the 25th August the following gracious message received from Her Majesty the Queen was published in Force Orders greatly to the gratification of all the troops concerned :—

"I am grieved at the loss of brave officers and men and trust that the wounded are doing well. It is most gratifying to see how well the native troops have behaved. The conduct of all my troops has been admirable."

CHAPTER 6.

ADVANCE INTO BAJAUR TO CO-OPERATE WITH THE MOHMAND FIELD FORCE.

At the time when Sir Bindon Blood received the orders of Government as given in the preceding chapter, great anxiety was felt with regard to the attitude of the tribes located about the Panjkora Valley. These clans were greatly disturbed by the fighting which had taken place in the Swat valley; they were also undoubtedly affected by the general spirit of fanaticism spreading throughout the country, and by the exaggerated false reports regarding Afridi successes in the Khyber, and on the Samana; and further they were impregnated with the general conviction, prevalent among the tribes, that the Amir of Kabul was about to join in the *jihad*, an idea which was carefully fostered by the Fakir and by the Hadda Mullah. The presence of the Hadda Mullah's gathering in Mohmand territory also had a very disquieting effect on the whole of Bajaur, and reports received from those parts indicated that the clans would certainly oppose us if any British troops crossed the Panjkora.

Combined opposition of these clans involved the consideration of three eventualities, *viz.*:—(1) The possibility of having to abandon the idea of despatching troops through Bajaur, for an advance into the Mohmand country from the north, so as to join hands with the Mohmand field force. (2) The probability of having to maintain troops in the neighbourhood of Bajaur for an indefinite period, until opposition had been broken down and the submission of the tribes effected. (3) The likelihood that the Khan of Nawagai and his relations might take to flight, and thus cause subsequent trouble to Government in connection with future arrangements in the country for our communications with Chitral.

Every endeavour was accordingly made to win over the Khan of Nawagai and the rest of the Bajaur Khans to our side, and thus to detach their clans from the fanatical combination. But one of the main difficulties was that the Khan of Nawagai had become genuinely alarmed that when Government troops had once entered his country, they would permanently remain there; and the same feeling actuated all the clans.

As soon as the orders of Government were received for the advance into Bajaur, Sir Bindon Blood decided to despatch a force as quickly as possible to take over charge of the Panjkora suspension bridge close to Sado, which up to this time was guarded by a strong body of the Nawab of Dir's men. Accordingly, on the 4th September, a force as per margin under Brigadier-General

2 squadrons of 11th Bengal Lancers.
10th Field Battery.
38th Dogras.
4 companies 22nd Punjab Infantry.
2 sections No. 5 company Madras Sappers and Miners.
2 sections of field hospitals.

Wodehouse proceeded from Uch to Panjkora and Sado;* and on the 5th September the force on the Panjkora was strengthened by the arrival of No. 1 mountain battery, the 1st battalion of the "Queen's" and No. 3 company Bombay Sappers and Miners. This was a most fortunate move, as shortly

after General Wodehouse's reaching the Panjkora bridge information was received that a *jirga* of all the Bajaur tribes with their Khans and the Shamozaï Utman Khels, which had assembled in Khar,† had decided on opposing Government,

* The road between Sarai and the Panjkora bridge was an exceedingly difficult one, especially the latter part of it where there was only a very rough narrow path, in places cut along the face of the rock above the rushing and swollen river. At one spot the guns, limbers, and wagons had to be taken along separately by hand. The presence of this battery was of great value in the subsequent operations, as the natives had already heard of its death-dealing powers in the action at Landakai.

† This is Khar in Bajaur, which must not be confounded with Khar in the Swat valley.

and had resolved on seizing the bridge on the following day. The Khan of Nawagai though not personally present at this *jirga*, had sent a representative; and the other Khans had told the tribes that they could not themselves take any active part in resisting our troops, but that they would lend their men and arms. It must be remembered that these tribes had sent large contingents to fight at Chakdarra, and it was but natural that they should look upon the advance of our troops as a punitive expedition directed against themselves; they certainly could not believe that Government would march troops through their country without exacting some retribution from them. They had already heard of the severe punishment and disarmament of the tribes in Swat, Adinzai and Talash valleys, which was in fact hardly yet finished, and they must have expected similar treatment for themselves.

Ever since the operations of the Chitral relief expedition, the Salarzais and Mamunds had continuously maintained a defiant attitude, and most of the outrages which had taken place along the Chitral road had been traced to these two tribes. Their presence on the flank of the line of advance to Chitral caused great anxiety during the passage of the Chitral annual reliefs. It was, thus, fully recognised that, if advantage could be taken of the presence of our troops in their country to punish these two tribes, it would undoubtedly have a pacifying effect. The situation, however, did not permit of this; for, although Government considered it necessary to send a force through the Bajaur country to disperse the Hadda Mullah's gathering, to punish the Mohmands and Utman Khels, and to give support to the Nawab of Dir and Khan of Nawagai, it was essential that these movements should be carried out as quickly as possible, in order that the troops engaged might be available at Peshawar for the operations about to be undertaken against the Orakzais and Afridis in Tirah. The Government of India, therefore, did not desire that Sir Bindon Blood should be drawn aside to deal with other tribes, unless urgent necessity compelled him to do so.

The Khans of Nawagai, Jhar and Khar were much affected by the general excitement and fanatical feeling throughout the country; and, when called to account for combining with the clans to resist us, they stated that the Bajaur tribes had combined and were determined to fight, and they themselves were powerless to restrain them. However, the move of the troops to the Panjkora river came as a surprise to the Bajauris, completely upsetting the plans they had made, and involving a further meeting of the clans to decide afresh as to their line of action. For the moment they gave up the idea of fighting; and a few days afterwards the Khan of Nawagai and his brothers came forward and offered to render assistance to Government.

In the move from Khar to Uch and thence to Sado the 10th field battery encountered very great difficulties. Although the suspension bridge at Chakdarra had been built for the passage of field guns it was not capable of bearing the strain of the guns with their teams; consequently all the guns and wagons had to be man-handled across. This was satisfactorily completed in about two hours without the slightest mishap.

On the 6th September Sir Bindon Blood with his staff and the 2nd brigade* moved to Chakdarra. As it was anticipated that this brigade would have some difficult country to traverse in the course of the contemplated operations, it was equipped entirely with mules, and all units moved forward without tents, on the "light scale" of baggage: five days' rations for men and followers and one day's grain for transport were carried in regimental charge, and seven days' rations in brigade Commissariat charge; the divisional Commissariat carried a further supply for 14 days. The 3rd brigade was similarly equipped, but its transport was principally camels. The 1st brigade, now detailed to hold Khar, the Malakand, and the posts on the advanced line of communications at Sarai and Sado, was equipped with camels, carts and a few mules. On the 7th

* 1 Squadron 11th Bengal Lancers, No. 8 (Bengal) mountain battery, and No. 4 company Bengal Sappers and Miners were now attached to the 2nd Brigade. 2 squadrons 11th Bengal Lancers, No. 1 mountain battery, and No. 3 company Bombay Sappers and Miners were similarly attached to 3rd Brigade.

The remaining divisional troops were placed under the orders of Brigadier-General Meiklejohn on the Line of Communications.

The field hospitals were distributed as requirements demanded.

September divisional head-quarters and the 2nd brigade marched to Sarai,* and on the following day crossed the Panjkora river by the suspension bridge and encamped one mile short of Kotkai on the left bank of the Jandol river. Whilst these movements were taking place the attitude of the inhabitants in the Talash valley and along the Panjkora was sullenly neutral: the size of the force overawed them and they recognised that resistance was useless.

On the 9th September the divisional head-quarters and the 2nd brigade marched to Ghosam, where they encamped on the left bank of the Jandol river; the Buffs, however, encamped on the right bank, about a mile higher up the valley. The 38th Dogras (which now rejoined their own brigade) and 1 squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers joined the 2nd brigade from Sado during the course of the day. Shortly after the arrival of the troops at Ghosam the Khan of Nawagai and his brothers, with the Shamozaï Utman Khel and other *jirgas*, visited the camp, and at an interview with Major Deane arrangements were made for the march of the troops through Nawagai territory.

On the 10th September the 2nd brigade remained halted at Ghosam, as Government had sanctioned the postponement of the Mohmand operations for three days. This was done in order that pressure might be put on the Shamozaïs, on whom a fine of 100 rifles was imposed, to make them submit to terms; but the time allowed was not sufficient to enforce compliance: and coercive measures, such as the destruction of towers and forts, which would have involved delay in reaching the Mohmand country, could not be undertaken, so that only 15 breach-loaders and 85 guns were obtained from them.

Taking advantage of the halt a small reconnoitring party consisting of 4 companies of the 38th Dogras, and 1 troop 11th Bengal Lancers, went up the valley as far as Jhar; while Major Deane with a small escort of the 11th Bengal Lancers visited the Jandol valley, going as far as Barwa. The Khans of Mundah, Tor Chandeh, and Shah surrendered 30 rifles; but the attitude of Umra Khan's brothers and his cousin, Abdul Majid Khan, was far from satisfactory, and it was noticed that all women and children had been sent off to the hills. These Khans had taken an active part in the late disturbance. Major Deane now ordered them to surrender a number of rifles known to be in their possession. As they failed to comply with these terms they were taken back to camp in charge of the cavalry escort and thence sent to the Malakand, where they were detained until they had surrendered 40 rifles.

On the 10th September 1 squadron, 1 battery, and 2 battalions of the 3rd brigade marched from the Panjkora to Shakrata and there encamped, their places at Sado being filled by 3 squadrons of the Guides, 31st Punjab Infantry, 45th Sikhs and $\frac{1}{2}$ No. 5 company Madras Sappers and Miners from the 1st brigade, who henceforth held the post and guarded the commissariat advance dépôt now formed there.

On the 11th September the remainder of the 3rd brigade concentrated at Shakrata and the divisional head-quarters also moved there from Ghosam.

Cavalry reconnaissances from the 2nd and 3rd brigades, with the intelligence officers, were now pushed up the valley to obtain information regarding the Batai, Shinai, and other passes leading over the spurs of the Koh-i-Mohr range into the Mohmand country from Jhar and Khar. With the exception of a slight hostile demonstration, at Saramena and on the Shinai pass, to a reconnaissance made by Captain Walters, no opposition was met with. As soon as our troops entered the Nawagai valley it was seen that it differed considerably from the Swat and adjoining valleys, in being much more wide, open, flat, and highly cultivated. All the houses too were built on different principles to those previously met with: in Swat and elsewhere they are clustered together and form large irregular shaped villages, surrounded by high stone walls; but in the Nawagai valley such clusters are rarely met with, and in place of them there are innumerable strongly built forts, with strong towers and high walls, in which live the owners with their families and their special armed retainers. These forts, built on

* The 4 companies, 22nd Punjab Infantry and the 39th Garhwal Regiment from Uch also marched to Sarai on the 7th September and rejoined the 3rd Brigade on the Panjkora on the following day. The squadron of the 10th Bengal Lancers returned to the Line of Communications on the 6th September.

sites well selected for defence, are exceedingly thick and massive, and in most cases surrounded by deep wide moats. They formed a most impressive sight, indicative of the lawless existence of the inhabitants.

On the 12th September, the divisional head-quarters and 3rd brigade moved to Shamshak, 2 miles south of Tangkhata and close to the Watelai stream; and the Rambat pass was carefully reconnoitred and found to be the best route for a flank movement into the Utman Khel country. Two shots—the first in the valley—were fired into the camp of the 3rd brigade during the night. The next day the 3rd brigade halted, and the 2nd brigade moved to a point close to Khar.

On the 13th September Major Deane, who up to this date had accompanied the field force as chief political officer, returned to Panjkora, as the rest of the operations beyond Nawagai would be in country outside his political district. He had, moreover, important work to do at Malakand. Henceforth Sir Bindon Blood exercised chief political authority, as well as military command, Mr. W. S. Davis being detailed to accompany the 3rd brigade as assistant political officer, and Mr. A. H. Gunter, I.C.S., was similarly attached to the 2nd brigade.


On the arrival of the 3rd Brigade at Shamshak some Salarzai and Mamund maliks came in to see Mr. Davis to ascertain the intentions of Government in further dealings with them. Neither tribe sent in representative *jirgas* but Mr. Davis informed them that if they desired permanent peace, the Salarzais should surrender 40 rifles and the Mamunds 50. At this time, also, cavalry reconnaissances were sent out, which penetrated for some distance up the Salarzai and Mamund valleys. No resistance was offered by the Salarzais, but in the Mamund valley when the cavalry set fire to a house close to Zagai, which the villagers said belonged to a man who had looted a Government horse from Chakdarra, a few harmless shots were fired at them.

Whilst these reconnaissances were being made to the north Sir Bindon Blood personally examined the Rambat pass. Finding that the country to the south of it was very deficient in water and forage, he directed Brigadier-General Jeffreys with the 2nd brigade to advance from Khar on the following morning and encamp on a position north of Markhanai. On the 15th September Jeffreys was to cross over the Rambat pass to Butkor with two battalions, a company of Sappers and Miners, one squadron, and five days' supplies; while the remainder of the 2nd brigade was to march under the command of Colonel T. H. Goldney, 35th Sikhs, to join the 3rd Brigade at Nawagai, to which place Sir B. Blood intended that brigade to march on the 14th September. Further instructions were also issued to Brigadier-General Jeffreys directing him, after he had crossed the Rambat pass, to move his special force through Butkor as quickly as possible to Danish Kol, where Sir B. Blood would rejoin him or send him additional orders. Both brigades were fully supplied with rations up to the 23rd September. Arrangements were accordingly made to drop all direct communication with the Malakand and draw the next supplies at Shabkadar, where the Mohmand field force was waiting till the 15th September, to commence the simultaneous advance into the Mohmand country south of Nawagai.

On the 14th September the 3rd brigade advanced to Nawagai and encamped about a mile south of the village: the march, although only about 13 miles, was arduous owing to the last six or seven miles passing through a network of deep ravines.

The 2nd brigade marched to the neighbourhood of Markhanai where camp was pitched on a well chosen site on the right bank of the Charmung stream, on a plateau overlooking the river. Meanwhile Brigadier-General Jeffreys with 2 guns of No. 8 mountain battery, a company of Sappers and Miners, and three battalions had occupied the Rambat pass without opposition by 7 A.M. The guns, 35th Sikhs, 38th Dogras and all transport animals then returned to camp; but the Buffs and Sappers remained on the pass to hold it and improve the path as far as possible, for the passage of the troops on the following morning.

On the arrival of the 2nd brigade near Markhanai supplies were for the most part taken from that village without payment, as it belonged to the Mandil



ROUGH PLAN
OF
2nd BRIGADE CAMP
NEAR
MARKHANAI

14th September 1897.

(Sd.) H F WALTERS, Capt.,
F. I. O. M. F. F.,
15-9-97.

section of the Utman Khels who, although implicated in the attacks upon Malakand and Chakdarra, had not yet shown any sign of submission. With such a large force moving through the country it was impossible to avoid causing a certain amount of friction, crops had to be cut for fodder, and owing to the absence of all other kinds of firewood, houses had to be dismantled to obtain it. But in every case liberal prices were paid to the owners and endeavours made to do as little damage as possible. During all these movements of troops in their country the Khans of Nawagai, Khar and Jhar rendered much assistance in collecting supplies and acted fully in accordance with their promises.

The camp near Markhanai had been laid out in the manner usual in frontier operations, with the troops in bivouac on the perimeter of the camp, and the hospitals, transport animals, and commissariat stores in the centre as shown in the rough plan attached.

On the east was a broad and deep nullah, with precipitous banks 50 to 60 feet high, beyond which was a fairly flat open plain, much cut up by small nullahs and strewn with loose boulders. On the west the country was generally flat and open; but at about 70 yards from the parapet a slight fold in the ground, with terraced fields, sloped away to a small nullah which led into the main Charmung river: on the north the ground was perfectly open with a gentle slope towards the broken bank of the Charmung river some 1,200 yards distant: on the south the whole country was quite open ploughed land, sloping gently upwards towards Markhanai and the Rambat pass.

At 8-15 P.M. just as the edge of the full moon rose above the horizon, while most of the officers of the force were at dinner with bright lights on their tables, and the men were engaged cooking their evening meal over blazing fires, three shots were fired from the north-east corner of the camp.

These were apparently signal shots, for almost immediately afterwards heavy firing commenced from all sides but the south; and the enemy had evidently carefully noted the range before dark, as bullets were falling into the camp from all directions and several mules and horses were quickly killed and wounded. As soon as the heavy firing commenced, the troops occupied their shelter trenches on the perimeter, all fires and lights were extinguished, and the hospital and staff officers' tents which, standing out white in the moonlight, had been already pierced by bullets in many places, were thrown down. Firing at first was heaviest on the face occupied by the Guides Infantry: it was replied to by star-shells, and by steady volleys in the direction of the enemy's flashes. The enemy, however, made no attempt whatever to rush the camp, but contented themselves with maintaining a close and accurate fire from behind *sangars* and other cover obtained from the broken country in the vicinity of the camp. They kept this up steadily until 10 P.M. when after much bugling and shouting, the firing almost entirely ceased. Up to this period, although the casualties amongst the horses and mules were very heavy, only one or two men had been hit. As soon as the firing ceased, signal fires were lighted by the tribesmen at Khairabad, Shamshak, Nawakila, Inayat Kila and onward up the Mamund valley. There was also much beating of drums and yelling, and the enemy appeared to be performing a "Khattak" dance in the river-bed.

At about 10-45 P.M. the attack was renewed and, increasing in persistency, lasted without the slightest intermission till 2-15 A.M. The enemy on this occasion directed their main efforts on that portion of the west face occupied by the 38th Dogras, where owing to the broken ground they were enabled to get quite close up to the line of entrenchments. Brigadier-General Jeffreys with his staff took up a position at this point, and directed the Dogras to hold their fire so as to induce the enemy to attempt to rush them. The enemy, however, could not be persuaded to do this; and it was then arranged that a small party of Dogras should make a counter-attack on the enemy and drive them from their cover. Whilst exposing themselves in the necessary preparations for this attack Captain W. E. Tomkins, and Lieutenant A. W. Bailey, Adjutant of the 38th Dogras, were both shot dead, and shortly afterwards Lieutenant H. A. Harington, who was attached to that battalion was mortally wounded in the head. The idea of a counter-attack was then abandoned, and shortly afterwards the enemy withdrew.

In addition to the loss of the officers above mentioned, the casualties during this night attack were: killed, 2 non-commissioned officers and men, and 2 followers; wounded, 1 Native officer, 5 non-commissioned officers and men, and 4 followers. The losses among the animals were more considerable: 4 horses and 22 mules were killed; and 7 horses and 52 mules wounded, many so seriously that they had to be destroyed.


From subsequent information it was ascertained, that the chief man in organizing the attack was Muhammad Amin, of Inayat Kila, a leading Mamund malik and vassal of Nawagai; and that the tribesmen who had attacked the camp numbered some 400 selected rifle shots from the Kakazai, Wara, Hindu Raj and Shurtan Mamunds, (including Umra Khan's retainers of Zagai), who were joined by a few Salarzais, But Khels, Charmungis and Shamozaïs. Their loss was some twelve men killed and many others wounded.

At 6-30 A.M. on the 15th September the squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers commanded by Captain E. H. Cole, left camp to try and overtake any of the enemy's loiterers and ascertain where they came from. On the banks of the Charmung river a large body of armed men were seen who, on being questioned, stated they were vassals of the Khan of Khar, and that they had come out during the night as soon as firing took place to render us assistance; but they professed to be absolutely without any information as to who the assailants were, or whither they had gone. At length one man was prevailed upon to give information, and point out the enemy's line of retreat leading up the Mamund valley. Continuing the pursuit, Captain Cole rode up the valley for some miles without meeting any one. When he had gone about six miles, his right flank patrol reported the presence of a small party of men, two miles distant, moving away on the right front towards Badan. Changing direction, Captain Cole galloped over the heavy plough after them, and overtaking the last of them close to Badan killed 21 of them. Many of them had, however, reached ground where they were safe from cavalry, and these opened a hot fire on Captain Cole's party from the hills, nullahs, and broken ground in the Badan gorge. In spite of this the cavalry followed the enemy into the gorge, and some of them dismounting opened fire. But the position was a most disadvantageous one, and Captain Cole ordered his party to retire. As soon as the enemy perceived this, large numbers of them came swarming down from the hills, and taking advantage of every nullah considerably harassed the retirement. On becoming aware that the cavalry had come across the enemy Brigadier-General Jeffreys despatched two guns and the Guides Infantry, under command of Major Campbell, to Captain Cole's support; but the enemy had retired to their hills and villages before these troops arrived on the scene.

Brigadier-General Jeffreys, who had sent off a duffadar's patrol of the 11th Bengal Lancers to Nawagai to inform Sir Bindon Blood of the situation and to request instructions for further action, had meanwhile interviewed the Khan of Khar in camp, and had ascertained from him who the assailants were, and what villages in the Mamund valley were concerned in the attack. Information regarding the Mamunds and their valley was at this time vague as no operations against them had been contemplated, and consequently their valley had not been carefully reconnoitred. From the available information it appeared that the Mamunds numbered some 1,500 to 2,000 fighting men with some 80 or 90 rifles. The subsequent operations proved that these numbers were very considerably under-estimated. Their valley was known to be a very difficult one; and from the map it appeared to be only about 7 miles long to the furthest point, and about 4 miles broad at its widest parts.


United Service Institution
of India

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of India



THE WATELAI VALLEY.

Scale 1 Inch = 2 Miles.



11

x

calars

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CHAPTER 7.

OPERATIONS OF THE 2ND BRIGADE IN THE WATELAI VALLEY AGAINST THE WARA AND KAKAZAI MAMUNDS, SEPTEMBER 1897.

At about midday on the 15th September a heliographic message from Sir Bindon Blood reached Brigadier-General Jeffreys, cancelling all former orders and directing him to at once undertake the rigorous punishment of the Mamunds. On receipt of these instructions, orders were sent to the Buffs and Sappers and Miners occupying the Rambat pass to evacuate their position and rejoin the brigade, which they did late that afternoon. The camp was now moved to the mouth of the Watelai valley, and an excellent site on a perfectly flat open plain was selected one mile south of Inayat Kila. The Khan of Khar accompanied the brigade, and ordered out his vassals to piquet by night Inayat Kila and all neighbouring nullahs, he himself for the next few days living in the camp. Entrenchments having been thrown up, arrangements were made for commencing the operations against the Mamunds on the following day.

It was Brigadier-General Jeffreys' original intention to advance some miles into the Watelai valley and encamp there and orders to that effect had been issued, but on receiving information from Captain Cole that the whole valley was much cut up by nullahs, that it would be impossible to find a safe place for the camp, and that water was everywhere scarce, it was decided to remain at Inayat Kila. It has been already stated that, when these operations against the Mamunds were commenced, very little information was available concerning either the inhabitants or their country; but the subsequent operations cleared up all doubt in these matters. The Mamund valley is a subsidiary valley, drained by the Watelai nullah, which joins the main Bajaur stream on the left bank at Khar; and it lies between the Salarzai valley on the east and the Charmung valley on the west, high and precipitous ranges of hills separating the valleys. The head waters of the Watelai descend from the Lakra range which, rising to a height of some 10,200 feet, forms part of the main watershed between the Swat and Kunar rivers, which is the boundry line limiting British and Afghan spheres of influence. The Mamund tribe, however, inhabits both sides of the range; and by the Durand agreement those living on the north became subjects of the Amir, while those south of the range fell within the British sphere of influence. Two passes lead over the watershed into the Kunar valley, *viz.*, the Hindu Raj pass to the north-west which leads to Marawara, and the Kaga pass to the north which leads to Shurtan. Both these passes are reported to be difficult, and only the latter can be traversed by pack animals. The Watelai valley itself is about 13 miles long from north to south and some 10 miles wide at its widest part. The head of the valley is divided into two main nullahs by a big spur of the main range which juts out some four or five miles to the east of Lakra Sar. These nullahs run down on either side of this spur from the Hindu Raj and Kaga passes, and join near Hazarnao, about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles south of the spur: the combined nullah-beds then form a wide nullah, varying from 500 yards to 1,200 yards in breadth, which passes through an open valley some 5 miles wide. Except when the snows are melting or a freshet comes down, there is no water in the main nullah, and there is no perennial water above Inayat Kila.

The nullah leading down from the Kaga pass forms the boundary between the Wara Mamunds on the east and the Kakazai Mamunds on the west; the former

of whom own valuable rice lands at Marawara on the north of the range, while the latter hold those at Shurtan. Each section is supposed to number 3,000 fighting men.

The largest villages in the Watelai valley are built around the head of the valley, at the foot of the high hills, wherever good springs are found: the villages in the open valley are dependent for their water-supply on ponds and wells, the latter varying from 90 feet to 200 feet in depth. The whole valley, though much cut up by deep dry nullahs, is very carefully cultivated the fields being laid out in successions of stone-faced terraces. The cultivation is all *barani*,* with the exception of a little rice-land at the mouth of the valley near Inayat Kila. Notwithstanding this in good years the whole of the open valley, including the nullah-bed and to a certain extent the hill-sides also, are under cultivation; and good crops of wheat, barley and Indian corn are obtained. With the exception of fine groves of chenar and olive trees in the *ziarats* around all the hill villages few trees are to be found in the valley. When our troops entered the valley most of the crops in the open valley had been gathered in, and ploughing operations were in full progress in preparation for the October sowing. But in the immediate neighbourhood of the hill villages and around the Zagaderai villages high crops of Indian-corn were still standing.

In September 1897, the inhabitants of the villages of Nawakila, Inayat Kila and Niag, at the mouth of the valley, and of Kuz Khalezai and Kamar, higher up the valley, were vassals of the Khan of Nawagai, to whom they paid taxes and in a limited manner owed allegiance: the remainder of the inhabitants of the valley were absolutely independent of every one. The leading men among these Mamunds, at this time, were Muhammad Amin Khan of Inayat Kila; Momin Khan, his son; and Malik Khachai of Zagaderai. The first of these, as has been already mentioned, took a leading part in the attack on the 2nd brigade camp on the night of the 14th September.

Mention has been already made of certain retainers of Umra Khan who lived at Zagai near the head of the valley. These men who, with a gunsmith named Ustaz Muhammad, were said to receive monthly pay from Umra Khan, began to settle here at the invitation of Kazi Muhammad of Zagai, a friend of Umra Khan, soon after the latter had lost his footing in Jandol. Their numbers gradually increased until, at the time of our operations in the valley, they numbered some 80 men, all armed with breech-loading rifles and possessing a large amount of ammunition which was said to be constantly reaching them from Kabul. They soon constituted a powerful faction in the valley, as the other inhabitants were not so well armed, having only some sixty or seventy rifles amongst them.

On the 16th September, at about 6 A.M., Brigadier-General Jeffreys moved his force up the valley in three columns as under:—

No. 1, Lieutenant-Colonel Goldney 35th Sikhs.	{ 1 squadron, 11th Bengal Lancers.
	{ 4 guns, No. 8 mountain battery.
No. 2, Lieutenant-Colonel Vivian 38th Dogras.	{ 4 companies The Buffs.
	{ 6 companies 35th Sikhs.
No. 3 Major Campbell Guides Infantry.	{ 2 sub-sections No. 4 company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
	{ 6 companies 38th Dogras.
No. 3 Major Campbell Guides Infantry.	{ 4 sub-sections No. 4 company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
	{ 2 companies The Buffs.
No. 3 Major Campbell Guides Infantry.	{ 5 companies Guides Infantry.
	{ 2 sub-sections No. 4 company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

The remainder of the troops, (with the exception of one company of the Guides detailed as escort to the survey party) remained behind to guard the camp.

No. 1 column was to advance up the centre of the valley along the road to the Kaga pass and destroy the fortified villages of Tanai, Mankot, Kamar, and Badalai.† No. 2 column was to move along the foot of the hills on the east of the valley, and destroy the fortified villages of Shinkot, Chingai (1) and

* Dependent on rain.

† The map of the Watelai valley on which these orders were issued was very inaccurate and misleading. Mankot and Kamar correspond to Munar and Hazarnao of the corrected map.

Damadolah, and also Badan, where the enemy had taken refuge from the cavalry the previous day. No. 3 column was to move along the valley on the west, and deal with Niag, Sharif Khana, Khalozai, Agrah, and Gileh. Nos. 1 and 3 columns were to move on parallel lines as far as Kamar, and No. 2 was to move independently, so that the whole force might be concentrated anywhere whenever considered necessary. By these movements it was intended to deal with all the villages in the low lying portion of the valley at once.

Brigadier-General Jeffreys after arranging for the safety of the camp and for heliographic communication between Nawagai and himself rode out and joined Lieutenant-Colonel Goldney's column in the centre of the valley with a view to concentrating the columns as circumstances might require.

Lieutenant-Colonel Vivian with No. 2 column having destroyed the villages of Shinkot and Chingai (1), without encountering any opposition, proceeded to Damadolah; but finding that village located in a strong position on the slope of the hills, and that the enemy were holding it in strength, he decided on leaving it alone, as he considered that he could not deal satisfactorily with it with the force at his disposal being without artillery. On his withdrawing from the village the enemy followed up boldly along many of the numerous deep nullahs, and opening a heavy fire from the front and flanks, did not retire until several of them had been killed and many wounded. The column reached camp at about 4 P. M., having only had two men very slightly wounded.

Meanwhile the other two columns had been marching towards the head of the valley. At about 7-30 A.M., when the centre column had marched about 4 miles up the valley, information was received from the cavalry, which had been pushed out well to the front and flanks, that the enemy were occupying Badan. On receipt of this information Lieutenant-Colonel Goldney detached Lieutenant-Colonel Ommaney with the four companies of The Buffs and two guns, to dislodge them but not to destroy the village, as No. 2 column had been detailed to do this. After a march of some 2 miles over heavy ploughed fields, Lieutenant-Colonel Ommaney arrived in front of the village, when the three headmen of the village came forward and requested that their village might be spared. Their request was refused, the headmen were detained and the remainder of the villagers meanwhile were seen hurriedly escaping up the rugged hills behind the village. Two shells from the guns were sufficient to completely scatter all gatherings.

After detaching this force Lieutenant-Colonel Goldney pushed on with the rest of his column in the direction of Badalai, where a few of the enemy were seen on the hills; and at 8-30 A.M. when the column was nearly opposite that village, reports were received from the cavalry, that large numbers of the enemy were collecting from the west of the valley, and that every village appeared to contain armed men. Colonel Goldney thereupon halted his column, and sent a message to The Buffs, then at Dabar, to rejoin him quickly. But before they were able to overtake him, the cavalry commander reported that the enemy were retiring northwards towards the Kaga pass.

On receipt of the latter report, Brigadier-General Jeffreys directed Colonel Goldney to push on; and as the column advanced, small numbers of the enemy were seen to be occupying the villages at the foot of the hill on the right flank, and it became necessary to dislodge them. One company of the 35th Sikhs was sent to clear the village of Badalai and two guns were sent away to the high ground to the right, with another company 35th Sikhs as escort, to take up a position on the spur north of Badalai, whence they shelled the enemy on the high hill to the east. Brigadier-General Jeffreys, after despatching his orderly officer, Lieutenant Byron, R.A., to ensure the early arrival on Lieutenant-Colonel Goldney's left of Major Campbell's column, to whom a written order had been previously despatched, joined the two guns at their first position, leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Goldney with four companies of the 35th Sikhs below. Later on at about 9-30 A. M. after the village of Badalai had been cleared, Brigadier-General Jeffreys sent Captain Ryder* with $1\frac{1}{2}$ company of the 35th Sikhs (leaving $\frac{1}{2}$ company with the guns) still further to the right to clear the enemy off the spurs on the right flank of the guns to cover the troops moving against Chingai (2) and the advance of the battery to a second position. The remaining companies of the 35th Sikhs, led on by their advanced guard, pushed on northwards beyond the

* Captain Ryder belonged to the 1st Gurkhas, but was attached to the 35th Sikhs.

support of the guns until they reached the end of the spur north of Chingai (2) ; and two companies pushing on still further,—rather far from their supports—occupied the village of Shahi Tangi at about 10-30 A. M. Here Colonel Goldney ordered a halt to enable the Buffs to overtake him. As soon as the enemy noticed that the Sikhs had halted, they began to collect on all sides, seeing which Colonel Goldney ordered a retirement. The enemy thereupon promptly attacked in force, and the Sikhs were driven back about a mile, to the foot of the spur north of Chingai (2), with the loss of Lieutenant and Adjutant V. Hughes and one sepoy killed, and sixteen non-commissioned officers and sepoys wounded.


While this retirement was taking place, large numbers of the enemy were moving across from the west of the valley. Emboldened by the temporary success of the counter-attack, these men now ventured into the open ground at the foot of the hills and commenced to seriously threaten the retirement of the Sikhs from the left rear. Observing this, Captain Cole, who had been slowly retiring on the left flank in face of the superior numbers of the enemy, ordered his squadron to charge. The ground was not suitable for mounted action, and a deep nullah intervened between the squadron and the tribesmen which completely prevented the cavalry closing with them ; but the moral effect was very great, for as soon as the enemy heard the cavalry shout, and saw them galloping at speed towards them, they turned and fled seeking refuge in broken ground to the north. This completely relieved the pressure on the retirement of the Sikhs who promptly fixed bayonets and, charging with a cheer, put to flight their immediate pursuers. At this moment Lieutenant-Colonel Ommañey arrived with 4 companies of The Buffs, and his two guns, which were instantly brought into action along the spur north of Chingai (2), where they were immediately joined by Brigadier-General Jeffreys and the other two guns from the spur north of Badalai. Meanwhile Captain Ryder had advanced to the summit of the high hill to the east, so as to completely protect the right flank of the troops in the valley. In so doing Captain Ryder went somewhat further than was intended, and on this it subsequently became difficult to communicate with him.

We must now turn to the progress of No. 3 column. In the earlier part of the day this column had been very considerably delayed in dealing with the villages met with along the road shortly after leaving camp, which were found to be far more numerous and much more strongly built than had been expected. At about 9 A.M., when Major Campbell was still only about two miles from camp, he received a written message from Brigadier-General Jeffreys informing him that the enemy were collecting in front of Lieutenant-Colonel Goldney's column, and directing him to at once move forward and take up a position on Goldney's left flank. Meeting with but little opposition on the way, Major Campbell arrived just as the cavalry charge took place, and took up a strong position on the high bank of the main nullah, where he held at bay large numbers of the enemy who were endeavouring to cross over from the west and join their kinsmen in the Shahi Tangi valley. Amongst these several men in khaki uniform, apparently carrying great coats strapped on their shoulders who rendered themselves especially conspicuous, were said to be Umra Khan's retainers.

It was just 12 o'clock when the two columns united under Brigadier-General Jeffreys ; and as the troops were then some 9 or 10 miles from camp, the first intention of the General was to retire. But on learning from Lieutenant S. Churchill, 4th Hussars, who was attached to his staff, and had been with the advance companies of the 35th Sikhs, details of the losses suffered by the 35th Sikhs in their withdrawal from Shahi Tangi, and seeing the enemy still exultant at their partial success, he determined first to effect the destruction of that village. Accordingly, the Buffs were sent forward, with the 35th Sikhs in support, and completely destroyed the village. The enemy vigorously opposed this movement and many of them were killed in so doing.

At about 2-30 P. M., as soon as the villages of Shahi Tangi and Chingai (2) had been completely destroyed, Brigadier-General Jeffreys ordered the retirement to commence.

All this time Captain Ryder had maintained his position on the summit of the high ridge above Chingai (2) all efforts to communicate with him by signal to order his earlier withdrawal having failed. During the 2½ hours which he had waited there, the enemy had been collecting in numbers on the high range beyond him, whence they had kept up a desultory fire on his party, by which one sepoy had



DABAR HILL

SCENE OF CAPTAIN RYDER'S POSITION.

16th September 1897,

From Khalozai, looking N.-E.

(Sd.) H. F. WALTERS, Captain,
F. I. O., M. F. F.
18th Sept. 1897.

I. B., Topo. Dy. No. 2501.
Exd. C. J. A., April 1899.

been killed and two others wounded. At about 3-30 P.M., as soon as the troops, in their withdrawal, were falling back from the spur north of Chingai (2), Captain Ryder also conformed to the movement by retiring along the summit of the ridge; and by so doing, adopted a direction which diverged from the line of retreat of the main body of the force. Soon after this a message from Captain Ryder, stating that he was hard-pressed and unable to rejoin the main body without assistance, was received by Brigadier-General Jeffreys who instantly despatched $\frac{1}{2}$ company Guides Infantry to Captain Ryder's assistance, and sent orders to Major Campbell to move across from the left flank with the remainder of the Guides Infantry to support Captain Ryder.

The position of the troops at about 4-30 P.M. was as follows: The cavalry were on the extreme left watching the main nullah, and guarding the left flank; the Buffs forming the rear-guard, were in extended order retiring by alternate companies*; the Guides were proceeding to Captain Ryder's assistance, who was on the high ridge on the east; 3 companies of the 35th Sikhs under Captain Bond were slowly retiring homewards with the convoy of wounded men; the guns, moving in sections with a company of the 35th Sikhs and the Sappers as escort, were covering the general retirement. The enemy with several standards, both white and red, were pressing the retirement with great persistence, taking full advantage of the excellent cover afforded by the deep nullahs and terraces of the fields. During this retirement Lieutenant Crawford, R.A., was killed by a distance chance shot.

As the afternoon advanced, it became evident that Captain Ryder's position had become very serious; large numbers of the enemy, having noticed his isolated position, desisted from their attack on the main column, and moving rapidly eastwards attempted to entirely cut off his detachment from the rest of the force. A second message was received from him, stating that his men were hopelessly exhausted from fighting and from want of water, and that without further assistance he could not withdraw from the hill. Brigadier-General Jeffreys accordingly determined to halt the remainder of the force, and to wait until assured of the safety of Captain Ryder's detachment. Taking advantage of this halt, the neighbouring villages were inspected to ascertain their suitability for defence, in the event of its becoming necessary to occupy them for the night; for the afternoon was already far advanced, the heavy clouds rolling up threatened to cut short all evening twilight, and there was now no chance of the troops reaching camp before dark.

Meanwhile the Guides Infantry, under Major Campbell, at about 6 30 P. M. most successfully and gallantly relieved and brought off Captain Ryder's detachment, which had suffered heavy losses. The moment his party had begun to retire from the summit of the ridge the enemy had closed in on his flanks, and he had repeatedly to charge and put them to flight with a part of his force, while the remainder kept in check those in rear. At length Captain Ryder perceived that by proceeding further along the ridge he was following a course which was taking him further away from the main body; so he halted and determined to await reinforcements, as the spur down which he must descend was bare and without cover. The enemy now closed in on him on all sides and their swordsmen made repeated attacks, but were hurled back with heavy loss; Captain Ryder's party, also lost considerably, as the enemy's sharpshooters from behind excellent cover kept up a heavy fire. When the $\frac{1}{2}$ company of the Guides got half-way up the hill, the party descended the spur, and the enemy then pressed still more closely on the Sikhs who, exhausted by their long day's work and running short of ammunition, were unable to keep them off. At length under cover of the cross fire of the Guides at the foot of the hill, and the $\frac{1}{2}$ company of the Guides half-way up it, the Sikhs reached the plain just as it became dark and, passing through the Guides, proceeded with them to camp, the enemy following up for a considerable distance. The casualties among the Sikhs had been severe, *viz.*, fifteen non-commissioned officers and men killed; three missing; and two native officers and twenty men wounded. Both British officers (Captain Ryder and Lieutenant Gunning) were wounded, the former only slightly; but Lieutenant Gunning's condition was far more serious, as in the early part of the day he had been wounded by a shot in the face, and in

* Six Companies, as the two companies detailed as part of Major Campbell's column had rejoined Lieutenant-Colonel Ommaney when the two columns united.

descending the spur he received two severe sword-cut wounds, when engaged in a hand to hand combat with a couple of the enemy's swordsmen. Twenty-two Martini-Henry rifles also fell into the hands of the enemy.

As soon as it was seen that the Guides Infantry were retiring towards camp, Brigadier-General Jeffreys continued his retirement; and near Bilot, at about 7 P. M. he was joined by the reinforcements from camp, consisting of two companies 35th Sikhs, and two companies Guides Infantry, under the command of Major J. F. Worlledge* of the former battalion. Brigadier-General Jeffreys now directed Major Worlledge to take his four companies off to the eastward to assist the Guides, whose volleys could be distinctly heard, indicating that they were still slowly retiring. At about the hour above mentioned (7 P.M.) the Buffs, still extended, were covering the retirement, with their left resting on the edge of the nullah close to Munar; while the guns, escorted by the Sappers and Miners, and one company of the 35th Sikhs, were about to come into action on the south bank of a branch nullah just north of Bilot. The cavalry had, a short time previously, been ordered home, as it was becoming quite dark. Brigadier-General Jeffreys, being still anxious regarding the safety of the Guides and Captain Ryder's detachment, and fearing that many of his battery mules would be shot by the enemy's sharp shooters, if he continued the retirement, decided on occupying Bilot for the night, with the troops close at hand, his intention being that the Buffs should also occupy Munar for the night. But his verbal order to this effect was mis understood and was never delivered to Lieutenant-Colonel Ommaney. Brigadier-General Jeffreys himself ordered Captain Birch to move his guns into Bilot. The Sapper and Miner escort conformed to this movement, but the company of the 35th Sikhs did not; a mistake which was not discovered till darkness had set in. Just as the Battery reached Bilot Major Hamilton, D. A. A. G., rejoined Brigadier-General Jeffreys and was ordered to put the troops within the village walls. He, however, reported that this was not possible owing to the burning state of the village. It was accordingly decided to make the best of a position in an angle outside the village walls. Before these arrangements could be completed, the thunderstorm, which had been so long threatening, came on causing sudden and complete darkness and in the consequent confusion the troops got separated. The Buffs and the company 35th Sikhs lost all touch with the remainder of the troops and made their way home separately to camp, which they reached at about 9 P.M., by which time it was raining very heavily.

Meanwhile Brigadier-General Jeffreys was left at Bilot with the four guns of No. 8 mountain battery, 35 Sappers and Miners, and a section of 12 men of G. Company of the Buffs under Lance-Corporal J. Smith.† Part of the village had been burnt in the morning and was still smouldering: the troops accordingly placed themselves with their backs to the walls in an angle outside the village, and quickly threw up a small breastwork to their front as shown in the sketch opposite. While they were thus engaged the enemy occupied that portion of the village which was not burning and opened a sharp fire from the walls. Lieutenant T. C. Watson, R.E., at once collected a few men of The Buffs, and charged several of the enemy, who were firing from the north-east corner of the village. He then pushed on and dislodged a number of men from the west side, but in doing so he was wounded in the leg, and some of the Buffs were also wounded. Returning to the enclosure, he collected a few more men and again attacked the enemy in the same direction, but was again badly wounded in the arm and hand. Thereupon, Lieutenant J. M. C. Colvin, R.E., with some 8 sappers, worked his way into the village by the lane in the centre and, climbing on to the roofs of some houses near the tower on the west with a couple of men, drove the enemy away from under the walls on the outside. But the enemy were in the village all round him, and he was compelled to withdraw. He, however, again collected a few men and climbed on to the roofs a second time, but the position was untenable and he was forced to finally retire.‡ The enemy were now shooting at ranges varying from 5 to 20 yards; and from the village walls kept hurling down

* These reinforcements were sent out from camp in accordance with written instructions issued by Brigadier General Jeffreys at 3.30 P.M.


† The officers with Brigadier-General Jeffreys were—

Major Hamilton, D.A.A.G.; Captain Birch, R.A.; Lieutenant Wynter, R.A.; Lieutenant Watson, R.E.; Lieutenant Colvin, R.E.; and two Native officers. The section of the Buffs had been detached from the regiment as an escort for wounded

‡ For these acts of gallantry Lieutenants Watson and Colvin and Corporal Smith of the Buffs subsequently received the Victoria Cross and four other men of the Buffs received the Distinguished Conduct Medal.

PLAN
OF
BILOT VILLAGE.

Scale of Yards.




From a sketch by—
H. F. WALTERS, Capt.,
F. I. O., M. F. F.,
18-9-97.

MAP TO ILLUSTRATE ACTION AT DAMADOLAH,
18th September 1897.

Surveyed by Lance Naik Diwar Singh and Private Besant Singh, 45th Sikhs.

Scale 2 Inches = 1 Mile. R. F. $\frac{1}{31680}$

Yards 1000 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1000 2000 3000 Yards



(Sd.) H. F. WALTERS, Capt.,
F. I. O., M. F. F.
18-9-97.

■ The principal fortified
homesteads of Damadolah.

I. B., Topo. Dy. No. 2,502.
Exd. C. J. A., March 1899.

No. 1,566-L, 99.

large stones, and also lighted grass to enable their sharp-shooters to fire. Brigadier-General Jeffreys received a severe blow from a stone which cut open the back of his head; Captain Birch was slightly wounded; and in a short space of time many men and animals were killed or wounded. The guns fired a few rounds of case shot into the village. At 9-30 P.M. the enemy's attack abated slightly, owing probably to the heavy rain, but at 10-30 P.M. it was again renewed with vigour and Lieutenant Wynter, R.A., and many men were wounded. This state of things, in spite of numerous acts of distinguished gallantry by our troops, continued until Major Worledge opportunely arrived with his four companies about midnight, when the enemy were easily driven off, and gave no further annoyance during the rest of the night. The fortunate arrival of these re-inforcements needs explanation.

As stated above, Brigadier-General Jeffreys had sent Major Worledge off at about 7 P.M. to try and join the Guides Infantry, to give what assistance he could to Major Campbell and bring them back to Bilot to the rest of the column. Failing to find the Guides in the dark, he tried to retrace his steps to the General. At length after a great deal of marching, he arrived close to the village of Bilot, whither he had been attracted by the firing of the guns. By shouting and blowing of bugles he tried to inform the belated troops of his approach, but as he was merely fired at in reply, he formed square in the open ground about 250 yards east of the village and, his men having thrown up a small breast-work by the aid of their bayonets, he waited until the moon had risen sufficiently to enable him to ascertain his surroundings. Then he sent a mounted sowar of the 11th Bengal Lancers to communicate with the troops at Bilot, who returned with the order that Major Worledge should at once march to their assistance. This he did, the enemy vacating the village on his approach: the fires were then extinguished and the enclosures were occupied until soon after daybreak on the morning of the 17th September, when the cavalry and 38th Dogras arriving from camp escorted Brigadier-General Jeffreys and his troops back to Inayat Kila, without any further annoyance from the enemy.

The casualties during the operations of the 16th September will be found in detail in Appendix C (4-e): they amounted to two officers and 36 men killed; and 11 officers, 102 men, and 3 followers wounded. Forty-eight horses and mules were also killed and otherwise lost.

The bulk of the 2nd brigade rested on the 17th September after their exertions of the previous day. But 3 companies of the Buffs, and 3 companies of 38th Dogras, under the command of Major Moody of the former battalion proceeded to Jhar to meet a convoy, bringing five days' supplies and 44 boxes of Martini-Henry ammunition for the brigade, which Sir Bindon Blood had ordered up from Panjkora on the 15th September. This convoy was escorted from the Panjkora to Sikanderai by the Guides Cavalry, supported by the 31st Punjab Infantry at Ghosam, and thence by the levies of the Khans of Khar and Jhar, in accordance with arrangements made by Major Deane. Said Ahmad Khan of Barwa, in the Jandol Valley, also came forward with a body of sowars to assist the troops, and the Shamozai Utman Khels protected the line of march through their country. These arrangements were made to avoid the chance of a small escort being locked up in hostilities with Utman Khels and others on the line of communications.

On the 18th September the punishment of the Mamunds was continued. At 6 A.M. the marginally noted troops moved out of camp and marched on the village of Damadolah, 5 miles north-east of Inayat Kila. This well wooded

4 guns No. 8 mountain battery.
3 companies, The Buffs.
6 " Guides.
6 " 35th Sikhs.
3 " 38th Dogras.
No. 4 company, Bengal Srppeas
and Miners.

village, (see sketch) consisting of a large number of stone-built houses, with stone walled enclosures and several strongly built towers, was situated on the lower slopes of a high hill, in a horseshoe-shaped gorge with rugged spurs on either side. In two or three places, commanding the approaches to the village, were strongly constructed, stone-built, forts with walls 15 to 20 feet high and strong towers. Below the village, on the lower slopes of the hill, were fields covered with crops of green Indian-corn about 8 feet high, with terraced walls of stone, some of which were quite 10 feet high.


None of the enemy were met with until the troops got to within about a mile of Damadolah, when a few men were seen moving about the village, on the


spurs behind it, and on the top of the hills. On approaching the village, Brigadier-General Jeffreys sent the 35th Sikhs to hold a rocky knoll on the spur overlooking the village on the east, while the 38th Dogras occupied the lower slopes of a spur to the north-west. The battery then came into action on the terraced fields west of the village. When the Sikhs and Dogras had reached their allotted positions after slight opposition, the Guides advanced right through the village and up on to the slopes to the north, being followed immediately by the Sappers and Miners and about 400 spare transport mules of the brigade. While the latter were being loaded up with the grain, of which large quantities were found in every house, the Sappers were employed in preparing the towers and village defences for destruction; and the main body of the Buffs remained in the open fields south of the village, ready to stop any of the enemy joining in from other parts of the valley, with one company of the Buffs detached to a spur to the west, from whence they could observe Badan and the country beyond. As soon as the Guides had occupied the spurs above the village, the battery advanced to a second position on the low spur occupied by the Dogras, whence artillery fire was opened on the enemy on the high hill who kept up a desultory dropping fire on our troops. At 12-10 P.M., when all the mules had been loaded up and safely withdrawn from the village, the Sappers blew up the towers and destroyed the village defences. The Guides and the battery then retired from their advanced positions to the open fields on the west of the village under cover of the fire of the Sikhs and Dogras posted on the flanking spurs, who in turn retired, under cover of the fire of the troops on the plain and of the Buffs, who formed the rearguard back to camp. As soon as the parties of the Guides above the village began to retire, the enemy, in accordance with their usual tactics, rapidly descended from the hills and attempted to close on our troops; but no chance was given them of getting to close quarters or of doing any material damage, and all the troops returned to camp at 2-30 P.M. The casualties for the day were two men killed and five wounded. The loss inflicted upon the enemy could not be accurately ascertained, but it was believed to have been severe, as many of them were seen to fall.

On the 19th September the brigade moved out from camp at 6 A.M. to visit Hazarnao and other villages in the neighbourhood of Bilot. On the arrival of the troops at Bilot it was found that the bodies of seven of our men, (Mahomedans) who had been killed on the night of the 16th September and buried there, had been exhumed and stripped of all clothing*. All these villages were located in the open valley away from the hills, and nothing was seen of the enemy; but they were completely destroyed after the quantities of grain and bhoosa which they contained had been conveyed to camp. While the infantry were engaged in destroying these villages the cavalry reconnoitred towards the village of Zagai, in which Umra Khan's adherents, all well armed with Martini-Henry rifles, were known to reside, and which it was intended to visit on the following day.

During these operations some of the inhabitants of Badan, on behalf of the villages of Badan and Dabar, came to Brigadier-General Jeffreys, stating that the inhabitants of both villages were willing to make unconditional surrender, and requesting that their villages might be spared. They were informed that no terms could be granted to any one until a full representative *jirga* of the whole tribe came in, bringing with them the rifles lost by our troops on the 16th September, as an earnest that they were prepared to submit to whatever terms Government might impose. These men then departed, promising to do their utmost to persuade their kinsmen to comply, and to meet Brigadier-General Jeffreys at 6 A.M. on the following morning as he advanced against Zagai. At 5 A.M. on the 20th September, the brigade started from camp to attack Zagai, 9 miles distant. Although the enemy were seen hanging about the hills on the left flank watching the movement of the troops, there did not appear to be any large gatherings of them anywhere, as they were ignorant of the point of attack, and consequently no opposition was met with till the troops approached Zagai. Covered by a screen of cavalry the brigade marched straight up the valley in column of route till within 2,500 yards of Zagai, when it was ascertained that the village, which like that of Damadolah lay on the lower slopes of a high hill with low spurs on either side of it, was held by the enemy. Accordingly the 38th Dogras, forming the advanced guard, were directed to form for attack and advance on the village, as soon as the Buffs had occupied the spur on the north-east, and the Guides had occupied a

* Excepting a few sword-cuts these bodies had not been mutilated.





ACTION AT ZAGAI,
20th September 1897.
From position of the Guns.

(Sd.) H. F. WALTERS, *Captain,*
F. I. O., M. F. F.

I. B., Topo. Dy. No. 2,503.
Exd. C. J. A., March 1899.

No. 1,567-I, 99.

small knoll on the south-west overlooking Agrah and Gat. The artillery then came into action in front of the village, with the 35th Sikhs in reserve, while the cavalry watched the left flank. The attack was completely successful, and the Dogras and Sappers completely destroyed the village without loss. While the demolition of the village was in progress, large numbers of the enemy, estimated at between 500 and 600, moved down from the hills into the valley to the west and threatened the left flank and rear. On this being reported to Brigadier-General Jeffreys, he moved the 35th Sikhs to his left rear, and followed himself with two guns. By skilful demonstrations by Captain Cole's squadron and the fire of the two guns, these reinforcements were prevented from closing on the Guides Infantry who subsequently passed through the 35th Sikhs. At 12 noon the retirement to camp commenced, when the enemy followed up with great dash as usual, and heavily pressed the Buffs in their retirement over very difficult ground, which afforded no cover. The withdrawal was, however, carried out successfully and heavy losses were inflicted on the enemy, who made no attempt to follow our troops after they got away from the broken ground near the foot of the hills. On reaching the nullah-bed opposite the Zagaderai villages, a fort belonging to Umra Khan's retainers was completely destroyed; and the troops reached camp at 3 P.M.* The casualties during the day amounted to four officers (Major Moody, Captain Hulke, Lieutenant Power of the Buffs, and 2nd-Lieutenant Keene, I.S.C.), and ten non-commissioned officers and men wounded.

The brigade rested on September 21st.† During the night a few shots were fired into camp a little after midnight; one pony was killed and one follower wounded, but a star shell and a few volleys soon stopped all further firing. The following morning the brigade left camp at 5 A.M. to attack the village of Dag. On reaching the neighbourhood of the village, the Buffs occupied the commanding heights on the east, while the Guides held those on the left; the 35th Sikhs, moved right through the village; the Sappers completely destroyed all towers and defences, and a considerable amount of grain and bhoosa was obtained and carried back to camp. The opposition was slight until the retirement commenced, when large numbers of the enemy descended from the heights and harassed the rear-guard. Our casualties were, one man killed and two wounded.

While these operations were in progress, Sir Bindon Blood and staff marched from Nawagai to Inayat Kila with two squadrons of the 11th Bengal Lancers, and remained two days in camp with the 2nd brigade.

On September 23rd the brigade moved at 5-30 A.M. to attack Tangai, a small village west of Dag, which the troops had not had time to deal with on the previous day. On arriving opposite the village, the Guides occupied a commanding position to the south; the 35th Sikhs seized a hill, wood, and fort on the north, whence they were enabled to prevent an attack on our right front from Garigal; while the 38th Dogras and Sappers moved up through the village and destroyed the defences. Swarms of the enemy were seen on the hills, but were prevented from descending by the fire of the artillery, posted in the open west of the village. A company of the Buffs, occupying a hill on the right flank, and supported by the remainder of the battalion to the right rear, prevented the enemy advancing from that direction. The retirement was successfully carried out with only two casualties Major Moody of the Buffs being again slightly wounded; and one sepoy of the 38th Dogras severely wounded.

On the return of the troops to camp, the Khan of Jhar, who (at his own request), had been permitted to visit the Mamunds (not as an emissary of Government, but in his capacity as a leading Khan) to try and induce them to submit, and thus to enable us to withdraw our troops from the valley, reported that the enemy had already lost heavily in killed and wounded, and that they were desirous of obtaining peace; but that the daily attacks of our troops were preventing them from meeting together to discuss the terms. Sir Bindon Blood accordingly agreed to grant the tribesmen an armistice for 48 hours to enable them to send in a representative *jirga*. Taking advantage of this temporary cessation of hostilities in the Watelai valley attention may now be turned to the events which had taken place at Nawagai, where the 3rd brigade was now encamped.

* No *jirga* from Badan or Dabar came in.

† On the 21st September the following gracious message from Her Majesty the Queen was published in orders:—

"I am deeply grieved at the loss of so many brave officers and men, and wish to know how the wounded are doing. The conduct of the troops is most admirable."

CHAPTER 8.

OPERATIONS OF THE 3RD BRIGADE AT NAWAGAI AGAINST THE HADDA MULLAH'S GATHERINGS, SEPTEMBER 1897.

It will be remembered (*vide* page 48) that on the 14th September, the day on which the Mamunds made their night attack on Brigadier-General Jeffreys' camp at Markhanai, the 3rd brigade marched from its camp at Shamshak, opposite the mouth of the Watelai valley, to Nawagai. There, it encamped on open sloping ground about a mile beyond the village, near the point where the basin of the hills, in which Nawagai is situated, opens southwards into the broad plain. Safdar Khan of Nawagai here met Sir Bindon Blood, and declared his fixed determination of doing all in his power to assist Government, placing the services of his son Muhammad Ali Jan at Sir Bindon's disposal to supervise the collection of all supplies that might be required.

It was now ascertained that the Hadda Mullah with a miscellaneous and daily increasing gathering of Musa Khel, Mohmands, and fanatics from the Amir's territory was at Bedmanai, about 8 miles from Nawagai. The proximity of this gathering and the sullen feeling of hostility of the Bajaur tribes was producing a bad effect on the Khans of Nawagai, Khar, and Jhar; and although openly they made offers of assistance, covertly they were hostile. At this time the Khan of Nawagai's chief advisers were Momin Khan, Mamund of Inayat Kila, and two brothers, named Raza Khan and Adam Khan, Musa Khels of Suran. These three men did their utmost to poison the Khan's mind against Government, and with many others joined in calling him a coward, and in taunting him for having allowed British troops to reach Nawagai without offering resistance.

On the 15th September news was received of the attack on the camp of the 2nd brigade; and, as described in the preceding chapter, the force under Brigadier-General Jeffreys was directed to undertake operations in the Watelai valley. The turning aside of the 2nd brigade to punish the Mamunds made a considerable change in the aspect of affairs in Southern Bajaur and the Mohmand country; and the strategical situation which now developed itself was interesting. Sir Bindon Blood found himself at Nawagai with a brigade of all arms in a strongly entrenched position, faced by the Hadda Mullah's gathering in the Bedmanai pass, a not very difficult defile some six or eight miles in length, the mouth of which was about seven miles south-west in a straight line from the site of his camp,—itself about one mile south of Nawagai village. The intervening ground was a plain, of which the western half was cut up by ravines, while the rest was favourable for cavalry. East of, and behind, his position lay the road to the camp of the 2nd brigade at Inayat Kila running for about six miles through a net work of deep ravines and then for the remaining six or seven over a plain. Sir Bindon was not strong enough to attack the Mullah's gathering in their position with a sufficient amount of odds in his favour, while he did not think it advisable to rejoin Brigadier-General Jeffreys,—first, because Jeffreys was strong enough already for immediate requirements; secondly, because it would have been most unwise to have retired through the ravines above mentioned in the face of the Mullah's gathering; thirdly, because he (Sir Bindon) expected that one of Major-General Elles' brigades would join him in the Nawagai

valley on the 17th or 18th at latest; and, finally, because support was necessary to keep the Khan of Nawagai with us,—as, if he were deserted, he would have been compelled by the Mullah's men to throw in his lot with them, which would have been a serious matter on account of his influence in Bajaur. Accordingly, Sir Bindon Blood determined to stay where he was, until Major-General Elles' advance should make it possible to dispose effectually of the Mullah's gathering; and to completely clear out the Bedmanai pass and the Mitai and neighbouring valleys.

Communication between the two forces being now so highly desirable, cavalry reconnaissances for the next few days were pushed out as far as possible, in the direction from which the Mohmand field force was daily expected to appear. Thus on the 15th September a squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers, accompanied by Captain Stanton, D. A. Q. M. G., for Intelligence went out some 18 miles across the Kandara valley to the Ata Khel valley, through the small pass of Darwazgai, to within 5 or 6 miles of the Nahaki pass. The Ata Khel villages were found to be deserted; the Kandaris were in their villages and ostensibly friendly. The Ambahar valley was reconnoitred as far as Pipal by Captain Tod, Field Intelligence Officer, 3rd brigade.

The Bedmanai pass was also reconnoitred during the evening by a patrol, which was fired upon from Kuz Chinarai. The reconnaissances left no doubt that the Hadda Mullah's gathering was hourly increasing. Not only were the enemy now holding the Bedmanai pass, but reports received on this day showed that part of the gathering was now holding Kuz Chinarai close to the entrance of the pass. Emboldened by their numbers and confident of the strength of their position, they sent in a letter to Sir Bindon Blood saying that they were determined to fight, unless they were granted three conditions:—(1) That no arms should be demanded from them; (2) That no damage should be done to their property by the troops; (3) That Malik Sultanai's house in the Mitai valley should not be destroyed.*

On the 16th September a signalling station was established at Lakarai but nothing was seen of the Mohmand force; and the evening patrol towards the Bedmanai pass was again fired upon, without result, from Kuz Chinarai.

News was received on the 17th September of the severe fighting of the 2nd brigade in the Watelai valley, exaggerated reports of which were of course being rapidly circulated throughout the country. The Khan of Nawagai was much annoyed with the Mamunds for having committed themselves, and for thus keeping our troops in the Bajaur country for an indefinite period. In spite of evil counsels from nearly all the leading men in his country, and constant messages from the Sipah Salar, he had so far fully carried out all his promises to assist Government. His vassals were out all along his border, and were doing their utmost to prevent the camp being attacked; they had turned back many men, and up to date not a single shot had been fired into the camp. The Musa Khel Mohmands, too did not appreciate the presence of trans-frontier men in their ranks who had nothing to lose; so they sent in a message to Sir Bindon Blood offering to surrender 10 of the Amir's subjects with their arms, if their own punishment would be cancelled.

Between 3 and 4 P.M. on the afternoon of the 17th, some 800 or 1,000 men were seen from the camp, streaming out of the Bedmanai defile into the open plain. It was considered not unlikely that the camp was about to be attacked, and the brigade accordingly moved out; but the enemy remained among the ravines. The cavalry fired a few rounds at them and the guns dropped a few shells amongst them, which had the effect of sending them back at once to the hills, about half of them streaming off to Mitai. Thereupon the troops retired to camp, which they reached at 7 P.M., and a quiet night was passed.

On the 18th September, communication was at length opened with Major-General Elles' force, part of which had reached the Nahaki pass, after being much delayed by the great difficulties in traversing the country. During this day, nothing was seen of the enemy, and reports stated that they had all withdrawn to

* As bad feeling existed between Ghairat Malik (by whom this letter was signed) and the family of Malik Sultanai, who was dead, this request was evidently inserted to ensure the destruction of the house.

the Bedmanai pass, where they intended fighting and awaiting the issue. In the night a man of the Queen's was attacked with knives and mortally wounded a few yards outside the camp perimeter.

A heliographic message from Army Head-quarters reached Sir Bindon Blood, through the Mohmand force, on the 19th September directing him to proceed to Inayat Kila and there rejoin Brigadier-General Jeffreys. But Major-General Elles' force had not yet penetrated far enough into the country to draw off the Mullah's gathering from the vicinity of Nawagai: so that it was not until the 22nd September that Sir Bindon Blood could comply with this order.

At about 5-30 P.M. on the 19th, some 2,000 of the Hadda Mullah's men descended from their hills to the mouth of the Bedmanai pass, and for an hour or so amused themselves by engaging in "Khattak" dances. Ultimately, about dusk they commenced to move towards camp, and shortly afterwards the Khan of Nawagai's son reported that an attack on the camp would take place during the night. The camp itself was situated on open stony ground sloping gently to the south and prepared for cultivation in terraced fields. To the north the ground was level and bare for a considerable distance: on the west face successive terraces gave 4 or 5 feet of cover to within 30 or 40 yards of the camp entrenchments; while 150 to 200 yards away, was a dry stony nullah with banks 8 to 10 feet high, in which the enemy subsequently collected in considerable numbers: on the east the ground was much broken with deep nullahs and the slope was steep. Rocky and precipitous hills rose at some 1,600 or 1,700 yards distance to the westward, a low spur from them running down to within about 1,000 yards of the south-west corner of the camp; the hills on the east side were also about a mile distant. At about 11-30 P.M. the attack commenced. The enemy approached the camp in two lines, with some 150 men (mostly swordsmen) in the first line and about 1,000 in the second, the intention evidently being, that if the first line were successful in obtaining an entrance into the camp, the 2nd line was to rush in and complete the surprise. The first line crept up unperceived to within 50 yards of the parapet held by the Queen's and fired two or three volleys; but the steady fire, with which they were met, soon sent them off from that side. After trying other parts of the camp in a half-hearted manner, and meeting with no better success, they withdrew, after a short time, and with much shouting entered into a short engagement with the Khan of Nawagai's piquets. The enemy's second line made no attempt to enter the camp. Our casualties on this occasion were one man of the Queen's killed, and one severely wounded.


On the 20th September Sir Bindon Blood received a message from Major General Elles who had on this date reached Nahaki arranging to meet him at 10 A.M. on the following day at Lakarai, 7 miles south of Nawagai. During the afternoon Brigadier-General Wodehouse, with a squadron, four guns, and two battalions, reconnoitred towards the Bedmanai pass; and, on advancing towards Kuz Chinarai, found the enemy in considerable force in the Mitai valley. As they made no attempt to attack our troops, and it was far too late in the day for our troops to attack them, orders were given for the force to return to camp. Thereupon the enemy followed up, at a considerable distance, and when last seen before dark, they were still some two miles from the camp. The Khan of Nawagai again sent word informing Sir Bindon Blood that the enemy were about to make a second night attack on the camp; and further reports were also received showing that the enemy's gathering had been increased by several fresh contingents, including a large number of Shinwaris and other Afghan subjects.

At about 8-45 P.M., as it became evident that the enemy were approaching, large bonfires, which had been prepared in three places, were lighted. Scarcely had this been done when the camp was vigorously assaulted. The attack, which was led by the Sufi Mullah, (a resident of Batikot midway between Dakka and Jelalabad, and a zealous follower of the Hadda Mullah,) was rather well carried out tactically, constant rushes being made simultaneously from several points by swordsmen, covered by heavy rifle fire. The firing which commenced at 9 P.M. continued without any intermission till about 2 A.M. when the moon arose and the enemy withdrew. The enemy's force was probably not less than

**United Service Institution
of India.**

Scale 6 inches = 1 mile.

Yards 100 50 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 Yards



No. 1,563-I., 99.

3,000 strong, with about 100 Martini-Henry and several Lee-Metford rifles, besides many other rifles and firearms; and besides the 3,000 who actually attacked, some 2,000 others were held in reserve at a little distance awaiting events. The steadiness of the troops during this somewhat trying action was perfect and the safety of the camp was never in the slightest degree doubtful although the enemy's swordsmen were so courageous that many of them were shot down close to the entrenchment. In short, the affair was a most satisfactory one, as proving the admirable discipline, confidence, and steady shooting of our troops, as well as the efficiency of the simple defensive arrangements which had been made. Our casualties amounted to one killed and 31 wounded, among the latter being Brigadier-General Wodehouse. Forty-four horses, mules, ponies and camels were killed, and 89 wounded. The enemy's casualties were exceedingly heavy: it was afterwards ascertained that they lost at least 330 in killed alone, including several leading men; many bodies were left lying about close to the perimeter of the camp. The next morning, at daybreak, the cavalry were sent in pursuit, but nothing was seen of the enemy.

At 10 A.M. on the 21st September, Sir Bindon Blood met Major-General Elles, as previously arranged, at Lakarai. The latter officer, in spite of the great difficulties of the country, had reached this spot from Peshawar with three squadrons, 10 mountain guns, $\frac{1}{2}$ company Sappers and Miners, and the 1st brigade, Mohmand field force, while his 2nd brigade was maintaining the line of communications to Peshawar. In accordance with instructions received from Army Head-quarters, Sir Bindon Blood now decided on leaving Major-General Elles to carry on the operations in the Mohmand country; while he himself returned to Inayat Kila to rejoin Brigadier-General Jeffreys' brigade, and to supervise the completion of the punishment of the Mamunds, and the passage of supplies to his own force *via* Panjkora. To enable Major-General Elles to deal effectively with the combined gatherings of the Hadda and Sufi Mullahs, who might still be expected to offer vigorous opposition at the Bedmanai pass, Sir Bindon Blood placed the 3rd brigade,* Malakand field force, temporarily at his disposal. And next day, (22nd September) the 3rd brigade with the following divisional troops—1 squadron 11th Bengal Lancers, No. 1 Mountain Battery and No. 3 company Bombay Sappers and Miners,—marched to Kuz Chinarai to join Major-General Elles' force; while Sir Bindon Blood and head-quarters staff with two squadrons of the 11th Bengal Lancers returned to Inayat Kila. Henceforth, these troops formed a portion of the Mohmand field force, and their subsequent movements are described in detail in the official account of the operations of that force. It will suffice here to state that they took part in the action at the Bedmanai pass on the 23rd; and that after reaching Peshawar, *via* the Gandab valley, on the 2nd October, they were merged into the Tirah expeditionary force. The 21st September passed by without anything being seen of the enemy.

The failure of the enemy's night attacks on Sir Bindon Blood's camp had had a most beneficial effect all over the country; the Hadda Mullah's gathering saw that they had been unable to make any impression and began to rapidly disperse; the Sufi Mullah with many of his followers was reported to be already on his way to Kunar; and the Khan of Nawagai was now no longer in doubt regarding our intention and ability to maintain him, and his attitude became greatly changed. He held a *jirga* and told his followers that he would throw up the Khanship and leave the country, if they did not desist from harassing the British troops, or if they failed to obey his orders.

* The command of this brigade now devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel B. C. Graves, 39th Garhwalis.

CHAPTER 9.

OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MAMUNDS—(continued).

During the 48 hours truce granted to the Mamunds, as already noticed in Chapter 7, to enable them to assemble and discuss the terms of submission, arrangements were made to reorganise the 2nd brigade and also to make it more mobile. Owing to the large number of casualties which had taken place among the transport animals, it would have been impossible for the 2nd brigade to have marched anywhere at this time, without leaving a considerable portion of its baggage behind, or without considerably overloading all the animals. In addition to the usual requirements, transport was also now necessary for the removal of the sick and wounded, who at this time numbered no less than 170.

Accordingly on the 25th September, No. 8 Mountain Battery, the Buffs and 35th Sikhs, who had suffered heavily from casualties in action and from sickness, left Inayat Kila for Jhar, *en route* to Panjkora, where they came under Brigadier-General Meiklejohn's orders, and were employed at posts along the line of communications.

On September 26th all the sick and wounded, except slight cases, were despatched to Jhar *en route* to the base.

While the 2nd and 3rd brigades were engaged in the operations in Bajaur, several changes had taken place in the composition and distribution of the troops holding the line of communications, which it is now necessary to enumerate.

It will be remembered that the Highland Light Infantry originally formed a part of the 3rd Brigade. When Brigadier-General Wodehouse withdrew from Rustam and proceeded to Uch the Highland Light Infantry remained behind to hold Mardan. But when news of the severe fighting in the Watelai valley reached Government, it was recognised that Sir Bindon Blood's force would be delayed in Bajaur, and that consequently the line of communications, *viâ* the Malakand and Panjkora, must be maintained. Thereupon His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, with the sanction of Government, ordered the following movements to take place:—

No. 7 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery	} From Mardan to the Malakand.
2nd Battalion, Highland Light Infantry	
16th Bengal Infantry, Nowshera to Malakand.			
No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, from Jutogh to Rawal Pindi.			
3rd Bombay Light Infantry from Jhelum to Nowshera and Mardan for garrison duty.			
2nd Battalion, Derbyshire Regiment, from Bareilly	...	} To Rawalpindi to form a Reserve Bri- gade.	
1st Battalion, Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, from Lucknow.	...		
13th Bengal Infantry from Meerut and Fyzabad	...		
Sections B, C and D No. 6 British Field Hospital, from Meerut.	...		
No. 53 Native Field Hospital from Mesan Meer	...		

These precautionary measures were especially advisable on account of the numerous reports of unrest amongst the Bunerwals, who at any time could advance into Swat and threaten the line of communications to Bajaur.

It had been Sir Bindon Blood's original intention, as soon as his 2nd and 3rd brigades had established themselves in Bajaur and had been fully equipped and rationed for their march through Mohmand country, that Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, who had taken command of all the troops stationed between Mardan and Panjkora, should roll up the line of communications, then no longer necessary, and retire to the Swat valley. And it was with this object in view that, on the 15th September, Brigadier-General Meiklejohn had retired with his force from Panjkora to Sarai. But the night attack of the Mamunds on the 2nd brigade camp completely changed the aspect of affairs; and on the 17th September, under orders from Sir Bindon Blood, he returned to Panjkora, and with the above mentioned reinforcements, which quickly reached him, he maintained his line until the 3rd October, when he advanced to Inayat Kila.

To replace the troops withdrawn from Inayat Kila two squadrons Guides, No. 7 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, 500 rifles of the Royal West Kent Regiment, and 539 rifles of the 31st Punjab Infantry were sent up to join Jeffreys' force.

Several days' rations for both the 2nd and 3rd brigades were also passed through from the Panjkora unmolested to their destinations; in the latter case the convoy was escorted by 3 squadrons of the 11th Bengal Lancers, who proceeded to Chinarai, and there joined Colonel Graves' brigade, then with the Mohmand field force.

Meanwhile the negotiations with the Mamunds were not making much progress. It had been made known to them that if they desired peace a full and representative *jirga* must come in to Inayat Kila, and that before any terms would be dictated to them this *jirga* must surrender 50 guns and Rs. 4,000 in proof of their earnest desire for peace. On the 24th September representatives from the villages of Dabar, Badan and Upper Chingai came in, bringing their share of the earnest money and arms, which amounted to Rs. 400 and four guns, and stated that they were doing their best to induce the rest of the tribe to submit. These men were, however, told that negotiations could only be carried on through a full representative *jirga*; and that unless the tribe submitted as a whole the punishment of the whole tribe would be continued. The 48 hours truce granted to the tribesmen expired without any further overtures on their part; but the time was extended for another 24 hours, on the representation of the Khans that the *jirga* really was assembling. On the evening of September 26th, a representative Mamund *jirga* arrived at Inayat Kila, and at noon on the following day they were interviewed by Mr. Davis, assistant political officer, but with little success. They brought with them 3,575 Kabuli rupees and 50 old and utterly useless *jesails* and the Khan of Jhar gave security for the remaining Rs. 425.

Their demeanour was sullen, and on being informed that Government demanded the immediate surrender of 50 rifles for the attack on Chakdarra, and the return of the 22 rifles taken from our troops in the fighting on the 16th September, they flatly refused to give up any. Their excuse was that "all the world had turned out to take part in *ghaza* at Chakdarra", and that in the fighting on the 16th September large numbers of men from Kunar, Pech Darrah, Badil, and other places across the Kunar in Afghan territory, had joined in, and that these men had carried off all the rifles taken, and that they themselves had none of them. An attempt was then made to obtain hostages from them for the 22 rifles, two from the Wara and two from the Kakazai sections; but this also they absolutely refused to comply with. However, just before leaving, the *jirga* said they would go and talk matters over with the rest of the tribe and send in their answer on the following day. There is no doubt that the Khans of Nawagai, Jhar, and Khar had been secretly encouraging the tribes to maintain this hostile attitude: for, on three separate occasions, Sardar Khan of Khar sent out messengers to the Mamunds advising them to resist our terms. They all appeared to be under the impression that, owing to the events on other parts of the north-west frontier, our troops must shortly leave the country, and that they would thus escape having to give up any of the rifles.

On the morning of the 27th September Sir Bindon Blood and staff left Inayat Kila, *en route* to the Panjkora, as he had been informed that he with his staff

and the 1st and 2nd brigades, were to form part of the Tirah expeditionary force; and he accordingly desired to be in direct telegraphic communication with Government, so that the position of affairs in the Watelai valley might be thoroughly discussed. But on arriving at Panjkora the next day orders were received countermanding the previous instructions, and directing Sir Bindon Blood, with his staff,* together with Meiklejohn's and Jeffreys' brigades to remain on the Malakand side to complete terms with the local tribes, and to maintain order there.

As various matters of detail in connection with these orders had to be arranged, Sir Bindon Blood remained at the Panjkora bridge.

In the meanwhile the negotiations with the Mamunds had come to nothing. No answer whatever was received from them on the 28th September, and so far indeed was the tribe from submitting that during the day it was considered exceedingly probable, from all the reports received, that a night attack on the camp would take place. The Mamunds, however, were too busy removing their property from their villages to the hills to attempt this; and, with the exception of some dozen shots which were fired into camp (killing one of the cavalry horses), a quiet night was passed. It was afterwards ascertained that the tribes were so little in earnest in suing for peace, that the *jirga* had not even taken the trouble to make their fellow-tribesmen acquainted with the terms imposed. One of their chief objects in applying for a truce appeared to be to enable them to sow as much land as possible, during the cessation of hostilities; for if their sowing operations were delayed much longer, no spring crops could have been obtained.

On the following morning (29th September) at daybreak, Brigadier-General Jeffreys resumed punitive operations against the tribe. With the exception of the cavalry, who had a few shots fired at them from the high hills west of Hazarnao, the troops entering the valley saw nothing of the enemy, and the fortified villages at Zagaderai (4 hamlets), Khalozai (3 hamlets), Shagai, Amanatta, Jangzai, and Kamar (*vide* Map of Watelai valley, page 51) were utterly destroyed, without the slightest hostile molestation, after large quantities of grain, *bhoosa* and wood had been carried away out of them to camp.

Fifteen large well built towers were also blown up; and the troops returned to camp at 3 P. M. The night passed off quietly.

At 6 A. M. on the 30th September the marginally noted troops left camp to

Guides Cavalry, 163 sabres.	
No. 7 Mountain Battery,	
Royal West Kent Regiment ...	380 rifles.
31st Punjab Infantry ...	385 "
38th Dogras ...	342 "
Guides Infantry ...	364 "
Total ...	1,391 "

attack the villages of Agrah and Gat, 8 miles north of Inayat Kila. These two villages occupied a very strong position in a re-entering angle on the lower slopes of the great spur which divides the head of the valley. Long rocky spurs strewn with

enormous boulders guarded the flanks of the two villages, while between them is a small rugged spur with precipitous sides, covered with large rocks. At 9 A. M. the troops reached the open ground within striking distance of the villages, when large numbers of the enemy with a red standard could be seen collected on the spur overlooking the villages from the west. Tomtoms were being beaten loudly in many villages, and hundreds of the enemy were observed hurrying from all parts of the valley to their kinsmen's assistance. The Guides Cavalry had moved about a mile up the valley towards the Hindu Raj pass, where the country, being much cut up by numerous deep nullahs, and covered with a thick scrub jungle, was quite unsuitable for cavalry operations: they had, however, already commenced the action, and by dismounted fire were preventing many of the tribesmen from reaching Agrah and Gat.

Having observed the enemy's position, Brigadier-General Jeffreys decided on attacking Agrah first; and accordingly he ordered the Guides Infantry to advance and occupy the southernmost knoll of the spur west of Agrah, on which the enemy showed in force; while the Royal West Kent Regiment were to advance in the centre, clear the woods south of Agrah, and then ascend a given distance up the high hill behind the village; the 31st Punjab Infantry were to

* Colonel Broadbent, R.E., Surgeon-Colonel Townsend, Captain Grier, R. A., and Captain Walters, Intelligence Branch, were ordered to proceed at once to Kohat to join the Tirah force.

occupy the low rocky spur between Agrah and Gat. The guns came into action in rear of the centre, at a range of 2,500 yards, against the tribesmen collected on the ridge opposite the Guides Infantry; and the 38th Dogras were held in reserve in rear of the battery.

As the 31st Punjab Infantry advanced, it soon became apparent that large numbers of the enemy were concealed amongst the crags on the spur between the two villages. The artillery accordingly brought a searching fire to bear on that point; but in spite of it the enemy, ensconced among the large boulders, held on to the position, which they had considerably strengthened by a number of *sangars*. After a most stubborn resistance, the 31st Punjab Infantry advanced and, having with great gallantry driven the enemy out at the point of the bayonet, occupied the position. In this advance Lieutenant-Colonel O'Bryen was mortally wounded while gallantly leading his battalion to the assault, and Lieutenant Peacock was severely wounded in the thigh. An order was thereupon sent to the 31st Punjab Infantry to retain their position on the spur, and not to enter Gat village until reinforced by the West Kent Regiment.

As soon as it became evident that the 31st Punjab Infantry were being stubbornly opposed two companies 38th Dogras were despatched to occupy a low rocky mound on the right rear; and the guns were also advanced to a 2nd position, whence they could shell the ground to the east of Gat. Meanwhile the Guides Infantry had gained the spur on the west under a heavy fire, but without loss: and the Royal West Kent Regiment then occupied the slopes of the hills above Agrah, which was now completely destroyed by No. 4 company, Bengal Sappers and Miners. As the enemy still continued to oppose the 31st Punjab Infantry, the Royal West Kent Regiment were directed to wheel to their right, towards the north-east, against the village of Gat, so as to support the left flank of the 31st Punjab Infantry. The Guides Infantry remained in their position, on the spur on the left, where they held in check large numbers of the enemy who were in front of them and on their left flank. Numbers of men in khaki uniform were again noticed and bugle calls were repeatedly sounded.

The Royal West Kent Regiment in moving across to its right soon became hotly engaged with the enemy at close quarters. The ground was exceedingly difficult to move over, and the high standing crops in the terraced fields with their stone-faced revetments 3 feet to 10 feet high, considerably favoured the enemy's tactics. Their *sangars* also were cunningly constructed, and each one appeared to be covered by the fire of some other *sangar* situated still further up on the hills above. As at Zagai, where the Buffs had several casualties after capturing and occupying one of the *sangars*; so in a similar manner at Gat, the Royal West Kent Regiment lost 2nd-Lieutenant W. C. Browne-Clayton killed, and several men wounded. The wounded men were quickly removed towards the rear by their comrades. This, however, very considerably reduced the number of men holding the *sangar*. Noting this a large number of swordsmen charged the four or five men left in the *sangar* with 2nd-Lieutenant Browne-Clayton's body and forced them to retire. Thereupon Major Western directed a spirited counter-attack and quickly recovered the *sangar* at the point of the bayonet. Part of the village of Gat was then destroyed; but by this time large numbers of the enemy, with two or three white standards, had arrived from the eastern villages of the valley, and were streaming over the spurs from the Zagai direction. Major Evans therefore withdrew the West Kent from the village, carrying down all his killed and wounded with him. During the withdrawal this battalion was not heavily pressed, owing probably to the fact that the enemy had already suffered very heavily indeed.

As soon as the West Kent was safely withdrawn from Gat, Brigadier-General Jeffreys ordered the retirement to become general; and it was carried out with great steadiness in the following order. The Sappers and Miners evacuated Agrah, while the West Kent withdrew from Gat, covered by the 31st Punjab Infantry, the latter battalion in turn joining in the retirement, protected most effectually by the two companies 38th Dogras, on the right, who maintained their position on the low knoll until the whole of the other two battalions had passed them. Meanwhile the battery was keeping up a brisk fire in the direction of Gat,

which almost entirely kept down the fire of the enemy's marksmen; and it maintained its advanced position until compelled to retire by the near approach of the enemy in the nullahs on the right flank. As the Bengal Sappers and Miners were withdrawing from Agrah, several of the enemy came down from the hills and attempted to follow them up through the village, but the steady volleys of the sappers drove them back. The left flank of the Guides Infantry, as they fell back, was protected by the Guides Cavalry, which, by means of dismounted fire and by several spirited charges held in check large numbers of the enemy, who followed up and attempted to get to close quarters. The general retirement was steadily continued, with the main body in the large nullah; the 38th Dogras and a small party of the Guides Cavalry guarding the right (east) flank, while the main body of the Guides Cavalry and Infantry protected the left (west) flank; camp was safely reached at 4 P.M.

The casualties of the 2nd Brigade in this action were two officers and ten men killed; seven officers and forty two men wounded (see appendix C 4-7). The Guides Cavalry had one horse killed and five wounded, and the Mountain Battery one mule killed. The enemy's losses are known to have been considerable. Four leading maliks were killed, and many bodies were left lying about in Gat village; the Royal West Kent Regiment alone are said to have killed and wounded over 200 men.

The disposition of the troops of the Malakand Field Force on the 30th September is given in Appendix A (4).

On the 1st October Sir Bindon Blood wired to Government "I am now crowding every man and gun on the decisive point, and if no unforeseen complications arise, I hope there will be an end of the Mamund difficulty in a few days." On the 2nd October, after instructions had been given to Brigadier-General Meiklejohn to proceed to Inayat Kila with 4 guns of No. 10 Field Battery, the Highland Light Infantry* and No. 5 Company Madras Sappers and Miners Sir Bindon Blood with his staff moved to Inayat Kila with 4 guns No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery, 1 squadron of the Guides Cavalry, and 4 companies of the 24th Punjab Infantry.†

On this day the troops at Inayat Kila were employed in furnishing foraging parties who went up the Watelai valley as far as Khalozai. 1,100 mule loads of grain and other supplies were collected from the villages and carried back to camp without opposition.

On the 3rd October Brigadier-General Jeffreys left camp at 6 A.M. to attack Badalai, which lay 8 miles from camp in a re-entering angle at the foot of the hill, on which Captain Ryder's company of the 35th Sikhs had lost so heavily on the 16th September. Owing to the fact that the column (as detailed in the margin) marched as if intending to attack Gat, which the enemy still expected, the village of Badalai, was occupied without opposition. The 31st Punjab Infantry having occupied the spur on the south-east of the village, and the 38th Dogras that on the north-west overlooking Chingai, a portion of the Sappers and Miners and two companies of the West Kent then entered the village and utterly destroyed it. The remainder of the West Kent were placed in reserve in rear of the centre, with the two batteries, while the Guides Infantry were posted well away to the north-west to watch any approach of the enemy from the direction of Agrah and Gat, where several standards were visible.

At 9-15 A.M. a message was received from the officer commanding the Guides Cavalry, who was watching the valley to the north, that parties of the enemy were visible to his front, against whom guns might open fire with effect. No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery and the Guides Infantry were consequently sent forward in support of the cavalry, and the West Kent took the place of the

* Relieved at the Malakand by the Buffs.

† During the night of October 2nd-3rd five Afridi sepoys of this regiment deserted with their rifles and ammunition.

Guides Infantry when that corps moved forward. As soon as the village had been destroyed, orders for the withdrawal were issued. The moment the enemy, who had been keeping up a harmless desultory fire on the 31st Punjab Infantry, perceived this they began descending the hills, and working down the valley from the north on to the ridge north of Chingai, they very soon occupied the positions which the 38th Dogras and 31st Punjab Infantry had just vacated. Those of the enemy who were posted at Agrah, Gat, and Zagai also boldly advanced into the open in a long extended line, but were held in check by the Guides Cavalry. In all some 4,000 men followed up the retirement with great boldness, and made persistent efforts to get round the flanks, the numerous deep ravines on the flanks materially assisting them in these tactics; but they were kept at a distance without difficulty, and the camp was finally reached at 3-45 P.M. The casualties during the day were 2 killed and 17 wounded. Whilst these operations were in progress, Sir Bindon Blood, having witnessed the commencement of the attack on the village, proceeded to reconnoitre the rest of the valley with a view to future operations. These, however, were unnecessary; for with the action of Badalai, hostilities against the Mamunds practically ceased. The tribe now became aware of the near approach of the reinforcements that were rapidly hurrying up from the Panjkora, and at once recognised that Government were determined to insist on their complete submission, and that therefore continued opposition on their part would merely bring upon them further loss and heavier punishment.

On the 3rd October Brigadier-General Meiklejohn and his staff arrived at Inayat Kila; and on the following day the Highland Light Infantry, No. 5 Company, Queen's Own Madras Sappers and Miners, and four guns of the 10th field battery, also arrived.*

On the 4th October the troops of the Malakand field force were reorganised as under:—

At Inayat Kila—

1st brigade, Brigadier-General Meiklejohn.	{ 2nd battalion, Highland Light Infantry. 24th Punjab Infantry (4 companies). 31st " "
2nd brigade, Brigadier-General Jeffreys.	{ Royal West Kent Regiment. 38th Dogras. Guides Infantry.
Divisional troops.	{ 10th field battery, Royal Artillery (2 guns at Panjkora). No. 7 mountain battery, Royal Artillery. No. 8 (Bengal) mountain battery (2 guns at Malakand). Guides Cavalry. No. 4 company, Bengal Sappers and Miners. No. 5 company, Madras Sappers and Miners.

On the line of communications—

1 squadron, 10th Bengal Lancers.
1st Battalion East Kent Regiment.
16th Bengal Infantry.
20th Punjab Infantry.
21st " " (4 companies).
24th " "
35th Sikhs

*The advance of the 10th field battery from the Panjkora bridge is worthy of notice. After having successfully hauled his six guns over the ford of the Panjkora river just above the bridge without mishap the officer commanding took four of the guns on to Inayat Kila, over ground destitute of any road of even the roughest description. Overcoming all obstacles, man-hauling the guns frequently, the battery without a single casualty arrived at the Watelsai valley, and thus reached a point in the hills 50 miles further than any other wheeled traffic had ever proceeded.

CHAPTER 10.

FULL SUBMISSION OF THE MAMUNDS, SALARZAIS, AND SHAMOZAIS OF BAJAUR.

Owing to the difficulty in settling up matters with the Mamunds, at Sir Bindon Blood's request, Major Deane rejoined the force at Inayat Kila, on the 4th October. Since his return to the Panjkora on the 13th September he had been busily employed dealing with the Swatis. On the 24th of that month he had received the Upper Swat *jirga*, which was accompanied by Gul Badshah, (the younger Mian Gul, a boy about 14 years old, the son of Abdul Manan elder son of the Akhund of Swat) who brought in Lieutenant Greaves' sword and two Government rifles. Pressure and intrigues of every kind had been employed to prevent Gul Badshah from coming in; and the mad fakir went to the extreme length of despatching four men to assassinate Major Deane's men who were with the *jirga*. The usual exaggerated reports of tribal victories in the Khyber, on the Samana, and in the Mamund valley; and rumours that the Amir was distributing rifles and ammunition, and was sending his son Sardar Habibulla Khan to Jelalabad to fight against Government, were being circulated freely throughout the country. In spite of all this, the interview with the *jirga* was satisfactory, and did much to allay the prevailing spirit of unrest. Later, on the 2nd October, the Mian Gul Amir Badshah, the elder son of Abdul Hanan, the younger son of the Akhund, also came in to Major Deane at the Malakand with a following of maliks, mullahs, and sheikhs; and Said Badshah, the senior of the Mian Guls, and the elder son of Abdul Manan, wrote saying that he was also on the road coming in to attend the gathering, but was prevented doing so by illness, and would attend when well. This further helped to settle matters in Swat.

But the Nawab of Dir at this time was giving cause for much anxiety. He was surrounded by pernicious *Akhundzadas** who, pandering to the Nawab's love of flattery, imbued him with ideas of his being a great and independent chief. Instead of doing his utmost to heartily assist Government at this troublesome period, he wrote to Major Deane making various excuses as to his age, ill-health, etc., for his want of action, and stating that he had made over everything to his eldest son, who would perform Government service in future. A reply from Major Deane, remarking that he feared Government would not be pleased with his conduct, had the effect for a short time of making the Nawab exert himself in the interests of Government.

By the time Major Deane arrived at Inayat Kila, the Mamunds had already approached the Khan of Nawagai requesting him to use his influence with Government to obtain peace for them on as favourable terms as possible. Major Deane, therefore, recommended a cessation of hostilities to enable the Khan of Nawagai, with the Khans of Khar and Jhar, to recommence negotiations with the tribe; and for the next few days, with the exception of the daily foraging, all operations were stopped.

On the 6th October the cavalry covering the foraging party had a small brush with the enemy, causing them some small loss; but our casualties were one duffadar slightly wounded, one horse injured. These were the last shots

* The Akhundzadas are descendants of saints of local or tribal reputation.

fired by our troops in the valley; for on the 11th October the Mamund *jirga* came in to Sir Bindon Blood and made full submission.

The terms now required of the Mamunds were merely the restitution of the 22 rifles lost by our troops on the 16th September: for, it was agreed that the destruction of their villages, the consumption of their grain and other supplies carried off to camp, and their losses in killed and wounded in action, should be considered sufficient punishment for their attacks on Chakdarra and on Brigadier-General Jeffreys' camp; and it was intimated to them that further terms would not be exacted, provided the tribe at once submitted. It was also made known to them that, in the event of their failing to comply with these terms, Government would authorize the Khan of Nawagai to occupy their valley, and, having built forts, to retain possession of their lands.

The negotiations with the tribe, which were carried on through the Khans with the assistance of Khan Bahadur Mian Rahim Shah, one of Major Deane's Native Political Assistants, were somewhat prolonged and difficult. On the 7th October it was reported that the Mamunds at length really intended complying with the terms, and that they had already sent back numbers of trans-frontier men who had crossed their passes to attack our troops; they also now daily piquetted all approaches to our camp to prevent night firing. But the final settlement was greatly delayed owing to the efforts made from the Afghan side of the line to prevent the submission of the tribe. There is no doubt that the *jirgas* were waiting for the permission of the Sipah Salar, then in Asmar, before they dared to submit.* By the 9th October the Mamunds had collected fourteen of the rifles demanded from them, but owing to the working of the Sipah Salar's emissaries, who had come across the boundary line and were doing their utmost to persuade the tribe not to surrender arms, the *jirgas* were by no means prepared to give them up.

Khan Bahadur Mian Rahim Shah, however, greatly counteracted the working of these emissaries, by promptly sending in to camp ten of the rifles which had been collected. This committed the *jirga*, who then took up the line that as some of the members had given up their rifles, others could not be allowed to retain those in their possession. They, moreover, directed that whoever refused to comply with this decision should forfeit all his hereditary lands, which would thereupon be sold, and the proceeds devoted to purchasing another rifle to be surrendered. Eventually, by the 11th October, the *jirga* had surrendered 20 rifles and had provided security for the two others.† They also sent in two officers' swords, and a lance which had been lost during the fighting in the valley.

On that date, the *jirga* was interviewed in durbar, at about 3 P. M., close to Nawa Kila and about half a mile from camp, by Sir Bindon Blood with Major Deane and others, including the Khans of Nawagai, Khar, and Jhar. The tribesmen expressed regret at the recent fighting and stated that they now desired a lasting peace: they acknowledged that they had lost very heavily in killed and wounded, and stated that they would never have fought with us had they not feared that Government contemplated annexing their country. At their request they were given a written statement setting forth that, so long as the tribe behaved itself and acted in accordance with their present agreement, Government had no desire to annex their country. They then complained that the boundary line between Afghan and British territory cut their country in half; but they were informed that this was an imperial question, which could not be discussed, and they were assured that no interference of Afghan officials would ever be permitted within the British sphere of influence. At this the *jirga* appeared to be satisfied, and agreed to require Umra Khan's gang under Ustaz Muham—mad to move across the border and never return to the Mamund valley. With uplifted hands the whole *jirga* then rose and swore with acclamations to abide by their agreement. Thus this durbar, which merely lasted for some fifteen minutes, brought to a conclusion the operations against the Mamunds, whose undeniable bravery and good fighting qualities had much impressed every British officer opposed to them.

* Fresh ammunition was also reaching the Watelai valley from Kabul and even as late as the 8th October two fresh mule loads arrived.

† Handed in on 13th October.

This result, however, had not been obtained without heavy losses on both sides. The casualties in the 2nd brigade between the 14th September and the 11th October amounted to 6 officers killed and 24 wounded; 55 non-commissioned officers and men killed and 194 wounded; 49 horses and mules killed, 68 wounded, and 18 missing. The Mamunds' losses, as ascertained from reliable information, amounted to no less than 220 killed, 120 dangerously wounded and not expected to recover, and some 250 others wounded, but not disabled. Besides these some 155 trans-frontier tribesmen, Charmungis and Salarzais, were killed. In addition to these losses in killed and wounded, 26 of their villages and a large number of their towers were totally destroyed; and the 1,265 transport animals of the 2nd brigade had lived on supplies obtained from Mamund villages free of cost for nearly a month. The destruction of villages and towers, which were largely composed of wood, must have entailed great loss on the tribe, owing to the scarcity of large timber in their valley, and the trouble, expense, and delay in obtaining it from a distance.

As soon as affairs had been satisfactorily settled with the Mamunds, preparations were made for the immediate departure of the troops from their country. While the negotiations were in progress, all the sick and wounded had been transferred to the base, the 1st battalion West Kent escorting a large convoy to the Panjkora, on the 9th October. As this battalion had been suffering a great deal from fever in their bivouacs at Inayat Kila, they were ordered to remain at the Panjkora, where they were able to live in tents; and the remaining 4 companies of the 24th Punjab Infantry, from the Panjkora, rejoined their other four companies at Inayat Kila, and took the place of the West Kent in the 2nd brigade.

On the 12th October the whole force at Inayat Kila marched to Jhar, 9 miles. The attitude of the tribesmen was friendly, and there was nowhere any sign of hostility, which was satisfactory, especially as the Mamund elders had reported that some of their young men were not altogether under control and might give trouble. Reconnaissance parties also found the neighbouring villagers of the Salarzai valley friendly. Next day the force moved to Mattashah, about three miles north of Jhar, in the Salarzai valley, with the object of bringing pressure to bear on the Salarzais, and to compel them to comply with our terms of punishment for their attacks on Chakdarra. The move of the camp to Mattashah also relieved the Khan of Jhar of the trouble of providing supplies, about which there was a certain amount of difficulty.

In dealing with the Salarzais regard was had to the fact that, although they had joined in the general *jehad* against us, they had never taken any very active part in the fighting. Moreover, since our troops had entered Bajaur they had not opposed us, neither as a tribe had they rendered any assistance to the Mamunds, or in any way interfered with our line of communications which passed close by the mouth of their valley. Taking all these matters into consideration, it was decided that a fine of 20 rifles and 200 guns would be sufficient punishment to impose on the Salarzais. The attitude of the tribe was at first uncertain, and it was some days before they could decide whether they would fight or submit. The main difficulties in dealing with this clan were their internal feuds, and the attempts of the Khan of Nawagai to prevent a settlement, an end which he desired to compass in order that the tribe might be involved in hostilities with Government, which would cripple them and leave the valley at his mercy when our troops withdrew. As noted in the opening chapters, the Khan of Nawagai, before the commencement of these hostilities, had given considerable trouble by attacking the Khan of Pashat and attempting to extend his influence over the Salarzai valley, which is the most fertile in Bajaur, and therefore an object of much desire to the Khans. The Salarzais, having discussed the terms imposed on them, at first decided to submit, then having quarrelled amongst themselves regarding the distribution of the fines they decided to fight; this decision, however, was never regarded as serious, as women and children were still seen in all the villages. The point of difference between the *jirgas* was that the Lower Salarzais, who lived in the open valley and possessed rifles, demanded a share of the rifle fine from the Upper Salarzais, who possessed none. Finding that the Lower Salarzais were doing their best to involve the whole tribe in hostilities Major Deane decided to deal at once with the Upper Salarzais

independently; and on 18th October their submission was accepted, when they handed in 100 guns as their portion of the fine. On the following day the Lower Salarzais also fully complied with the terms by handing in 100 guns and 10 breech-loaders and by giving security for the ten others, which in due course were handed in on 17th November 1897.

While these negotiations were in progress, the troops had thoroughly reconnoitred the valley, which was found to be finer than that of the Mamunds, being highly cultivated, with more trees in the valley itself, while the hills to the north were clothed with pines. The valley had a most peaceful appearance, the villagers coming out of their houses to watch the troops pass by; and nowhere was there the slightest sign of hostility during the progress of the reconnaissance. But every night while the troops were encamped at Mattashah shots were fired into camp; these for the most part were harmless, and the tribal piquets drove the marauders away. On the 19th October, the last night the troops were in the valley, some 20 shots were fired, and one sowar the Guides Cavalry was severely wounded in the foot. The Salarzai *jirga* attributed this work to a discontented malik, who wished to embroil the tribe with Government, and accordingly this man's villages and towers were blown up the next day, and the *jirga* seized his lands.

On the 20th October the troops returned and again encamped at Jhar, and matters were taken up with the Shamozaï Utman Khel *jirga*. While negotiations were still proceeding with the Salarzai tribe, the Shamozaïs had been anxious to be informed whether Government proposed imposing any terms on them; but Major Deane deferred reopening negotiations with them until matters had been settled finally with the Salarzais. The Shamozaïs acknowledged to having taken part in the attacks on Chakdarra; and a hundred of their men armed with rifles had since taken part in the night attack of the 14th September on the 2nd brigade camp, after the tribe had sworn to maintain peace. They had already surrendered at Ghosam, early in September, 15 breech-loaders and 85 guns to meet the 100 breech-loaders demanded from them; and Sir Bindon Blood, taking into consideration the services which the tribe had since rendered in guarding their portion of our line of communications, now agreed to accept 20 more breech-loaders and 35 guns in full settlement of the original demand. Failing compliance, operations were to be at once commenced against them. As their forts and lands all lay in the open at our mercy, the Shamozaïs saw the uselessness of resistance, and on the 21st October their *jirga* having complied with this demand was interviewed and dismissed. On the following day the 1st brigade, No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery, No. 5 Company Madras Sappers and Miners, and 1 squadron Guides Cavalry, marched to Ghosam; while the divisional headquarters with the remainder of the divisional troops and the 2nd brigade moved to Panjkora, preparatory to withdrawing across the river. This same day the Jandol tribesmen surrendered the balance of seven breech-loading rifles due from them.

The 2nd brigade continuing its march reached the north camp at the Malakand, on October 25th, dismantling as far as Chakdarra the field telegraph line (which during the operations had been laid as far as Kotkai), and taking back all stores and heavy baggage. The 1st brigade crossed the Panjkora river on the 23rd October and encamped on the left bank, whence it withdrew to the Swat Valley where, by the 27th October, the whole force was once again assembled. Owing mainly to the unhealthiness of the Swat valley at this season, it was decided to retain only the 2nd brigade in the valley on the old Malakand north camp, and to place the 1st brigade and divisional troops in a standing camp at Jalala;* the Guides, infantry and cavalry, were directed to return to Mardan,

* On the 21st October the Force was reconstituted as under:—

1st brigade—

1st Royal West Kent Regiment.
20th Punjab Infantry.
24th Punjab Infantry.
31st Punjab Infantry.

2nd brigade—

1st East Kent Regiment.
35th Sikhs.
38th Dogras.
Guides Infantry.

Divisional troops—


10th Field Battery, Royal Artillery.
No. 7 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery.
1 squadron 10th Bengal Lancers.
Guides Cavalry.
2nd battalion, Highland Light Infantry.
16th Bengal Infantry.
21st Punjab Infantry.
No. 4 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.
No. 5 Company Madras Sappers and Miners.

remaining, however, at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding if required. These dispositions were all completed by the 30th October. It should be noted that, while the operations in Bajaur were in progress, Colonel Reid, who was in command at the Malakand, had employed all the troops under his command in clearing the position, which he had considerably strengthened.

On leaving Bajaur territory Government granted to the Khan of Nawagai a sum of Rs. 10,000, to the Khan of Khar Rs. 3,500, and to the Khan of Jhar Rs. 2,500, as presents for themselves and their vassals in recognition of the valuable assistance rendered by them during the occupation of Bajaur. In addition to this Rs. 6,000 had been paid as compensation to the *zemindars* for the crops, etc., taken for fodder.

On the 30th October the eldest Mian Gul, with his brother Gul Badshah, the Pisani Mullah, and some 600 maliks of upper Swat came in to visit Major Deane. The visit was an important one as completing the submission of the religious as well as of the tribal leaders of upper Swat, and it gave a further opportunity of allaying feelings hostile to Government. A long discussion as to the future administration of their country was raised by the *jirga* who for the most part desired our direct interference, and declared that without it they had no hope of obtaining justice. Major Deane advised them to settle all their difficulties in accordance with Muhammadan law, but they represented that their difficulty did not lie in applying Muhammadan law, but in finding a power capable of enforcing their decisions. Before departing the Mian Guls requested that they might be allowed to show the sincerity of their submission to Government by being permitted to bring about the submission of the Bunerwals: this Major Deane told them they were permitted to attempt.

By the middle of November Major Deane reported that "the fanatical feeling in the country generally has subsided. The people are engaged in repairing damage done to villages, and in their ordinary occupations. Trade is passing freely up and down the road, and the only troubles in the country are the usual factional feuds, which are never ending."



SKETCH FROM BAR KANDAO,

12th November 1897.

(Sd.) A. WATERFIELD, Lieut.

11th Bengal Lancers.

CHAPTER II.

THE CIS-UTMAN KHEL EXPEDITION.

For the next few weeks the troops of the Malakand field force remained at the Malakand and Jalala, and nothing of special interest occurred. A number of reconnaissances, however, were successfully carried out including the principal passes into Buner and the Kotkai pass from upper Swat to the Indus; while the Charsadda route to Peshawar, the approaches to the Totai valley, and the Shakot, Morah, and Bazdarra passes were also all reconnoitred by the 21st November.

It will be remembered that large numbers of the Utman Khels had taken part in the attacks on the Malakand. On the 2nd August the garrison of Dargai saw the hills west of the Malakand covered with Utman Khels, hurrying to attack the Malakand; but they all turned back and dispersed to their homes, as soon as they saw that the garrison there had assumed the offensive. Large numbers of Utman Khels had also taken part in the raid on Shankargarh and the subsequent fight at Shabkadar; and amongst them were several of the inhabitants of the villages of Pranghar, Buchar, Balola, Nawedand, Nawai Killi, Sappri, and Deo Dehri, which lie on the southern slopes of the Utman Khel hills, close to the borders of the Peshawar District, in the country known as the Laman Utman Khel. The complicity of these tribesmen in the late rising was beyond all doubt, as several leading men amongst them were killed at Shabkadar; and Government had accordingly imposed terms on them and demanded their formal submission. It has been already related in Chapter 5, that the tribe had failed to make any signs of submission and that the 2nd brigade under Brigadier-General Jeffreys at the end of August had entered their country *via* Matkanai, from the Swat valley, and had reached the Ingzri pass, when the receipt of orders directing the Malakand field force to advance into Bajaur and to co-operate with the Mohmand field force, necessitated the postponement of the punishment of the Utman Khels.

Up to the 21st November the only Utman Khels who had submitted were the inhabitants of the Kuz-Totai villages of Kot, Myana, and Bar; three hundred guns were still due from the villages of Bar-Totai and Agra; and the Laman Utman Khels had paid in nothing of the fines imposed on them. Government, therefore decided on sending a military force into the Cis-Swat Utman Khel country, in order to enforce the surrender of arms by those sections who had not already complied with the terms imposed on them.

No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery.
1 squadron, 10th Bengal Lancers.
1st battalion East Kent Regiment.
21st Punjab Infantry.
35th Sikhs.
No. 5 Company, Madras Sappers
and Miners.

Accordingly on the 22nd November the force detailed in the margin, under the command of Colonel A. J. F. Reid, who was also given full political charge, concentrated at a place called Usman Khel Garhi near Dargai.

The plan of operations was as follows :—

Colonel Reid's column was to enter the Utman Khel country by the Bar-Totai pass, west of Dargai, thence advance to Agra and reconnoitre the Ingzri pass, up to the point which Brigadier-General Jeffreys' column had reached in August. As the Laman Utman Khel villages were under the political control of the Commissioner of Peshawar, it was decided to deal with them separately and without armed intervention unless necessary. After enforcing the compliance of the Utman Khels in Totai, Colonel Reid was to return by the Bar-Totai pass,

unless the Laman Utman Khels failed to submit, in which case he was to advance against them from Kot *via* Spinkhara.

Before the departure of the Utman Khel column, the Guides Infantry were recalled from Mardan: they reached Jalala on the 17th November and accompanied divisional head-quarters on the 20th idem to Dargai, where Sir Bindon Blood remained during the operations. The 16th Bengal Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Montanaro, also marched to Abazai to protect the head-works of the Swat canal, and to strengthen the hands of the political officers who were detailed to enforce the submission of the Laman Utman Khels.

On the 23rd November Colonel Reid advanced with his column to Hariankot and encamped at the foot of the Bar-Totai pass: throughout the day the sappers were at work on the pass to make it practicable for the camel transport, with which (with the exception of its obligatory mules*) the column was supplied. The Utman Khels, now recognising that the column was about to enter their country, assembled their *jirgas* and sent in to Colonel Reid requesting instructions. In reply they were informed that Colonel Reid would interview the *jirgas* on the following day at Kot. The column crossed the Bar-Totai pass on 24th and halted at Kot; but, owing to the difficulties experienced in getting the camels over the pass, the rearguard did not reach camp till midnight.

During the afternoon, Colonel Reid interviewed the combined Agra, Bar-Totai, and Khanauri *jirgas*; and the maliks of Bar and Myana also attended and paid their respects. Their attitude was entirely satisfactory, and they agreed to comply with the following terms:—

(1) The surrender of 300 guns, to include every rifle in their possession, 50 from Khanauri, 100 from Bar-Totai, and 150 from Agra; (2) to be responsible, within their own limits, that our troops were not opposed when traversing the country; (3) to permit a complete survey of their country; (4) to provide supplies for the transport animals, and wood, etc., for the troops while in the limits of their country; (5) to permit the troops to make such roads as might be found necessary.

While these negotiations were in progress, a reconnaissance was made up the Jhindai stream towards Bar-Totai as far as Derai, a small village about four miles from Kot, by half a squadron of the 10th Bengal Lancers and 4 companies of the 21st Punjab Infantry. The route as far as Derai was found to present no difficulties for camel transport; the inhabitants were quite peaceful, and numbers of cattle and herds of goats were seen grazing on the hills. Another reconnaissance was also made, by a troop of the 10th Bengal Lancers, to Spinkhara where also everything was found quiet and the route easy.

On the 25th November the column remained halted at Kot, sending reconnaissances to Tuthi Ziarat, 7 miles up the Jhindai stream towards the Agra pass, and also to the Kelo pass: and the next day it marched up the Jhindai stream for $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and encamped on a narrow basin-shaped site at Silipatai namlet, close to Badami, whence working parties were sent out to improve the track leading towards Bargholai. The inhabitants of Silipatai and Badami were perfectly friendly and furnished all the supplies required.

From Silipatai the column marched on the 27th November $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles to Bargholai by a track so rough and difficult that the rearguard did not arrive till 5 P.M. The advance of the troops was not molested, and the Bargholai villagers produced the necessary supplies. Colonel Reid pushed on from Bargholai with 4 companies of the 35th Sikhs and two guns to reconnoitre the Agra pass, at the foot of which he was met by the Agra *jirga*, who quietly accepted all the terms imposed on them. The sappers were for several hours employed in improving the track up the Agra pass; but as the road was not practicable for camels, Colonel Reid decided on visiting Agra with only a flying column, consisting of 1,000 infantry, 4 guns, and half a company of Sappers, equipped with mule transport only and carrying two days' supplies, leaving the remainder of the column (consisting of 850 Infantry, two guns, 125 Cavalry, and half a company of Sappers) at Bargholai, under the command of Colonel Goldney.

* Mules attached to corps units in the field for the purpose of carrying certain equipment for which pack-mule transport is considered essential, *viz.*, reserve ammunition, drinking water, stretchers and regimental ambulance, signalling equipment, entrenching tools.

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Accordingly, on the 28th November, Colonel Reid marched to Agra, $4\frac{1}{4}$ miles distant, and encamped at the foot of the pass, where water was obtained from a spring in the nullah bed. The Agra people were perfectly friendly and put out piquets to prevent the approach of any of the trans-Swat inhabitants. From the summit of the Agra pass a party of Shamozaïs with four standards could be seen on the hills on the right bank of the Swat-Panjhora river; and it was ascertained from subsequent information that the Shamozaïs, alarmed at the advance of our troops to Agra, had assembled to oppose any attempt on our part to enter their country by the rope bridge in the neighbourhood.

On the 29th November Colonel Reid sent out reconnaissances to Ormullo Sar by the Ingzri pass and Yardialai Sar, when the Shamozaïs were observed to be still in position on the far bank of the river. During the day the inhabitants of Agra surrendered the 150 guns demanded of them; and the following morning, the survey of the country having been completed to the junction of the Swat and Panjhora rivers, Colonel Reid returned with his flying column to Bargholai. The Agra *jirga* accompanied the troops, and on reaching Kot, proceeded thence to the Malakand to make their formal submission to Major Deane.

By the 1st December the Bar-Totai inhabitants had surrendered the 150 guns demanded; and accordingly, on that date, the whole column returned to Kot, where some men representing the Asil section of the Khanauris came in, and made excuses for non-compliance with the terms, stating that malik Gujar of the Umar Khel section had left his village with all his belongings, and had fled to escape compliance. Next day the Khanauris brought 32 guns into camp, and the remaining 18 were surrendered at Khanauri, whither a force had proceeded on reconnaissance. Malik Gujar's house was destroyed, and survey work was carried on without interruption. The force halted at Kot on the 3rd December, to enable the surveyor to complete his work on the Khanauri range, which was done with the aid of a small escort, and under the safe conduct of the Maliks of Kot.

On the 4th December, all terms having been fully complied with, and the survey work having been completed, the force evacuated Kuz-Totai and returned, by the Bar-Totai and Kaga passes, to Hariankot and Irozshah. The Bar-Totai *jirga* accompanied the troops on their way to the Malakand, where they also formally submitted to Major Deane on the 6th December.

While these operations had been in progress, the Laman Utman Khels had also fully complied with all Government demands. The political proceedings in connection with this section were entrusted to Mr. Stuart Waterfield, Punjab Police, who directed the *jirga* to assemble at Gandheri where the terms would be made known to them. The *jirga* assembled as directed, and on the 27th November Mr. C. Banbury, I.C.S., accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Montanaro and Mr. Stuart Waterfield, announced the terms to them. These were: (1) Payment of a fine of Rs. 2,000 in cash; (2) Surrender of all rifles, breech and muzzle loading; (3) Surrender of 300 guns and 300 swords; (4) Assistance in a complete survey of their country; and (5) Free forage and fuel to be supplied to troops visiting their country to enforce the terms. The *jirga* accepted these terms, and were given till the evening of the 2nd December within which to comply. They arrived at Abazai on the 2nd December with the full amount of their money fine and the swords and guns demanded; but, owing to the time taken in counting out the money, only Rs. 1,931-8-0, and 274 guns and swords, were handed in that day: some of the members of the *jirga* became tired of waiting and went away; but they all returned on the following morning, and handed in the remaining Rs. 68-8-0 and 26 guns and 26 swords. Amongst the guns handed in were 45 Tower muskets; but no rifles, the tribesmen declaring that they had none. In order to make sure as far as possible in this matter, each headman of each village and quarter (*kandi*) was placed on oath on the Koran. All solemnly swore that no rifles either Martini-Henry, Snider, or Enfield were in the possession of any man of their village or *kandi*, or even within their limits. Within the next few days the whole Laman Utman Khel country was surveyed and thoroughly reconnoitred with the assistance of the inhabitants themselves. The dealings with the Cis-Swat Utman Khels were thus brought to a successful conclusion, without a single shot being fired.

CHAPTER 12.

OPERATIONS OF THE BUNER FIELD FORCE, JANUARY 1898.

After the submission of the Cis-Swat Utman Khels the only tribes, who remained to be dealt with for their participation in the Malakand rising, were the Bunerwals, Chamlawals, Gaduns, Khudu Khels, and Amazais. While operations were in progress in Bajaur and elsewhere, Government had caused exhaustive enquiries to be made concerning their complicity in the attacks on the Malakand and Chakdarra, and in the action at Landakai; and it was established beyond doubt that they all had fully committed themselves. Each of these tribes was accordingly called upon to tender its submission. The Gaduns, Khudu Khels, and Amazais quickly complied, and wrote to the Assistant Commissioner at Mardan requesting that the terms of Government might be communicated to them. Accordingly on the 15th December Lieutenant C. P. Down, I.S.C., assembled a representative *jirga* of the Khudu Khels at Swabi and announced to them that they must pay a cash fine of Rs. 2,000; and surrender 150 guns, 200 swords, and the standards of Dagi, Talate, and Chinglai. The *jirga* was dismissed to collect the demand, which they were ordered to bring in on 19th December; and on that day they returned bringing in the demands in full; and their demeanour was extremely submissive. At the same time all outstanding border cases against the tribe were satisfactorily settled.

On the 22nd December the representative *jirga* of the Gaduns, evidently influenced by the example of the Khudu Khels, also came in to Lieutenant Down at Swabi. They likewise did not attempt any palliation of their conduct, but freely admitted that several of their *badmashes* had gone to the Swat valley, and expressed themselves now ready to comply with any terms Government might demand. They were accordingly ordered to pay a cash fine of Rs. 2,500; and to surrender 200 guns, 200 swords, and the standards of Gandap and Bisak; and the *jirga* was then dismissed with orders to return on the 2nd January. Owing, however, to the inclemency of the weather, it was not until January 5th that the terms were fully complied with at Mardan, and all outstanding cases against the tribe were disposed of.

With regard to the Amazais, Government decided that, their complicity being of little importance, they should be left alone, and no further reply was sent to their letter of submission.

With the Bunerwals and Chamlawals, however, matters did not progress so satisfactorily. The efforts made by the Mian Guls to bring about the submission of the former tribe were unavailing, and up to the end of December both of the tribes still remained recalcitrant. This refusal of the Bunerwals to comply with the demands of Government was doubtless prompted by various motives. In the first place, they appear to have been actuated not so much by any intention of offering a determined or continuous resistance to our advance, as by a desire to save their own good name amongst their neighbours: had they submitted to our terms at once, they would always have been taunted thereafter with cowardice by the surrounding clans. For the last 34 years the Bunerwals have been living on a spurious reputation for valour, acquired at Ambela in 1863, when the bulk of the resistance offered to us was due to the Swatis, Bajauris, and others, collected together by the influence of the Akhund of Swat, rather than to the Bunerwals themselves; and on the strength of the reputation then acquired, the Bunerwals have since been

looked up to, and feared by, such of our own subjects as have had dealings with them. They have consistently followed a policy of keeping to themselves, and of holding aloof from dealings or intercourse with the authorities of the Peshawar District. Though, as a general rule, they abstained from acts of aggression in British territory, still, when any individuals belonging to the tribe committed offences in our jurisdiction, it was always most difficult, if not impossible, for the local officers to obtain redress. Then again it seems that the Bunerwals had persuaded themselves that Government either could not or would not enter their country: they had seen troops concentrated at Rustam, and assembled on the Karakar pass, in August 1897, but on each occasion our forces had been withdrawn. Thus strengthened in their confidence regarding the inaccessibility of their country, and entertaining a lingering hope that their patron saint, Pir Baba (whose *ziarat* is in Gadaizai limits), would exert his supernatural influence to prevent foreign troops from invading Buner, the Bunerwals and Chamlawals ignored the demands of Government and showed no signs whatever of submission.

Government accordingly determined to enforce their submission, and towards the end of December directed that the terms of that submission should be made known to these two tribes. These were, in the case of the Bunerwals, (1) the submission of a fully representative *jirga*, of all sections implicated, to the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar at Mardan; (2) the restoration of Government property in possession of the tribes, or payment of such value as Government might determine; (3) surrender of 600 guns, which must include all Enfield rifles (about 50 in number) stolen from the Rustam border; also all breech-loaders held by the tribe; (4) payment of a cash fine of Rs. 11,500: in the case of the Chamlawals (1) payment of a cash fine of Rs. 1,500; and (2) surrender of 100 guns and 100 swords, and the standards of the villages of Kogah and Nawagai. These terms had to be fully complied with within seven days after the date of the formal acknowledgment of their receipt; and in the letter communicating them to the Bunerwals, they were distinctly informed that, in the event of their failing to comply, troops would invade their country and enforce compliance.

The letter despatched to the Bunerwals reached Buner on the 29th December, but the formal acknowledgment of its receipt by some of the leading maliks was dated the 31st idem; that announcing the terms to the Chamlawals was duly delivered to the Chamla *jirga* on the 29th December. Thus, the periods of grace expired, in the case of the Chamlawals, on the 5th January 1898; and in the case of the Bunerwals, on the evening of the 6th idem.

While the tribes were discussing these terms, Sir Bindon Blood was making due preparations for the invasion of Buner, on the expiration of the period of grace, with a force of the composition given below:—

1st Brigade.

Brigadier-General W. A. Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G.

1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment.

16th Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

20th (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

31st " " " " "

2nd Brigade.

Brigadier-General P. D. Jeffreys, C.B.

1st Battalion, East Kent Regiment (The Buffs).

21st Punjab Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

The Queen's Own Corps of Guides Infantry.

Divisional Troops.

10th Field Battery, Royal Artillery.
 No. 7. Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
 No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery.
 10th Bengal Lancers (1 squadron).
 Guides Cavalry.
 2nd Battalion, Highland Light Infantry.
 3rd Bombay Light Infantry, 6 companies.
 No. 4 company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
 No. 5 company, Madras Sappers and Miners.
 No. 1 British Field Hospital.
 2 sections No. 14 British field hospital.
 No. 25 British field hospital.
 No. 29 Native field hospital.
 2 sections No. 35 Native field hospital.
 No. 37 Native field hospital.
 2 sections No. 42 Native field hospital.
 No. 50 Native field hospital

Sir Bindon Blood was given full political control, having as his assistants, Mr. C. Banbury, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, and Lieutenant C. P. Down, Assistant Commissioner of Mardan.


The troops on the line of communications from Chakdarra to Mardan, consisting of 3 squadrons 10th Bengal Lancers, 24th Punjab Infantry, 35th Sikhs, and the 38th Dogras, were also placed under the orders of Sir Bindon Blood: and it was decided that from the date of the advance of Sir Bindon Blood's force into Buner, the remainder of the troops at the Malakand and elsewhere were to come under the orders of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Punjab Command.

On the 2nd January the 2nd brigade (excepting the Guides Infantry) with No. 7 Mountain Battery, the Highland Light Infantry, and 3 sections of No. 4 company Bengal Sappers and Miners, marched direct from Kunda to Katlung. The same day the 1st Brigade with the head-quarters of the force, 10th Field Battery, 1 squadron 10th Bengal Lancers, Guides Infantry, and one section Bengal Sappers and Miners, moved from Kunda to Mardan: of these the Guides Infantry, 31st Punjab Infantry, and the section of Sappers and Miners, who were to form a separate column destined for Rustam, camped on the road leading to the latter place; while the remaining troops encamped along the Mardan-Katlung road.

The troops halted for the next two days; but on the 5th January, the Rustam column, having been joined by two squadrons of the Guides Cavalry and three squadrons 10th Bengal Lancers, marched to Rustam, while the remainder of the force at Mardan with 6 companies of the 3rd Bombay Light Infantry, advanced to Katlung, between which place and Rustam heliographic communication was established. On the following day the head-quarters of the force, with the 1st and 2nd brigades and the divisional troops at Katlung, moved to Sanghao, where they were joined by No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery, the 16th Bengal Infantry, and No. 5 company Madras Sappers and Miners, who marched up from Dargai, *via* Kasimeh. Thus on the 6th January the Buner field force was disposed as follows: the 1st and 2nd brigades and the divisional troops, (with the exception of those at Pirsai and Rustam) were at Sanghao.* At Pirsai there were the 31st Punjabis, the Guides Infantry, and a section of the Bengal Sappers and Miners: while Rustam was held by 3 squadrons of the 10th Bengal Lancers and 2 squadrons of the Guides Cavalry.

For the Distribution Return of the Malakand field force on the 1st January 1898, *vide* Appendix A (5).

* The 2nd Battalion Highland Light Infantry was temporarily attached to the 1st brigade, and 5 companies of the 3rd Bombay Light Infantry to the 2nd brigade to replace the troops of those brigades detached to Rustam.



On the line of communications, under Colonel V. A. Schalch, 2 companies of the 3rd Bombay Light Infantry were at Katlung, and one company at Mardan.

While these movements were in progress, neither the Bunerwals nor the Chamlawals had attempted in any way whatever to comply with the terms. On the contrary they still maintained a defiant attitude; and on the 3rd January Mr. Banbury received letters from the leading men of the two separate Buner factions, *viz.*, Hukmat Khan, Khan of Dagar (Nasuzai section), and Mubaras Khan, living in exile at Shalbandai in the Daulatzai section, refusing the terms. That from Mubaras Khan ran defiantly, thus: "Having been informed of your order, our reply is as follows: We have not stolen anything belonging to the Government, nor have we done any harm to Government, nor have we got any Government rifles in our possession. We are not capable of paying Rs. 11,500 to Government, nor have we, the members of *jirga*, got time to come down to Mardan." The Chamlawals did not reply in any way whatever. On the 5th January, however, Ibrahim Khan, cousin of Kadir Khan, of Tursak, of the Ashazai section, arrived at Rustam, bearing a verbal message to the effect that the Ashazai section had repented of the reply previously sent, and were willing to comply with the Government demands, and that if a further week's grace were allowed them, they would endeavour to persuade the other sections to do likewise. This message tended to indicate that the various sections of Buner were not all of one mind in resolving to resist the demands of Government. However, the request of the Ashazai section for a further period of grace was refused, and on the 6th January Sir Bindon Blood issued his orders for the forward move.

After arriving at Sanghao on the 6th January Sir B. Blood rode out with his brigadiers and commanding officers and reconnoitred the Tanga pass. The enemy were found to be in position on the pass, which they were holding with some 1,000 men with 27 standards, who fired a few harmless shots at the reconnoitring party. Reconnaissances from Pirsai and Rustam also ascertained that the Pirsai, Malandrai, and Ambela passes were all held by the enemy. On the Pirsai pass there were merely some 40 or 50 men, but each of the others was held by about 800 or 1,000 men. Under cover of the 20th Punjab Infantry the Sappers and Miners were employed during the day in the Tanga gorge in improving the approaches to the pass.

The intelligence officers of the force, under Captain Stanton, D.S.O., had already carefully reconnoitred all the passes leading into Buner. From their reports it was considered that the Tanga pass was the most suitable of all for the main advance on account of the special advantages it offered for the combined action of artillery and infantry in the event of resistance being offered.

Accordingly the plan of operations, which Sir Bindon Blood, with the previous sanction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, determined to adopt on the following morning was that the troops at Sanghao should force the Tanga pass, the mouth of which is one mile north of Sanghao, while the Pirsai detachment was to force the pass of that name early the same day; and the cavalry from Rustam were then to cross the Pirsai pass, working thence onward towards the enemy's line of retreat from the Tanga pass.

During the night of the 6th January some of the tribesmen descended from the Tanga pass and fired into the camp at Sanghao, without however occasioning any loss. On the following morning at 8 A.M. the 20th Punjab Infantry left camp with orders to ascend a steep spur about half a mile north-west of camp leading to a high peak on the enemy's right flank, whence they were to deliver an attack on the flank and rear of the hostile position, as soon as the frontal attack was sufficiently advanced. At about 8-30 A.M. Brigadier-General Jeffreys marched off, having under his command the artillery, under Colonel Aitken, C.B., the Buffs, 5 companies 3rd Bombay Light Infantry, and a squadron of the 10th Bengal Lancers.

On reaching the vicinity of the pass it was seen to be held by some 2,000 or more of the enemy with about 30 standards. Accordingly, at 9 A.M. the 10th Field Battery commenced the action by opening fire at a range of 2,200 yards from a knoll close to the mouth of the ravine which forms the entrance to the

pass. While this battery was bombarding the ridge occupied by the enemy, the Buffs extended, climbed up a long spur parallel to, and facing, the ridge held by the enemy, and took up a position some 250 feet lower than the summit of the pass, whence they were able to open long range volleys at ranges varying from 1,400 to 1,600 yards. Covered by the Buffs the two mountain batteries also climbed up the same spur,* and at about 9-45 A.M. opened a most effective fire at ranges varying from 1,600 to 2,000 yards. While this bombardment was taking place the Sappers and Miners were busy improving the track leading through the entrance to the pass.

As soon as all these troops had reached their respective positions and had made sufficient impression on the enemy, the marginally noted troops, under command of Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, advanced into the pass and took up a position ready to make the frontal attack on the

1st Royal West Kent Regiment.
2nd Highland Light Infantry.
16th Bengal Infantry.
21st Punjab Infantry.

ridge. At about 12 noon it was seen that the 20th Punjab Infantry, under the fire of the enemy, were approaching their objective; and accordingly at 12-10 P.M. the frontal attack was sent forward. The Royal West Kent and 16th Bengal Infantry, preceded by a detachment of No. 4 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners, moved up the pass by the track, while the 21st Punjab Infantry started climbing up to the ridge by two rugged and very difficult spurs, and the Highland Light Infantry ascended by a similar spur, still further to the west on the left of the 21st Punjab Infantry. As the frontal attack ascended the steep slopes, the enemy kept up a heavy fire on them with their old matchlocks and a few rifles, and attempted to still further impede their progress by rolling down big rocks on them. Owing, however, to the steady and well directed fire of the Artillery and the long range volleys of the Buffs and 3rd Bombay Light Infantry, the enemy became altogether demoralised and were afraid to show themselves. Moreover, the 20th Punjab Infantry were already on their flank, as at about 1-30 P.M. Lieutenant-Colonel Woon had captured the high peak on the right of the enemy's position, driving them off with the loss of two standards and some fifteen killed. At about 2 P.M. Brigadier-General Meiklejohn's battalions with ringing cheers crowned the ridge within a few minutes of one another.


Thus, within five hours of the time that the first gun was fired, the Bunerwal's boasted pride in the inaccessibility of his hitherto unexplored country was dissipated.

The enemy did not wait for our troops to close with them, but fled precipitately, leaving a number of their dead behind on the field. The reason of this became apparent as soon as our troops reached the summit of the pass. For although the enemy's position on the ridge appeared from the south side to be a strong one, in reality it was not so: the ground on the Buner side of the pass was found to be most unfavourable to troops retiring over it before a successful attack from the south, as for a very considerable distance there is practically no cover whatever, either in the valley below the pass or on the spurs on either side. The descent from the top of the pass into Buner was steep and sudden: the track lay in a small valley some 400 to 800 yards wide as far as the village of Kingargali which is situated about two miles from the top of the pass, on the border of a level well cultivated plain. As soon as the infantry crowned the ridge, they opened long range volleys and inflicted still further losses on the enemy, and the Royal West Kent were sent down the valley at once to Kingargali. They were followed soon afterwards by Brigadier-General Meiklejohn with the Highland Light Infantry, the 20th Punjab Infantry and a section of No. 4 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners; and at 3-30 P.M. the deserted village of Kingargali was occupied without further opposition, the enemy having retired to the hills beyond, and these troops bivouacked there for the night.

Meanwhile Sir B. Blood had proceeded to the summit of the pass, and on finding it then quite impracticable for mules, all transport was sent back to camp. A few obligatory mules were, however, got over, and the great-coats and blankets of the troops at Kingargali and of those remaining on the pass were conveyed to them by means of 500 coolies, who had been collected the previous

* The climb up this rugged spur was an arduous one for both the mountain batteries and the Buffs owing to the ice and hoar-frost on many of the rocks.

*United Service Institution
of India.*



VIEW INTO BUNER FROM SUMMIT OF MALANDRAI PASS.

(Sd.) J. K. Tod, Capt.,
16th January 1898.

day at Sanghao to meet this contingency. As mule transport for the next few days could not cross the pass, stores, etc., were regularly conveyed to the troops by means of these coolies, in the interval before the pass was regularly opened for mule traffic. As soon as Brigadier-General Meiklejohn's position at Kingargali was assured, the troops of the 2nd brigade and the artillery withdrew from the pass, and under cover of the 3rd Bombay Light Infantry retired to Sanghao, where they all arrived by 8 P.M. The pass was held for the night by the 16th Bengal Infantry, and the one and half Companies of Sappers and Miners, who were at work till nightfall on a mule path over the pass, also bivouacked for the night on the pass. The troops at Kingargali and Sanghao and also those on the pass spent a perfectly quiet night, and not a single shot was fired at any of them.

The only casualty on our side during the whole day's operations was one man of the Highland Light Infantry mortally wounded. From the nature of the enemy's position it was of course difficult to estimate their losses, but from subsequent information it was ascertained that they amounted to at least 20 killed and some 30 badly wounded. The sections engaged in defending the Tanga pass were the Salarzais and Ashazais generally, and also men from the villages of Sultanwas, Kalakhela, Bai, and Ghazi Khan, numbering in all some 2,000 men. Other sections were absent watching the Ambela, Malandrai, Pirsai, and Karakar passes, as the tribesmen were in doubt, until it was too late for them to concentrate, as to which pass was really threatened.

While the operations above described were in progress, the marginally noted force, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, V.C., attacked and captured the Pirsai pass. Reconnaissances from Rustam and Pirsai, on the

2 squadrons, Guides Cavalry.
3 " 10th Bengal Lancers.
The Guides Infantry.
31st Punjab Infantry.
A section, 4th Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

6th January, showed that the Ambela, Malandrai, and Pirsai passes were all held by the enemy. Accordingly the Guides Infantry and the 31st Punjabis under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel McRae

marched from Rustam on the afternoon of the 6th January, bivouacked for the night near Pirsai village at the foot of the pass, and at 7-30 A.M. the following morning advanced against the Pirsai pass, which after slight resistance by a few Salarzais of the Chorbanda and Kuhi villages, was captured without any casualties, at about noon. The enemy evidently were completely taken by surprise and had no time to collect from the other passes which, owing to the movements of the cavalry, they believed to be also threatened. At 11 A.M. the cavalry having ridden up from Rustam, commenced to cross the pass; but this was found to be exceedingly arduous, for in addition to the natural obstacles of the rugged track, the difficulties had been greatly increased by ice and hoar-frost, and it became necessary for every man to dismount and lead his horse in single file with great care. Eventually, all having passed over in safety, Lieutenant-Colonel Adams pushed on in the direction of Bampokha and reconnoitred the country as far as Kuhi without opposition. Returning to Chorbanda, near the foot of the pass, he bivouacked there for the night, but without any baggage, as none of the transport animals could get over the pass. The night was undisturbed, and on the following day Lieutenant-Colonel Adams marched to Kingargali and joined Brigadier-General Meiklejohn's force, having searched the country as far as Tursak, and also towards the south-east. A gathering of the enemy was seen on the hills near Tursak. Meanwhile Lieutenant-Colonel McRae remained at Chorbanda with the infantry; and it was not until the 10th January, after three days of very hard work in getting the baggage over the Pirsai pass, that he was able to join Brigadier-General Meiklejohn's force at Bampokha.

Sir Bindon Blood commenting on these operations thus writes: "The movement thus successfully carried out by Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, V. C., was of very great value, as the sudden appearance of five squadrons and two battalions in the middle of the Buner country, in addition to the brigade which came over the Tanga pass, helped most effectually to prevent the enemy from being encouraged to make fresh resistance, as they might have been otherwise, in consequence of the delay which necessarily took place before I could bring supplies enough over the pass to enable me to advance. *"

* Sir Bindon Blood's despatches, No. 1, dated 19th January 1898, *vide* Appendix B (7).

On the 8th January the maliks of the Salarzai villages of Kingargali, Nauser, Girarai, and Bampokha came in to Kingargali: their attitude was very submissive, and they were informed that if any firing into camp took place, their villages would be immediately destroyed. This intimation had the desired effect, and throughout the time that the troops were across the border not a single shot was fired into camp at night. Next day representative *jirgas* of the Salarzai and Ashazai sections came in to Kingargali, and the settlement of political matters was at once commenced.

Although, as a general rule, it is desirable to deal with a tribe as a whole, collectively, and not with its various sections separately, yet in the present instance it was deemed advisable to depart from this rule, since it was of the greatest importance that, as the troops marched eastwards through Buner, no section should be left in rear that had not made complete submission and had been settled up with. It was, moreover, found that the expression Buner was merely a geographical, and not an ethnographical, term, and that the distinction, not merely between the main divisions of Iliaszai and Malizai, but also between the various sections comprised in each division, was plainly marked. Accordingly the Salarzai and Ashazai sections were informed that payment of their sectional shares of the Government demands would be accepted from them, while the force was in their sectional limits; and that troops would visit the territory of each section in Buner, and would live free while in the country, but that no damage would be done to their villages, provided the tribesmen were not guilty of hostile behaviour or misconduct. This same announcement was made to the other sections as the force advanced.

Military exigencies necessitated halts at Sanghao and Kingargali until the 10th January, while supplies for the troops were being pushed across the Tanga pass, over which a good mule-path was being rapidly constructed; and Sir Bindon Blood, seeing that it would be impossible to construct a path over the pass fit for camels, without seriously delaying his advance into Buner, sent Brigadier-General Jeffreys and that portion of his brigade at Sanghao (which was equipped with camel transport) together with the 10th Field Battery and a section of No. 5 Company Madras Sappers and Miners to Katlung, on the 9th January, with directions to proceed by easy stages to the Ambela pass. By the 10th January, after three days of arduous work, the sappers had the mule-path over the Tanga pass ready for traffic. Accordingly on that date Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, leaving 3 squadrons of the 10th Bengal Lancers and the West Kent Regiment to hold Kingargali, marched with the Highland Light Infantry, 20th Punjab Infantry, 31st Punjab Infantry* and Guides Cavalry, without opposition to Jowar in the Bazargai valley, which place the Guides Cavalry had reconnoitred the previous day. Meanwhile No. 7 Mountain Battery, and a mule convoy of supplies and the field hospitals crossed the Tanga pass and reached Kingargali in safety. The rate of crossing the pass was about 200 mules per hour. The Pirsai section of No. 4 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners also marched to Kingargali on this date.

Sir Bindon Blood with the Head-quarters Staff and No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery from Sanghao, and $\frac{1}{2}$ No. 4 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners from the pass, marched to Kingargali on the 11th January, when a report was received that the Bunerwals were making preparations in the neighbourhood of Fursak to oppose any further advance of our troops. Sir Bindon Blood had arranged to organize a brigade of all arms, consisting of the first brigade under Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, two mountain batteries, two squadrons, and one company of sappers, and to march with it through Buner to Chamla. On hearing of the enemy's intended resistance, preparations were made to add a battalion and three squadrons to this brigade if necessary; and at the same time Brigadier-General Jeffreys was directed to march at once from Katlung to the Ambela pass, and to make his presence felt there as quickly as possible. And the other three sections of No. 5 Company Madras Sappers and Miners were also sent from the Tanga pass to join his force: this intended opposition, however, fell through. Accordingly on the following day the 3 squadrons 10th Bengal Lancers from Kingargali, and the Guides Infantry from Bampokha, were also sent to join the 2nd brigade *via* Sanghao and Katlung, as Sir

* Joined the column at Bampokha.

Bindon Blood did not consider it advisable to take them on any further into Buner.

On the 12th January Sir Bindon Blood with head-quarters, two mountain batteries, and one wing of the West Kent Regiment marched to Tursak, whither the troops under Brigadier-General Meiklejohn at Jowar had also proceeded on this date. Tursak was found to be a large and prosperous village containing ample supplies of grain and fodder; and the attitude of its inhabitants was very submissive. The two sections of No. 4 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners marched from the Tanga pass to Kingargali this day, and proceeded to Tursak on the following day.

On the 13th January the other wing of the Royal West Kent Regiment, which had remained at Kingargali, marched with a convoy of supplies to Tursak; and Kingargali, where the water-supply had become a difficulty, was abandoned. The same day Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, with the marginally noted force,

No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery.
 $\frac{1}{2}$ Battalion H. L. I.
 $\frac{1}{2}$ Battalion West Kent Regiment.
 $\frac{1}{2}$ Battalion, 20th Punjab Infantry.
 $\frac{1}{2}$ Battalion, 31st Punjab Infantry.
 $\frac{1}{2}$ No. 4 Company Bengal Sappers
 and Miners.

marched to Bai, and there bivouacked in the Gadazai valley, 7 miles from Tursak and 2 miles from the tomb of the famous Pir Baba. Orders were issued forbidding any one of the force, with the exception of Mussalmans, to go near the *ziarat*; and the inhabitants were much gratified when they heard

of this order. The 1st brigade was now provisioned up to the 24th January, and the line of communications with Buner *via* Sanghao and the Tanga pass was then abandoned; and the 16th Bengal Infantry, (who, with the 5 companies of the 3rd Bombay Infantry, had up to this date remained at Sanghao) marched to Dargai, and the 3rd Bombay Infantry were forthwith placed under the orders of the officer commanding the line of communications and employed along the new line *via* the Ambela pass.

The health of the troops at this time was exceptionally good; and the condition of the transport was in every way satisfactory. Of the 2,200 mules with the force, only 8 were unfit for work; and out of the total number of over 3,000 laden animals which had crossed over the Tanga pass, only 2 mules and 1 pony had died, and these had been killed by falling over the pass.

The Gadazais having already collected their portion of the various fines, had in due course handed them over to the political officer with the force; and on the 14th January, the Salarzais and Ashazais also complied with their share of the Government terms by each paying up Rs. 2,000 in cash and 100 guns. News was also received that all the remaining sections were ready with their fines and guns: Hukmat Khan of Dagar, the chief malik in Buner, accompanied by other leading Khans of Dagar and Bagra, came into the camp at Tursak and paid his respects. During the 15th January the Nasuzais and Daulatzais paid in their shares of the fines.

Meanwhile, the following movements of troops had been taking place. On the 14th January Brigadier-General Meiklejohn marched round the Jafir Hill to Hilai, and encamped close to the village: and next day, Sir Bindon Blood with the head-quarters staff and 1 squadron Guides Cavalry, No. 7 Mountain Battery, Royal West Kent Regiment, 31st Punjab Infantry, and $\frac{1}{2}$ Company No. 4 Bengal Sappers and Miners, marched to Dagar, 7 miles from Tursak and in Nasuzai country. Hukmat Khan and other headmen made excellent arrangements for providing supplies required for the force at Dagar, and there was no difficulty of any kind.

The other half of the force consisting of 1 squadron Guides Cavalry, No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery, Highland Light Infantry, 20th Punjab Infantry, and $\frac{1}{2}$ Company No. 4 Bengal Sappers and Miners, under the command of Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, marched to Rega, about four miles from Hilai, where the house and property of the Mullah Sadullah, the celebrated Mad Fakir, was situated. The house was destroyed; and two towers in Rega were also demolished to mark the disapprobation of Government at the conduct of the maliks of Rega in giving the fakir asylum after his retreat from Malakand and Swat.

On the 16th January the force with Sir Bindon Blood marched to Bajkatta, and the troops with Brigadier-General Meiklejohn to Barkilli (close to the Buner pass), whence heliographic communication was opened with Brigadier-

General Jeffreys' force at Surkhahi. The inhabitants offered no opposition to these moves; the Nurizais paid in their share of the fines at Barkilli and provided all the supplies demanded. Sir Bindon Blood now joined General Meiklejohn, leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Adams in command of the troops at Bajkatta. On the 17th January the troops at Barkilli crossed the Buner pass, which the sappers had considerably improved the previous day, and encamped at Ambela village in the Chamla valley. The column at Bajkatta remained halted, and final arrangements were made with the Bunerwals respecting the surrender of the few rifles remaining in their possession. A certain number, which had been stolen or carried away by sepoy deserters, had been already handed in; but it was known that a few still remained in the Bunerwals' possession. Mubaras Khan, the exiled rival of Hukmat Khan, Khan of Dagar, was known to be in possession of four of these rifles, but he had fled towards the Chagarzai hills on approach of the troops, taking the weapons with him. The sum of Rs. 1,000 in cash was therefore recovered from the supporters and partizans of Mubaras Khan as security; and Hussain Khan, the owner of a house in Shilbandi in which Mubaras Khan had been living, was also taken as a hostage for the production of these four rifles; and all concerned were informed that unless the rifles were produced by the 26th January, the security of Rs. 1,000 would be forfeited to Government. Security was also obtained for three other rifles; and certain outstanding cases against the tribe were also satisfactorily settled. With these arrangements the full submission of the Bunerwals was completely accomplished, and all sections had paid up their fines.*

Accordingly on the 18th January, Lieutenant-Colonel Adams marched from Bajkatta to Ambela *via* the Buner pass; and thus Buner was on this date completely evacuated by our troops.

While these operations were in progress, Brigadier-General Jeffreys had been dealing with the Chamlawals. On receipt of Sir Bindon Blood's telegram of the 11th January, directing him to push on to the Ambela pass, he marched that same day to Rustam; and thence on the following day (leaving the 10th Field Battery and 2 companies of the Buffs at Rustam) to Surkhabi, at the mouth of the pass, where a good water-supply for the brigade was obtained from the Panjdara stream, which runs down from the Ambela pass. The pass was reconnoitred and found to be unoccupied, whereupon working parties from the troops, and a large number of coolies locally obtained, commenced the construction of a good camel-road over the pass, under the protection of a covering party consisting of 6 companies of the 21st Punjab Infantry. Some slight opposition was encountered which resulted in the loss to the enemy of three men killed and two wounded.

On the 14th January the Chamlawal *jirga*, assembled at Kogah, sent a representative to Brigadier-General Jeffreys requesting an interview. The man was sent back with a letter directing the *jirga* to meet Brigadier-General Jeffreys on the summit of the pass on the following day. Accordingly on the 15th January, Brigadier-General Jeffreys, accompanied by a portion of the Buffs and 21st Punjab Infantry, proceeded to the summit of the pass, where the *jirga* was interviewed and eventually dismissed with instructions to have a full representative *jirga* at Ambela village on the 17th January. On the pass the old encampments and piquets of the Ambela campaign of 1863 were clearly visible. The three

* The cash fine and the guns demanded by Government from the Bunerwals were paid in by the various sections as follows:—

Sections.							Amount of cash fine paid in Rs.	Number of guns surrendered.	
							Rs.		
Salarzai	2,000	100	
Ashazai	2,000	100	
Gadaizai	2,000	100	
Nasuzai	1,500	100	
Daulatzai	2,000	100	
Nurizai	2,000	100	
Total							...	11,500	600

squadrons of 10th Bengal Lancers, and the Guides Infantry, who had been despatched from Tursak on the 12th January (see page 84), joined Jeffreys' brigade on this date.

By the evening of the 16th January the road over the pass was fit for camels down to the foot of the pass on the Chamla side, and the pass itself was held by the Guides Infantry and No. 5 Company Madras Sappers and Miners.* Next morning Brigadier-General Jeffreys crossed the Ambela pass, the Guides Infantry and sappers rejoining the brigade and occupied the villages of Kogah and Nawagai with the troops of his brigade, while the 10th Bengal Lancers reconnoitred the lower end of the Chamla valley.

Political arrangements regarding the submission of the Chamlawals were then completed; and by the afternoon of the 18th January the Chamlawals had paid in their cash fine of Rs. 1,500, 100 guns, 100 swords, and the standards of Kogah and Nawagai, thus complying with the demands of Government in full. Accordingly, on that day and on the 19th January, Sir Bindon Blood moved the whole of his force over the Ambela pass into British territory; and by 1 P.M. on the 19th January, within twelve days of the commencement of hostilities, the last of our troops had evacuated Buner and Chamla territory.

The general political and military results of the expedition were in every way satisfactory. The demands of Government had been complied with in full; the spurious reputation of the Bunerwals had been dissipated; and troops had visited the territorial limits of each section of Buner, except the valley of the Makhozai sub-division of the Nasuzais, which was very remote. In addition to this a good mule-road had been made over the Tanga pass, a camel-road over the Ambela pass, and the whole country, hitherto practically a *terra incognita*, had been accurately surveyed. These were advantages, practical and political, which far exceeded the value of the few thousands of rupees and the obsolete weapons collected from the tribesmen.

The interior of Buner was found to be a succession of open valleys, separated by ridges of hills, all draining into the Barandu stream. The Ghadaizai valley is especially open and well watered, and contains a considerable area under rice cultivation. The two hills—Sapir and Jafir, which, though disconnected, stand side by side in the centre of Buner, and form a prominent feature in the scenery. The higher ranges were seen to be extensively wooded, the *pinus longifolia* being the predominant species. The unirrigated lands in the valleys were found to be highly manured and exceedingly fertile; the bulk of such land bears two crops yearly. There was very little arable land that was not actually under cultivation; and though only a small proportion of the cultivated area was irrigated, the enormous stocks of grain and numerous and goodly stacks of fodder to be found at every village bore testimony to the generally fertile character of the soil. Wells are not used for irrigation purposes at all.

The physique of the Bunerwals generally was disappointing; the men were found to be of medium stature, and their physical development was nothing remarkable. As compared with the other sections, the Salarzais and Ashazais generally appeared to possess a finer physique. As a race, the Bunerwals may be described as exceedingly dirty; they are evidently not addicted to regular ablutions; and the sombre hues of their dark-blue clothing, which they universally affect, tend to accentuate the unwashed appearance of the men.

The Hindustani fanatics, about whom so much is heard in all our dealings with the Bunerwals, did not bring themselves into prominence during these operations. Some of them were said to have been holding the Ambela pass in the first instance; and a few are said to have gone down as far as Amnawar in Daulatzai limits, with a view to opposing our advance, but these few adventurous spirits were promptly turned back by the Daulatzais themselves. It is certain, however, that the whole of the Hindustani colony moved from its old abode at Tilwai near Shergarh, on the northern slopes of the Mahaban mountain in Amazai

* This company of Sappers reached Surkhahi from the Tanga pass on the 14th January.

limits, to the vicinity of Batara in the limits of the Firozai Chagarzais. This exodus was doubtless prompted by the Amazais, who feared that the former sins of the Hindustani fanatics might be visited on their own heads.

By the 20th January the whole of the troops from Buner had reached Mardan where orders were received directing the Buner field force to be broken up, and the several units despatched to their destinations under the orders of the Officer Commanding the Line of Communications. On the 23rd January Sir Bindon Blood relinquished the command of the force and returned to his permanent appointment at Meerut.

The troops engaged in the operations above described were subsequently granted the India medal, 1895 and various clasps, as set forth in army orders Nos. 77 and 96 of 1898, *vide* Appendix D (6).

Although the Malakand and Buner field forces ceased to exist as such after the 23rd January and the greater portion of the troops returned to their cantonments in India, the Government did not deem it advisable to demobilise the whole of the troops concerned until assured that the state of Swat, Bajaur, and Buner was sufficiently satisfactory to warrant the reduction of the force to a normal condition.

Accordingly a force consisting of 1 mountain battery, 3 squadrons of cavalry, 6 battalions and 2 sapper companies,* was retained in or near the Malakand and the Swat valley until permanent arrangements could be made for the maintenance of communication with Chitral.

The defences at the Malakand Kotal and at Chakdarra were considerably improved, and the former so re-arranged as to include the Kotal, Castle Rock, the Eastern Ridge, and the Northern Spur. Two additional 9-pr. S. B. guns were also added to the armaments of the Kotal position.

Since the organization of this force, however, the armed intervention of troops has not been required.

During February 1898 a great deal of unrest existed in Buner and in parts of the Swat valley owing to the preachings of certain mullahs, who endeavoured to again cause disturbances along the border during the Id festival.

The tribesmen, however, listened to their exhortations with lukewarmness, and the exertions of the headmen were alone sufficient to prevent the tribesmen again implicating themselves.

On the 17th or 18th March 1898 Ghulam Haidar Khan, Sipah Salar of the Afghan Army in Asmar, died. This man for many years past had been intriguing with all the border tribes, and his presence in Asmar undoubtedly resulted in a great deal of unrest all along the neighbouring portion of the frontier.†

The Chitral Reliefs of 1898 took place in May without the slightest hitch and not a single shot was fired at the troops in either going or coming.

In July 1898 the Nawab of Dir caused a great deal of trouble by his interference in Jandol affairs, and on the 21st July, in spite of a warning from Major Deane, he started with a large tribal force to invade the Jandol valley. The Khan of Nawagai therefore collected his forces and started to drive him out. A few small skirmishes between the two took place, but further fighting was prevented owing to Major Deane's intervention, and finally the two Khans came to a solemn agreement, whereby their respective spheres of influence in Jandol have been for the time being settled.

The Hadda Mullah and the "Mad Fakir," the two mullahs who had been mainly directly responsible for the late risings, for a time remained quiet, and little or nothing was heard of them.

The Hadda Mullah is now reported to be at Chamarkand close to Nawa Kandao on the immediate border between Kunar and Bajaur where he has obtained a small plot of land and with a few followers has built himself a small mosque, and there settled down.

Towards the end of 1898 the "Mad Fakir" was responsible for a great deal of unrest and excitement in the Swat valley owing to his attacks on the


* For the composition and distribution of this force *vide* Appendix A (7).

† On the death of the Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar Khan, General Mir Ata Khan was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Afghan forces in Asmar.


Nawab of Dir in Dir territory. His action at one time appeared to be so serious that the Moveable Column at Khar moved to Chakdarra, and arrangements were made to mobilize a force from India should the disturbance spread. The Fakir's attempt, however, proved to be abortive, as the Nawab of Dir's troops drove him and his gathering out of the country without any difficulty.

Meanwhile the inhabitants of Swat and adjoining countries have settled down to their accustomed lives, and at the present time, with the exception of their endless feuds and factional fights, there appears to be little or nothing to interfere with that peaceful settlement of the country and increase of its trade which the Government of India so earnestly desires.

SIMLA ; }
January 1899. }



APPENDICES.



Appendix A (1).

SCHEME OF OPERATIONS FOR THE MALAKAND FIELD FORCE.

1. *Formation of Force.*—The force, which will be styled the Malakand Field Force, will hold the Malakand and adjacent posts, and operate against the neighbouring tribes as may be required.

It will be composed as follows :—

1ST BRIGADE.

1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment.
24th (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
31st (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
45th (Rattray's Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
Sections A and B of No. 1 British Field Hospital.
No. 38 Native Field Hospital.
Sections A and B of No. 50 Native Field Hospital.

2ND BRIGADE.

1st Battalion, East Kent Regiment.
35th (Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
38th (Dogra) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
Guides Infantry.
Sections C and D of No. 1 British Field Hospital.
No. 37 Native Field Hospital.
Sections C and D of No. 50 Native Field Hospital.

DIVISIONAL TROOPS.

1 Squadron, 11th Regiment of Bengal Lancers.
Guides Cavalry.
6 Guns, No. 1 British Mountain Battery.
6 Guns, No. 7 British Mountain Battery.
6 Guns, No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery.
22nd (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
No. 5 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners.
No. 3 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.*
Section B of No. 13 British Field Hospital.
Sections A and B of No. 35 Native Field Hospital.

LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS.

No. 34 Native Field Hospital.
Section B of No. 1 Field Veterinary Hospital.

The above-mentioned troops will move on the field service scale of strength, establishments, etc., as laid down in the Field Service Equipment Tables for the different branches, except that the number of British officers with Regiments of Native Cavalry and Infantry will not be increased above the peace establishment. Depôts will be formed as laid down in the "Mobilisation Measures" in the Field Service Equipment Tables. Depôts of Native Infantry will be on Scale B.

2. *Movements in Relief*—

1st Battalion, Royal West Surrey Regiment, Dagshai to Jullundur.
4 Companies, 1st Battalion, Bedfordshire Regiment, Umballa to Meean Meer.
Head-quarters and 4 Companies, 1st Battalion, Bedfordshire Regiment, Solon and Dagshai to Umballa.
1 Company, 1st Battalion, Royal Highlanders, Subathu to Dagshai.
1st Battalion, Devonshire Regiment, Jullundur to Peshawar.
1st Battalion, Somersetshire Light Infantry, Meean Meer and Dalhousie to Peshawar.
3 Squadrons, 10th Regiment of Bengal Lancers, Jhelum to Hoti Mardan.
6 Companies, 37th (Dogra) Regiment of Bengal Infantry, Sialkot to Peshawar.
22nd (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry, Jhelum to Mardan.
2 Companies, 1st Regiment of Bengal Infantry, Jhansi to Nowgong.
8th Regiment of Bengal Infantry, Nowgong to Nowshera.

These corps will move on the relief scale, but without families.

3. *Concentration of Force.*—The corps and units not already in the Malakand Brigade will, on receipt of orders from Army Head-Quarters, be railed to Nowshera, and march thence to the Malakand.

* No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, was substituted for this Bombay Company, which was subsequently attached to the Reserve Brigade.

The Staff and Departments of the Force will be directed to assemble at Nowshera.

After arrival at Nowshera the General Officer Commanding the Field Force will assume command, and all movements at and beyond Nowshera will be made under his orders.

Nowshera will be the Base of operations, but will remain in the Punjab Command.

4. *Commands and Staff—*

General Officer Commanding the Force (with the temporary rank of Major-General).			Brigadier-General Sir B. Blood, K.C.B.
Aide-de-Camp	Captain A. B. Dunsterville, East Surrey Regiment. (Replaced by Lieutenant Viscount Fincastle, 16th Lancers, 4th November 1897.)
Orderly Officer	Captain A. R. Dick, Personal Assistant to the Military Member of the Viceroy's Council. (Replaced by Lieutenant W. S. Fraser, 19th Bengal Lancers, 4th November 1897.)
Extra Orderly Officer	Lieutenant Viscount Fincastle, 16th Lancers. (Appointed 31st August 1897.)
Assistant Adjutant General	Major H. H. Burney, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders.
Assistant Quarter Master General	Lieutenant-Colonel A. Masters, Central India Horse.
Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General (Intelligence).	Captain H. E. Stanton, D.S.O., R.A.
Field Intelligence Officer	Captain H. F. Walters, 24th (Baluchistan) Regiment, Bombay Infantry. (Replaced by Captain J. K. Tod, 7th Bengal Cavalry, 2nd October 1897.)
Superintendent, Army Signalling	Captain E. W. M. Norie, 2nd Battalion, Middlesex Regiment. (Replaced by Captain E. V. O. Hewett, Royal West Kent Regiment, 22nd November 1897.)
Principal Medical Officer	Surgeon-Colonel G. Thomson, C.B., I.M.S. (Replaced by Surgeon-Colonel J. C. G. Carmichael, M.D., I.M. S., 30th September 1897.)
Commanding Royal Artillery	Lieutenant-Colonel W. Aitken, C.B., R.A.
Commanding Royal Engineers	Colonel J. E. Broadbent, R. E. (Replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel W. Peacocke, R.E., 17th October 1897.)
Adjutant, Royal Artillery	Captain H. D. Grier, R.A. (Replaced by Captain H. Rouse, R. A., 7th October 1897.)
Adjutant, Royal Engineers	Captain H. J. Sherwood, R.E.
Field Engineer	Major E. Blunt, R. E.
Assistant Field Engineer	Lieutenant C. M. F. Watkins, R. E.
" " "	Lieutenant H. O. Lathbury, R.E.
Field Paymaster	Lieutenant F. D. Grant, Military Accounts Department.
Field Treasure Chest Officer	Captain W. E. Banbury, 25th Madras Infantry.
Ordnance Officer	Captain W. W. Cookson, R. A. (Replaced by Captain L. G. Watkins, R.A., 26th December 1897.)
Chief Commissariat Officer	Major H. Wharry, Assistant Commissary-General.
* Assistant to Chief Commissariat Officer	Captain R. C. Lye, 23rd Pioneers.
Divisional Transport Officer	Captain C. R. J. Thackwell, Assistant Commissary-General.
* Assistant to Divisional Transport Officer	Captain A. W. V. Plunkett, 2nd Manchester Regiment. (Replaced by Lieutenant E. F. Macnaghten, 16th Lancers, 11th October 1897.)

*These officers will personally report themselves for orders to the Base Commissariat Officer, Nowshera.

Inspecting Veterinary Officer	Veterinary Captain H. T. W. Mann.
Survey Officer	Captain C. L. Robertson, R.E.
Provost Marshal	Captain C. G. F. Edwards, 5th Punjab Cavalry. (Replaced by Major Biddulph, 19th Bengal Lancers.)
Chaplain	Revd. L. Klugh.
Commissariat Officer, Advance Depot	Captain A. R. Burlton, I.S.C.
Assistant Commissariat Officer, Advance Depot	Lieutenant T.G.P. Lawrenson, 6th Madras Infantry (to 28th October 1897.)

1ST BRIGADE STAFF.

Commanding (with the temporary rank of Brigadier-General.	Colonel W. H. Meiklejohn, C. B., C. M. G.
Orderly Officer	Lieutenant C. R. Gaunt, 4th Dragoon Guards.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant General	Major E. A. P. Hobday, R. A.
" " Quarter Master General	Captain G. F. H. Dillon, 40th Pathans.
Brigade Commissariat Officer	Captain C. H. Beville, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General.
*Brigade Transport Officer	Captain J. M. Camilleri, 13th Bengal Infantry.
*Regimental Commissariat and Transport Officer.	Lieutenant J. Duncan, R. S. F.
Assistant Superintendent, Army Signalling (from the Brigade).	Captain E. V. O. Hewett, 1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment. (Replaced by Lieutenant J. W. O'Dowda, Royal West Kent Regiment, 23rd November 1897.)
Provost Marshal (from the Brigade).	2nd Lieutenant S. Morton, 24th Punjab Infantry.
Veterinary Officer	Veterinary Captain W. R. Walker.

2ND BRIGADE STAFF.

Commanding	Brigadier-General P. D. Jeffreys, C. B.
Orderly Officer	Lieutenant J. Byron, R. A.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant General	Major E. O. F. Hamilton, 1st Battalion The Queen's Royal West Surrey Regiment. (Replaced by Captain A. B. Dunsterville, East Surrey Regiment, 4th November 1897.)
" " Quarter Master General	Major C. H. Powell, 2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkhas.
Brigade Commissariat Officer	Captain G. A. Hawkins, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General.
Brigade Transport Officer	Captain D. Baker, 2nd Bombay Grenadiers.
*Regimental Commissariat and Transport Officer.	Lieutenant G. C. Brooke, 2nd Battalion The Border Regiment.
Assistant Superintendent, Army Signalling (from the Brigade).	Lieutenant W. H. Trevor, 1st Battalion, East Kent Regiment.
Provost Marshal (from the Brigade).	Captain F. Duncan, 23rd Pioneers. (Replaced by Captain Banbury, 19th September 1897.)
Veterinary Officer	Veterinary-Lieutenant G. M. Williams.

FOR BASE AND LINE OF COMMUNICATION.

Base Commandant (with the temporary rank of Colonel and pay and status of Colonel on the Staff).	Lieutenant-Colonel V. A. Schleich, 11th Bengal Infantry.
Staff Officer at the Base	Captain H. Scott, 2nd Battalion, The Royal Sussex Regiment. (Replaced by Brevet-Major A. Caddell, 38th Dogras, 30th November 1897.)

* These officers will personally report themselves for orders to the Base Commissariat Officer, Nowshera.

Section Commandant	Captain O. B. S. F. Shore, 18th Bengal Lancers. (Replaced by Captain C. E. Belli-Bivar, 7th Bombay Lancers, 5th October 1897.)
Base Commissariat Officer	Captain S. W. Lincoln, Assistant Commissary-General.
Assistant to Base Commissariat Officer	Lieutenant E. G. Vaughan, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General. (Replaced by Lieutenant W. J. Ottley, 17th Madras Infantry, 2nd November 1897.)
Transport Officers	{ Captain W. Burlton, I.C.S., (to 28th October 1897.)
			{ Lieutenant C. H. G. Moore, I. S. C.
			{ „ F. W. H. Forteach, I. S. C.
			{ „ R. S. Weston, 2nd Battalion, The Manchester Regiment.
			{ Lieutenant E. F. Macnaghten, 16th Lancers.
Regimental Transport Officer, Advanced Depot			Lieutenant C. G. Lewes, 2nd Battalion The Essex Regiment.
Commandant, Depot British Troops	Captain H. d'E. Vallancey, 2nd Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
Adjutant and Quartermaster	Captain A. F. Bundock, 2nd Battalion South Lancashire Regiment (appointed 7th January 1898).
Commandant, Depot Native Troops	Captain R. R. Renton, 18th Bengal Infantry.
Adjutant and Quartermaster	Lieutenant H. L. Tomkins, 28th Punjab Infantry (appointed 7th January 1898).
Engineering Field Park	Major M. C. Barton, R. E.
Ordnance „ „	Lieutenant J. Henry, R. A.
Veterinary Officer	Veterinary-Lieutenant W. A. McDougal.

5. *Staff Offices.*—The Divisional Staff Office for the First Division of all Arms will be detailed as the Staff Office of the General Officer Commanding the Force, and will be sent to Nowshera under instructions to be issued by the Adjutant General in India.

Two military clerks will be appointed for this office from Army Head-Quarters; one from the Adjutant General's Office, and one from the Quarter Master General's Office.

The Staff Office for the Divisional Troops of the First Division maintained at Peshawar will be detailed as the Staff Office for the 1st Brigade, and will be sent to Nowshera in charge of a clerk from the District Staff Office at Peshawar.

The Staff Office for the 1st Brigade of the First Division of all Arms maintained at Peshawar will be detailed as the Staff Office of the 2nd Brigade, and will be despatched to Nowshera in charge of a clerk from the District Staff Office at Peshawar.

The Staff Office maintained at Rawalpindi for the Commanding Royal Artillery, First Division of all Arms, will be detailed for the Commanding Royal Artillery of this Force. It will be sent to Nowshera in charge of a British non-commissioned officer to be detailed by the Brigadier-General, Royal Artillery, Punjab Command.

All these Staff Offices will at once be replaced under the orders of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab, and the cost of such replacement debited to these operations.

Before despatch to Nowshera, the office detailed for the 1st Brigade will be completed with mule trunks and lamps and candles on the scale authorised for a Brigade Office.

All the Staff Offices will be supplied under the orders of the Adjutant General in India, with Indian Army Lists, Field Service Forms and Duplicating Machines, and also

with G. G. O's., G. O's., G. O. C. C's., and Army Circulars from this date to the conclusion of the operations.

The Director General of Ordnance will take the necessary steps to supply the camp equipage required for these Staff Offices. This will be sent immediately from the Rawal Pindi Arsenal to Nowshera.

Departmental Offices will be formed and equipped under departmental arrangements.

6. *Clothing*.—The summer scale of clothing for troops and followers, as laid down in the Field Service Departmental Code "Commissariat—Transport" and in the Field Service Equipment Tables, will be issued; except to attendants of hired transport, who will receive one blanket only.

Wadded sunshades for helmets and pads will be provided by British Corps under regimental arrangements at a cost not to exceed Rs. 2 per head.

Cost to be recovered on contingent bills. Goggles for British Corps will be issued by the Commissariat Department.

The hob-nails and toe-plates, in possession of corps as mobilisation equipment, will be at once placed on the boots.

7. *Equipment*.—All units will be equipped on the field service scale as laid down in the Field Service Equipment Tables.

Units will be supplied with Field Service Form No. 6 by the Adjutant General in India.

Units now detailed for service, which are already in possession of the articles of mobilisation equipment, maintained in regimental charge, will only require to be completed by Departments of Supply with the articles now kept in Departmental charge pending mobilisation, in accordance with the checked indents drawn up for the same. This will be done at once, and all equipments of these corps will be replaced without delay under the orders of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab, the cost of replacement being debited to these operations.

No. 1 British Mountain Battery will take over the mobilisation equipment of No. 5 British Mountain Battery.

No. 5 British Mountain Battery will be the "supplying battery" of Nos. 1 and 7 British Mountain Batteries.

Watches and magnetic compasses to complete the signalling equipment will be issued by the Mathematical Instrument Office to all Infantry Regiments detailed for service.

A reserve of 50 sets of water-gear will be maintained at Nowshera by the Commissariat Department.

Beyond Nowshera the scale of baggage, tentage, etc., may be reduced at the discretion of the General Officer Commanding the Field Force.

8. *Establishments*.—The Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab, can authorise such modifications in the scale of establishments laid down in the Field Service Departmental Code, "Commissariat-Transport," as may be necessary. Any conservancy establishments that may be required on the Line of Communication will be arranged for under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Force in communication with the Commissary-General, Punjab Command.

9. *Ammunition*.—As laid down for Corps in the Field Service Manual, Part V, and the Field Service Equipment Tables. British Infantry Regiments will be supplied with ammunition made up with the new pattern "Dum Dum" bullet.

10. *Supplies*.—One month's supplies for the force will be collected at Nowshera. Five days' rations for men and two days' grain for animals will accompany the troops operating in advance of the advance dépôt (wherever it may be formed).

Supplies will be packed in water-proof bags where necessary.

11. *Transport*.—Transport will be supplied as stated below:—

STAFF, Normal Scale, *i.e.*, Pack mules.

INFANTRY OF 1ST BRIGADE, Normal Scale, *i.e.*, Obligatory mules and camels.

" 2ND " Normal Scale, *i.e.*, Obligatory mules and camels.

CAVALRY, Normal Scale, *i.e.*, Regimental ponies and Government mule.

MOUNTAIN BATTERIES, Normal Scale, *i.e.*, Pack mules.

SAPPERS AND MINERS, Normal Scale, *i.e.*, Obligatory mules and mule carts.

FIELD HOSPITALS, Normal Scale, slow moving, *i.e.*, Obligatory mules and camels

(for ambulance transport, see paragraph 12).

Similar transport will be provided for supplies and grain as for the Infantry of each Brigade.

Corps and field hospitals moving by rail will be accompanied by their obligatory pack mules from their entraining stations, and will receive the balance of their transport under the orders of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab.

Staff, units and departments will draw their transport at Nowshera.

12. *Medical*.—Strict medical examination of troops and followers is to be made before they proceed to the front, in accordance with paragraph 49, Field Service Departmental Code, "Medical," 1897 edition.

Reserves of medicines and medical comforts will be arranged for by the departments concerned.

All field hospitals will be equipped with tongas as ambulance transport.

Such additional ambulance tongas (with cattle, etc.), as may be required for the Line of Communication in advance of Nowshera, will be arranged for in the usual manner.

A British General Hospital will be established at Cherat, and a Native General Hospital will be established at Nowshera. The number of beds in each of these General Hospitals will be fixed, as circumstances may require, by the Principal Medical Officer, Her Majesty's Forces in India.

A supply of limejuice as an antiscorbutic will be taken to the advanced base.

13. *Veterinary*.—Veterinary stores and establishments, as required, will be supplied under the orders of the Principal Veterinary Officer in India, and veterinary examinations of horses and other animals will be held before they proceed to the front.

14. *Ordnance Field Park*.—A Depot will be formed at Nowshera containing stores on the scale laid down in Ordnance Field Park Tables, and any special Engineer equipments which may be deemed necessary. The Ordnance Officer will receive orders from the General Officer Commanding with reference to the formation of any advanced depôts which may subsequently be required.

15. *Engineer Field Park*.—An Engineer Field Park will be established at Nowshera. The *personnel*, on the scale laid down in Field Service Equipment Tables, will be furnished from the Bengal Sappers and Miners at Roorkee and the equipment will be supplied from the Rawal Pindi Arsenal.

The Field Engineer will arrange under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Force for a sufficient supply of explosives for demolitions, etc., and for mussacks or other requirements for crossing rivers.

16. *Signalling*.—Communication by signalling will be maintained beyond the telegraph line.

This will be arranged for by the General Officer Commanding the Force from regimental equipment, supplemented, if necessary, by the Ordnance Department. (*Vide* G. O. 53 of 1892.)

17. *Telegraphs*.—The Director General of Telegraphs will arrange for the opening and strengthening of such local offices as may be considered necessary.

The staff and departmental officers of the force will be permitted to send telegrams on the "debit note" systems from the Nowshera and Mardan telegraph offices.

The Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab, will authorise the despatch of telegrams on the debit note system of payment from such offices as may be concerned with the equipment of the force or its maintenance in the field.

18. *Post Office*.—A field post office will be attached to each Brigade. The Director General of the Post Offices will take such steps as he may consider necessary for strengthening the local offices.

19. *Tonga Service and Bridge of Boats*.—The Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab, will arrange for strengthening the tonga service beyond Nowshera to the extent he may think desirable, and if its maintenance is expedient; and for maintaining, and supplementing, if necessary, the bridge of boats across the Kabul River at Nowshera.

20. *Supply of Maps and Books*.—Maps and books will be supplied as follows by the Intelligence Branch, Simla :—

For every officer.—A map of the theatre of operations on cloth.

For Staff Offices.—Maps and books as may be arranged by the Intelligence Branch of the Quarter Master General's Department.

Mobilisation maps and gazetteers kept at Peshawar for the First Division of all Arms are not to be issued.

21. *Submission of Reports.*—As laid down in the Field Service Manual, Part XI, Appendix F. The General Officer Commanding the Force will correspond direct with Army Head-quarters.

22. *Officers' Messes.*—On the scale laid down in the Field Service Manual, Part XII, Section III.

23. *Survey Party.*—The Surveyor General of India will arrange for a Survey Party to join the force at Nowshera.

24. *Concessions and privileges.*—The troops and followers will be considered on Field Service for all concessions and privileges from the date of crossing the frontier.

Concessions which are admissible from or between certain dates fixed by regulations will have effect from such dates; free rations will not be given until the column leaves Hoti Mardan. Commissariat-Transport establishments will receive universal rates of pay and 50 per cent. batta. Staff Officers will draw pay from the date on which they join their appointments.

Approximate strength of the Malakand Field Force.

Staff and Units.	COMBATANTS.				CLERKS.		FOLLOWERS.			Chargers or horses.	Ponies.	MULES.			Camels.	Donkeys.	BULLOCKS.		AMBULANCE TRANSPORT.		REMARKS.					
	British officers.	British warrant and non-commissioned officers and men.	Native officers.	Hospital assistants.	Native rank and file.	European.	Native.	Ordnance.	Commissariat-Transport.			Public.	Private.	Ordnance.			Pack.	Draught.	Pack.	Draught.		Pack.	Draught.	Riding animals, mules or ponies.	Bullocks.	Ambulance tongas.
Staff of Field Force	24	8	13	..	36	4	115	45	21	..	86				
FIRST BRIGADE.																										
Brigade Staff	(a)	8	(b)	(b)	..	(b)	(b)	(b)	18	9	..	28				
1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment ...	29	803	2	127	47	28	9	6	..	105	..	143				
24th (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry ...	9	..	16	1	721	70	53	25	9	6	..	84	..	102				
31st (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry ...	9	..	16	1	721	70	53	25	9	6	..	84	..	102				
45th (Rattray's Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.	9	..	16	1	721	70	53	25	9	6	..	84	..	102				
2 Sections, No. 1 British Field Hospital (S.M.)	2	11	2	13	103	15	2	9	..	4	..	27	20	10				
No. 38 Native Field Hospital (S.M.)	4	1	..	8	15	23	172	28	4	16	..	8	..	45	40	20				
2 Sections, No. 50 Native Field Hospital (S.M.)	2	1	..	4	8	12	85	15	2	9	..	4	..	24	20	10				
SECOND BRIGADE.																										
Brigade Staff	(a)	8	(b)	(b)	..	(b)	(b)	(b)	18	9	..	28				
1st Battalion, East Kent Regiment ...	29	803	2	127	47	28	9	6	..	105	..	143				
35th (Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry ...	9	..	16	1	721	70	53	25	9	6	..	84	..	102				
38th (Dogra) Regiment of Bengal Infantry ...	9	..	16	1	721	70	53	25	9	6	..	84	..	102				
Guides Infantry	9	..	16	1	721	70	53	25	9	6	..	84	..	102				

Appendix A (2).

Scheme for a Reserve Brigade for the Malakand Field Force.

1. *Formation of Force.*—This force will be held in readiness as a Reserve to move in support of the Malakand Field Force if required.

It will be composed as follows :—

- 2nd Battalion, the Highland Light Infantry.
- 1st Battalion, The Gordon Highlanders.
- 21st (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
- 2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.
- 6 Guns, 10th Field Battery Royal Artillery.
- No. 3 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.
- No. 14 British Field Hospital.
- No. 45 Native Field Hospital.
- No. 1 Field Medical Depôt.

The above-mentioned troops will move on the field service scale of strength, establishments, &c., as laid down in the Field Service Equipment Tables for the different branches, except that the number of British officers with regiments of Native Infantry will not be increased above the peace establishment. Depôts will be formed as laid down in the "Mobilisation Measures" in the Field Service Equipment Tables. Depôts of Native Infantry will be on Scale B.

2. *Movements in relief.*—

The following units will move at once in relief :—

- 2 Companies, 1st Battalion, The Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, from Lucknow to Cawnpore.
- 2 Companies, 1st Battalion, The Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, from Lucknow to Fatehgarh.
- One Wing, 2nd Battalion, The King's Own Scottish Borderers, from the Murree Hills to Rawalpindi.
- 2 Companies, 34th (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry (Pioneers), from Jhelum to Sialkot.

The 50th Field Battery, Royal Artillery, will be held in readiness to move immediately by rail from Jullundur to Rawalpindi, in the event of British units of the Reserve Brigade moving forward.

The other wing of the 2nd Battalion, the King's Own Scottish Borderers, will be held in readiness to march immediately from the Murree Hills to Rawalpindi, in the event of the British units of this Brigade moving forward.

These units will move on the relief scale, but without families.

3. *Construction of Force.*—The British units detailed in paragraph 1 will concentrate at Rawalpindi and the Native portion of the Brigade will be concentrated at Hoti Mardan as early as possible, under orders to issue from Army Head Quarters.

The Staff and Departments of the Force will be directed to assemble at Rawalpindi.

4. *Subsequent movements.*—All preliminary arrangements for the onward move of the British units from Rawalpindi to Nowshera will, under the orders of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab, be made at once by the General Officer Commanding the Reserve Brigade, in communication with local Railway authorities, who should be requested to prepare the necessary time-bills for train movements, and to arrange for the required amount of rolling-stock, in order that they may be despatched at the shortest notice, on receipt of orders from Army Head Quarters.

5. *Command and Staff.*—

Commanding	Brigadier-General J. H. Wodehouse, C.B., C.M.G., R.A.
Orderly Officer	Captain R. I. G. Elkington, R.A.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General	Captain A. H. G. Kemball, 2nd Battalion, 5th Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General	Captain H. R. B. Donne, 1st Battalion, The Norfolk Regiment.
Field Intelligence Officer (attached to Divisional Head-Quarters).	Captain J. K. Tod, 7th Bengal Cavalry. (Replaced by Lieutenant A. C. M. Waterfield, 11th Bengal Lancers, 11th October 1897.)
Veterinary Officer	Veterinary-Lieutenant T. W. Rudd.

Brigade Commissariat Officer Captain A. Mullaly, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General.
*Brigade Transport Officer Captain E. deV. Wintle, 16th Bengal Lancers.
*Regimental Commissariat-Transport Officer Lieutenant H. I. Nicholl, 1st Battalion The Bedfordshire Regiment.
Provost Marshal (from the Brigade). Lieutenant C. Kaye, 21st Punjab Infantry.

6. *Staff Offices.*—The Staff Office for the First Cavalry Brigade, maintained at Rawalpindi, will be detailed as the Staff Office for this Reserve Brigade. It will be in charge of a clerk from the District Staff Office, Rawalpindi, who will report himself to the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General of this Brigade.

This Staff Office will be supplied under the orders of the Adjutant-General in India with Indian Army Lists, Field Service Forms and Duplicating Machines, and also with G. G. O's., G. O's., G. O. C. C's., and Army Circulars from the date on which orders were issued for the concentration of the Malakand Field Force until the conclusion of the operations.

The Director-General of Ordnance will take the necessary steps to supply the camp equipage required for this Staff Office. This will be sent immediately from the Rawalpindi Arsenal to the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Rawalpindi District.

The Staff Office will at once be replaced under the orders of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab, and the cost of such replacement debited to these operations.

Departmental offices will be formed and equipped under departmental arrangements.

7. *Clothing.*—The Summer scale of clothing for troops and followers, as laid down in the Field Service Departmental Code, "Commissariat-Transport," and in the Field Service Equipment Tables will be issued. The clothing for the units at Rawalpindi will be issued in bulk, but will not be issued to individuals until orders are received for the movement of these units from Rawalpindi. Clothing for Native units will, however, be distributed at once. Attendants of hired transport will receive one blanket.

Wadded sunshades for helmets and back pads will be provided by British Corps under regimental arrangements at a cost not to exceed Rs. 2 per head. Cost to be recovered on contingent bills. Goggles for British Corps will be issued by the Commissariat Department.

The hob-nails and toe-plates, in possession of corps as mobilisation equipment, will be at once placed on the boots.

8. *Equipment.*—All units will be equipped on the field service scale as laid down in the Field Service Equipment Tables.

Units will be supplied with Field Service Form No. 6 by the Adjutant-General in India.

Units now detailed for service, which are already in possession of the articles of mobilisation equipment, maintained in regimental charge, will only require to be completed by Departments of Supply with the articles now kept in departmental charge pending mobilisation, in accordance with the checked indents drawn up for the same. This will be done at once.

The 2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment, will take over the mobilisation equipment of the 1st Battalion, 1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment, and this equipment will be at once replaced under the orders of Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab, and the cost debited to these operations.

The 50th Field Battery, Royal Artillery, will be the "supplying battery" of the 10th Field Battery.

Watches and magnetic compasses to complete the signalling equipment will be issued at once by the Mathematical Instrument Office to all Infantry Regiments detailed in paragraph I.

9. *Establishments.*—During the time that the British units of this Brigade remain at Rawalpindi the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab, can authorise such conservancy and other establishments as may be necessary in accordance with Regulations. Any additional conservancy or other establishments that may be required at Hoti Mardan will also be arranged for in communication with the Commissary-General, Punjab Command.

10. *Ammunition.*—As laid down for Corps in the Field Service Manual, Part V, and the Field Service Equipment Tables. British Infantry Regiments will be supplied with ammunition made up with the new pattern "Dum-Dum" bullet.

11. *Supplies.*—The supplies collected for the Malakand Field Force will be increased to such extent as may be found necessary to complete the one month's supplies for the Field Force thus augmented.

* These officers will personally report themselves to the Base Commissariat Officer, Nowshera.

12. *Transport*.—The whole of the transport required for the British units of this Brigade on the Normal Scale will be collected at Nowshera as soon as possible, and the whole of the transport for the Native units on the Normal Scale will be similarly collected at Hoti Mardan.

All the above transport will be kept in reserve at Nowshera and Hoti Mardan for the forward movement of the Brigade at the shortest notice.

13. *Medical*.—Strict medical examination of troops and followers is to be made before they leave their present stations, in accordance with paragraph 49, Field Service Departmental Code, "Medical" (1897 edition).

No. 1 Field Medical Depot will be mobilised at Meean Meer, and will concentrate at Rawalpindi. In the event of the British units moving forward from Rawalpindi this Depot will accompany them.

All field hospitals will be equipped with the Normal Scale of ambulance transport.

If any additional Field Hospitals or other medical arrangements are required for the Line of Communication these will be arranged for by the Principal Medical Officer, Her Majesty's Forces in India.

A Staff Surgeon will be appointed as a collateral charge.

14. *Veterinary*.—The necessary Veterinary arrangements will be made under the orders of the Principal Veterinary Officer in India.

Veterinary examinations of horses and other animals will be held before they proceed to join the Malakand Field Force.

15. *Ordnance Field Park*.—The Ordnance Field Park established at Nowshera may be augmented to such extent as may be considered necessary by the Director-General of Ordnance in India.

16. *Signalling equipment*.—Any extra equipment considered necessary will be furnished by the Ordnance Department in accordance with G. O. 53 of 1892.

17. *Telegraphs*.—The Lieutenant-Generals Commanding the Forces, Punjab and Bengal, will authorise the despatch of telegrams on the debit note system of payment from such offices as may be concerned with the equipment of the force or its maintenance in the field.

Staff and Departmental Officers of the Brigade will be permitted to send telegrams on the "debit note" system from the Nowshera and Mardan telegraph offices.

18. *Post Office*.—The Director-General of the Post Offices will arrange that a field post office will be attached to the Brigade.

19. *Supply of Maps and Books*.—Maps and books will be supplied by the Intelligence Branch, Simla, on the same scale as has been supplied to the Malakand Field Force.

20. *Base Stationery Depot*.—In the event of the Reserve Brigade joining the Malakand Field Force, a Base Stationery Depot, with a two months' supply of Forms, Stationery and Mathematical Instruments for all Staff Offices and Corps Units, will be formed at Nowshera under arrangements to be made by the Superintendent of Stationery.

21. *Officers' Messes*.—On the scale laid down in the Field Service Manual, Part XII, Section III.

22. *Concessions and privileges*.—If moved beyond Hoti Mardan the Brigade will come under the concessions and privileges authorised for the Malakand Field Force. Staff Officers will draw pay from the date on which they join their appointments.

Approximate Strength of the Reserve Brigade for the Malakand Field Force.

Staff and Units.	COMBATANTS.					CLERKS.		FOLLOWERS.				Chargers or horses.	Ponies.	MULES.			BULLOCKS.		AMBULANCE TRANSPORT.		REMARKS.			
	British officers.	British warrant and non-com-missioned officers and men.	Native officers.	Hospital assistants.	Native rank and file.	European.	Native.	Ordnance.	Commissariat-Transport.	Public.	Private.			Ordnance.	Pack.	Draught.	Camels.	Donkeys.	Pack.	Draught.		Riding animals, mules or ponies.	Bullocks.	Ambulance tongas.
Brigade Staff	(a) 8	(b) 2	(b) 6	...	(b) 12	(b) 6	(b) 42	18	9	...	28		
2nd Battalion, The Highland Light Infantry.	29	803	2	...	47	...	127	47	28	9	6	...	105		
1st Battalion, The Gordon Highlanders.*	29	803	2	...	47	...	127	47	28	9	6	...	105		
21st (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.	9	...	16	1	721	...	53	...	70	53	25	9	6	...	84		
2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.	9	...	16	1	721	...	53	...	70	53	25	9	6	...	84		
6 Guns, 10th Field Battery, Royal Artillery.	6	164	11	...	58	...	34	58	24	154	8	...	9		
No. 3 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.	4	2	3	1	169	...	18	...	64	18	18	8	5	...	76		
No. 14 British Field Hospital	4	21	3	...	208	...	26	208	28	4	16	...	8		
No. 45 Native Field Hospital	4	1	...	8	15	...	172	...	23	172	28	4	16	...	8		
No. 1 Field Medical Store Depot	1	1	5	...	5	5	6	1	2		
TOTAL	103	1,795	35	11	1,644	2	667	667	252	225	80	...	507		

Note i.—The strength of Field Hospitals is based on the latest orders on the subject, for which revised Field Service Equipment Tables are now being prepared.

Note ii.—The transport shown in this statement is that required for the troops, and does not include that required for supplies, &c.

* 1st Battalion, West Surrey Regiment (The Queen's) took the place of the Gordon Highlanders who subsequently formed part of the additional reserve brigades mobilised at Rawal Pindi.

Appendix A (3).

RETURN of the Marching-out (Field) Strength of each Battalion of British Infantry detailed for Service in the recent Operations on the North-West Frontier of India; of the Number of Non-commissioned Officers and Men left behind in Quarters; and of the actual Number who joined the Field Force and engaged in Active Operations.

RETURN SHOWING THE STRENGTH OF EACH BATTALION OF BRITISH INFANTRY DETAILED FOR SERVICE IN THE RECENT OPERATIONS ON THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER OF INDIA.

WARRANT OFFICERS AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND MEN.

BATTALION.	Date of Information (1897). *	With Expeditionary Force.				Not with Expeditionary Force.				Total.			
		Warrant Officers.	Sergeants.	Drummers, &c.	Rank and File.	Total.	Warrant Officers.	Sergeants.	Drummers, &c.	Rank and File.	Total.	Warrant Officers.	Sergeants.
Royal West Surrey, (a)	1st Battn.	...	32	10	724	766	2	14	4	236	256	2	46
East Kent, (a)	" "	1	26	13	711	751	1	19	3	211	234	2	45
Devonshire,	" "	1	35	12	676	724	1	13	3	283	305	2	48
Somersetshire Light Infantry,	" "	1	20	4	529	554	1	26	3	432	462	2	46
Yorkshire Regiment,	2nd	...	37	7	738	782	1	7	8	187	203	1	44
Royal Scots Fusiliers,	1st	...	21	7	377	406	1	23	9	545	578	2	44
King's Own Scottish Borderers,	2nd	1	34	14	683	732	1	10	2	244	257	2	44
Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers,	" "	1	33	11	748	793	1	13	5	183	202	2	46
Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry,	1st	1	35	7	739	782	1	10	5	101	207	2	45
Dorsetshire,	" "	1	36	13	694	744	1	7	3	217	228	2	43
Oxfordshire Light Infantry,	2nd	1	40	14	724	779	1	9	...	181	188	2	46
Derbyshire,	" "	...	33	13	742	788	1	9	3	189	202	1	42
Northamptonshire,	1st	1	41	12	779	833	1	8	4	143	153	2	46
Royal West Kent, (a)	" "	1	35	12	739	807	1	8	4	167	180	2	43
Yorkshire Light Infantry, (a)	2nd	1	37	16	664	718	1	8	...	252	261	2	45
Highland Light Infantry, (a)	" "	1	37	15	743	796	1	8	3	167	179	2	45
Gordon Highlanders,	1st	1	34	19	747	801	1	11	2	203	217	2	45
Royal Sussex,	2nd	1	37	16	689	743	1	8	...	178	187	2	45
Royal Irish Regiment,	" "	...	36	15	759	810	1	8	1	201	211	1	44

* Date of return in which this distribution is first reported.

(a) Battalions engaged in the operations of the Malakand and Buner Field Forces.

† Four companies only.

WAR OFFICE;

24th February 1898.

EVELYN WOOD,

Adjutant-General.

APPENDIX A (4).

Distribution Return of the Malakand Field Force on the 30th September 1897.

Stations.			Units.
			<i>2nd Brigade.</i>
Inayat Kila	{ No. 7 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery. 1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment. 2 squadrons, Guides Cavalry. No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners. 31st Punjab Infantry. 38th Dogras. Guides Infantry.
			<i>3rd Brigade.</i>
Returning to Peshawar with Moh-			{ No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery. 1st Battalion, Royal West Surrey Regiment. 11th Bengal Lancers. No. 3 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners. 22nd Punjab Infantry. 39th Garhwal Rifles.
Panjhora	{ 10th Field Battery, Royal Artillery. No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery. 1 squadron, Guides Cavalry. 24th Punjab Infantry. 35th Sikhs. 6 companies, 45th Sikhs.*
Sarai	{ Detachment, 10th Field Battery, Royal Artillery (58 men with ammunition wagons). Detachment, 10th Bengal Lancers. 2 companies, 45th Sikhs.*
Chakdarra	{ 1st Battalion, East Kent Regiment. No. 5 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners. Detachment, 10th Bengal Lancers. 4 companies, 16th Bengal Infantry.
Malakand	{ 2nd Battalion, Highland Light Infantry. 21st Punjab Infantry. Detachment, 24th Punjab Infantry (52 men). Detachment, 31st Punjab Infantry (76 ") " 10th Bengal Lancers.
Dargai	{ ½ squadron, 10th Bengal Lancers. 2 companies, 16th Bengal Infantry.
Jalala	{ Detachment, 10th Bengal Lancers. 2 companies, 16th Bengal Infantry.

* The 45th Sikhs left the Malakand on the 30th September *en route* to Nowshera to join the Tirah expeditionary force. The 20th Punjab Infantry, from the Mohmand field force, reached Nowshera on the 3rd October and replaced them at the Malakand.

Mardan was held by 2 squadrons of the 10th Bengal Lancers, 3rd Bombay Infantry, and Depôts of the Guides (318 men).

APPENDIX A (5).

DISTRIBUTION RETURN OF THE MALAKAND FIELD FORCE ON 1ST
JANUARY 1898.

Stations.	Units.
Chakdarra ...	{ Detachment, 10th Bengal Lancers. Wing, 24th Punjab Infantry.
Malakand ...	{ Detachment, 10th Bengal Lancers. 35th Sikhs. 38th Dogras. No. 5 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners.
Dargai ...	{ No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery. Detachment, 10th Bengal Lancers. 16th Bengal Infantry. Wing, 24th Punjab Infantry.
Camp Kunda ...	{ <i>1st Brigade.</i> 1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment. 20th Punjab Infantry. 31st „ „ (7 companies). <i>2nd Brigade.</i> 1st Battalion, East Kent Regiment. 21st Punjab Infantry. Guides Infantry. <i>Divisional Troops.</i> 10th Field Battery, Royal Artillery. No. 7 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery. Detachment, 10th Bengal Lancers. 2nd Battalion, Highland Light Infantry. No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
Jalala ...	{ Detachment, 10th Bengal Lancers. 1 company, 31st Punjab Infantry.

At Mardan, in garrison—2 squadrons of the 10th Bengal Lancers, Guides Cavalry, and 3rd Bombay Light Infantry.

APPENDIX A (6).

Commands and Staff of the Bnuer Field Force.

Major-General Commanding the Force	...	Major-General Sir B. Blood, K.C.B.
Aide-de-Camp	...	Lieutenant A. E. Viscount Fincastle, V.C., 16th Lancers.
Orderly Officer	...	Lieutenant W. S. Fraser, 19th Bengal Lancers.
Assistant Adjutant General	...	Major H. H. Burney, 1st Battalion, Gordon Highlanders.
Assistant Quarter Master General	...	Lieutenant-Colonel A. Masters, Central India Horse.
Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General (Intelligence).	...	Captain H. E. Stanton, D.S.O., Royal Artillery.
Commanding Royal Engineers	...	Lieutenant-Colonel W. Peacocke, C.M.G., R.E.
Adjutant, R. E.	...	Captain H. J. Sherwood, R.E.
Field Engineers	...	{ Major E. Blunt, R.E. Major M. C. Barton, R.E.
Superintendent of Army Signalling	...	Captain E. V. O. Hewett, 1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment.
Chief Commissariat Officer	...	Major H. Wharry, Assistant Commissary- General.
Divisional Transport Officer	...	Captain C. G. R. Thackwell, Assistant Commissary-General.
Assistant to Chief Commissariat Officer	...	Captain R. C. Lye, 23rd Bengal Infantry (Pioneers).
Assistant to Divisional Transport Officer	...	Lieutenant E. F. Macnaghten, 16th Lancers.
Principal Medical Officer	...	Surgeon-Colonel S. C. G. Carmichael I. M. S.
Senior Veterinary Officer	...	Veterinary Captain H. T. W. Mann, Army Veterinary Department.
Commanding Royal Artillery	...	Colonel W. Aitken, C.B., R.A.
Adjutant, Royal Artillery	...	Captain H. Rouse, R.A.
Chaplain	...	The Revd. L. Klugh.
Survey Officer	...	Captain C. L. Robertson, R.E.
Superintendent of Telegraphs	...	Lieutenant W. Robertson, R.E.
Field Intelligence Officers	...	{ Captain J. K. Tod, 7th Bengal Cavalry. Lieutenant A. C. M. Waterfield, 11th Bengal Lancers.
Commissariat Officer, Advance Depot	...	Captain A. R. Burlton, Indian Staff Corps.
Transport Officer	...	Lieutenant R. S. Weston, Manchester Re- giment.
Ordnance Officer	...	Captain L. G. Watkins, R.A.
Commandant, Line of Communications	...	Colonel V. A. Schalch, 11th Bengal Infantry.
Section Commandant	...	Captain C. E. Belli-Bivar, 7th Bombay Lancers.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, Line of Communications.	...	Brevet-Major L. Herbert, Central India Horse.
Commissariat Officer, Rustam Force	...	Lieutenant C. H. G. Moore, Indian Staff Corps.
Base Commandant	...	Colonel Bingham, 13th (Shekhwati) Bengal Infantry.

1st Brigade.

Commanding	Brigadier-General W. A. Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G.
Orderly Officer	Lieutenant C. R. Gaunt, 4th Dragoon Guards.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant General			...	Major E. A. P. Hobday, R.A.
Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General			...	Captain C. F. A. Dillon, 40th Bengal Infantry.
Assistant Superintendent of Army Signalling				Lieutenant J. W. O'Dowda, 1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment.
Provost Marshal	Lieutenant S. Morton, 24th Bengal Infantry.
Brigade Commissariat Officer			...	Captain C. H. Beville, Indian Staff Corps.
„ Transport	„	Captain J. M. Cammilleri, 13th Bengal Infantry.
Regimental Commissariat and Transport Officer				Lieutenant J. R. Duncan, Royal Scots Fusiliers.
Veterinary Officer	Veterinary-Lieutenant W. A. McDougal, Army Veterinary Department.

2nd Brigade.

Commanding	Brigadier-General P. D. Jeffreys, C. B.
Orderly Officer	Lieutenant J. Byron, R. A.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant General			...	Captain A. B. Dunsterville, East Survey Regiment.
Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General			...	Major C. H. Powell, 21st Gurkha Rifles.
Assistant Superintendent of Army Signalling				Lieutenant W. H. Trevor, "The Buffs."
Provost Marshal	Captain W. E. Banbury, 25th Madras Infantry.
Brigade Commissariat Officer			...	Captain G. A. Hawkins, Indian Staff Corps.
„ Transport	„	Captain D. Baker, 2nd Bombay Infantry.
Regimental Commissariat and Transport Officer.				Lieutenant G. C. Brooke, Border Regiment.
Veterinary Officer	Veterinary-Lieutenant G. M. Williams, Army Veterinary Department.

APPENDIX A (7).

Malakand Force.

On the demobilization of the Malakand and Buner field forces, the following troops were retained on, or in the neighbourhood of, the Malakand pass to maintain communication with Chitral *via* the Dir-Chitral road.

No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery.
 3 squadrons, 10th Bengal Lancers.
 No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
 No. 5 " Madras " "
 1st Battalion, "The Buffs."
 16th Bengal Infantry.
 21st Punjab Infantry.
 31st Punjab Infantry.
 38th Dogras.
 3rd Bombay Light Infantry.
 B and D sections, No. 14 British Field Hospital.
 Nos. 37, 50, 51, Native Field Hospitals.

These units were maintained at field service strength of combatants and followers and with baggage on relief scale.

The Force was designated "The Malakand Force" and was disposed as under:—

CHAKDARRA.

Detachment, Native Cavalry.
 Wing of Native Infantry.
 1 Section, Native Field Hospital.

KHAR.

The General Officer Commanding the Force and Staff and a Moveable Column consisting of —

1 Battalion, British Infantry.
 2 Battalions, Native Infantry.
 1 Mountain Battery.
 2 Squadrons, Native Cavalry.
 1 Company of Sappers and Miners.
 2 Sections, British Field Hospital.
 1½ Native Field Hospital.

MALAKAND KOTAL.

2 Battalions, Native Infantry.
 Detachment, Native Cavalry.
 1 Company, Sappers and Miners.
 1 Native Field Hospital.

DARGAI.

Detachment, Native Cavalry.
 Wing, Native Infantry.
 1 Section, Native Field Hospital.

COMMAND AND STAFF OF THE MALAKAND FORCE.

Commanding (with the temporary rank of Brigadier-General).	Colonel A. J. F. Reid, 29th Punjab Infantry.
Orderly Officer	... Lieutenant T. F. Murray, Highland Light Infantry.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master General.	Major E. A. P. Hobday, R.A.
Principal Medical Officer	... Brigade-Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel W. J. Charlton, A.M.S.

Field Engineer	Captain C. F. M. Watkins, R.E.
Assistant Superintendent of Army Signalling			Lieutenant W. H. Trevor, "The Buffs."
Commissariat Officer	Lieutenant C. H. G. Moore, D. A. C. G.
Assistant to Commissariat Officer		...	Lieutenant C. A. Roosmale-Cocq, 3rd Bombay Light Infantry.
Transport Officer	Captain D. Baker, 2nd Bombay Grenadiers.
Provost Marshal	Lieutenant B. I. Way, North Staffordshire Regiment.
Veterinary Officer	Veterinary Lieutenant W. A. McDougall, A. V. D.
Staff Surgeon	Surgeon-Captain J. Gould, M. B., I.M.S.
Station Staff Officer, 3rd class, at Dargai			Lieutenant H. B. Ford, 31st Punjab Infantry.

The above staff were in addition to the Staff of the Malakand Brigade which was composed as under :—

Commanding	Colonel J. E. Kelly, C. B., A.D.C., I.S.C.
Orderly Officer	Lieutenant F. M. E. Kennedy, Somersetshire Light Infantry.
Deputy Assistant and Quarter Master General.			Brevet-Major L. Herbert, 1st Regiment Central India Horse.
Field Engineer	Captain E. P. Johnson, R.E.
Provost Marshal	Lieutenant H. E. Cotterill, Royal West Surrey Regiment.
Transport Officer	Captain H. B. Murray, 34th Pioneers.
Senior Medical Officer	Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel P. N. Martin, M.D., I.M.S.

This force, as reconstructed, at once came under the direct orders of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab.

The following ammunition was maintained in charge of the force :—
639 rounds per Lee-Metford rifle.

500	„	„	M.-H. rifle and carbine.
200	„	„	revolver.
13,200	„	„	maxim.
200	„	„	9-pr. S. B.

For the Mountain Battery, 48 rounds of star shell with boxes and cartouches 883 rounds in battery charge, 600 rounds in store at Khar.

A minimum reserve of one month's supplies for men and grain and fodder for animals was constantly maintained at Malakand, Dargai, and Chakdarra posts, and transport was supplied for all units of the Force at the normal scale.

DESPATCHES.

Appendix B (1).

FIELD OPERATIONS.

MALAKAND.

G. G. O. No. 1089.—The Right Hon'ble the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council directs the publication of the subjoined communications from the Adjutant-General in India, submitting, under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief in India (i) a despatch from Brigadier-General W. H. Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G., Commanding the Malakand Brigade, on the operations of the troops under his command from the 26th July to the 1st August 1897, (ii) despatches from Major-General Sir B. Blood, K.C.B., Commanding the Malakand Field Force, describing the operations at the Malakand and in the Swat Valley from the 1st to 3rd August 1897, including the defence and relief of Chakdarra, and (iii) a despatch from Major-General Sir B. Blood, K.C.B., giving an account of the operations of the force under his command from the 4th to 26th August 1897.

2. The successful defence of the Malakand and the undaunted resistance offered to the tribesmen at Chakdarra command the special admiration of the Governor-General in Council, who shares with His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief his appreciation of the bravery and discipline displayed by all ranks in these and subsequent operations, and of the excellent dispositions ably made by Brigadier-General Meiklejohn for the defence of the Malakand.

3. His Excellency in Council also entirely concurs with the Commander-in-Chief in his approbation of the ability, energy, and skill shown by Major-General Sir Bindon Blood in the operations at the Malakand, in the Swat Valley, and at the action of Landa-kai on the 17th August.

No. 727-F., "*Field Operations—Malakand*," dated Simla, 15th September 1897.

From—MAJOR-GENERAL G. DEC. MORTON, C.B., Adjutant-General in India,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

I have the honour, by direction of the Commander-in Chief, to forward for the information of the Government of India the accompanying report from Brigadier-General W. H. Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G., giving details of what occurred at the Malakand from the 26th July to the 1st August 1897, on which latter date Major-General Sir B. Blood, K.C.B., took over command of the Malakand Field Force.

2. The Commander-in-Chief desires to draw attention to the success with which the first sudden attack of the tribesmen was promptly met and repulsed, while he considers that the subsequent arrangements made to hold the position reflect great credit on Brigadier-General Meiklejohn and the force under his command.

3. Sir George White wishes to express his entire concurrence with the remarks of Brigadier-General Meiklejohn in paragraph 42 as regards the admirable behaviour of the troops during the defence of the Malakand. For five consecutive nights large numbers of the enemy, led on by their Mullahs and strongly imbued with a spirit of fanaticism, attacked the position with determination, during which time the troops had no rest or sleep. Each successive attack was met and repulsed with steadiness and success.

4. The incident mentioned in paragraph 29 when an advanced post in the line of defence was held by a party of a native officer and 25 men of the 31st Punjab Infantry cannot pass unnoticed. The small party detailed for this duty gallantly maintained their position for 6½ hours, and resisted, what is described as a most determined attack, until at length the Serai they were holding was set on fire and rendered untenable. Out of the party of 26 men detailed for the duty, 19 were either killed or wounded, which in itself testifies to the gallant stand they made.

5. His Excellency also wishes to express his admiration of the manner in which the Corps of Guides marched at very short notice from Mardan, a distance of 32 miles. Despite the intense heat they had gone through the corps arrived in such a soldierlike condition that, on reaching the Malakand, the Infantry of the Guides at once took up the position allotted to them in the line of defence, and were under arms and fighting throughout the same and ensuing nights. Nor can Sir George White omit a reference to the march of the 35th Sikhs and the 37th Dogras, under Colonel Reid, which regiments proceeded to reinforce the Malakand Brigade as rapidly as possible. The march was carried out under the most trying conditions and in exceptionally sultry weather, but all ranks pushed on to reinforce their comrades, notwithstanding that they left 18 of their number dead from heat apoplexy *en route*, a loss which His Excellency deeply deploras.

Sir George White has also heard with the deepest regret of the death of Lieutenant-Colonel J. Lamb, 24th Punjab Infantry, Major W. W. Taylor, 45th Sikhs, Lieutenant L. Manley and the non-commissioned officers and men mentioned in the report.

6. In conclusion the Commander-in-Chief desires to recommend to the favourable consideration of the Government of India Brigadier-General W. H. Meiklejohn and the officers mentioned by him in his report.

No. 2, dated Malakand, 13th August 1897.

From—BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. H. MEIKLEJOHN, C.B., C.M.G., Commanding Malakand Brigade,
To—The Adjutant-General in India (through General Officer Commanding, Malakand Field Force).

I have the honour to submit, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, my report of the fighting that took place at Malakand between the dates of 26th July and 1st August.

2. I have kept you informed by telegram of the events of each day, but I have been prevented from sending any detailed report before by the incessant nature of the fighting.

3. On the afternoon of the 26th, I was informed by Major H. A. Deane, Political Agent, who had previously warned me of possible trouble, that matters had assumed a very disquieting aspect, reports having reached him of the entire failure of the residents of the Swat Valley to stop the advance of a fanatical Fakir, who had gained immense influence on the superstitious and religious feelings of the people, and that he thought that the Guides should be called up, and arrangements made for the Brigade to turn out. The Guides were consequently wired for at once, and all Officers Commanding Regiments and Adjutants were ordered to meet me immediately.

4. At 7 P. M. I saw these officers and gave them instructions to be prepared to turn out at any moment. These instructions had hardly been given when Major Deane joined me, and informed me that news has just come in that the Fakir was moving towards Aladand, and that in his opinion the Brigade should turn out at once and prevent his seizing the Amandara Pass. Orders were consequently issued by me for the Officer Commanding, 45th Sikhs, with 2 guns of No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery, 2 companies, 31st Punjab Infantry, and the Squadron, XIth Bengal Lancers, to start at midnight and seize the Amandara Pass. The remainder of the column to start at 3 A.M. under my own command.

5. All officers were recalled from leave and orders given that all regimental baggage was to be stored under guards in their own camps, there being no time to strike tents and carry them away to the fort.

6. At 9-45 P.M. a telegram was received from the Officer Commanding, Chakdarra, saying that two forces of Pathans were marching towards Chakdarra from the east along both banks of the river, and at 10 P.M. Major Deane arrived at the Brigade Office with the news that a Levy Jemadar had just arrived, giving information that the Fakir had passed Khar and was advancing on Malakand, and that neither levies nor people would act against him, and that the hills to the east of the camp were covered with Pathans. It was at once seen that a night attack on the camp was intended, and the "alarm" was immediately sounded, the troops moving at once to their posts.

7. This had just been completed when the first shots were fired and a general attack was made on the camp by the Buddhist and Graded Roads. At the same time firing from the direction of the North Camp, and the glow of star shells showed that the North Camp was also threatened.

8. In the first rush the enemy succeeded in over-powering the picquet on the Graded Road, and penetrated into the camp behind the enclosure in which were the camps of the Sappers and Miners and Field Engineer Park.

9. On the right flank the Buddhist Road had been secured by the 45th Rattray's Sikhs under Lieutenant-Colonel McRae, who had, on the first alarm being sounded, despatched Major Taylor with a party to secure the gorge where the road reaches the top of the pass. Lieutenant-Colonel McRae, followed immediately with 30 men, caught up Major Taylor, and they together advanced to the gorge, and almost immediately encountered the head of the enemy's column, numbering several hundred men who were creeping silently up the Buddhist Road. They opened a very hot fire on them and the enemy at once broke into yells and screams and tried to rush them.

10. The small party held on to their position manfully till the enemy clambered up on to the rocks that overlooked the gorge on both sides, and from this position rolled down rocks and fired on them. Lieutenant Barff and some more men of the 45th Sikhs had by this time arrived and been sent by Lieutenant-Colonel McRae to protect his right flank round which the enemy were trying to make a way. The remainder of the regiment now came up, and Lieutenant-Colonel McRae retired to a more defensible position about 50 yards in rear in which he remained and defied the enemy all night. Just before he retired Major Taylor was mortally wounded.

11. There is no doubt that the gallant resistance made by this small body in the gorge, against vastly superior numbers, till the arrival of the rest of the regiment, saved the camp from being rushed on that side, and I cannot speak too highly of the behaviour of Lieutenant-Colonel McRae and Major Taylor on this occasion.

12. On the left, on the alarm being sounded, the picquets supplied by the 24th Punjab Infantry had been doubled, one company of the same regiment under Lieutenant Costello was sent to line the walls of the enclosure facing the gorge through which the road to the North Camp passes, and another company under Lieutenant Climo was sent to line the wall of the Bazaar facing the gorge up which the Graded Road passes. The remainder of the regiment being held in readiness to support any part of the line that required it.

13. The central position, *viz.*, the enclosure in which were the Sappers and Miners Camp, the Commissariat Godown and the Field Engineer Park was occupied by No. 5 Company, Queen's Own Madras Sappers and Miners.

14. I ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Lamb to bring one company of his regiment into this enclosure, and I also withdrew the company lining the Bazaar wall into this enclosure, as the enemy were getting round their flank, and in their former position they ran a risk of being fired into by the company lining the enclosure facing the gorge leading to the North Camp. There were thus in this enclosure—

No. 5 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners, and
2 Companies, 24th Punjab Infantry.

15. The enemy having over-powered the picquet on the Abbott (Graded) Road got on to the high ground in rear of the position from which they kept up a heavy fire all night periodically charging with great determination right up to the abattis which was lined by the Sappers and Miners. Twice they penetrated. Once capturing the Quarter Guard, in which was all the ammunition of the company. It was in trying to stop this charge that Lieutenant Watling, temporarily in command of the company, was wounded by a man whom he ran through with his sword. The enemy over-powered the guard, and for a time held the guard-room, but were eventually driven out by a party of the 24th Punjab Infantry under Lieutenant Climo. Some of the enemy penetrated into the Commissariat Godown, and here they killed Honorary Lieutenant Manley, my Brigade Commissariat Officer.

16. In the enclosure the fighting was very severe, for the enemy were on three sides of it, and fought with great determination, bringing a heavy cross fire on the defender, and continually charging right up to the breast-works.

17. Lieutenant-Colonel Lamb, 24th Punjab Infantry, Major Herbert, my Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, and Captain Holland, 24th Punjab Infantry, were all shot in this enclosure. The attack had been carried on with great vigour from 10-30 P.M. till 2-30 A.M. when the sounds of tomtoms and pipes approaching up the Graded Road indicated reinforcements coming to the enemy. The garrison of the enclosure was already hard pressed, and so I sent Lieutenant Rawlins, 24th Punjab Infantry, up to the fort to bring down 100 men from there. The enemy were all round the enclosure and there was every chance of his having to fight his way. He went with three orderlies and arrived back safely with the reinforcements. The fight lasted till 4-30 A.M., when the enemy withdrew.

18. At daybreak it was ascertained that the North Camp had not been seriously attacked and that all was well there. I consequently ordered the 31st Punjab Infantry with the Squadron, XIth Bengal Lancers, and 2 guns, supported by a wing of the 24th Punjab Infantry to pursue the enemy, the majority of whom had withdrawn in the direction of Khar and Butkheyla.

19. They pursued for a short distance up the valley when they came across a very large gathering of the enemy, and as it was evident that this attempt on our camp had been the signal for a large tribal gathering, I ordered Major Gibbs, who was in charge of the pursuit, to retire and bring up all the stores, ammunition and treasure of the troops in North Camp to the Kotal, and concentrate all his force before dark in that place.

20. The Squadron, XIth Bengal Lancers, under Captain Wright, which had covered the advance of Major Gibbs' force, had pushed right on to Chakdarra, being fired on the whole way, and Captain Wright wisely determined to stop at that place, where his party has proved a useful reinforcement to the two companies, 45th Sikhs, under Lieutenant Rattray and Lieutenant Wheatley, forming the garrison of the post.

21. The rest of the force retired to their respective camps. The manner in which Lieutenant Climo, on whom the Command of the 24th Punjab Infantry devolved when Lieutenant-Colonel Lamb and Captain Holland were wounded, covered this retirement is most praiseworthy, and I shall have again to draw attention to the good work done by this officer on subsequent occasions.

22. The withdrawal of all baggage and stores, from North Camp to the Kotal, was commenced at once, their being no transport, however, to bring up the E. P. tents, all the camels being at Dargai, the camp equipage was left by my order, and was burnt by the enemy in the night. Almost every tent had been struck by Major Gibbs' force, but there was no time to do more. All day large bodies of the enemy were seen coming from different directions in the valley, and joining the enemy who were visible all over the hill tops, and it was certain that last night's fight was not merely an attempt to do as much harm as possible and then clear off, but the beginning of an important movement to try

and turn us out of the valley and regain possession of the Pass, and that we must prepare for another attack in the night.

23. They did not wait till night, however, for, while the stores, etc., from North Camp were being sent up to the Kotal, the troops in North Camp were threatened by the enemy on the hills to the west, and the retirement was completed under cover of fire from the 24th Punjab Infantry and the Guides Cavalry, who had arrived in camp at 8-30 A.M. that morning.

24. At about 6-45 P.M., as the 31st Punjab Infantry were arriving in the Kotal Camp, a body of the enemy about 1,000 strong made a sudden attack down from the hills on the west, and driving in No. 2 Picquet of the 24th Punjab Infantry tried to rush the camp. Lieutenant Climo with two companies, 24th Punjab Infantry, at once went up the hill to meet them, and aided by 2 guns, No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery, drove them back with loss towards the North Camp.

25. The Guides Cavalry arrived at 8-30 A.M. this morning (27th). The Guides Infantry arrived at 7-30 P.M. I would like to call His Excellency's attention to the march of this regiment. The Officer Commanding Guides received my telegram calling him to Malakand at 9 P.M. on the 26th, the Cavalry of the Corps left Mardan at 12-30 A.M. and arrived at Malakand at 8-30 A.M., *i.e.*, a distance of 32 miles in 8 hours, and the Infantry left Mardan at 2 A.M., arriving at Malakand at 7-30 P.M., *i.e.*, in 17½ hours. The heat on the road between here and Mardan was intense and the march reflects great credit on the regiment.

26. Our casualties on the first night were—

Killed—

Honorary Lieutenant L. Manley, Commissariat Department.

Wounded—

Dangerously	Major W. W. Taylor, 45th Sikhs.
Severely	Lieutenant-Colonel J. Lamb, 24th Punjab Infantry.
			Major L. Herbert, D.A.A.G.
			Captain H. F. Holland, 24th Punjab Infantry.
			Lieutenant F. W. Watling, No. 5 Company, Queen's Own Sappers and Miners.

Native ranks—

Killed	21
Wounded	31

27. At 8-30 P.M. the enemy attacked with their whole force all along the line, but were repulsed everywhere. The force in the Kotal this night was composed of—

24th Punjab Infantry,
6 Companies, 45th Sikhs,
Guides Infantry,
Guides Cavalry,
No. 5 Company, Queen's Own Sappers and Miners,
No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery,

and was disposed as follows:

On the Right Flank.—Holding a position about 50 yards in a rear of that which they finally held on the night of the 26th were the 45th Sikhs, with 2 guns, and supported by 100 of the Guides Infantry under Lieutenant McCaskill.

In the centre.—Holding the top of the Graded Road and the enclosures occupied by the Sappers Camp, Commissariat and Field Engineers Park were the—

31st Punjab Infantry.
No. 5 Company, Queen's Own Sappers and Miners.
The Guides.
2 guns.

On the Left.—Holding the hill to the north of camp and overlooking the short road to North Camp were the 24th Punjab Infantry and 2 guns.

28. The 31st Punjab Infantry being short of officers, Lieutenant Maclean was sent from the Guides to assist Major Gibbs. The position on the right and the centre enclosure were hardly pressed the whole night.

29. About 100 yards in advance of the north-east corner of the central enclosure was a fortified serai, and, in order to check the advance of the enemy along the Graded Road, a party of 25 men, 31st Punjab Infantry, under Subadar Syed Ahmed Shah was sent to occupy it with orders to block up the only entrance to the Serai. The enemy made a most

determined attack on this Serai, but the garrison defended it gallantly from the commencement till 3 A.M. when the enemy succeeded in setting fire to it, and broke through one wall through which opening they rushed. The garrison now could hold on no longer, and with the aid of a ladder let themselves down over the wall nearest the camp, and retired to the enclosure, bringing their wounded with them. Nine of their number, I regret to say, were killed and ten wounded.

30. Subadar Syed Ahmed Shah was himself wounded. He was promoted to a commission on the recommendation of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief for a previous act of bravery, and I would like to call His Excellency's attention to his gallant conduct on this occasion also.

31. The darkness and the noise of firing all round prevented their condition being appreciated by the troops behind the breast-work, otherwise assistance would most surely have been sent them. Nothing could have been finer than the way these few men stuck to their post till it was made absolutely untenable.

32. The 24th Punjab Infantry were also hotly engaged all night, and in the early morning the enemy began to press close upon them from the heights on the west, whereupon Lieutenant Climo advanced up the spur to meet them with 2 companies, covered by the fire of the 2 guns attached to his position and 1 other company. The enemy stuck determinedly to their ground. They had many Martinis with them and kept up a heavy fire on Lieutenant Climo's force, at the same time rolling stones down on them. Lieutenant Climo, however, advanced, driving the enemy before him from position to position, and pursuing them for some two miles. He estimates the enemy's loss at 40. This counter-attack was excellently executed and is one more proof of the soldierly ability and dash displayed by Lieutenant Climo ever since the outbreak of hostilities.

This night (27th) our casualties were—

British officers—

Killed	None.
Wounded severely	Lieutenant E. W. Costello, 22nd Punjab Infantry, attached 24th Punjab Infantry.

Native ranks—

Killed	11
Wounded	45

33. *28th July.*—During the day desultory firing was going on into the camp. On the night of the 28th the attack was renewed with the same energy as on the two previous nights and on all sides of the camp, the brunt of the fighting falling on the central position and on the right flank.

The position of the troops was the same as on the 27th. The fighting commenced at 10 P.M. and ceased at 3 A.M. The casualties at this night were—

British officers—

Killed	None.
Wounded severely	Lieutenant H. L. S. Maclean, The Guides. Lieutenant H. B. Ford, 31st Punjab Infantry.
Wounded slightly	Lieutenant G. D. Swinley, 31st Punjab Infantry.

Native ranks—

Killed	2
Wounded	13

34. *29th July.*—On the morning of the 29th July signalling communication was re-established with Chakdarra, and it was learned that the fort had been attacked on the night of the 26th by a force, 1,000 strong, who had been repulsed without any loss to the garrison, and that they had since been attacked twice by day and twice by night.

35. At 4 P.M. this day (29th) one squadron, 11th Bengal Lancers, 88 strong, marched into Malakand under command of Major Beatson. In the evening the 38th Dogras and 35th Sikhs and details of the Guides arrived at Dargai under Colonel Reid. The heat on the road had been intense and 21 men of the 35th Sikhs died of heat apoplexy. I ordered Colonel Reid to halt at Dargai the next day in order to give these regiments a rest. During the day the Bazaar and Serai were levelled, trees were cleared away, abattis and breast-works strengthened, and in the evening large bonfires were lighted up in front of the central position, so that the enemy advancing by the Graded Road to the attack should be obliged to cross a line of light. The result was that the central position did not have such a severe time of it this night. It was known that the enemy had been largely reinforced during the day, and a vigorous attack was anticipated.

36. It commenced at 9-30 and was perhaps more vigorously and more fiercely pushed than on any previous night. It was principally delivered on the two flanks. At 2 A.M. a tremendous assault was made and at 2-30 A.M. suddenly ceased, and the enemy withdrew having been repulsed everywhere. The loss inflicted on them must have been very great, and as day broke they could be seen dragging away the bodies of their dead over the hills.

Our casualties were—

British officers—

Wounded severely	...	Lieutenant E. W. Costello, who had already been wounded, but continued to do his duty.
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Native ranks—

Killed	1
Wounded	17

It was reported that in the morning the mad Fakir had personally led this attack, had been wounded and had fled to Landakai, and that his second-in-command and companion had been killed.

37. *30th July.*—At about 10 A.M. on the 30th a heliogram was received from Chakdarra that the fort had been attacked from 2 P.M. on the 29th till 8 A.M. that day, that the attack had been repulsed with great loss to the enemy, and that the casualties among the garrison were 1 sepoy dangerously wounded. Later in the day I received intimation that their supplies and ammunition were running short.

38. During the day a large organised body joined the enemy, showing that, although the two Fakirs were *hors-de-combat*, they were still determined to carry on the fight. The attack was commenced again at 9-30 P.M., but there was not the same spirit in the fighting that there had been before. Once during a thunderstorm that broke over the camp during the night the enemy charged the 45th Sikhs position, but were repulsed with the bayonet. Our casualties on the night of the 30th were—

British officers	Nil.
Native ranks	2 wounded.

39. *31st July.*—At 7 A.M. on the 31st July the 35th Sikhs and 38th Dogras marched into camp having had a most trying march. The telegraph wire had been cut in the night on both sides of Dargai and 1,200 yards of wire had been carried away from opposite Shergarh. It was, however, repaired on the 31st, and news was received in the evening that Dargai was going to be attacked that night. It, however, was not attacked, nor, except a certain amount of sniping, did anything happen at Malakand on the night of the 31st.

40. *1st August.*—On the 1st August, my troops having had a quiet night and been able to get a little rest, I decided to try and relieve Chakdarra at once, taking with me the 45th Sikhs, 24th Punjab Infantry, Guides Cavalry and Infantry, the squadron, XIth Bengal Lancers, 4 guns, No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery, and No. 5 Company, Queen's Own Madras Sappers and Miners.

41. At 11 A.M. I sent the Cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Adams of the Guides, down into the plain, by the short road into North Camp, with orders to make a dash for the Amandara Pass, to seize it if not held, and if it was held to send me back word of the strength and position of the enemy. Before the Cavalry had reached the plain, however, the enemy saw what was going to happen, and assembled in great numbers from every direction to oppose them. The Cavalry charged them once and slew a great number of them, but the broken nature of the ground cramped their action, and, as the enemy were gradually working round their left flank to cut them off from their only line of retreat, I sent Major E. Hobday, R.A., then Staff Officer to Colonel Reid, to order Lieutenant-Colonel Adams to withdraw, being convinced that, with the opposition that the force was certain to receive, they would not, starting so late, reach Chakdarra that night. I determined therefore to put off the attempt till the morning of the 2nd, when I should have the whole day before me. The casualties among the Cavalry in this morning's action were—

British officers—

Killed	None.
Wounded severely	Lieutenant G. M. Baldwin, Guides.
Wounded slightly	Lieutenant C. V. Keyes, Guides.

Native ranks—

Killed	1
Wounded	12

Sir Bindon Blood arrived at noon and took over command of the force.

42. Such is the narrative of the events which took place here between the 26th July and the 1st August. Of the behaviour of the troops of all ranks, I cannot speak too highly. The courage with which they have faced overwhelming odds night after night, the endurance with which they have stood and fought with next to no sleep for 5 days and 5 nights has been beyond all praise. The trial has been a very severe one, and I trust that His Excellency will agree that they have come out of it honourably.

43. All have done well, but I should like to bring before His Excellency for favourable consideration the following names of officers and men:

24th Punjab Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. Lamb, who on the first alarm being sounded on the night of the 26th July had taken prompt action in reinforcing the outpost line held by his regiment and latter was of great assistance in directing the defence of the central enclosure till he was severely wounded.

Captain H. F. Holland showed great courage in assisting to drive a number of the enemy out of the central enclosure and was severely wounded in doing so.

I would specially wish to mention *Lieutenant S. H. Climo*, who commanded the 24th Punjab Infantry after Lieutenant-Colonel Lamb and Captain Holland had been wounded. This officer has shown soldierly qualities and ability of the highest order. He has commanded the regiment with dash and enterprise and shown a spirit and example which has been followed by all ranks. I trust His Excellency will be pleased to favourably notice Lieutenant Climo, who has proved himself an officer who will do well in any position and is well worthy of promotion.

Lieutenant A. K. Rawlins has behaved well all through. I would recommend him to His Excellency for the plucky way in which he went to the fort on the night of the 26th July to bring down reinforcements, and again for the dash he showed in leading his men on the 27th and 28th of which Lieutenant Climo speaks most highly.

Lieutenant E. W. Costello, 22nd Punjab Infantry, temporarily attached to the 24th Punjab Infantry has behaved exceedingly well and is the subject of a separate recommendation.

31st Punjab Infantry.

Major M. I. Gibbs, who commanded the regiment in the absence of Major O'Brien with skill and in every way to my satisfaction.

Lieutenant H. B. Ford, Acting Adjutant, 31st Punjab Infantry, rendered valuable assistance in helping to bring in a wounded sepoy during the withdrawal from North-Camp. He also behaved with courage in resisting an attack of the enemy on the night of the 28th when he was severely wounded.

Surgeon-Lieutenant J. Hugo, attached to 31st Punjab Infantry, rendered valuable service on the night of the 28th in saving Lieutenant H. B. Ford from bleeding to death. Lieutenant Ford was wounded and a branch of an artery was cut. There were no means of securing the artery, and Surgeon-Lieutenant Hugo for two hours stopped the bleeding by compressing the artery with his fingers. Had he not had the strength to do so, Lieutenant Ford must have died. Early in the morning thinking that the enemy had effected an entrance into Camp, Surgeon-Lieutenant J. Hugo picked up Lieutenant Ford with one arm, and, still holding the artery with the fingers of the other hand, carried him to a place of safety.

45th Rattray's Sikhs.

Colonel H. A. Sawyer was away on leave when hostilities broke out, but he returned on the 29th and took over command of the Regiment from Lieutenant-Colonel McRae, and from that time rendered me every assistance.

I would specially bring to notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the name of *Lieutenant-Colonel H. N. McRae*, who commanded the regiment on the 26th, 27th and 28th. His prompt action in seizing the gorge at the top of the Buddhist Road on the night of the 26th and the gallant way in which he held it undoubtedly saved the camp from being rushed on that side. For this, and for the able way in which he commanded the regiment during the first three days of the fighting, I would commend him to His Excellency's favourable consideration.

Also *Lieutenant R. M. Barff*, Officiating Adjutant of the Regiment, who, Lieutenant-Colonel McRae reports, behaved with great courage and rendered him valuable assistance.

The Guides.

I also wish to bring the name of *Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Adams* of the Guides to His Excellency's notice. The prompt way in which the corps mobilised and their grand march reflect great credit on him and the corps. Since arrival at the Malakand on the 27th July and till the morning of the 1st August, Lieutenant-Colonel Adams was in command of the Lower Camp, *i.e.*, that occupied by central and left position, and in execution of this command, and the arrangements he made for improving the defences, he gave me every

satisfaction, I have also to express my appreciation of the way in which he conducted the cavalry reconnaissance on the 1st August on which occasion his horse was shot under him.

Great credit is due to *Lieutenant P. C. Eliot-Lockhart*, who was in command of the Guides Infantry, for bringing up the regiment from Mardan to Malakand in such good condition after their trying march.

Captain G. M. Baldwin, D.S.O., behaved with great courage and coolness during the reconnaissance of the 1st August, and though severely wounded by a sword cut on the head, he remained on the ground and continued to lead his men.

Lieutenant H. L. S. Maclean also behaved with courage, and displayed an excellent example on the night of the 28th July when he was severely wounded.

XIth Bengal Lancers.

Major S. B. Beatson commanded the Squadron, 11th Bengal Lancers, which arrived at Malakand on the 29th and led them with great skill and dash on the occasion of the reconnaissance on the 1st August.

No. 8, Bengal Mountain Battery.

Lieutenant F. A. Wynter was the only officer with No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery from the 26th till the 30th July, and he commanded it during that time when all the severest of the fighting was going on with great ability, and has proved himself a good soldier. I should like especially to mention him for His Excellency's consideration. The Battery did excellent work all through.

No. 5 Company, Queen's Own Madras Sappers and Miners.

Lieutenant A. R. Winsloe, R.E., commanded the company from the 27th July till the 1st August to my entire satisfaction. His services in strengthening the defences were invaluable.

Lieutenant F. W. Watling, R.E., was in command of the company in the absence of Captain Johnson on the 26th, and commanded it well until he was wounded in gallantly trying to resist a charge of the enemy. After Lieutenant Watling was wounded the command of the remainder for the remainder of the night of the 26th and till Lieutenant Winsloe returned on the 27th devolved on *Lieutenant E. N. Manley, R.E.* He performed his duties with great credit, and afterwards was of great assistance, by his zeal and his exertions, to Lieutenant Winsloe.

Medical Staff.

Brigade-Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel F. A. Smyth was most zealous and performed his duties to my satisfaction. He volunteered to perform the duties of Provost Marshal and did so for a short time during the illness of Lieutenant H. E. Cotterill.

The arrangements made by *Surgeon-Major S. Hassan*, Senior Medical Officer, 38th Native Field Hospital, and the indefatigable attention and care with which he devoted himself to the wounded deserve great praise. The list of casualties is large, and Surgeon-Major Hassan has been untiring in his exertions for their relief. I hope His Excellency will think fit to consider his services favourably.

Surgeon-Captain T. A. O. Langston, 38th Native Field Hospital, rendered valuable assistance in attending to the wounded under a heavy fire on the night of the 26th and each following night, and behaved with courage and devotion in carrying out his duties under very exceptional circumstances. *Surgeon-Lieutenant W. Carr* has worked night and day in the hospitals in trying to alleviate the sufferings of the wounded, and has most ably and efficiently aided Surgeon-Major Hassan.

Brigade Staff.

Major L. Herbert, my Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master General, was of the greatest assistance to me by the zeal and energy with which he performed his duties from the moment the news of the approach of the enemy was received till he was severely wounded while standing next to me in the enclosure of the Sappers and Miners Camp on the night of the 26th. Since being wounded, he has carried on all his office duties on his bed. I would wish to commend his gallant conduct for the favourable consideration of the Commander-in-Chief.

Although *Major H. A. Deane* is in no way under my authority, I feel I am under a great obligation to him for the valuable assistance he rendered me with his advice and for volunteering to put himself at my disposal with the object of carrying on the active duties of Deputy Assistant Adjutant General when Major Herbert was wounded. He was indefatigable in assisting me in every way he could, and I am anxious to put on record my grateful appreciation of the services he rendered me.

44. The above list of names may appear to be somewhat long; but I would point out that the fighting was almost constant for a week, and was of such a close nature as to

demand incessant exertion from every officer in the force, and to elicit constant acts of courage and gallant example which cannot be overlooked.

45. I would not like to close this despatch without paying a tribute to the memory of a fine soldier and charming companion whose death the whole force deplores.

Major W. W. Taylor had behaved with the greatest gallantry and dash in meeting the enemy's first charge with Lieutenant-Colonel McRae, and, had he lived, he would undoubtedly have distinguished himself in his career. His loss is a heavy one to his regiment and to the Service, and there is no one in the Brigade who does not mourn him as a friend.

I have also to deplore the death of *Honorary Lieutenant L. Manley*, as my Commissariat Officer, had rendered me great assistance and who died fighting manfully. His loss is a very serious one to the Brigade.

46. I attach separately for favourable consideration a list of native officers, non-commissioned officers and men who have done especially good service, some of whom I have therein recommended for the order of merit.

I trust these recommendations will meet with the favourable consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

No. 2, dated Camp Mingaora, 23rd August 1897.

Endorsed by the General Officer Commanding, Malakand Field Force.

Forwarded to the Adjutant-General in India.

I fully concur in Brigadier-General Meiklejohn's favourable opinion of the troops under his command, and with his recommendation of individuals for favourable consideration.

Return of casualties in action at Malakand from 26th July to 1st August 1897, inclusive—

SUMMARY.

Officers.

Killed	1
Wounded	19

Non-Commissioned Officers and men.

Killed	22
Wounded	131

Appendix B (2).

No. 728-F., "*Field Operations—Malakand*," dated Simla, 15th September 1897.

From—MAJOR-GENERAL G. DEC. MORTON, C.B., Adjutant-General in India,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 727-F., dated 15th September 1897, I have the honour, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to forward herewith despatches from Major-General Sir B. Blood, K.C.B., describing the operations at the Malakand and in the Swat Valley from the 1st to 3rd August 1897, including the defence and relief of Chakdarra.

2. In submitting these reports His Excellency desires to express his approbation of Sir B. Blood's energy, of the sound dispositions made by him, and of the able way in which he was supported by Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, Colonel Reid, and all ranks, under his command.

3. The advance from the Malakand to the relief of Chakdarra was carried out with skill and judgment. The troops in spite of the exertions and hardships they had undergone during the past week, advanced with great energy and drove the enemy disheartened and panic-stricken in all directions into the plain, where they were pursued by the Cavalry and still further dispersed.

4. The separate report on the defence of Chakdarra speaks for itself, but Sir George White wishes to record his admiration of the manner in which this small garrison successfully held their own for six nights and days against overwhelming numbers. He would also specially refer to the patient courage and endurance of the followers, both at the Malakand and Chakdarra, during the operations from the 26th July to the 2nd August.

5. Among many other brave acts performed during the defence, Sir George White desires to draw special attention to the gallantry and devotion of the signallers who, isolated as they were in the Signal Tower under very trying circumstances without water to drink, and at times under a heavy fire, continued to perform their duties in a most soldierlike manner.

That the morale of the small garrison of Chakdarra was in no degree shaken by the severe strain to which they had been subjected is evident from the brilliant sortie which was made by the party under command of Lieutenant Rattray on the arrival of the relieving force.

6. His Excellency desires to commend the services of Major-General Sir B. Blood, and those mentioned by him in the operations under reference, to the special consideration of the Government of India.

No. 1, "*Despatches—Malakand Field Force*," dated Camp Amandara, 14th August 1897.

From—MAJOR-GENERAL SIR B. BLOOD, K.C.B., Commanding the Malakand Field Force,

To—The Adjutant-General in India.

I have the honour to submit the following report of the operations carried out under my orders at the Malakand and in the Swat Valley on the 1st, 2nd and 3rd instant, including the relief of the garrison of Chakdarra Fort on the 2nd instant.

2. Having assumed command of the Malakand Field Force at Nowshera on the morning of the 31st July 1897, I proceeded at once to Mardan, where I halted to make arrangements for the onward march of the additional troops which had been detailed for the Field Force. At about 3 A.M. on the 1st August, I received a telegram from Army Head-quarters informing me that Chakdarra Fort was hard pressed, and that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief wished me to go on to the Malakand as quickly as possible with a view to the immediate relief of the first named place. I accordingly proceeded at once, and being somewhat delayed by the disturbed state of the country between Jalala and Dargai, I arrived at the Malakand about noon on the 1st August.

3. On arrival I found that Brigadier-General W. H. Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G., Commanding at the place, was busily engaged in organising a force of all arms, with provisions and ammunition for the relief of Chakdarra Fort. He had limited the strength of the force to 1,000 rifles with 4 guns, all the Cavalry available, and a party of sappers, as he considered the detaching of a larger force from the garrison of the Malakand would involve the risk of the capture by the enemy of the outlying portions of that position and of the destruction of the buildings, stores and transport animals therein—a contingency which I agree with him in thinking altogether inadmissible. I consequently decided on the composition and strength of the force which he proposed as under—

400 Rifles, 24th Punjab Infantry, under Major J. G. Ramsay.

400 Rifles, 45th Sikhs, under Colonel H. A. Sawyer.

200 Rifles, Guides Infantry, under Lieutenant P. C. Elliott-Lockhart.

2 Squadrons, Guides Cavalry, under Lieutenant G. deH. Smith, 2nd Regiment, Central India Horse.

2 Squadrons, 11th Bengal Lancers, under Major S. B. Beatson.

The whole under Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Adams.

4 Guns, No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery, under Captain A. H. C. Birch, R. A.

50 Sappers, No. 5 Company, Queen's Own Sappers and Miners, under Lieutenant A. R. Winsloe, R.E.

2 Sections, Native Field Hospital, under Surgeon-Captain H. F. Whitchurch, V.C., I.M.S.

4. Brigadier-General Meiklejohn's idea of carrying out the movement of the relieving force was that it should march down to the Khar plain by the Graded Road, and that the ground near our position which commands that road, and was then in the hands of the enemy, would have as far as possible to be cleared of them in time to prevent their interfering with the march of the force; all of which was also entirely in accordance with my views. With regard to the time of the operation, I decided that it was to be carried out at dawn on the 2nd, the day of the 1st being already far spent, and the necessary arrangements not being forward enough to admit of its being properly carried out on that day; while, as a matter of course, the chances of success were greater and the probability of loss less, if the operation were undertaken at dawn instead of by daylight.

5. These matters having been satisfactorily settled, I next relieved Brigadier-General Meiklejohn of charge of the Malakand position, and gave him command of the relieving column entrusting him with the sole charge of the preparations connected with it, and directing him to have it assembled before dark with everything complete on Gretna Green there to bivouac for the night, and to be ready to march as soon as it should be light enough next morning.

6. I then handed over charge of the Malakand Fort and position to Colonel A. J. F. Reid, directing him to strengthen the picquets at Castle Rock as far as possible, and to be ready with a force taken from them to attack and clear the enemy from the position marked "A" on the sketch herewith at dawn on the morning of the 2nd.

* Hereinafter called "Goldney's Hill."

7. A considerable amount of firing went on all the afternoon of the 1st, parties of the enemy advancing boldly among the rocks to within three or four hundred yards of our picquets, and great numbers of men, armed and unarmed, being seen all round the north, north-east and north-west of our position. During the night, especially between eleven and twelve, the firing in these directions was heavy and sustained, so much so that the force on Gretna Green got under arms on one occasion; but the firing finally ceased about 3 A.M., and from that time until our attack began everything was quiet.

8. At 4-30 A.M. I went to Greta Green, and found that Brigadier-General Meiklejohn had arranged everything in the most perfect manner and only wanted light enough to march. Having ascertained that the troops for the attack on the enemy's position marked "A" were also ready under the immediate command of Colonel T. H. Goldney, 35th Sikhs, I gave the order, as soon as it was light enough, to Brigadier-General Meiklejohn to move off, passed an order to Colonel Goldney to advance, and went quickly myself to the top of Castle Rock Hill to superintend the operations generally.

9. Colonel Goldney's force was taken from the Castle Rock picquets, and consisted of about 250 rifles, 35th Sikhs, under Lieutenant-Colonel L. J. E. Bradshaw, and 50 rifles, 38th Dogras, under Captain L. C. H. Stainforth. His attack was supported by the remainder of the picquets holding Castle Rock, and by 2 guns, No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery, in position near the picquets and under the command of Jemadar Nawab of that Battery.

10. Colonel Goldney and his men, on receipt of my order, advanced silently to within about one hundred yards of the enemy's position without being perceived. Then the enemy, becoming suddenly aware of what was going on, opened an irregular and ineffective fire, and as our men came to close quarters ran away in all directions, leaving seven of their number dead and one prisoner in our hands. There was no casualty of any sort on our side.

11. I now found that with Colonel Goldney's Infantry on the position they had captured, and with Jemadar Nawab's guns on Castle Rock Hill behind them, I had complete control of the high ground commanding the Graded Road to the eastward, nearly as far as the junction of that road with the North Camp Road, at which point the ground begins to open out. Consequently Brigadier-General Meiklejohn arrived near this point almost without being fired at, and was able to deploy to a certain extent and to bring his fire to bear before the enemy could do much to oppose him. They took some time to collect their wits after being driven from Goldney's Hill, and could be seen running about like ants in a disturbed ant-hill. After a short time they seemed to realise the situation, and streaming down behind a spur, which covered them from Goldney's Hill, they took up a position near the junction of the two roads before mentioned, from which they opened a heavy fire at short range on Brigadier-General Meiklejohn's force. They were, however, speedily turned out at the point of the bayonet by the Guides Infantry and 45th Sikhs under Lieutenant P. C. Elliott-Lockhart and Colonel H. A. Sawyer, respectively, and fled leaving some sixty or seventy dead behind them. Meanwhile they had manned a second position further on in the Bedford Hill Pass, where they held some knolls, one of which was strongly crowned by a village; but Brigadier-General Meiklejohn sending a party to crown the hills on the right and attacking in front and on his left with the 24th Punjab Infantry and 45th Sikhs carried the position at the point of the bayonet without much difficulty. Here also the enemy suffered severely.

12. By this time the enemy had lost heart completely, in fact they had become panic-stricken, and were seen streaming off in every direction from all parts of our position, pursued by volleys from our picquets as long as they were within range. This was the opportunity for Brigadier-General Meiklejohn's cavalry. Great numbers of the enemy (as I knew would be the case) had to descend into the Khar plain, now in perfect condition for cavalry, in order to get away; and the Guides and 11th Bengal Lancers eager for vengeance, pursued, cut up and speared them in every direction, leaving their bodies thickly strewn over the fields.

13. The cavalry soon arrived at the strong position of Amandara which they seized almost without opposition, comparatively few of the enemy now remaining in sight. From this point the road runs level between rice fields to Chakdarra, and as a heavy firing was heard there, Brigadier-General Meiklejohn sent the cavalry on under Lieutenant-Colonel Adams of the Guides to find out what was happening. They soon reported that the Swat bridge was uninjured and that they had crossed over to the Fort which was still being attacked. The infantry and guns were accordingly pushed on as rapidly as possible and on their approaching Chakdarra the enemy began to retire, whereupon part of the garrison of the Fort, under Lieutenant H. B. Rattray, 45th Sikhs, made a sortie in pursuit and inflicted considerable loss upon them. In carrying out this duty Lieutenant Rattray was wounded in the neck. At the same time the cavalry also proceeded in pursuit and did some execution, but as their horses were much fatigued by their previous labours and by the great heat they were soon recalled.

14. The garrison of Chakdarra, who were under the command of Captain H. Wright, 11th Bengal Lancers, were in good health and spirits, notwithstanding the trying time they had had, and their total casualties during the week's fighting (26th July to 2nd August) were only 3 killed and 9 wounded. They were naturally much exhausted by want of sleep and constant exposure to the sun, and the enemy, who had with great cleverness seized and utilised a point which commanded the interior of the Fort, had also, just before the relief took place, begun to press the attack with increased vivacity, even bringing up scaling ladders and showing signs of an intention to attack by escalade. This would have been an awkward matter, considering how the Fort was

commanded by the enemy's fire, and also in view of the fatigued state of the garrison, so that there is no doubt about the relief having occurred just in time, as things were getting extremely serious.

15. The men, who held the signalling tower west of Chakdarra Fort, were without water for 18 hours before they were relieved. Several of them showed conspicuous gallantry in going on with their signalling duties under a heavy fire, and I shall have the honour of submitting their names specially for the favourable consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

16. After all necessary arrangements had been made, Brigadier-General Meiklejohn and his force bivouacked at Chakdarra on the night of the 2nd August, and marched back next morning towards the Malakand as far as Amandara, where I met them with another column of 500 rifles under Colonel A. J. F. Reid conveying a further quantity of ammunition and supplies for Chakdarra Fort. These supplies having been passed on, I proceeded with Brigadier-General Meiklejohn's and Colonel Reid's commands to Aladand and Thanna villages, which were thoroughly searched. No enemy being seen I rode on to Chakdarra, and the two forces bivouacked near Aladand, Colonel Reid's returning to the Malakand next morning and Brigadier-General Meiklejohn's to Amandara, where his brigade, the 1st of the Malakand Field Force, was to be organised. I also returned to the Malakand on the morning of the 4th August.

17. The complete and comparatively easy success of these operations, which I have been privileged to direct, was, chiefly and in the first place, due to the steadfast courage and conduct of our native soldiers under the gallant leading of their British officers. Not a little was also due to the patient courage of our mule-drivers and other followers, who behaved in the somewhat exciting circumstances of the early morning of the 2nd August, as if they were parading for a peaceful march in the plains of India. Their confidence in us was something touching, especially when we consider the scenes they had witnessed for nearly a week, the heavy and continuous firing at short range which had gone on round two-thirds of our position up to an hour or two before the start of the relieving column, and the constant sight at no great distance of hordes of wild barbarians thirsting for their blood. These circumstances were calculated to unpleasantly affect the steadiest nerves, and the way in which all sorts and conditions of our native soldiers and followers came out of the trial is a source of keen satisfaction to all of us. Truly these men deserve to bear the good old motto "*Nec aspera terrent.*"

18. In operations such as those connected with the relief of Chakdarra Fort, it is very difficult to select individuals for reward with fairness, and I would accordingly suggest that if possible in this case some distribution of rewards should be made to the native ranks at proportionate rates per unit, to be allotted in each unit by the British officers acting as a sort of committee.

19. I have the honour to invite the special attention of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India to the good services of the following officers during the operations described above, namely:—

Brigadier-General W. H. Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G., carried out his duties in command of the force which relieved Chakdarra Fort with great gallantry and judgment.

Colonel A. J. F. Reid, Officiating Colonel on the Staff, Malakand Brigade, afforded me valuable assistance by carrying out the re-arrangement of the defensive posts at the Malakand on the 1st August after the relieving force had been drawn from them, and in making the preparations for Colonel T. H. Goldney's attack on the 2nd.

Colonel T. H. Goldney, 35th Sikhs, disposed and led the troops on the morning of the 2nd in the successful attack on the hill since named after him in a most judicious and satisfactory manner.

Major E. A. P. Hobday, R.A., was most energetic and indefatigable in assisting Colonel A. J. F. Reid and me in carrying out the multifarious work which had to be done at the Malakand and in the Swat Valley on the 1st, 2nd and 3rd.

Brigadier-General Meiklejohn reports favourably on the following officers who were under his command during the operations above detailed, *viz.*:—

Captain G. F. H. Dillon, 40th Pathans, who acted as Staff Officer to the Relieving Force, showed great readiness and resource, and his assistance was of the utmost value.

Lieutenants C. R. Gaunt, 4th Dragoon Guards, Orderly Officer, and *E. Christian*, Royal Scots Fusiliers, Signalling Officer, carried out their duties most satisfactorily.

Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Adams, Queen's Own Corps of Guides, commanded the cavalry (four squadrons) with the Relieving Force in the most gallant and judicious manner.

The following Officers Commanding Units and Detachments of the Relieving Force are stated by Brigadier-General Meiklejohn to have carried out their duties in a thoroughly capable and satisfactory manner, *viz.*:—

Colonel H. A. Sawyer, 45th Sikhs.

Major Stuart-Beatson, 11th Bengal Lancers.

Major F. G. Ramsay, 24th Punjab Infantry.

Captain A. H. C. Birch, R.A. (8th Bengal Mountain Battery).

Lieutenant G. de H. Smith, 2nd Regiment, Central India Horse, attached to Queen's Own Corps of Guides (Cavalry).

Lieutenant A. R. Winsloe, R.E. (No. 5 Company, Queen's Own Sappers and Miners).

Lieutenant P. C. Elliott-Lockhart, Queen's Own Corps of Guides (Infantry).

Surgeon-Captain H. F. Whitchurch, V.C., attended to the wounded under fire throughout the fighting.

The following officers under Colonel T. H. Goldney's command led their detachments under my own observation with gallantry and judgment, *viz.*:—

Lieutenant-Colonel L. J. E. Bradshaw, 35th Sikhs.

Captain L. C. H. Stainforth, 38th Dogras.

Jemadar Nawab, who commanded two guns of No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery in support of Colonel Goldney's attack, attracted my favourable notice by his smartness, quickness and thorough knowledge of his work.

I would also wish to bring to His Excellency's notice the good work done by *Major H. Burney*, Gordon Highlanders, Assistant Adjutant-General, *Major H. Wharry*, D.S.O., Chief Commissariat Officer, and *Captain A. B. Dunsterville*, 1st Battalion, East Surrey Regiment, my Aide-de-Camp, the only officers of the Divisional Staff of my force who had arrived at the Malakand on the 2nd August. These officers worked very hard and were of great use to me.

20. *Major H. A. Deane*, C.S.I., Political Agent, Dir and Swat, was not in any way under my orders during the operations above described, but notwithstanding, I hope, I may be permitted to express the obligations under which I lie to him for valuable information and general assistance which he gave me.

21. I forward herewith in original Brigadier-General Meiklejohn's report on the fighting which took place at the Malakand from the 26th July until I arrived there on the 1st August of which my report above is really a continuation, and in doing so I would observe that I fully concur with Brigadier-General Meiklejohn's favourable opinions regarding the behaviour of the troops under his command and with his recommendations of individuals. I further append a report which I have compiled myself on the fighting at Chakdarra from 26th July till the 2nd August when its relief was carried out under my orders.

22. I attach a sketch of the Malakand position to my report on the Malakand operations of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd August, and a sketch of Chakdarra Fort to my report on the fighting there. A list is appended to each report of the casualties which took place in the fighting to which it refers.

Malakand Field Force.

Return of casualties in action at relief of Chakdarra on 2nd August 1897:—

SUMMARY.

Non-Commissioned Officers and men.

Killed	5
Wounded	28

Appendix B (3).

No. 3, "Despatches—Malakand Field Force," dated Camp Mingaora, 20th August 1897.

From—MAJOR-GENERAL SIR B. BLOOD, K.C.B., Commanding Malakand Field Force,

To—The Adjutant-General in India.

I have the honour to submit the following report on the fighting which took place at Chakdarra Fort between the 26th July and the 2nd August 1897, when the place was relieved and the enemy dispersed by the force commanded by Brigadier-General W. H. Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G., who was then acting under my orders.

2. On the 26th July 1897 the garrison consisted of Lieutenant H. B. Rattray, 45th Sikhs, Commanding, Lieutenant L. L. Wheatley and 2 companies of the same regiment, and 25 sabres, 11th Bengal Lancers; the total strength being 3 British officers (including a medical officer), 2 British non-commissioned officers, 3 native officers and 213 other ranks, besides a few medical and commissariat details. Lieutenant A. B. Minchin, 25th Punjab Infantry, Assistant Political Agent, was also present in the Fort on this date and throughout the subsequent period under reference.

3. *26th July.*—The first intimation of disturbance which reached the garrison was brought in on the evening of the 26th July by Havildar Gurdit Singh, 45th Sikhs, who was out surveying that day. He came in on a mule and reported that the tribe were rising and that some of them had taken from him a pair of binoculars, a prismatic compass and Rs. 50. Lieutenant Rattray was playing polo at Khar at this time, but on being warned he at once rode back to Chakdarra and on arrival made all necessary preparations for the defence of the Fort, which was vigorously attacked three times between 10-15 P.M. and 4 A.M. that night; the attacks in all cases being easily repulsed. In one of these attacks the enemy used ladders taken from the civil hospital, a solid building which stood close outside the walls of the Fort, and was therefore very useful to the enemy throughout their operations.

4. *27th July.*—On the morning of the 27th July Captain H. Wright, 11th Bengal Lancers, with 40 sabres of his regiment rode through the enemy from the Malakand, and in doing so, showed very marked gallantry and judgment. At the Amandara Pass he was strongly opposed, and only succeeded in getting through the enemy by a combination of quick and sound decision with determined resolution which was in the highest degree creditable to him. Two of his men were wounded during his ride, but were brought safely into Chakdarra. Captain D. Baker, Transport Officer, Malakand Brigade, also arrived with Captain Wright.

5. On arrival Captain Wright assumed command of the Fort, and his detachment, with the other men of his regiment already there, took over and most ably conducted throughout the siege the defence of the outer enclosure in which the horses and transport animals were accommodated.

6. On the forenoon of the 27th the enemy made several determined advances towards the walls of the Fort, but were repulsed with heavy loss. By this time sangars had been built round the Signal Tower and a heavy fire from them was kept up upon it. As signalling could only be done from the open outside the tower, it became practically impossible, and as the telegraph line had been destroyed, communication with the Malakand was cut off. There was also considerable difficulty about throwing food and water into the Signal Tower, but nevertheless on the 27th, with the help of the maxims and 9-pounder in the Fort, several days' provisions were put in, together with six additional men and as much water as possible; and in the same way daily supplies of water were afterwards sent in until the 1st August, when the enemy succeeded in cutting off all access to the Tower.

7. On the night of the 27th the enemy made two more attacks which were repulsed with heavy loss to them. In the second of these attacks, they brought up ladders and attempted to escalate the walls of the Fort at the north-east corner. On this and subsequent days, Captain Baker made himself most useful by superintending arrangements for giving increased cover, which undoubtedly saved many casualties.

8. *28th July.*—On the 28th July the enemy made vigorous attacks between 5-30 P.M. and dawn next morning, chiefly against the east side of the cavalry enclosure. They were invariably beaten off with heavy loss.

9. *29th July.*—On the 29th July the enemy were seen approaching at 3 P.M. in largely increased numbers with ladders and bundles of grass, and directed their chief efforts to the capture of the Signal Tower. They continued their efforts against the Tower till 8 P.M. without success, and next morning some 50 of their corpses were counted outside it.

10. *30th July.*—On the 30th July the garrison had a comparatively easy time, and obtained some much needed rest, as the enemy did not advance till about 7 P.M. and then without much vigour.

11. *31st July.*—On the 31st July the enemy kept quiet till about 4-30 P.M., when they advanced against the north-east corner of the Fort, but suffered severely from the fire of the 9-pounder and maxims, finally retiring at 11 P.M. to Chakdarra village.

12. *1st August.*—On the 1st August the difficulties of the garrison greatly increased the enemy appearing in far larger numbers with more rifles. During the previous night they had occupied and loopholed the civil hospital already mentioned, and from thence they completely commanded the cavalry enclosure and rendered moving about there very dangerous. They also held the ridge some 350 yards from the Fort to the north-west, thus cutting off all communication with the Signal Tower, and commanding the whole of the north and west sides of the Fort itself. Matters now looked so serious that Captain Wright decided to send an urgent message for help, but as signalling was so difficult, only the two words "Help us" were transmitted, and the answer from the Malakand, promising relief next morning, would appear not to have been received. The detachment in the Signal Tower made pressing requests for water which could not be sent to them. The enemy kept the whole garrison at their posts all day and all night, but did not attempt to press an attack home, notwithstanding which they lost very heavily.

13. *2nd August.*—On the 2nd August the enemy came on in large numbers and very boldly, with ladders and bundles of grass, evidently determined to make a final attempt to take the Fort at any cost. A very heavy fire was kept up on both sides, numbers of the enemy being killed, and one man of the garrison being killed and two wounded. Just as matters were becoming critical, the garrison being dead beat from fatigue and exposure, the Cavalry of the Relieving Column appeared at Amandara. When they came near, the enemy

began making off, and on seeing this, Lieutenant Rattray, 45th Sikhs, assembling a few men, attacked and carried the Civil Hospital, bayoneting most of the enemy whom he found in it. From thence he pursued the enemy for about half a mile, being joined by Captain Baker and Lieutenant L. L. Wheatley with more men, and doing much execution. In this gallant sortie Lieutenant Rattray was severely wounded in the neck, and one sepoy was killed and two wounded, one mortally. In returning, the party found the cavalry of the Relieving Force checked by the fire from the ridge north-west of the Fort, whereupon this was attacked and the occupants bayoneted or driven off. The men who made this sortie, under 20 in number, killed over 50 of the enemy, whose bodies were afterwards counted.

14. Whilst this was going on, the cavalry of the Relieving Force had advanced for some distance along the plain north of the Fort, and had cut off many of the fugitives. They had, however, to return after pursuing a comparatively short distance, their horses being much fatigued.

15. During the fighting above described, the conduct of the whole of the garrison, whether fighting men, departmental details, or followers, is reported to have been most gallant. Not the least marked display of courage and constancy was that made by the small detachment in the Signal Tower who were without water for the last 18 hours of the siege. The signallers, under No. 2729, Lance-Naik Vir Singh, 45th Sikhs, who set a brilliant example, behaved throughout in a most courageous manner ; one of them, No. 2829, Sepoy Prem Singh, climbing several times out of a window in the Tower with a heliograph, and signalling outside to the Malakand under a hot fire from sangars in every direction.

16. I would beg to recommend all the British and Native officers who took part in the defence I have described for the favourable consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief as under, *viz.* :—

Captain H. Wright, 11th Bengal Lancers, who, with his detachment of 40 sabres of his regiment, made the gallant ride through the enemy from the Malakand to Chakdarra Fort on the morning of the 27th July, and commanded the Garrison from that morning till its relief on the 2nd August.

Captain D. Baker, 2nd Bombay Infantry, who rode to Chakdarra Fort with *Captain Wright*, and made himself most useful. *Lieutenant H. B. Rattray*, 45th Sikhs, who commanded the garrison from the commencement of the attack on the 26th July till the arrival of *Captain Wright* next day, and is reported by that officer to have been the life and soul of the defence. *2nd-Lieutenant L. L. Wheatley*, 45th Sikhs, had charge of the gun and maxim detachments, and it was largely owing to his care and judgment that these weapons were so effective in the defence.

Lieutenant A. B. Minchin, 25th Punjab Infantry, Assistant Political Agent, was in the Fort throughout the siege, and was most useful.

Ressaïdar Tilok Singh, 11th Bengal Lancers, accompanied Captain Wright in his ride of the 27th July, and is very favourably mentioned by that officer.

Jemadar Sudama commanded the detachment of the 11th Bengal Lancers who were at Chakdarra Fort on the 26th July, and was present throughout the siege, and is also very favourably reported on.

Subadar Jwala Singh, 45th Sikhs, was present throughout the siege, and showed great intelligence and readiness of resource, as well as courage and coolness, under fire.

Femadar Ala Singh, 45th Sikhs, had command of the sections on the parapet of the river fort, and showed conspicuous courage and coolness under heavy fire.

Lieutenant Rattray reports that *No. 522 Hospital Assistant Piara Singh*, 11th Bengal Lancers, rendered valuable assistance, not only in attending the wounded under fire, but also in the sortie on the 2nd, and at other times in bringing up ammunition, etc., to the men on the parapets under fire.

17. I shall further have the honour, in a separate communication to submit, for the favourable consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the names of several non-commissioned officers and men, who distinguished themselves during the siege of Chakdarra Fort, in view of their being granted the Order of Merit, should His Excellency think them deserving of that distinction.

18. I attach a rough sketch of Chakdarra and its immediate surroundings, together with a list of the casualties that occurred during the siege.

MALAKAND FIELD FORCE.

Return of casualties in action at Chakdarra from 26th July to 2nd August 1897.

SUMMARY.

Officers.

Wounded	I
<i>Non-commissioned officers and men.</i>							
Killed	5
Wounded	10

Appendix B (4).

No. 729 F., "*Field Operations—Malakand*," dated Simla, 15th September 1897.

From—MAJOR-GENERAL G. DEC. MORTON, C.B., Adjutant-General in India,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 728-F., dated 15th September 1898, I have the honour, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to submit for the information of the Government of India the accompanying despatch from Major-General Sir B. Blood, K.C.B., Commanding the Malakand Field Force, giving an account of the operations of the force under his command from the 4th to 26th August 1897, inclusive.

2. His Excellency has much pleasure in bringing to the notice of the Government of India the admirable manner in which Sir B. Blood has exercised his command and the skilful way in which that officer handled his troops at the action of Landakai on the 17th August when he dislodged the enemy from an extremely strong natural position.

3. Sir George White deeply regrets the loss of Lieutenants R. T. Greaves, Lancashire Fusiliers, and H. L. S. Maclean of the Queen's Own Corps of Guides, and he also desires to record his admiration of the gallantry displayed on the occasion of their death by Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Adams, Queen's Own Corps of Guides, Lieutenant Viscount Fincastle, 16th Lancers, and the Native officers and non-commissioned officers and men of the Queen's Own Corps of Guides who accompanied them, and whose conduct will form the subject of a separate communication.

4. The Commander-in-Chief cordially endorses the opinions expressed in paragraphs 31 and 35 of the report, and favourably commends to the notice of the Government of India the officers therein mentioned.

No. 4, "*Despatches—Malakand Field Force*," dated 30th August 1897.

From—MAJOR-GENERAL SIR B. BLOOD, K.C.B., Commanding Malakand Field Force,

To—The Adjutant-General in India.

In continuation of my report No. 1, "*Despatches—Malakand Field Force*," dated the 14th instant, I have the honour to submit the following account of the operations of the force under my command from the morning of the 4th August up to the 26th August 1897, inclusive, with special reference to the advance into Upper Swat which commenced with the engagement of the 17th August at Landakai.

2. On my return from Chakdarra to the Malakand on the 4th August, I proceeded with the organisation of the Malakand Field Force and its communications with the removal of the advanced dépôt to Khar from the Malakand, and with the preparation, for further operations, of a special force which I placed at Amandara—a strong and strategically important position conveniently situated for the purpose in view.

3. This special force was ready to march without tents, and with 10 days' supplies on the 8th August 1897, being composed of the 1st Infantry Brigade under Brigadier-General W. H. Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G., with six squadrons under Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Adams, Queen's Own Corps of Guides, a Field and two Mountain Batteries under Colonel W. Aitken, C.B., R.A., a company of Sappers and Miners under Captain E. P. Johnson, R. E., and the necessary Field Hospitals and Medical Staff under Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel J. T. B. Bookey, I.M.S.

4. During the interval which necessarily elapsed before the receipt of orders for further operations, the transport of the special force was utilised for general purposes in its neighbourhood; but after the receipt of orders on the evening of the 12th August 1897 to move on Mingaora in Upper Swat, only two clear days were expended in the necessary preparations, and the special force was ready to march with 12 days' supplies for men and two days' grain for animals on the morning of the 15th. I joined the special force myself on the 14th August, the Divisional troops attached to it coming under my direct command from the morning of the 15th.

5. The weather had been unsettled for some days prior to the 15th, and in the early morning and forenoon of that day it rained so hard that I determined to delay the forward move till the 16th. On the morning of 16th it also rained very hard, but we managed a start at 1.30 P. M. and marched about five miles to Thana, four miles west of Landakai, where there is a strong position—the gate of Upper Swat—which I felt sure would be held against us, as in fact it was.

6. During the halt of the special force at Amandara, the country between that place and Upper Swat, on our side of the Swat River, had been very completely reconnoitred by the cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, Queen's Own Corps of Guides, who had

been most ably seconded by Major S. B. Beatson, 11th Bengal Lancers; so that all I had to do on the 16th was to take a general view of the situation at Landakai, which I accordingly did in the evening.

7. It will be seen from the accompanying sketch that our camp at Thana was in the middle of an open plain, well away from the hills and easily defended. The road from there to Landakai runs round the northern edge of the village of Thana, and thence close to hills on the right until the village of Jalala is reached, where the road passes between that village and the end of a spur covered with Buddhist ruins and running up to a peak which dominates the whole Landakai position. Between the Jalala spur and Landakai is first an open valley about 900 yards wide at the lower end, then another spur, then a deep ravine, and finally the main Landakai spur ending in cliffs overhanging the Swat River; the road being carried round these cliffs for nearly a mile on a stone causeway, which, as I was correctly informed, the enemy had damaged and obstructed in various ways. Beyond the Landakai spur, as I knew from a reconnaissance made by Major S. B. Beatson, 11th Bengal Lancers, the valley is open, and the rice cultivation lies in such a way that the enemy, in occupying the lower end of the Landakai spur, would find himself formed to the left flank of his line of retreat.

8. During my reconnaissance on the evening of the 16th, I saw some hundreds of the enemy with flags occupying sangars, spread over a mile or so of the end of Landakai spur, and holding an old Buddhist Fort on a peak, where they evidently fancied themselves very securely posted. From their general appearance, their shouting, and their expenditure of ammunition, I judged that larger numbers were behind what I saw, and I accordingly returned to camp, making as little show of force as possible, and issued orders for the next day.

9. Soon after daylight the 17th August the tents and the baggage in excess of the light scale prescribed for the advance were despatched on camels to Khar under escort of a squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers. The remainder of the baggage and the stores were then parked in camp with the unloaded transport animals, spare horses and followers, to wait until the road in front should be cleared; being protected by strengthened baggage guards, with 2 companies, 45th Sikhs, two squadrons, 11th Bengal Lancers, and 400 rifles borrowed for the day from Khar. Thus I was enabled to advance to the attack unencumbered by baggage, along the somewhat awkward road from Thana to Jalala.

10. Punctually at 6-30 A. M. the cavalry of the advanced guard moved off and pushing on to Jalala, found a few of the enemy established in the Buddhist ruins on the adjacent spur. These they held in check with the assistance of the infantry of the advanced guard, which consisted of two companies, 1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment, under Captain W. R. Marshall, 2nd Derbyshire Regiment, attached 1st Royal West Kent Regiment, until the arrival of the remainder of the battalion which headed the main body. Then the battalion, under Major C. W. H. Evans, extended and crowned the Jalala spur, clearing the enemy out of the Buddhist ruins before mentioned. Meanwhile No. 7 (British) Mountain Battery, under Major M. F. Fegan, R.A., and No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery, under Captain A. H. C. Birch, R.A., had arrived and formed in rear of the 1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment, closely followed by the main body of the infantry under Brigadier-General W. H. Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G., consisting of the 24th Punjab Infantry and 31st Punjab Infantry under Major J. G. Ramsay and Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. O'Brien, respectively; Colonel H. A. Sawyer with the 45th Sikhs having been left in camp to await the arrival there of the 400 rifles borrowed from Khar, with orders to bring on six companies of his battalion thereafter. The 10th Field Battery, under Major C. A. Anderson, R.A., which I had put in rear of the main body for fear it should stick anywhere in the narrow passage round Thana, also appeared close behind the infantry, and trotted towards the position told off to it.

11. Brigadier-General Meiklejohn now moved his infantry half right towards the peak marked A on the sketch herewith, the 6 companies, 45th Sikhs, having come up and following him at some little distance; while the 10th Field Battery came into action to the right of Jalala, and No. 7 (British) Mountain Battery up the spur still further to the right, both batteries being guarded by the 1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment, whose firing line crowned the crest of the spur up to and including the Buddhist ruins, with their supports, etc., well closed up.

12. The 10th Field Battery opened fire at 8-50 A.M. on the fort mentioned in paragraph 8, followed soon afterwards by No. 7 Mountain Battery; and the two batteries continued firing leisurely during the time that elapsed before Brigadier-General Meiklejohn reached the peak marked A in the attached sketch. The 1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment, also occasionally fired section volleys as targets offered. The effect of the artillery fire was instantly apparent, as the enemy quickly evacuated the fort and sangars fired at, and retired under cover in their rear, appearing again afterwards whenever the fire slackened. Brigadier-General Meiklejohn had a long and arduous climb, but his movement was carried out in the most entirely satisfactory manner, and his appearance when he reached his objective seemed altogether to surprise and confuse the enemy, who, as we afterwards found, had made up their minds that we would force the passage of the

Landakai causeway by a frontal attack, had accordingly posted considerable reserves near the end of it, which reserves were of course not only out of the actual engagement, but now found themselves in danger of being cut off from their line of retreat.

13. The enemy, after making a feeble attempt to reinforce their left from the centre and right of their first line, which I easily frustrated by the fire of the 10th Field Battery, and No. 7 Mountain Battery, and by moving the right half battalion, 1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment, to its right, into touch with Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, now seemed to lose heart altogether, and it only required a forward movement of the left half battalion, 1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment, at about 11 A.M., to cause them to retreat from their last positions on the Landakai ridge. Then the 5th Company, Queen's Own Sappers and Miners, under Captain E. P. Johnson, R.E., advanced, and under the direction of Major E. Blunt, R.E., the senior Royal Engineer Officer present, began to repair the Landakai causeway, which, as I have mentioned, had been damaged and obstructed by the enemy. This was soon done sufficiently to admit of the advance in pursuit of three squadrons of the Guides Cavalry, whom I had kept together for that object under Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Adams. At this time the 10th Field Battery, which could not accompany the special force beyond Jalala, in consequence of the badness of the roads beyond that place, returned to Khar under special arrangements for its escort.

14. The Landakai causeway, though passable, was still in such bad order when the Guides traversed it that they debouched from it slowly by twos and threes, and Captain H. I. E. Palmer, who commanded the leading squadron, being told by the infantry crowning the heights to his right that the enemy were escaping over the plain in front of him which he could not yet see, collected part of his squadron and pushed on in pursuit. As soon as he emerged from the fields of high Indian-corn at the end of the causeway, he saw the enemy a mile or so in front escaping to the hills and galloped after them, but the ground being heavy he got rather ahead of his men. Near him on his left was Lieutenant R. T. Greaves, Lancashire Fusiliers, who was with the force as Correspondent of the *Times of India*; and further to his left and a little in rear, rode Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Adams with his galloper, Lieutenant Norman, 11th Bengal Lancers. The first squadron came along as quickly as they could, in somewhat loose formation, and were followed at no great distance by the other two. The enemy were rapidly escaping to the face of the hill marked B on the attached sketch, and Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, quickly taking in the situation, ordered the Ziarat marked C to be held with dismounted fire; a measure which, but for the unfortunate *contretemps* which now occurred, would have been most effectual, as fire from this Ziarat swept completely and at short range the hill up which the enemy were retiring.

15. Captain Palmer, not hearing Lieutenant-Colonel Adams' orders, galloped on towards the hill, still having on his left Lieutenant Greaves, whose pony had apparently become unmanageable by him. Seeing a standard-bearer in the open, Captain Palmer attacked and cut him down, but at the same moment he was disabled by a bullet wound in the wrist, and his horse being also shot under him, he was only saved from the enemy's swordsmen

* 1142½ Duffadar Hayath Mahomed.
806½ Duffadar Bura Khan.

by some of his own men* who had meanwhile come up and charged the swordsmen with great gallantry. Simultaneously Lieutenant Greaves was struck by a bullet in the body and falling from his pony was instantly pounced upon by the enemy's swordsmen. Seeing this, Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, Lieutenant Viscount Fincastle, 16th Lancers (acting as Correspondent of the *Times* with the force), followed by Lieutenant Maclean of the Guides and several of his men† fled to the rescue, drove off the swordsmen, and carried off Lieutenant Greaves, who, while Lord Fincastle was lifting him, was again hit through the body and killed. Lieutenant Maclean, in helping, was

† Jemadar Bahadur Singh.
1142½ Duffadar Hayath Mahomed.
806½ Duffadar Bura Khan.
1455 Sowar Mahomed Khan.
1215½ Sowar Alaf Khan.

mortally wounded, Captain Palmer's and Lord Fincastle's horses, together with two troop horses, were killed, and Lieutenant-Colonel Adams' horse was wounded.

16. Meanwhile the remainder of the Guides had occupied and opened fire from the Ziarat before mentioned and from the village of Nawa Kila close by, thus keeping the enemy in check; but notwithstanding all they could do, the fire directed on the party who were bringing off Lieutenant Greaves' body and Lieutenant Maclean who was mortally wounded was exceedingly hot, as some four or five hundred of the enemy crowded the hill facing them.

17. I trust it will have been gathered that the feat of arms performed on this occasion by Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, Lieutenant Lord Fincastle, Lieutenant Maclean, and their men, was of the most truly gallant description. I shall have the honour to bring forward the names of these officers and men in separate communications with full details for the special consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

18. Soon after these occurrences, Brigadier-General Meiklejohn's infantry and artillery appeared on the scene, and the enemy were finally driven off to the higher hills, from which they continued to fire shots at impossible ranges all the afternoon.

19. About the time that Brigadier-General Meiklejohn arrived near Nawa Kila, Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, with two squadrons, advanced along the Barikot road to reconnoitre

as far as Abueh, where he found about 150 of the enemy in possession of the village and of a road which leads over a low pass behind it. One squadron being dismounted under Captain G. P. Brazier-Creagh, 9th Bengal Lancers, attached to the Guides, attacked and soon dislodged the enemy, killing six or eight of them, but without any casualty on their own side. Lieutenant-Colonel Adams and his squadrons afterwards returned to camp, arriving about 6-30 P.M.

20. Meanwhile the detachments left at Thana Camp to guard the baggage and transport were not without occupation. During our march from Thana on Jalala we had observed parties of the enemy moving along the high ridge leading from Landakai towards the Morah Pass to our right rear. These men soon came in full view of our camps, and seem to have imagined that it had been left unprotected, as they assembled to the number of about a thousand, and with great shouting and beating of "tomtoms" began to descend the hills. As they showed considerable hesitation about committing themselves to the open, Lieutenant-Colonel L. J. E. Bradshaw, 35th Sikhs, commanding the detachments at

* Major S. B. Beatson, Commanding 11th Bengal the camp, sent Major F. G. Delamain,* 11th Lancers, was with me at Landakai.

Bengal Lancers, with two squadrons of his regiment to try and draw them on. They were too cautious, however, and the affair ended in a musketry engagement in which Major Delamain inflicted a loss of some 20 killed on the enemy without any casualty on his own side; and ultimately drove them off to continue their retreat on Buner. After the conclusion of the engagement at Landakai, these two squadrons and the 400 rifles, 35th Sikhs, borrowed from Khar for the day, the whole under Lieutenant-Colonel L. J. E. Bradshaw, escorted the 10th Field Battery to Khar.

21. The force encamped for the night on a piece of ground well selected by Lieutenant-Colonel Masters, Assistant Quarter Master General, and situated between the villages of Landakai and Kotah.

22. The casualties in the engagement at Landakai were eleven in all as follows:

Officers killed	1
„ wounded	3 of whom 1 died immediately.
British non-commissioned officers and men killed	nil.
„ „ „ „ wounded	nil.
Native non-commissioned officers and men killed	nil.
„ „ „ „ wounded	5
Followers killed	nil.
„ wounded...	2

23. On the 18th August the force marched to Ghalagai, passing a somewhat difficult Kotal on the way near Barikot, which was quickly improved by the sappers under the direction of Major E. Blunt, R.E. Some interesting Buddhist ruins were seen, including a fine "stupa" in good preservation at a place called Shankardar.

24. On the 19th August the force marched to Mingaora, its objective for the time; the road being easy, except at the end of the march where it crosses some irrigated fields. The people everywhere seemed to have given up all idea of opposition, and were anxious to propitiate us by giving us such supplies as they could. Large numbers of arms, amounting to about 800 of all sorts, were given up at Ghalagai and Mingaora. A few shots were fired into camp this night, but the villagers turned out and put the "snipers" to flight.

25. On the 20th August the force halted and the day was given up to resting the troops and transport animals, the great number of the latter, about 2,000, having caused them to be many hours under their loads each day, even during our short marches, especially as the road, though good on the whole, was narrow and difficult in places, thus causing blocks and long delays. In spite of all drawbacks, however, the condition of the animals was excellent, and galls remarkably rare.

26. On the 21st August the force remained halted, and a reconnaissance was carried out under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Adams, up the Swat Valley to Minglaor, Chahr Bagh and Gulibagh, and also towards the Kotke Pass from the first named village; much interesting and useful information being obtained.

27. On the 22nd August, the force still remained at Mingaora, chiefly to enable Major H. A. Deane, Political Officer, to finish his arrangements with the tribesmen thereabouts. The country towards Minglaor was examined with a view to ascertaining whether a better alignment could not be obtained for the road there than that of the existing road; but the conclusion arrived at was that the alignment of the latter was the best on the whole.

28. On the 23rd August the force still halted at Mingaora, as it was hoped that some Martini-Henri rifles carried off from the Malakand would be given up if we waited another day. This hope was realised, several of the rifles in question being brought in.

24th August.

29. On the 24th August the force marched back to Barikot.

30. On the 25th August the force halted at Barikot, and a reconnaissance was pushed to the top of the Karikar Pass, from which a fine view of the Salarzai Bunerwal country was obtained.

25th August.

31. On the 26th August the force marched back to Thana, and I issued orders for it to move to Khar and the Malakand on the 27th, in order to release the 2nd Brigade with the cavalry and artillery attached to it for the next extended operation ordered.

26th August.

32. In concluding this part of my report, I would wish to express my admiration of the

* Major H. H. Burney, Assistant Adjutant General (Gordon Highlanders).

Lieutenant-Colonel A. Masters, Assistant Quarter Master General (2nd Regiment, Central India Horse).

Captain H. E. Stanton, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, Intelligence Branch, R. A.

Colonel W. Aitken, Colonel on the Staff, R. A.

Captain H. D. Grier, Adjutant, R. A.

Major E. Blunt, Senior Officer of Royal Engineers.

Captain E. W. M. Norie, Superintendent, Army Signalling (Middlesex Regiment).

Captain C. G. F. Edwards, Provost Marshal (5th Punjab Cavalry).

Captain A. B. Dunsterville, A.-D.-C. (1st Battalion, East Surrey Regiment).

Captain A. R. Dick, Orderly Officer.

BRIGADE STAFF.

Major E. A. P. Hobday, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, R. A.

Captain G. F. H. Dillon, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General (40th Bengal Infantry).

Captain C. H. Beville, Commissariat Transport Department.

Captain J. M. Camilleri, in charge of Transport (13th Bengal Infantry).

Surgeon-Lieutenant Colonel J. T. B. Bookey, I.M.S.

Lieutenant C. R. Gaunt, Orderly Officer (4th Dragoon Guards).

Commanding Officers of Divisional Troops.

Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Adams, Queen's Own Corps of Guides.

Major C. A. Anderson, 10th Field Battery, R. A.

Major M. F. Fegan, No. 7 Mountain Battery, R. A.

Captain A. H. C. Birch, No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery.

Captain E. P. Johnson, No. 5 Company, Queen's Own Sappers and Miners.

Major H. A. Deane, Political Agent, and his Assistant, Lieutenant A. B. Minchin, gave valuable assistance in collecting intelligence and supplies.

33. While the operations above described were in progress, a diversion was made towards the southern border of the Buner Country from Mardan by the 1st Reserve Brigade, which on its head-quarters leaving Mardan came under my command as the 3rd Brigade, Malakand Field Force.

34. A force as per margin under

1st Battalion Highland Light Infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel R. D. B. Rutherford.

39th Garhwal Rifles under Lieutenant-Colonel B. C. Graves.

No. 3 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners, under Captain C. E. Baddeley, R. E.

1 Squadron, 10th Bengal Lancers, under Captain W. L. Maxwell.

2 Guns, No. 1 Mountain Battery, R.A., under Lieutenant H. L. N. Beynon, R. A.

Brigadier-General J. Wodehouse, C.B., C.M.G., was concentrated on the 17th August at Rustam, 18 miles north-east of Mardan and about 4 miles from the Buner border, with the object of acting as a containing force, and so preventing the sections of the Bunerwals who had not already committed themselves against us from joining in opposition to our advance into Upper Swat.

35. The presence of this force had the desired effect, and Brigadier-General Wodehouse and his staff made good use of the time they spent at Rustam in acquiring valuable information about several of the passes in the neighbourhood.

36. Brigadier-General Wodehouse states that throughout the operations of his force, which involved considerable fatigue and exposure to heat and rain, the spirit of his troops left nothing to be desired. He makes special mention of the work of No. 3 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners, under Captain C. E. Baddeley, R. E. He also reports very favourably on the assistance given him by Lieutenant C. P. Down, Assistant Commissioner, and has expressed to me a high opinion of that officer's abilities and acquirements, particularly of his proficiency in the local vernacular.

37. I attach hereto a list of casualties and a sketch of the country near Landakai to illustrate my account of the action at that place.

Appendix B (5).

FIELD OPERATIONS.

Malakand.

G. G. O. No. 1317.—The Right Hon'ble the Viceroy and Governor General of India in Council directs the publication of the subjoined communication from the Adjutant-General in India, submitting under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief in India a despatch from Major-General Sir Bindon Blood, K.C.B., Commanding the Malakand Field Force, detailing the operations of that force from the 6th September to 7th October 1897.

2. The Governor General in Council concurs in His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's expression of approval of the general conduct of these operations and of the skill and resource shown by Sir Bindon Blood. His Excellency in Council also shares with the Commander-in-Chief his appreciation of the gallantry and discipline displayed by all ranks throughout the operations.

From the Adjutant-General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department,—
(No. 2094-F,—“*Field Operations—Malakand*,”—dated Simla, the 11th November 1897).

I have the honor, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a despatch from Major-General Sir B. Blood, K.C.B., detailing the operations of the Malakand Field Force from the 6th September to the 27th October 1897.

2. The plan of operations which the Commander-in-Chief had in view when recommending to the Government of India the movement of this Force was that two brigades should enter the Mohmand country from the north, while a division of similar strength under Major-General E. R. Elles, C.B., was to advance into the same country from the south, and by their combined movements the Mohmand country was to be traversed in the shortest possible time and in the most complete manner.

3. The rising of the Mamunds and other tribes in South Bajaur necessitated an alteration in this plan, the 3rd Brigade only of the Malakand Field Force being employed against the Mohmands, the 1st and 2nd Brigades being fully occupied in subduing Bajaur.

4. The movements of the 3rd Brigade after its junction with the Mohmand Field Force will be found in detail in a despatch from Major-General E. R. Elles, C.B., which has already been submitted to the Government of India.

5. The Commander-in-Chief considers that Brigadier-General Jeffreys' disposition of the troops under his command on the 16th September showed that that officer had greatly underestimated the fighting power of the Mamunds as regards both numbers and strength of position. His Excellency has, however, much pleasure in endorsing Major-General Sir Bindon Blood's commendation of the subsequent operations of this brigade.

6. Sir George White desires me to express his approval of the general conduct of the operations carried out under Sir Bindon Blood's directions, and of the resource and appreciation of the situation he evinced when confronted with unexpected difficulties. He also concurs in the terms in which Major-General Sir Bindon Blood speaks of the services rendered by Brigadier-Generals W. H. Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G., and J. H. Wodehouse, C.B., C.M.G., the latter of whom was severely wounded in the night attack on the 3rd Brigade on the 20th September.

7. The gallantry and discipline of the troops were, in Sir George White's opinion, conspicuous throughout the operations, especially so in the night attacks made by the enemy on 14th, 16th and 20th September, as well as during the trying incidents of the 16th September, and in the attack on the villages of Agrab and Gat on the 30th September.

The valuable reconnaissances made by the 11th Bengal Lancers under Major Beatson, when establishing connection with Major-General Elles' force, and the skilful handling of the cavalry of the Corps of Guides by Lieutenant-Colonel Adams on the 30th September, appear to the Commander-in-Chief to be specially worthy of commendation.

8. His Excellency has much pleasure in endorsing the favourable terms in which Sir Bindon Blood has mentioned Colonel A. J. F. Reid, who was responsible for a great portion of the Line of Communications and for the efficient supply of the troops at the front, as well as in commending to the favourable notice of Government the staff, departmental, and regimental officers named in the despatch.

9. The advance made in knowledge of their special duties evinced by transport officers during the operations now reported on, and the attention that has been paid to the care and treatment of the transport animals are, in Sir George White's opinion, most satisfactory and creditable.

10. In conclusion, the Commander-in-Chief desires to bring to the notice of Government the services rendered by Major-General Morton, C.B., Adjutant-General in India, and Major-General Badcock, C.B., C.S.I., Quartermaster-General in India, in the performance of the onerous duties which devolved upon them in connection with these operations.

From Major-General Sir B. Blood, K.C.B., Commanding the Malakand Field Force, to the Adjutant-General in India, —(No. 5, —“*Despatch—Malakand Field Force*,”—dated 27th October 1897.)

I regret to find that in my report, “*Despatches—Malakand Field Force*” No. 3 of the 20th August 1897, I omitted to include the name of Surgeon-Captain E. V. Hugo, Indian Medical Service, amongst those of the officers recommended to the favourable consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief for their services during the recent defence of Chakdarra Fort. I now have great pleasure in stating that Surgeon-Captain Hugo served with distinction throughout the defence in question, and in recommending him for favourable consideration accordingly.

2. The last report I had the honour to submit (“*Despatches—Malakand Field Force*,” No. 4 of the 30th August 1897) brought the history of the Malakand Field Force down to the 26th August, on which date the brigade of all arms which I took into Upper Swat returned to Thana in Lower Swat.

3. The period from the 27th August to the 6th September was taken up with routine work, and latterly with movements preparatory to the expedition into the Mohmand country, an account of which I will now proceed to give.

4. On the 6th September, in pursuance of orders which I had received, to march two brigades *via* the Panjkora Bridge and Nawagai to Shabkadr in the Peshawar Valley, the disposition of the Malakand Field Force was generally as follows :—

3rd Brigade, equipped with camels and a few mules, at the Panjkora Bridge and Uch.

2nd Brigade, equipped entirely with mules, at Chakdarra.

1st Brigade, equipped with camels, carts, and a few mules, at Khar, the Malakand and the Line.

Divisional head-quarters, with camp offices, at Chakdarra.

5. A very interesting feature in the movements by which this disposition was arrived at was the march of the 10th Field Battery under Major C. A. Anderson, R.A., first from Khar to Uch over the suspension bridge at Chakdarra, which was built for pack transport only, and afterwards from Uch to the Panjkora Bridge by the mule road through the Shigu Kas defile,—performances which show how our field artillery can overcome difficulties. The presence of this battery with its 12-pr. guns was of great value on many occasions during the operations I am about to describe.

6. Some little delay being necessitated by political arrangements with the Jandol Chiefs and others, the disposition of the force on the 12th September had only altered to the following:—

3rd Brigade, Watelai, three miles south-west of Khar, on the left bank of the Charmung stream.

2nd Brigade, Ghosam.

1st Brigade, two battalions and the 10th Field Battery at Panjkora and Serai, the remainder on the Line.

Divisional head-quarters, with the 3rd Brigade, at Watelai.

7. On the 13th the 3rd Brigade halted, the 2nd Brigade moved to a point close to and south-west of Khar, and I personally examined the Rambat Pass, finding that the country to the south of it was very deficient in water and forage. This being so, I directed Brigadier-General P. D. Jeffreys, C.B., commanding the 2nd Brigade, to encamp on the 14th, north of Markhanai, to improve the Rambat Pass, to cross it into Butkor on the 15th with two battalions, a company of sappers and miners, a squadron, and five days' supplies, and to send the remainder of his brigade on the same day, under Colonel T. H. Goldney, 35th Sikhs, to join me at Nawagai, to which place I intended to march on the 14th with the 3rd Brigade. I further directed Brigadier-General Jeffreys to move his special force through Butkor as quickly as possible to Danish Kol, where I promised to join him, or send him further instructions. Both brigades carried with them rations for men up to the 23rd September; and I had arranged to drop my communications with the Malakand and draw my next supplies from Shabkadr, where the Mohmand Field Force, under Major-General E. R. Elles, C.B., was waiting to march on the 15th to join me in the Mohmand country south of Nawagai.

8. The movements detailed in the foregoing paragraph were duly carried out by the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, so far as the 14th was concerned; the 3rd Brigade, with divisional head-quarters, being encamped on the evening of that day about a mile south of the village of Nawagai, while Brigadier-General Jeffreys, with three battalions, a mountain battery and a squadron, was on the right bank of the Charmung stream, north of Markhanai, having detached the Buffs and the 4th Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, to the crest of the Rambat Pass, to prepare it for the passage of his special force next morning.

9. At about 8 P.M. on the 14th, while it was still quite dark before the moon rose Brigadier-General Jeffreys' camp was suddenly assailed by a heavy musketry fire from the ravines close by. The attack was continued with little intermission for six hours, being directed at first chiefly against the faces of the camp held by the Guides under Major F. Campbell and the 35th Sikhs under Colonel T. H. Goldney, and afterwards against that defended by the 38th Dogras under Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. Vivian. The enemy showed no inclination to come to close quarters, and ultimately drew off about 2 A.M., doubtless having in view the desirableness of getting beyond reach of cavalry before day-light. This, however, they did not succeed in doing, as they were overtaken in the Mamund Valley about 8 A.M. on the 15th by Captain E. H. Cole and his squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers, who killed 21 of them and dispersed the rest.

10. I regret to say that two British officers were killed* and one dangerously wounded† in this affair. The other casualties were,—killed,

* Captain W. E. Tomkins and Lieutenant A. W. Bailey.

† Lieutenant H. A. Harington.

—two native soldiers and two followers; wounded,—one native officer, five other native ranks and two followers; ninety-eight horses and trans-

port animals were also killed or wounded.

11. Meanwhile, on my arrival at Nawagai on the 14th September, I found the Khan disposed to be friendly, and to do all in his power to provide such supplies as we required. The Hadda Mullah was reported to be in the Bedmanai Pass with a small gathering, which was said to be increasing in numbers; but the tribes inhabiting the Mittai and neighbouring valleys seemed somewhat half-hearted about opposing us. The tribes south of the Rambat Pass also sent to disclaim hostile intentions; but, notwithstanding this, some of their men joined in the night attack of the 14th-15th on Brigadier-General Jeffreys' camp.

12. Early in the morning of the 15th I received a brief report by heliograph of the attack on Brigadier-General Jeffreys' camp the night before, and at once sent him orders to concentrate his force and proceed to the punishment of the tribes concerned. Later in the day I received a fuller report of what had happened, together with information from Brigadier-General Jeffreys that he had received my orders and was concentrating his brigade at Inayat Kila in the Mamund Valley, with a view to carrying them out. He had ascertained that the attack on his camp had been made by a small gathering of Mamunds, who had been reinforced by some of Umra Khan's followers from Zagai, a village in the Mamund Valley, and by a few men from the neighbouring tribes.

13. Naturally the night attack of the 14th-15th, with the consequent turning aside into the Mamund Valley of Brigadier-General Jeffreys' brigade, made a considerable change in the aspect of affairs in South Bajaur and the Mohmand country; and the strategical

‡ 3 Battalions.
1 Mountain Battery.
3 Squadrons.
1 Company of Sappers.

situation which had now developed itself was interesting. I found myself at Nawagai with a brigade of all arms ‡ in a strongly entrenched position, faced by the Hadda Mullah's gathering in the Bedmanai Pass,—a not very difficult defile

some six or eight miles in length, the mouth of which is about seven miles south-west in a straight line from the site of my camp,—itself about one mile south of Nawagai village. The intervening ground is a plain of which the western half is cut up by ravines, while the rest is favourable for cavalry. East of and behind me lay the road to the camp of the 2nd Brigade at Inayat Kila running for about six miles through a net work of deep ravines, and then for the remaining six or seven over a plain. I was not strong enough to attack the Mullah's gathering in their position with a sufficient amount of odds in my favour, while I did not think it advisable to rejoin Brigadier-General Jeffreys,—first, because he was

§ 4 Battalions.
1 Mountain Battery.
1 Squadron.
1 Company of Sappers.

strong § enough already for immediate requirements; secondly, because it would have been most unwise to have retired through the ravines above mentioned in face of the Mullah's gathering

ing; thirdly, because I expected that one of Major-General Elles' brigades would join me in the Nawagai Valley on the 17th or the 18th at latest, and, finally, because my support was necessary to keep the Khan of Nawagai with us,—as, if I had deserted him, he would have been compelled by the Mullah's men to throw in his lot with them, which would have been a serious matter on account of his influence in Bajaur. Accordingly, I determined to stay where I was until Major-General Elles' advance should make it possible to dispose effectually of the Mullah's gathering, and to clear out the Bedmanai Pass and the Mittai and neighbouring valleys with completeness.

14. At about 6-30 on the morning of the 16th September, Brigadier-General Jeffreys moved out from his camp at Inayat Kila, with the greater portion of his force in three columns, to deal with the villages of the Mamunds.

15. The right column under Lieutenant-Colonel Vivian, 38th Dogras, consisting of six companies and a detachment of sappers, was directed along the eastern side of the Mamund Valley on the villages of Shinkot, Chingai 1st, Damadolah and Badam Kila; the central column under Colonel Goldney, 35th Sikhs, consisting of 10 companies (4 of the Buffs, 6 of the 35th Sikhs), four guns, one squadron and a detachment of sappers, was directed

against the villages of Munar, Hazarnao and Badalai; while the left column, under Major Campbell of the Guides, was composed of 7 companies (2 of the Buffs, 5 of the Guides) and a detachment of sappers, and was directed along the right bank of the Watelai ravine parallel to the centre column.

16. The right column, under Lieutenant-Colonel Vivian, having advanced by the route ordered as far as Damadolah, found that place too strong and too strongly held to be reasonably attempted without artillery, and returned thence to camp, arriving at 4 P.M., with two men slightly wounded.

17. The centre column, under Colonel Goldney, 35th Sikhs, advanced some six miles up the valley without seeing anything of the enemy, who were first reported at Badam Kila, to which place a detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel A. E. Ommanney was sent to dislodge them. The remainder of the column pushed on, and at about 10-30 A.M. two companies of the 35th Sikhs which led the advance, occupied a knoll near Shahi Tangi, upwards of nine miles from camp. In this movement, however, the two companies advanced too far from their supports, and as the enemy promptly attacked them in force, they were compelled to retire about a mile, with the loss of one British officer and one sepoy killed and sixteen non-commissioned officers and sepoys wounded. Soon afterwards the Buffs, under Lieutenant-Colonel Ommanney, coming up, the knoll was again occupied without much opposition, being the furthest point reached by the column.

18. During this advance the guns came into action,—first on the spur north of Badalai, and afterwards on that north of Chingai 2nd. They were covered in the first position by two companies of the 35th Sikhs, posted to their right; and on their moving towards the second position, one-and-a-half of these companies, under Captain W. I. Ryder, were ordered to cover the movement by climbing to the top of the high ridge to their right, and then advancing along it towards the north. Owing to subsequent orders not reaching him, Captain Ryder went further than was intended.

19. In the earlier part of the day the left column had remained far behind, being fully occupied for some considerable time in dealing with the numerous villages met with along the road shortly after leaving camp. Towards 9 A.M. it was called up by Brigadier-General Jeffreys, as the enemy began to appear in force on his left near Agrah, and it joined the centre column about noon.

20. At about 2-30 P.M., as soon as the fortified villages of Chingai 2nd and Shahi Tangi had been dismantled, Brigadier-General Jeffreys ordered the troops to return to camp. Captain Ryder was still on the high ridge above Chingai 2nd, along which he attempted to retire in a direction which diverged from the line of retreat of the main body of the force. Soon after the retirement commenced, a message was received from him stating that he was hard pressed and could not rejoin the main body, whereupon Brigadier-General Jeffreys ordered Major Campbell, with six companies of the Guides Infantry, to go to his assistance, which they did about 4 P.M., a short time being taken up in assembling the companies, which were in extended order.

21. The fact of this movement having to be undertaken so late in the afternoon was a most unfortunate occurrence, since Brigadier-General Jeffreys had to wait until the safety of the Guides and Captain Ryder's detachment was assured, and the consequent delay at that time of day made it impossible for him to reach camp before dark.

22. The Guides, under Major Campbell, most successfully and gallantly relieved and brought off Captain Ryder's detachment, which had suffered heavy losses. The combined detachments did not, however, succeed in rejoining Brigadier-General Jeffreys, being prevented by nightfall and a thunderstorm which came on about the same time. Ultimately they made their way to camp without further loss, arriving about 9 P.M.

23. Meanwhile as soon as the safety of Captain Ryder's detachment was certain Brigadier-General Jeffreys continued his retirement towards camp. So long as daylight lasted the enemy kept at a respectful distance from him, but as it got dark they got bold, and the ground being broken and difficult, they were able to bring a hot fire to bear on the troops, while a heavy thunderstorm, which came on at dusk, greatly increased the difficulties of the situation. Ultimately, however, by about 8-30 P.M., all the troops had arrived in camp, except Brigadier-General Jeffreys, four guns of No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery, a small party of sappers and a few men of the Buffs and 35th Sikhs, who got separated from the rest in the darkness.

24. About dusk Brigadier-General Jeffreys, then about three miles and half from camp, decided to occupy a neighbouring village, called Bilot, for the night, chiefly with a view to sheltering the battery mules with him from the enemy's sharp-shooters; and while he was engaged in arranging this, the thunderstorm before referred to came on, causing sudden and complete darkness. In the consequent confusion the troops got separated, and only the detachments above detailed remained with Brigadier-General Jeffreys. He proceeded to occupy and entrench a re-entering angle of the village, part of which was burning, while the rest was soon occupied by the enemy, who fired on the General and his detachment from behind walls at a few yards' range, inflicting serious losses in men and animals. This state of things continued, in spite of several gallant attempts to clear the village, which

were led by Lieutenants T. C. Watson and J. M. C. Colvin, R.E., until the arrival about midnight of Major J. F. Worlledge, 35th Sikhs, with two companies of the Guides and two of his own regiment. After this the enemy were easily driven off and gave no further annoyance during the night.

25. Major Worlledge had left camp about 5-30 P.M. in obedience to an order from Brigadier-General Jeffreys, and on joining the General about dark had been sent to find and support the Guides under Major Campbell. Failing to find the Guides in the dark, Major Worlledge tried to retrace his steps to the General, but only succeeded in rejoining him after the moon rose about midnight although he had been close to him for some time previously. Brigadier-General Jeffreys ultimately reached camp at 8 A.M. on the 17th, some of the troops there having been sent out to his assistance, and returning with him.

26. I regret to have to report that a large number of casualties occurred during these operations, as will be seen from the attached return, namely, killed—two British officers,* two other British ranks, 31 native non-commissioned officers and sepoys and one follower; wounded—five British officers, † nine other British ranks, three native officers, 92 other native ranks and three followers; missing—three sepoys,—being a total of 151 killed, wounded and missing. In addition, 48 horses and mules were killed, wounded or missing; and one gun was disabled through the breaking of its axle.

27. The behaviour of the troops throughout this trying day was very good. The steadiness and discipline shown by the 1st Battalion of the Buffs, under Lieutenant-Colonel Ommanney, were admirable, while Brigadier-General Jeffreys has specially commended the gallantry with which the Guides Infantry under Major Campbell brought off Captain Ryder's detachment of the 35th Sikhs, carrying the wounded on their backs under a heavy fire. He has further strongly endorsed Major Campbell's favourable mention of the courage and judgment shown by Captain G. B. Hodson and Lieutenant H. W. Codrington, of the Guides, who commanded the companies of the battalion which were chiefly in contact with the enemy; the gallantry of Surgeon-Captain J. Fisher, Indian Medical Service, who made a most determined, though unsuccessful, attempt to take medical aid to the wounded of Captain Ryder's detachment through a hot fire; of Surgeon-Lieutenant E. L. Perry, Indian Medical Service, of Jemadar Sikandar Khan of the Guides, and of several non-commissioned officers and sepoys of the same corps, regarding whom I have had the honour to make a separate communication.

28. Brigadier-General Jeffreys has also described in very favourable terms the gallant and valuable work done on this day by Captain Cole and his squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers. He has commended the conduct of Captain W. I. Ryder and Lieutenant O. G. Gunning, 35th Sikhs, who were both wounded, and of Jemadar Narayan Singh, Havildar Ram Singh and Sepoy Karam Singh‡ of the same regiment. He has also brought to notice a gallant act of Captain A. H. C. Birch, R. A., Commanding No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery, and his Trumpeter Jiwan, in rescuing a wounded sepoy of the 35th Sikhs; as well as the distinguished gallantry of Jemadars Nawab and Ishar Singh and several non-commissioned officers and men of the same battery, in regard to which I have made separate communications to you.

29. Brigadier-General Jeffreys further refers in the strongest terms of commendation to the gallant conduct of Lieutenants T. C. Watson§ and J. M. C. Colvin, R. E., and of the handful of men of the Buffs and No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, who spent the night of the 16th-17th with him in the village of Bilot. The conduct of these officers and men|| in entering the village several times in the dark, in face of a heavy fire directed upon them at close quarters, seems deserving of the highest recognition, and I have consequently made a special communication to you on the subject. Brigadier-General Jeffreys has also commended the gallant conduct of his Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, ¶ Major E. O. F. Hamilton, 1st Battalion, The Queen's Royal West Surrey Regiment, and finally he has praised the courage and resolution of Lieutenant W. L. S. Churchill, 4th Hussars, the correspondent of the *Pioneer* newspaper with the force, who made himself useful at a critical moment.

30. On the 17th September, the troops of the 2nd Brigade rested, and timely arrangements were made for bringing up supplies of ammunition and food and for sending the wounded down the line. On the 18th, Brigadier-General Jeffreys resumed the punishment of the Mamunds, attacking and destroying the strongly fortified village of Damadolah, with a loss of two sepoys killed and six wounded. On this occasion the enemy lost many killed and wounded, and some 300 loads of their grain and other supplies were

* { Lieutenant A. T. Crawford, R. A.

" V. Hughes, 35th Sikhs.

† { Lieutenant F. A. Wynter, R. A.

" T. C. Watson, R. E.

‡ { Captain W. I. Ryder,

" Lieutenant O. G. Gunning,

" G. R. Cassels,

} 35th
Sikhs.

§ This man's case has formed the subject of a separate communication.

¶ Twice wounded in attempting to clear the village.

|| Of whom six were killed and 18 wounded on this occasion, out of a total strength of 54.

¶ The remainder of Brigadier-General Jeffreys' staff was with the main body when it got separated from him.

carried off for the use of our troops. On the 19th, Brigadier-General Jeffreys seized and destroyed the group of villages called Hazarnao without opposition. On the 20th, he captured and burned Umra Khan's strong village of Zagai, some seven miles from camp, with the loss of two British officers, nine other British ranks, and two sepoy wounded. On the 22nd, he took and destroyed the fortified village of Dag, with the loss of one sepoy killed and two wounded. On this day I arrived at Inayat Kila from Nawagai.

31. While the events above described were occurring in South Bajaur, nothing of special interest happened at Nawagai until the 19th September. The Hadda Mullah's gathering was reported to be increasing, and some men belonging to it fired ineffectually at our evening patrols on the 15th and 16th from the ravines near the mouth of the Bedmanai Pass. The country was regularly reconnoitred in various directions, and the cavalry under Major S. B. Beatson, 11th Bengal Lancers, accompanied by Captain Stanton, D.S.O., Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General for Intelligence, penetrated on the 15th as far as Ato Khel, five or six miles north of the Nahakki (or Nakki) Pass, over which the Mohmand Field Force under Major-General Elles, C.B., was daily expected to appear. On the afternoon of the 17th, some 1,500 men of the Hadda Mullah's gathering appeared close under the hills at the mouth of the Bedmanai Pass, about seven miles from camp, and I turned out part of the brigade to meet them if they should advance. Nothing happened, however, as the enemy remained where they were, too far off for me to reach them without being benighted in the ravines afterwards. On the 18th, Captain Norie, Superintendent of Signalling with my force, opened heliographic communication with a detachment of Major-General Elles' force, which had arrived at the top of the Nahakki Pass.

32. At 5-30 P.M., on the 19th, about 2,000 of the Hadda Mullah's men appeared at the mouth of the Bedmanai Pass, and seemed to be engaged for an hour or so in some kind of dance. Ultimately, about dusk, they commenced to move towards our camp, and soon afterwards I was informed by the son of the Khan of Nawagai that they meant to attack us before morning. Accordingly at about 11 P.M. some 150 men, chiefly swordsmen, made a rush at the portion of the camp defended by the 1st Battalion, Queen's West Surrey Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Collins, who easily repulsed them, when, after trying other parts of the camp in a half-hearted way for a few minutes, they drew off and commenced skirmishing with the Khan of Nawagai's men, who were on outpost duty about a mile off, finally disappearing about 12-30 A.M. Our losses in the affair were, one British soldier killed and one severely wounded, besides several horses and transport animals killed or wounded. We were afterwards informed that about 1,200 men advanced against our camp on this occasion, but that the warm manner in which their first line was received stopped the rest.

33. On the 20th, I received a message from Major-General Elles, C.B., saying that he would meet me at 10 A.M. next day at Lakarai with his 1st Brigade under Brigadier-General Westmacott, C.B., D.S.O., to concert arrangements for further joint action. To this I replied that I would place my 3rd Brigade at his disposal with a view to his attacking the Hadda Mullah's gathering as soon as possible, and that I intended to join my 2nd Brigade at Inayat Kila in the Mamund Valley on the 22nd. In the afternoon I made a reconnaissance in force towards Kuz Chinarai, at the mouth of the Bedmanai Pass, whereupon the enemy appeared at the adjoining mouth of the Mittai Valley in considerable force; but as they remained at such a distance that I could not deal with them without being benighted during my return to camp, I did not attack them. Ultimately when I retired they advanced at a very respectful distance, and when last seen before dark they were about two miles from camp. On this occasion also I was warned by the Khan of Nawagai that the enemy meant to attack before morning, and I was informed, besides, that some fresh contingents had joined them.

34. Accordingly, at about 9 P.M., we were vigorously attacked by a force probably not less than 3,000 strong, with about 100 Martini-Henry and several Lee-Metford rifles, besides many other fire-arms.

The attack was well carried out by rushes of swordsmen covered by a smart fire of small arms; and the firing, with rushes at intervals, sometimes against three sides of the camp at the same time, went on till about 2 A.M., when the enemy drew off. They were nowhere to be seen at daylight when I sent the cavalry out in pursuit.

The steadiness of the troops during this somewhat trying action was quite perfect, and the safety of the camp was never in the slightest degree doubtful, although the enemy's swordsmen were so determined that many of them were shot down close to the entrenchment. The fire discipline of the infantry was shown to be excellent, especially that of the 1st Battalion, Queen's, under Lieutenant-Colonel Collins, who are in all respects an example of what a battalion of infantry should be. The star shells fired by the mountain battery were most useful, and shrapnel and case were also fired at different times with great effect, all under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel W. Aitken, C.B., Commanding the Royal Artillery with my force. In short, the affair was a most satisfactory one, as proving the admirable discipline, confidence, and steady shooting of our troops, as well as the efficiency of the simple defensive arrangements which had been made.

35. I regret to have to report that Brigadier-General J. H. Wodehouse, C.B., C.M.G., was severely wounded in this action. The other casualties were one British soldier killed

one British officer,* three British ranks, one native officer, 19 other native ranks, and six

* Veterinary-Captain H. T. W. Mann, Army Veterinary Department. followers wounded. In addition, 115 horses and transport animals were killed or wounded.

Since the action it has been ascertained that besides the 3,000 men who had actually attacked us, some 2,000 more were at a little distance awaiting events, and that their losses were at least 330 in killed alone.

36. On the 21st, I met Major-General Elles at Lakarai and made the arrangements with him which I have already detailed. Next morning, the 22nd September, my 3rd Brigade, the command of which had devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel B. C. Graves, 39th Garhwalis, after Brigadier-General Wodehouse was wounded, marched to Kuz Chinarai to join Major-General Elles, while I proceeded to Inayat Kila, in the Mamund Valley, and joined my 2nd Brigade under Brigadier-General Jeffreys.

37. Next day, the 23rd September, my 3rd Brigade took part in the seizure of the Bedmanai Pass, one British soldier being wounded in the operations. On the 24th the brigade attacked and destroyed the fortified villages in the Mittai Valley, two men of the 1st Battalion of the Queen's being wounded in the skirmishing which took place; and on the 25th a similar operation was carried out in the Suran Valley, without loss, by a column detached from the brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Collins, of the Queen's. On the 26th, the brigade marched to Lakarai, and thence *via* the Gandab Valley to Peshawar, where it was broken up and its troops merged into the Tirah Expeditionary Force.

38. On my arrival at Inayat Kila, on the 22nd, I found that about 170 sick and wounded were with the 2nd Brigade, and that arrangements were in progress to send all the serious cases down the line, starting on the 26th. On the 22nd, Brigadier-General Jeffreys destroyed the fortified village of Dag, as already related in paragraph 30, *ante*.

39. On the 23rd September, Brigadier-General Jeffreys proceeded to deal with the village of Tangai, near Dag. The opposition on this day was slight, and the casualties were one officer Major R. S. H. Moody, of the Buffs, and one sepoy wounded.

40. For some days different individuals and sections of the Mamunds had been asking for time to enable their *jirgas* to meet, with a view to submission; and on the 23rd, as there really seemed a prospect of a settlement being arrived at, I granted a cessation of hostilities for two days which I afterwards increased to three. On the evening of the third day a *jirga* came in, and as after this some days were required for discussion of terms, and I wished to be at the end of the telegraph line for a day or two, I started for Panjkora Bridge on the 27th with a force which Brigadier-General Meiklejohn had brought to Jhar on the 24th as escort to a convoy.

41. Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, with head-quarters of the 1st Brigade, had arrived at Panjkora Bridge on the 11th September, and in accordance with the arrangements mentioned at the conclusion of paragraph 7 above, under which I dropped my communications with the Malakand when my 2nd Brigade left Ghosam on the 13th, he withdrew on the 15th to Sarai. Then, however, as the task of dealing with the Mamunds seemed likely to last for some days, it became necessary for the communications *via* the Panjkora Bridge to be restored, and Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, having returned on the 17th September to that post, carried out the important work of pushing supplies forward to Brigadier-General Jeffreys' brigade at Inayat Kila, which is about 23 miles from the Panjkora Bridge.

42. At this time I was under orders with the 1st and 2nd Brigades of my force to join the Tirah Expeditionary Force, then being formed, but on my arrival at Panjkora Bridge on the 28th September I received instructions to remain on in command of the Malakand Field Force, with a view to settling affairs in Bajaur and to maintaining order there and in the neighbouring districts during the progress of the Tirah operations.

43. As various matters of details had to be arranged in connection with these orders, I halted at Panjkora Bridge until the 2nd October, on which date I rejoined Brigadier-General Jeffreys at Inayat Kila. At the same time I moved up Brigadier-General Meiklejohn and the head-quarters of his brigade, with four field guns under Major C. A. Anderson, R. A., and four mountain guns under Captain A. H. C. Birch, R. A. These additions raised the force at Inayat Kila by the 4th October, to a total of two brigades of three and two-and-a-half battalions, respectively, with fourteen guns, three squadrons, and two companies of Sappers. The battalions were much below strength, averaging only about 550 men each.

44. Meanwhile the negotiations with the Mamunds, which I mentioned in paragraph 40, had come to nothing, chiefly, I think, because the tribesmen became aware of the orders of my force to join the Tirah Force, and thought they had only to hold out a few days to get rid of us. In consequence of this action on their part, Brigadier-General Jeffreys recommenced operations against them on the 29th September, visiting several villages in the valley near Inayat Kila on that day, and bringing in large quantities of supplies without opposition.

45. On the 30th September, Brigadier-General Jeffreys attacked and took the villages of Agrah and Gat, about seven miles north of Inayat Kila. These villages are strongly

placed for mutual support on the southern face of a spur which runs eastwards from the high range of mountains whose crest forms the Afghan boundary. There are minor spurs on the east and west of the two villages, that to the eastward being rather far off; a third spur, crowned by huge boulders runs up between the others to a small peak below Gat, and adds greatly to the strength of the position. On the 30th September, the enemy held Agrah and Gat in considerable force, and departing from their usual tactics vigorously opposed the advance of our troops; but after some fighting at close quarters the villages were carried by the 1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment, under Major C. W. H. Evans,—the Guides Infantry, under Major F. Campbell, seizing and occupying the spurs on the left, and the 31st Punjab Infantry the rugged central spurs; while No. 7 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, under Major M. F. Fegan, covered the advance, with their fire; and the Guides Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Adams held in check in the most bold and brilliant manner a considerable force of the enemy who advanced from the westward towards our left flank. Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. O'Bryen, 31st Punjab Infantry, was mortally wounded while gallantly leading his battalion, and our other casualties were—killed, Second-Lieutenant W. C. Browne-Clayton, 1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment, three British and seven native soldiers; wounded, six British officers, twenty-one British and twenty-two native soldiers,—total 61 casualties. The enemy suffered severely in this action, and did not display their usual enterprise in following our infantry to the level ground, on their withdrawal and return to camp.

46. The next operation of interest was on the 3rd October, when Brigadier-General Jeffreys, whose force had now been increased by half a battalion and four mountain guns, seized and destroyed the village of Badalai without opposition. During his return to camp, however, the enemy showed in great force at the upper end of the valley, and advanced among the ravines to within 1,000 to 1,200 yards of the troops covering his withdrawal. They were kept in check without any difficulty, but as they had many Martini-Henry rifles and expended a great quantity of ammunition, they caused a loss on our side of two killed and sixteen* wounded, in spite of the long ranges at which they fired.

47. On the 4th October, the arrival of four guns of the 10th Field Battery, under Major Anderson, R.A., and of the 2nd Battalion, Highland Light Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel R. D. B. Rutherford, brought the force at my disposal at Inayat Kila up to the strength detailed in paragraph 43. Major H. A. Deane, C.S.I., the Political Agent of Dir, Swat and Chitral, arrived the same day, and as he recommended a cessation of hostilities for a few days to enable the Khan of Nawagai, and his brothers, the Khans of Khar and Jhar, to recommence negotiations with the tribes, who were reported to be again anxious to make terms, I discontinued operations with the exception of the daily foraging.

48. Ultimately the Mamund *jirga* came in and made submission on the 11th October, and on the following day the force marched to Jhar, advancing on the 13th to a position about three miles up the Salarzai Valley. Here the force halted until the 19th October while negotiations were carried on by the political officers with the Salarzai tribe, who were required to surrender some rifles and other fire-arms as a punishment for joining in the attack on Chakdarra Fort in July and August last. These negotiations having been successfully concluded, the force moved back to Jhar on the 20th October, where the Shamo-zai section of the Utman Khels, who had also taken part in the attack on Chakdarra Fort, were in like manner called upon to surrender arms; and after they had done so the force started on the 22nd for the Swat Valley, where they were all assembled on the 27th October.

49. It will have been observed, of course, that there was much more difficulty in dealing with the Mamunds than was experienced with the Swatis, the Masazai Mohmands, or with the Mamund's neighbours, the Salarzai and Shamo-zai.

50. Much of this difficulty was due to the fact that our invasion of the Mamund Valley was not preceded by a decisive action like that at the Malakand on the 2nd August, at Landakai on the 17th August, at Nawagai on the night of the 20th September, or, as in the case of the Salarzai and Shamo-zai, by such an object lesson as our operations against the Mamunds themselves.

51. Besides this, however, the special physical features of the Mamund Valley gave the tribe great advantages, which they utilized with considerable tactical skill. It will be seen from the accompanying map that the valley consists of a broad and gently sloping plateau, cut up by ravines, especially towards the top, and with hills rising somewhat suddenly on all sides. This plateau is well cultivated for rain crops, but is practically waterless at this season; the only good water above a point near Inayat Kila being in the ravines on the sides of the hills, where many of the most important villages are consequently situated, those on the level depending for their water-supply on tanks, or, in one or two cases, on doubtful wells. Thus, as soon as the lower villages had been dealt with, which was done without opposition, it was necessary for our troops to attack those on the sides of the hills, on ground very difficult for assailants and extremely favourable for defenders.

52. The tribesmen were further much assisted by the circumstances that a great part of their best lands lie in Afghanistan, on the north-western side of the high range of mountains whose crest forms the Afghan frontier in that direction. Thus, much

*17 by casualty return.

of their property was beyond our reach, while they had a secure refuge to which they could send their moveables from our side of the frontier, and betake themselves if pressed. They showed commendable skill and patience in adhering to the only tactics

*There was an exception at Agrah and Gat on the 30th September.

skirmishing order as far as the open ground on their withdrawal to their camp, which had to remain low down the valley on account of the difficulty about water higher up. The

† It is now known that 220 of the tribes were killed, besides about 150 of their friends who came to help them.

whose speedy reconstruction, though costly and difficult for them, is necessary to their existence.

53. Both in the Nawagai and Mamund Valleys a considerable number of Martini-Henry and other rifles were used against us with apparently unlimited supplies of ammunition.

54. The conduct and discipline of the troops in the operations under reference was in the highest degree satisfactory. The operations, which extended over seven weeks, were carried on without tents and on a very low scale of baggage, while the rations, though abundant and excellent in all respects, were necessarily open to the objection of sameness. Notwithstanding these inconveniences, the troops remained uniformly cheerful, especially when active hostilities were going on.

55. I have already alluded to the steadiness and gallant bearing of the infantry in the several engagements that took place during the operations under reference, and I would now wish to invite attention to the invaluable nature of the services rendered by the cavalry. At Nawagai three squadrons of the 11th Bengal Lancers, under Major S. B. Beatson, swept the country everywhere that cavalry could go, carrying out reconnaissances, protecting signalling parties, and watching every movement of the enemy. In the Mamund Valley a squadron of the same regiment, under Captain E. H. Cole, took part in every engagement that occurred while they were there, establishing such a reputation that the enemy even when in greatly superior numbers never dared to face them in the open. Afterwards, when Captain Cole and his men left the Mamund Valley, the Guides Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, being in greater strength, acted still more effectually in the same manner, showing tactical skill of a high order, combined with conspicuous gallantry.

56. A very interesting feature of the operations was the presence of field artillery in the Mamund and Salarzai Valleys, where, although active operations did not go on after their arrival, their presence produced a great effect, while it was amply proved that they could have been brought into most useful action with comparative ease.

57. The health of the force was remarkably good throughout, only seven British and five native soldiers and eight followers having died from disease between the 6th September and 27th October, out of a force (including Communications and Base Hospitals) which for nearly a month of that time included three brigades of infantry, besides a considerable proportion of the other arms.

58. The commissariat arrangements under Major H. Wharry, D.S.O., were most successful. The rations were always abundant and of uniformly good quality; and I may here observe that in five previous campaigns I have never seen the supply of bread anything like so continuously good as it has been throughout the operations of the Malakand Field Force. No doubt the excellence of the commissariat arrangements has had a great deal to do with the good state of health of the troops which I have remarked upon.

59. The transport was most efficient throughout the operations under reference, and its management under the direction of Captain C. G. R. Thackwell, Divisional Transport Officer, who was most ably and energetically assisted by Veterinary-Captain H. T. W. Mann, Senior Veterinary Officer, was most successful. In proof of this I will cite a report just made to me by Brigadier-General Jeffreys, commanding the 2nd Brigade of my force, that this morning, on inspecting 1,265 mules attached to his brigade, which have just returned from seven weeks in the field, he found fourteen sore backs, and four animals otherwise unfit for work, or a total of only 18 disabled animals in all.

60. The medical service was carried out in a very satisfactory manner. Some difficulties arose on the transfer of officers and material to the Tirah Expeditionary Force on its formation, especially as large convoys of sick and wounded were on the line of this force at the time, but these difficulties were successfully overcome by Colonel A. J. F. Reid, commanding the Malakand Brigade, who was in charge of the Line, and matters were ultimately restored to smooth working on the arrival of Surgeon-Colonel J. C. G. Carmichael, Indian Medical Service, who is now Principal Medical Officer of the Force.

61. The telegraph arrangements were well carried out by Lieutenant W. Robertson, R. E., under the direction of Mr. C. E. Pitman, C.I.E. The postal service under Mr. H. C. Sheridan was also satisfactory.

62. *The working of the several departments of the head quarters staff was most satisfactory and successful. The heads of departments were—

Major H. H. Burney, Gordon Highlanders, Assistant Adjutant-General.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. Masters, 2nd Regiment, Central India Horse, Assistant Quartermaster-General.

Captain H. E. Stanton, D.S.O., R.A., Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General (Intelligence).

Captain E. W. M. Norie, Middlesex Regiment, Superintendent, Army Signalling.

Surgeon-Colonel J. C. G. Carmichael, Indian Medical Service, Principal Medical Officer.

Lieutenant-Colonel W. Aitken, C.B., R.A., Commanding Royal Artillery.

Colonel J. E. Broadbent, R.E., Commanding Royal Engineer,—relieved early in October by Lieutenant-Colonel W. Peacocke, C.M.G., R.E.,

Captain W. E. Banbury, 25th Madras Infantry, Field Treasure Chest Officer.

Captain W. W. Cookson, R.A., Ordnance Officer.

Major H. Wharry, D.S.O., Staff Corps, Chief Commissariat Officer.

Captain C. G. R. Thackwell, Staff Corps, Divisional Transport Officer.

†Wounded in action, 20th September 1897.

Veterinary-Captain H. T. W. Mann,†
Army Veterinary Department, Senior
Veterinary Officer.

Captain C. L. Robertson, R.E., Survey Officer.

Captain C. G. F. Edwards, 5th Punjab Cavalry, Provost Marshal.

The Revd. L. Klugh, Chaplain.

Lieutenant W. Robertson, R.E., in charge of Telegraphs.

63. I am under great obligation to my personal staff—Captain A. B. Dunsterville, 1st Battalion, East Surrey Regiment, Aide-de-Camp; Captain A. R. Dick, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, and Lieutenant Viscount Fincastle, 16th (The Queen's) Lancers.

64. It will have been gathered from the foregoing narrative that the three brigades of the force were ably commanded by Brigadier-Generals W. H. Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G., 1st

†Wounded in action, 16th September 1897.

§Wounded in action, 20th ditto.

Brigade, P. D. Jeffreys,† C.B., 2nd Brigade, and J. H. Wodehouse, C.B., C.M.G.,§ 3rd Brigade,

who were efficiently seconded by their staffs. The Line of Communications and the Base were also most efficiently managed by Colonel A. J. F. Reid, Commanding the Malakand Brigade, and by Lieutenant-Colonel A. V. Schalch, 11th Bengal Infantry, the Base Commandant, and their respective staffs.

* 65. ¶ In my final report on the conclusion of the operations of the Force, I shall have the honour to bring the services of the officers above briefly referred to more fully to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

66. Major H. A. Deane, C.S.I., Political Agent, Dir, Chitral and Swat, was in separate and independent charge of the political arrangements connected with the operations I have described, as far as Nawagai. He accompanied my head-quarters to Ghosam, where I left him on the 12th September, and rejoined me at Inayat Kila on the 4th October. He gave much assistance in arranging for the collection of local supplies.

67. Mr. W. S. Davis was my political officer throughout the operations beyond Nawagai and in the Mamund Valley prior to Major Deane's return to my head-quarters on the 4th October. He carried out his duties to my complete satisfaction. His native assistant, Khan Bahadur Ibrahim Khan, also made himself very useful.

68. I attach a map of the country in which the operations I have described took place, together with a list of casualties.

FIELD OPERATIONS, MALAKAND.

No. 178.—The Governor-General in Council directs the publication of the subjoined communication from the Adjutant-General in India forwarding a list of amendments to Major-General Sir Bindon Blood's despatch No. 5, dated 27th October 1897, detailing the operations of the Malakand Field Force from the 6th September to 27th October 1897, published in G. G. O. No. 1317, dated 3rd December 1897.

* Paragraph 62 was amended as under by Gazette, dated 19th February 1898, No. 178.

¶ Paragraph 65 was amended as under by Gazette, dated 19th February 1898.

Letter from the Adjutant-General in India, No. 639-F., dated 11th February 1898, Field Operations, N.-W. F. Malakand.
to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

I have the honor, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to forward the enclosed list of amendments to Major-General Sir B. Blood's Despatch No. 5, dated 27th October 1897, and to request that it may be published in an early Gazette.

Amendments to despatch No. 5, published in General Orders, Military Department, No. 1317,
dated 3rd December 1897.

Paragraph 62.—After the full stop in line 2 *dele* "The Heads of Departments were—" and insert—

"Accordingly I have the honor to recommend the heads of these departments to the favourable consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief as having by their conduct and direction of their several departments, given assistance of the greatest value in the operations I have described. Their names are as under—"

Paragraph 64.—After the last full stop insert—

"I have the honor to recommend all these officers for favourable consideration."

Paragraph 65.—*Dele* the whole paragraph and substitute—

"I have further the honor to recommend the following Staff and Regimental Officers to the favourable consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, on account of the entirely satisfactory and efficient manner in which they carried out their several duties, and thereby gave most valuable assistance in the operations under reference; namely—

1st Brigade Staff.

Major E. A. P. Hobday, Royal Artillery, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General.

Captain G. F. H. Dillon, 40th (Pathan) Regiment of Bengal Infantry, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.

Lieutenant C. R. Gaunt, 4th Dragoon Guards, Orderly Officer.

2nd Brigade Staff.

Major E. O. F. Hamilton, 1st Battalion, Royal West Surrey Regiment, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General.

Major C. H. Powell, 2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.

Major E. Blunt, Royal Engineers, Field Engineer.

Captain G. A. Hawkins, Staff Corps, Brigade Commissariat Officer.

Captain D. Baker, 2nd (Prince of Wales' Own) Regiment of Bombay Infantry, Brigade Transport Officer.

Lieutenant J. Byron, Royal Artillery, Orderly Officer.

3rd Brigade Staff.

Captain A. H. G. Kemball, 2nd Battalion, 5th Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General.

Major H. R. B. Donne, 1st Battalion, Norfolk Regiment, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.

Lieutenant C. H. G. Moore, Staff Corps, Brigade Commissariat Officer.

Lieutenant E. deV. Wintle, 15th Bengal Lancers, Brigade Transport Officer.

Lieutenant D. W. Maxwell, 2nd Battalion, Highland Light Infantry, Assistant Superintendent Army Signalling.

Captain R. J. G. Elkington, Royal Horse Artillery, Orderly Officer.

Staff at Malakand and on Line of Communications.

Captain A. B. H. Drew, 29th (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry, Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master General.

Captain A. R. Burlton, Staff Corps, Commissariat Officer, Advanced Depot.

Staff at the Base.

Captain H. Scott, 2nd Battalion, The Royal Sussex Regiment, Base Staff Officer.

Captain S. W. Lincoln, Staff Corps, Commissariat Officer, Base Depot.

Medical Officers.

Brigade-Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. Reid, Indian Medical Service.

Brigade-Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel J. Ring, Army Medical Staff.

Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel Z. A. Ahmed, Indian Medical Service.

Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel P. F. O'Connor, Indian Medical Service.

Surgeon-Major C. R. Tyrrell, Army Medical Staff.

Surgeon-Captain H. J. M. Buist, Army Medical Staff.

Surgeon-Captain J. Fisher, Indian Medical Service.

Surgeon-Lieutenant E. L. Perry, Indian Medical Service.

The two last named officers specially distinguished themselves in action on the 16th September 1897; *vide* paragraph 27 *ante*.

Regimental Officers.

The following officers specially distinguished themselves in the fighting in the Mamund Valley, namely—

Lieutenant-Colonel A. E. Ommanney, 1st Battalion, The Buffs (East Kent Regiment).

Major R. S. H. Moody, 1st Battalion, The Buffs (East Kent Regiment) (wounded on the 23rd September).

Major W. G. B. Western, 1st Battalion, The Royal West Kent Regiment.

2nd-Lieutenant F. A. Jackson, 1st Battalion, The Royal West Kent Regiment.

The two last named officers distinguished themselves by their gallant conduct on the 30th September 1897, during the action at Agrah-Gat.

Captain A. H. C. Birch, Royal Artillery.

Lieutenant F. A. Wynter, Royal Artillery (twice wounded during the operations of the Malakand Field Force).

Lieutenant T. C. Watson, Royal Engineers.

Lieutenant J. M. C. Colvin, Royal Engineers.

Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Adams, V.C., Queen's Own Corps of Guides.

Major F. Campbell, Queen's Own Corps of Guides.

Captain G. B. Hodson, Queen's Own Corps of Guides.

Lieutenant H. W. Codrington, Queen's Own Corps of Guides.

Captain E. H. Cole, 11th Bengal Lancers.

Captain W. I. Ryder, 2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment (attached, 35th Sikhs).

Lieutenant O. G. Gunning, 35th Sikhs.

The following officers distinguished themselves generally by their valour and conduct in leading their men, and otherwise carried out their duties in an entirely satisfactory manner, namely—

Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Collins, Commanding 1st Battalion, Royal West Surrey Regiment.

Captain J. G. King-King, Adjutant, 1st Battalion, Royal West Surrey Regiment.

Captain B. T. Pell, 1st Battalion, Royal West Surrey Regiment.

Major C. W. H. Evans, 1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment (commanded his Battalion throughout the operations).

Lieutenant-Colonel R. D. B. Rutherford, 2nd Battalion, Highland Light Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel R. Gordon, 22nd (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

Major R. H. Rattray, 22nd (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

Brevet Colonel T. H. Goldney, 35th (Sikhs) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel F. G. Vivian, 38th (Dogras) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel B. C. Graves, 39th (The Garhwal Rifle) Regiment of Bengal Infantry, commanded the 3rd Brigade after the Brigadier-General was wounded on the 20th September 1897.

Captain A. C. O'Donnell, 39th (The Garhwal Rifle) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

Major S. B. Beatson, 11th (Prince of Wales' Own) Regiment of Bengal Lancers (specially distinguished himself, *vide* paragraph 55 *ante*).

Major C. A. Anderson, R.A., Commanding 10th Field Battery, Royal Artillery.

Major G. F. A. Norton, R.A., Commanding No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.

Major M. F. Fegen, R.A., Commanding No. 7 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.

Lieutenant H. R. Stockley, R.E., Commanding No. 4 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.

I have further the honor to recommend the following non-commissioned officers and private soldiers for favourable consideration, namely :—

For gallant conduct on the night of the 20th September 1897 at Nawagai ;

No. 845, Colour Sergeant R. Rudd, 1st Battalion, Royal West Surrey Regiment.

No. 1086, Colour Sergeant W. Mawdill, 1st Battalion, Royal West Surrey Regiment.

No. 3720, Private A. Penfold, 1st Battalion, Royal West Surrey Regiment.

For gallant conduct on the 30th September 1897 at Agrah-Gat.

No. 669, Colour Sergeant W. J. Willis, 1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment.

No. 2595, Lance Corporal J. McGee, 1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment.

Appendix B (6).

G. G. O. No. 57.—The Right Hon'ble the Governor General in Council directs the publication of the subjoined communication from the Adjutant-General in India, submitting, under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief in India, despatches from Colonel A. J. F. Reid and Lieutenant-Colonel A. Montanaro, describing the operations of the Utman Khel Column of the Malakand Field Force, in the Cis-Swat Utman Khel country.

No. 125-F., dated Fort William, the 10th January 1898.

From—MAJOR-GENERAL G. DEC. MORTON, C.B., Adjutant-General in India,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

I have the honor, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to forward, for the information of the Government of India, the accom-

* No. 6, dated 25th December 1897. panying letter* from Major-General Sir Bindon Blood, K.C.B., transmitting reports by Colonel A. J. F. Reid and Lieutenant-Colonel A. Montanaro, which describe the recent operations of a part of the Malakand Field Force in the Cis-Swat Utman Khel country.

2. His Excellency recommends that the reports may be treated as despatches and published as such in the *Gazette of India*. He cordially endorses the remarks made by Major-General Sir Bindon Blood as to the manner in which the operations in question were carried out by Colonel Reid and Lieutenant-Colonel Montanaro and all ranks under their command, and he would commend those officers to the favourable consideration of the Government of India.

No. 6, dated Camp Kundat, the 25th December 1897.

From—MAJOR-GENERAL SIR BINDON BLOOD, K.C.B., Commanding the Malakand Field Force,

To—The Adjutant General in India.

I have the honor to submit herewith a map of the Cis-Swat Utman Khel district, together with the following reports on the recent operations of part of my force therein, namely :—

- (a) A report by Colonel A. J. F. Reid, Staff Corps, describing his march with a column of all arms from Dargai, through the eastern portion of the district, and back again.
- (b) A report by Lieutenant-Colonel A. Montanaro, 16th Bengal Infantry, on the operations of the battalion under his command at the western extremity of the district.

2. You will observe that the objects in view of which the operations reported on were undertaken were fully and expeditiously attained, and that no hitch or contretemps of any sort occurred. I venture to think that much credit is due to Colonel Reid for the perfect manner in which he arranged and carried out the movement of his force and overcame the considerable physical difficulties which he encountered; and I fully endorse the favourable remarks he makes regarding his troops and staff. I would further express an opinion that Lieutenant-Colonel Montanaro also carried out what he had to do with tact and judgment; and I have the honor accordingly to recommend both these officers, together with all who served under them, to the favourable notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

3. In making the necessary preliminary arrangements for the operations under reference, I was much assisted by information and advice received from Mr. Merk, Civil Service the Commissioner of Peshawar, from Major Deane, C.S.I., the Political Agent at the

Malakand, from Mr. C. Banbury, Civil Service, Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, and also from Mr. Stuart Waterfield, Punjab Police, who was specially appointed Assistant Political Officer for the operations.

No. 1, Field Operations, Utman Khel Column, dated Malakand, 10th December 1897.

From—COLONEL A. J. F. REID, Commanding the Utman Khel Column,

To—The Assistant Adjutant-General, Malakand Field Force.

I have the honour to submit the following report of the operations of the Utman Khel Column.

2. The column was composed as under, *viz.* :—

I.—Corps.

	Officers.	Other ranks
1st Battalion East Kent Regiment,—Lieutenant-Colonel A. E. Ommanney ...	19	534
One squadron, 10th Bengal Lancers,—Captain W. L. Maxwell ...	2	121
No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery,—Captain A. H. C. Birch, Royal Artillery	4	253
The 21st Punjab Infantry,—Lieutenant-Colonel W. C. Faithfull ...	9	688
The 35th Sikhs,—Colonel T. H. Goldney ...	11	635
No. 5 Company, Queen's Own Madras Sappers and Miners,—Captain E. P. Johnson ...	4	130
"C" and "D" Sections, No. 1 British Field Hospital,—Surgeon-Major C. R. Tyrrell, Army Medical Staff.		
"A" and "B" Sections, No. 35 Native Field Hospital,—Surgeon-Captain T. W. A. Fullerton, Indian Medical Service.		
No. 50 Native Field Hospital,—Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel P. F. O'Connor, Indian Medical Service.		

II.—Staff.

Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General,—Captain A. B. Dunsterville, East Surrey Regiment.

Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General,—Major L. Herbert, Central India Horse.

Orderly Officer,—Lieutenant H. A. Vallings, 29th Punjab Infantry.

Extra Orderly Officer,—Lieutenant W. S. Fraser, 19th Bengal Lancers.

Field Engineer,—Captain H. J. Sherwood, Royal Engineers.

Intelligence Officer,—Lieutenant A. C. M. Waterfield, 11th Bengal Lancers.

Commissariat Officer,—Captain A. R. Burlton, Staff Corps.

Transport Officer,—Lieutenant R. S. Weston, Manchester Regiment.

Provost-Marshal,—Lieutenant H. E. Cotterill, Royal West Surrey Regiment.

Signalling Officer,—Lieutenant W. H. Trevor, The Buffs.

Senior Medical Officer,—Surgeon Lieutenant-Colonel P. F. O'Connor, Indian Medical Service.

Senior Veterinary Officer,—Veterinary-Lieutenant G. M. Williams, Army Veterinary Department.

I was placed in political charge, and nominated Lieutenant Waterfield, 11th Bengal Lancers, Assistant Political Officer.

3. The column assembled at Osmankhel Garhi on the 22nd November, on the light scale of baggage, without tents and with seven days' rations—afterwards supplemented by two more days' supplies—in order to exact certain terms from the Agra, Upper Totai, and Khanauri sections of the Utman Khels on the left bank of the Swat river, who had refused to come in, and which terms had been imposed on them as a punishment for their complicity in the attack on Malakand in July and August 1897. The terms were:—(1). The surrender of 300 guns and all breach-loaders; (2) Survey of the country; (3) Formal submission to the Political Agent at Malakand; (4) Forage for the force; (5) Road-making as required,—an important matter, as the column had 600 camels in its carriage equipment.

4. The path over the Bar Kotal was made fit for camels, and the force crossed to Kot in Lower Totai, on the 24th November, where it was inspected by Major-General Sir Bindon Blood, K.C.B., commanding the Malakand Field Force. The Jirgahs attended and accepted the terms,—Agra reluctantly. The Khelo Pass into Upper Totai was found to be difficult even for mules. Working parties were put on the river road, and the column reached Bargholai, in Upper Totai, on the 27th. From the village of Kot, where the camp was, the road is on the flat for half a mile; then up the narrow bed of the Jhindai stream for seven, when a low *kotal* is crossed; at the foot the Manki Mullah has a mosque. From this point a branch of the road is carried to the north over the Agra Pass (3,700 feet), and the Upper Totai Valley opens out to the east, with the village of Bargholai, a mile off, at the further end. Upper Totai acted fully up to its engagements, but Agra held back till interviewed on the 27th at the foot of the Agra Pass, when it submitted unconditionally. On the 28th a flying column of 1,000 men, with guns and sappers, was taken from Bargholai over the Agra Pass, easy for mules after repair, but impassable for camels, and returned on the 30th, after receiving the guns due by the section, and reconnoitring beyond the Inzargai Pass (4,460 feet), to the points touched by the 2nd

Brigade, Malakand Field Force, in August 1897. The valley is close and rugged, the people hardy and independent. At Agra a party of from 200 to 400 Shamozaïs, with standards, was seen watching events from a hill on the other side of the Swat river, but they made no attempt to cross.

5. The column returned to Kot on the 1st December, to deal with Khanauri, a cluster of hamlets high up on the hill to the west. The Jirgah was not there, and one of the *maliks* had absconded with all his belongings. The guns were given up next day, while a force destroyed the defences of the defaulting *malik's* house. Four days' rations, brought in by the Guides Infantry, were received at Kot. The 3rd December was spent in completing the survey of the country, and improving the road over the Kaga Pass. On the 4th Lower Totai was evacuated, one-half of the force using the Bar, the other half the Kaga Pass. The survey having been finished, and all terms complied with, the column broke up on the 5th December.

6. The weather was fine, and the troops were healthy. Every one worked cheerfully and well. Though there was no opposition, I should like to acknowledge the zeal and resource shown by the officers commanding corps and by the staff, in a march, not without difficulty, through an intricate country.

No. 591-A.O., dated Dargai, the 22nd December 1897.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL A. MONTANARO, Commanding the 16th (The Lucknow) Bengal Infantry,

To—The Assistant Adjutant-General, Malakand Field Force, Camp Kunda.

In compliance with your letter of the 21st instant, I have the honor to report that in accordance with your telegram No. 297 of the 24th November 1897, to the General Officer Commanding the 1st Brigade, for communication to me, I marched from Kunda on the 24th November 1897 with the 16th Bengal Infantry and one section of No. 51 Native Field Hospital for Abazai, where I arrived on the 25th, and sent one half-company to reinforce the guard of Border Police in charge of the Canal-Head post.

2. Mr. Banbury, Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, arrived in the afternoon and informed me that the Laman Utman Khel villages concerned in the attack on Shabkadr and the burning of Shankargarh and also in the attack on the Malakand, were Sapri, Buchai, Nawakilli, Nawadand, Frangarh, and some minor hamlets, that he did not anticipate resistance, and that Mr. Stuart Waterfield, Punjab Police, had summoned the Jirgahs to meet us at Gandheri on the 27th.

3. I employed the 26th in visiting the canal head and defences with Mr. Banbury, and on the 27th rode with him to Gandheri, where Mr. Waterfield had assembled the Jirgahs. Mr. Banbury announced to them the wishes of Government, *viz.*, that they should surrender all rifles, 300 guns and 300 swords, and pay a fine of Rs. 2,000. Time was given to them up to the evening of the 2nd December, in which to comply with these orders.

4. On the 2nd December in the afternoon, the Jirgahs of the several villages assembled at Abazai and brought in arms and money; but on counting the same it was found that they had brought in only Rs. 1,831-8, no rifles of any sort, and only 274 guns and 264 swords. Hostages were therefore retained until payment of the balances on the following day.

5. On the 3rd December Mr. Waterfield brought in the balance of Rs. 68-8, 26 guns and 36 swords, but still no rifles. He reported that village by village and hamlet by hamlet, the *maliks* had taken a solemn oath on the Koran that they had none. He also explained that when formerly reporting the presence of Enfield rifles in the Laman Utman Khel villages, he had been deceived by the resemblance to such of the Tower muskets now given in among the 300 guns surrendered. Mr. Banbury having expressed himself satisfied that the villages possessed no rifles, I reported accordingly in my telegram No. 542 of the 3rd December to the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, Intelligence Branch of the Force.

6. On the 5th December, acting on telegraphic orders received on the previous day from the Assistant Quarter Master General, I marched to Hari Chand, *en route* for Dargai, taking with me the surrendered arms and the fine money in charge of the 16th Bengal Infantry. The section No. 51 Native Field Hospital proceeded to Kunda. At Hari Chand I received orders to send the surrendered arms and money next day to the General Officer Commanding the 1st Brigade at Kunda. On the 6th I complied with this order, sending a special escort, and marched the regiment to Dargai.

Appendix B (7).

FIELD OPERATIONS.

BUNER.

G. G. O. No. 217.—The Right Hon'ble the Governor General of India in Council directs the publication of the subjoined communication from the Adjutant General in India, submitting, under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief in India, a despatch from Major-General

Sir Bindon Blood, K.C.B., describing the operations of the Buner Field Force, recently under his command.

2. His Excellency in Council concurs in the opinion expressed by the Commander-in-Chief regarding the skill with which the operations of the Buner Field Force were conducted by Major-General Blood, and the discipline and good conduct displayed by the troops throughout these short but successful operations.

From MAJOR-GENERAL G. DE C. MORTON, C.B., Adjutant General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department,—(No. 669-F., dated Fort William, the 14th February 1898).

I have the honor, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to submit, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying despatch from Major-General Sir B. Blood, K.C.B., describing the operations of the Buner Field Force, recently under his command.

2. The object with which these operations were undertaken was to coerce into submission the tribes of Buner and Chamla, who had failed to comply with the punitive terms imposed upon them by Government for their complicity in the recent disturbances in Swat. It will be seen from the despatch that this object was effected within twelve days from the commencement of operations, both the Bunerwals and Chamlawals having fully submitted to, and complied with the terms of, Government during that period.

3. The celerity with which this successful result has been attained is undoubtedly due to the skilful dispositions made by the Commander of the Force and to the enterprise judgment, and vigour with which the operations were carried out, particularly in the attack and capture of the Tanga Pass.

4. His Excellency now commends to the notice of Government the services of Major General Sir B. Blood and of the brigadiers and others mentioned in the despatch.

5. The discipline and conduct of the troops, British and native, have been all that could be desired, and reflect the greatest credit on all ranks.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR BINDON BLOOD, K.C.B., Commanding the Buner Field Force, to the Adjutant General in India,—(No. 1, dated Ambela Pass, the 19th January 1898).

I have the honor to submit the following account of the operations lately carried out by the Buner Field Force under my command.

2. It having been determined that the period of grace given to the Bunerwals, to enable them to comply with the terms offered them by Government, expired on the 6th January 1898, and that they were to be attacked next day, the force under my command was disposed as under on the evening of the 6th January, namely :—

(a) At Sanghao, about 21 miles north of Mardan.

The 1st Brigade under Brigadier-General W. H. Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G., consisting of—

- 1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment.
- 2nd Battalion, Highland Light Infantry.
- 16th Bengal Infantry.
- 20th Punjab Infantry.

The 2nd Brigade under Brigadier-General P. D. Jeffreys, C.B., consisting of—

- 1st Battalion, The Buffs.
- 21st Punjab Infantry.
- 3rd Bombay Light Infantry (5 companies).

The Artillery under Colonel W. Aitken, C.B., consisting of—

- The 10th Field Battery.
- No. 7 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
- No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery.

The Sappers and Miners under Lieutenant-Colonel W. Peacocke, C.M.G., Royal Engineers, as under—

- No. 5 Company, Queen's Own Madras Sappers and Miners.
- No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

One squadron, 10th Bengal Lancers, under Captain W. Stewart.

(b) At Pirsai, close to the pass of that name, about five miles across the hills to the east of Sanghao, under Lieutenant-Colonel H. N. McRae, 31st Punjab Infantry—

- The Guides Infantry.
- The 31st Punjab Infantry.
- A Section, 4th Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

At Rustam, under Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Adams, v.c., Queen's Own Corps of Guides, who was also in superior command of the force at Pirsai—

Two squadrons, Guides Cavalry.

Three squadrons, 10th Bengal Lancers.

(c) On the line of communications, under Colonel V. A. Schalch, Commandant of the line—

At Katlung, 12 miles north of Mardan.

One company, 3rd Bombay Light Infantry.

At Mardan—

Two companies, 3rd Bombay Light Infantry.

3. In accordance with the orders I had received on the subject I made all arrangements for the Sanghao force to attack the Tanga Pass, whose mouth is one mile north of Sanghao, on the morning of the 7th; for the Pirsai detachment to force the pass of that name early on the same morning: and for the cavalry from Rustam to cross this pass when opened, and to work thence towards the line of the enemy's retreat from the Tanga Pass.

4. I had recommended that the main attack should be made on the Tanga Pass, because it is tactically the most convenient of the Buner passes for the purpose. The hills connected with it are in plan somewhat like the letter D, the straight part being a steep and narrow-topped ridge, about eight or nine hundred yards long, running from north-west, to south-east, while the curved part is a spur starting in a south-westerly direction from the south-east end of the straight ridge, and terminating, after curving round, under the north-west end thereof, with a remarkable ravine or *tangi*, which forms the first part of the pass and gives it its name. The space inside the D is a sort of basin which the road traverses after it leaves the ravine before mentioned, ultimately finding its way over the south-east end of ridge from the corresponding end of the basin. High cliffs stand between the south-east end of the ridge and the upper end of the spur forming the curved part of the D, while the north-west end of the ridge is dominated by a lofty peak from which spurs run down towards Sanghao and Buner, respectively. Beyond this peak the main ridge of the mountains continues to the north-west towards the Morah. Shakhkot, and Malakand passes, the last named pass being some twenty-five miles off in a straight line.

5. The height of the top of the pass, and generally of the narrow-topped ridge which it traverses, over the site of our camp at Sanghao, is upwards of 1,800 feet, while the climb to the top of the ridge from the basin below it is about 1,400 feet. The spur opposite the pass is perhaps at its highest part a hundred feet or so lower than the top of the pass, and at its lower end, where I placed the mountain artillery on the 7th, it is some three hundred feet lower still. The top of the high peak at the north-west end of the pass-ridge is about a thousand feet above it, while the cliffs at its south-east end are surmounted by jagged rocks at even a greater elevation.

6. The ground on the Buner side of the pass is most unfavourable to troops retiring from it before a successful attack, as there is practically no cover whatever in the valley below the pass or on the spurs of the hills on either side for a distance from it considerably exceeding outside rifle range. It will be seen further on how this circumstance affected the tactics of the Bunerwals on the 7th January.

7. When I reconnoitred the Tanga Pass on the afternoon of the 6th January, I observed about 1,000 men with thirty standards distributed along the top of the ridge. There were also many *sangars* on the commanding points, and the men made the usual noisy demonstrations of hostility by shouting, beating tom-toms and letting off their guns. In the early part of the night a few ineffectual shots were fired into camp, but there being a bright moon the firers were easily driven away with some loss.

8. At about 8-30 A.M. on the 7th the artillery under Colonel Aitken, C.B., moved off under cover of the 1st Battalion of the Buffs, five companies of the 3rd Bombay Light Infantry, and a squadron of the 10th Bengal Lancers. The whole under the command of Brigadier-General P. D. Jeffreys, C.B. The 10th Field Battery under Major C. A. Anderson commenced the action at 9 A.M., by opening fire from a knoll close to the mouth of the ravine which forms the entrance to the pass. No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery, under Captain A. H. C. Birch, R.A., and No. 7 Mountain Battery under Major M. F. Fegan, R.A., followed suit before 10 A.M. from a shoulder of the spur facing the pass-ridge to the right of the field battery. The 3rd Bombay Light Infantry (five companies) under Lieutenant-Colonel F. G. T. Welch, and the squadron of the 10th Bengal Lancers, under Captain W. Stewart, formed the immediate escort of the guns while the Buffs under Lieutenant-Colonel A. E. Ommanney climbed to the top of the spur on their right, and commenced firing volleys at the enemy on the opposite ridge at ranges of 1,400 to 1,600 yards.

9. Simultaneously with the advance of the artillery, the sappers under Major M. C. Barton, R.E., proceeded to the mouth of the pass to work on the road, and the 20th Punjab Infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel J. B. Woon commenced climbing the spur which rises half a mile north-west of Sanghao and leads to the high peak at the north-west end of the pass-ridge. Lieutenant-Colonel Woon's orders were to assault this peak when the frontal attack (which I am about to describe) was well advanced, and if his assault succeeded, to descend on the enemy's right flank and rear.

10. As soon as the troops concerned in these arrangements were clear, Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G., to whom I had entrusted the duty of carrying out the frontal attack, commenced his march with the force detailed in the margin through the ravine in front of the 10th Field Battery. This movement took some time, as the road had been badly broken down by the enemy during the night, and while it was going on the artillery and the Buffs and

1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment, under Major C. W. H. Evans.
2nd Battalion, Highland Light Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel R. D. B. Rutherford.
16th Bengal Infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel A. Montanaro.
21st Punjab Infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel W. C. Faithfull (lent from the 2nd Brigade for the day).

the 3rd Bombay Light Infantry kept up a steady and well-directed fire on the pass-ridge, which prevented the enemy from showing otherwise than by ones and twos, and altogether demoralised them. Ultimately, about noon, Lieutenant-Colonel Woon was approaching his objective, while Brigadier-General Meiklejohn was also ready, I directed the last-named officer to deliver the frontal attack, which was carried out in fine style by the infantry under his command,—the Royal West Kent and 16th Bengal Infantry, preceded by a detachment of the 4th Company, Bengal Sappers, under Lieutenant D. M. Griffith, R.E., moving by the pass-road, the 21st Punjab Infantry on their left up two very difficult spurs, and the Highland Light Infantry up a third spur still further to the left. At about 1-30 P.M. Lieutenant-Colonel Woon had driven the enemy from the north-western peak with the loss of two standards and some fifteen killed, and at about 2 P.M. Brigadier-General Meiklejohn's battalions crowned the pass-ridge within a few minutes of each other. Before this, however, the enemy, finding that they could not impede our frontal attack without exposing themselves to a murderous fire from the artillery and infantry on the spur in their front, and that Lieutenant-Colonel Woon was pressing and outflanking their right, did not wait for our men to close with them, but retired precipitately down the valley on Kingargali and the hills beyond it, suffering some loss from the fire directed upon them by the infantry after they had crowned the ridge. The Royal West Kent were sent on at once to Kingargali, and were followed soon afterwards by Brigadier-General Meiklejohn with the Highland Light Infantry and the 20th Punjab Infantry. The 21st Punjab Infantry rejoined their own brigade at Sanghao in the afternoon, and the 16th Bengal Infantry remained for the night on the top of the pass, where the 4th Company, Bengal Sappers, under Lieutenant H. R. Stockley, R.E., and the 5th Company, Queen's Own Sappers, under Captain E. P. Johnson, R.E., also spent the night after working on the road until dark.

11. The road over the pass turned out, as I expected, quite impracticable for mules; but as I had provided coolie transport in view of this contingency, the troops in advance underwent no unusual hardships in the interval that elapsed before the pass was regularly opened for mule transport, which was done most successfully on the 10th January, after nearly three days' excellent and energetic work by the Royal Engineers and Sappers, under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel W. Peacocke, C.M.G., the Commanding Royal Engineer of the Force.

12. Only one casualty occurred on our side in this action; the causes of this fortunate result being that the accurate fire of our artillery, and of our infantry at long range, made it impossible for the enemy to bring an effective fire to bear on our advancing troops, or even to roll down stones on them to any great extent; and that the unfavourable nature of the ground in the rear of the enemy's position rendered it imperative for them, as soon as it appeared clear that they would have ultimately to retire, to do so in good time, before it was possible for them to try conclusions with the sword.

13. The endurance of our infantry, and the careful and judicious leading of their officers were conspicuous throughout the day. The signalling arrangements, under Captain E. V. O. Hewett, Royal West Kent Regiment, were perfectly carried out and were of the greatest value, as they enabled me to time the various movements with an accuracy which would not have been otherwise possible, and which was of course one of the causes of our easy success. I have already alluded to the fire of the artillery, under Colonel W. Aitken, C.B., which left nothing to be desired in regard to accuracy and sound management.

14. The strength of the enemy present was about 2,000 men, and considerable reinforcements were on the way to help them, but retired without taking any part in the action. It is now reported that the long range volleys fired by the Buffs had a most demoralising effect, as the bullets arrived before the sound of the discharges, whose smoke also could not be seen; so that the volleys could not be "dodged." The enemy's casualties, as reported up to date, included about 50 killed.

15. While the operations described above were in progress, the force under Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, V.C., at Rustam and Pirsai [see paragraph 2 (b) *ante*] was not idle.

* Two squadrons, Guides Cavalry, under Captain F. G. H. Davies.

Three squadrons, 10th Bengal Lancers, under Major F. A. Blyth.

† The Guides Infantry under Major F. Campbell.
The 31st Punjab Infantry under Major A. Wallace.

A section of the 4th Company, Bengal Sappers, under Lieutenant J. M. C. Colvin, R.E.

On the 6th January the cavalry* reconnoitred the Pirsai, Malandri, and Ambela Passes, finding some 40 men on the first named, and 800 to 1,000 on each of the others. On the afternoon of the same day the infantry† of the force under Lieutenant-Colonel H. N. McRae marched from Rustam to Pirsai village, where they bivouacked for the night; and at 7-30 next morning advanced against the pass, which they took with slight opposition. At 11 A.M., the cavalry

commenced to cross the pass, which was found exceedingly difficult for horses, especially on the north side, where a great deal of ice and hoar frost was met with, ultimately Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, V.C., reconnoitred in person with infantry towards Bampokha as far as Kuai, and then returned for the night to Chorbanda, below the pass. Next day, the 8th, he opened communication with Brigadier-General Meiklejohn at Kingargali, and reconnoitred to Tursak, and towards the south-east, finding a gathering of the enemy on the hills near Tursak. On the evening of this day Lieutenant-Colonel Adams and the cavalry joined the 1st Brigade under Brigadier-General Meiklejohn at Kingargali, Lieutenant-Colonel McRae also joined General Meiklejohn on the 10th with his infantry and sappers, after three days' very hard work in getting his baggage over the pass.

16. The movement thus successfully carried out by Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, V.C., was of very great value, as the sudden appearance of five squadrons and two battalions in the middle of the Buner country, in addition to the brigade which came over the Tanga Pass, helped most effectually to prevent the enemy from being encouraged to make fresh resistance, as they might have been otherwise in consequence of the delay which necessarily took place before I could bring supplies enough over that pass to enable me to advance.

17. On the 9th January, as I found it hopeless to make the Tanga Pass fit for camels in any reasonable time, and as water was very scarce at Sanghao, I moved Brigadier-General Jeffreys from that place to Katlang with the portion of his brigade which was at Sanghao, it being equipped with camel transport; and I directed him to proceed by easy marches to the Ambela Pass, where I intended to join him later. The 10th Field Battery accompanied Brigadier-General Jeffreys.

18. The first move in force from Kingargali was made by Brigadier-General Meiklejohn into the Bazargai valley on the 10th January, with a small column consisting of two battalions, one battery, two squadrons and a detachment of Sappers.

19. On the 11th, I received a report that preparations were being made by the enemy to * Four battalions, two batteries, two squadrons, offer resistance near Tursak to my further advance. one Company Sappers. I had arranged to organise my first brigade under Brigadier-General Meiklejohn as a brigade of all arms* and to march with it through Buner to Chamla, dealing with the various sections of the tribes during the movements; and on hearing of the intended resistance I made preparations to add a battalion and three squadrons temporarily to this brigade, if necessary; while at the same time I directed Brigadier-General Jeffreys, who was still at Katlang, to march at once on the Ambela Pass and to make himself felt there as soon as possible.

20. However, the intended opposition fell through, as the Bunerwals came to the conclusion that the risk of defeat, and of the destruction of their property which would have followed it, was too great; and I accordingly sent the extra battalion and three squadrons to join General Jeffreys *via* Sanghao and Katlang, as I did not consider it advisable to take them on with me.

21. On the 12th January, I moved the force at Kingargali (except half a battalion left to garrison the post) to Tursak, where Brigadier-General Meiklejohn joined me with his column from the Bazargai valley on the same day. On the 13th, Brigadier-General Meiklejohn marched with a small column of all arms to Bai, near the famous shrine of the "Pir Baba," which was visited by the Mahomedan officers and soldiers of the column; and on the 14th he moved to Hilai. On the same day I completed the provisioning of the 1st Brigade up to the 24th January, and having dropped communication with Sanghao, I marched the troops at Tursak on the 15th to Dagar, sending Brigadier-General Meiklejohn with his column from Hilai to Rega, to destroy the house and property of Mulla Saidulla, the "Mad Fakir." On the 16th, Brigadier-General Meiklejohn moved to Barkilli, close to the Buner Pass, where I joined him, and the force at Dagar marched under Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, V.C., to Bajkatta.

22. I had now reached the south-eastern border of Buner, and all the Bunerwal sections had paid up their fines and made submission as I passed through or near their several districts.

23. Meanwhile Brigadier-General Jeffreys, on receiving my telegram of the 11th directing him to push on towards the Ambela Pass, marched to Rustam the same day, and thence to Surkabi, at the mouth of the pass, on the following day. Some slight show of opposition was made to him at first, which resulted in the loss to the enemy of three killed and two wounded, but by the evening of the 16th he had fully occupied the pass, while Major E. Blunt, R.E., under his orders, had opened a road fit for camels down to its foot on the Chamla side. General Jeffreys received 900 mules from Peshawar on the 16th, and in accordance with my instructions prepared to march his brigade into Chamla on the 17th.

24. On the 15th Colonel V. A. Schalch, the Commandant of Communications, evacuated Sanghao and the line thence to Mardan, and on the following day he had opened the line from Mardan to Surkhabi, forming the advanced depôt at Rustam.

25. On the 17th I moved from Barkilli to Ambela in Chamla with Brigadier-General Meiklejohn's force, leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Adams' force at Bajkatta for one more

day, in order that the survey of that neighbourhood might be completed. At Ambela I met Brigadier-General Jeffreys, who occupied Kogah and Nawagai with his brigade, and proceeded to reconnoitre the lower end of the Chamla Valley with the 10th Bengal Lancers under Major F. A. Blyth.

26. The Chamlawals had paid up all fines by the afternoon of the 18th, and consequently on that and the following day I moved the whole of my force over the Ambela Pass into British territory; so that the Buner expedition was concluded on the twelfth day after its commencement on the 7th January.

27. The discipline and conduct of the troops throughout the expedition were all that could be desired. The 1st and 2nd Brigades were most ably and efficiently commanded by Brigadier-General W. H. Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G., and Brigadier-General P. D. Jeffreys, C.B., respectively; and I have the honour accordingly to recommend these officers strongly to the favourable consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

28. It will be understood from the smoothness and rapidity with which the operations of the force were carried out, that the staff duties of all kinds—divisional brigade, line of communications, and at the base—were performed in a very perfect manner by the officers concerned, each in his own sphere. The names of the principal staff officers who thus contributed so largely to the success of the expedition, are as under, and I have the honour to recommend them all to the favourable consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

Divisional Staff.

Major H. H. Burney, Gordon Highlanders, Assistant Adjutant General.
Lieutenant-Colonel A. Masters, 2nd Central India Horse, Assistant Quartermaster General.
Captain H. E. Stanton, D.S.O., R.A., Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General, Intelligence Branch.
Captain E. V. O. Hewett, Royal West Kent Regiment, Superintendent, Army Signalling.
Surgeon-Colonel J. C. G. Carmichael, Indian Medical Service, Principal Medical Officer.
Brevet-Colonel W. Aitken, C.B., R.A., Commanding Royal Artillery.
Lieutenant-Colonel W. Peacocke, C.M.G., R.E., Commanding Royal Engineer.
Major E. Blunt, R. E., Field Engineer.
Major M. C. Barton, R. E., Field Engineer.
Captain C. L. Robertson, R.E., Survey Officer.
Captain L. G. Watkins, R.A., Ordnance Officer.
Major H. Wharry, D.S.O., Staff Corps, Chief Commissariat Officer.
Captain A. R. Burlton, Staff Corps, Commissariat Officer.
Captain C. G. R. Thackwell, Staff Corps, Divisional Transport Officer.
Veterinary-Captain H. T. W. Mann, Army Veterinary Department, Senior Veterinary Officer.

1st Brigade Staff.

Major E. A. P. Hobday, R. A., Deputy Assistant Adjutant General.
Captain G. F. H. Dillon, 40th Pathans, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General.
Captain C. H. Beville, Staff Corps, Brigade Commissariat Officer.
Captain J. M. Camilleri, 13th Bengal Infantry, Brigade Transport Officer.

2nd Brigade Staff.

Captain A. B. Dunsterville, East Surrey Regiment, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General.
Major C. H. Powell, 2-1st Gurkhas, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General.
Captain G. A. Hawkins, Staff Corps, Brigade Commissariat Officer.
Captain D. Baker, 2nd Bombay Grenadiers, Brigade Transport Officer.

Line of Communications.

Colonel V. A. Schalch, 11th Bengal Infantry Commandant.
Major L. Herbert, Central India Horse, Staff Officer.
Captain C. E. Belli-Bivar, 7th Bombay Lancers, Road Commandant.
Lieutenant W. Robertson, R. E., Telegraph Officer.
Mr. H. C. Sheridan, Senior Postal Superintendent, Post Office.

Base.

Colonel E. H. Bingham, 13th Bengal Infantry, Base Commandant.

Major A. Cadell, 38th Dogras, Staff Officer.

Captain S. W. Lincoln, Staff Corps, Base Commissariat Officer.

Lieutenant C. G. Lewes, Essex Regiment, Transport Officer.

29. I have also the honor to recommend to His Excellency's favourable consideration the under-named officers who commanded the battalions and other units of my force in a thoroughly satisfactory manner, *viz.* :—

Lieutenant-Colonel A. E. Ommanney, Commanding the 1st Battalion, The Buffs.

Major C. W. H. Evans, Commanding the 1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment.

Lieutenant-Colonel R. D. B. Rutherford, Commanding the 2nd Battalion, Highland Light Infantry.

Major F. Campbell, Commanding the Guides Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. Montanaro, Commanding the 16th Bengal Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. B. Woon, Commanding the 20th Punjab Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel W. C. Faithfull, Commanding the 21st Punjab Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. N. McRae, Commanding the 31st Punjab Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel F. G. T. Welch, Commanding the 3rd Bombay Light Infantry.

Major C. A. Anderson, Commanding 10th Field Battery, R. A.

Major M. F. Fegen, Commanding No. 7 Mountain Battery, R. A.

Captain A. H. C. Birch, Commanding No. 8. (Bengal) Mountain Battery.

Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Adams, v.c., Commanding Guides Cavalry.

Major F. A. Blyth, Commanding 10th Bengal Lancers.

Captain E. P. Johnson, Commanding No. 5 Company, Queen's Own Sappers and Miners.

Lieutenant H. R. Stockley, Commanding No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

30. I have also the honor to bring the following medical officers to His Excellency's favourable notice on account of the very satisfactory manner in which they carried out their duties, *viz.* :—

Surgeon-Major C. W. Johnson, Army Medical Staff.

Surgeon-Major W. A. Sykes, D.S.O., Indian Medical Service.

31. I am greatly indebted to my personal staff, and I have the honor specially to commend the services of the under-named officers thereof, *viz.* :—

Lieutenant Viscount Fincastle, v.c., 16th Lancers, Aide-de-Camp.

Lieutenant W. S. Fraser, 19th Bengal Lancers, Orderly Officer.

32. I have further the honor to bring to notice the good services of the following Political officers, *viz.* :—

Mr. C. E. Banbury, Indian Civil Service, Chief Political Officer.

Lieutenant C. P. Down, Staff Corps, Assistant Political Officer.

Khan Bahadur Ibrahim Khan, Political Assistant.

33. I also beg to recommend the under-named Honorary Commissioned Officer, and Warrant Officer to favourable consideration on account of the highly satisfactory manner in which they carried out their duties, *viz.* :—

Honorary Lieutenant A. Watt, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

Conductor A. Edwards, Unattached List, Staff Clerk.

34. The Revd. L. Klugh, Chaplain, Church of England, and the Revd. R. H. Stevenson, M. A., Chaplain, Church of Scotland, accompanied the force during its march through Buner, and carried out their duties most satisfactorily.

35. Rai Bahadur Lorinda Mal, Contractor to the Commissariat of the force, is brought to favourable notice by Major H. Wharry, D.C.O., Chief Commissariat Officer, and I accordingly beg to recommend that his services may be rewarded in some suitable manner.

36. I regret that the Nabha Infantry, who were sent to join the Buner Field Force towards the conclusion of the operations, did not arrive in time to take part in them. I inspected the battalion at Mardan on 20th January, and was well satisfied with the turn-out of all ranks and with the manner in which they moved and in which the men handled their arms.

37. I have the honor to attach a casualty return, together with a sketch of the scene of the action on the 7th January. The Intelligence Department maps may be consulted for other details.

Return of casualties in action at the Tanga Pass on 7th January 1898.

BUNER FIELD FORCE.

SUMMARY.

Officers :—Killed—nil ; Wounded—nil ; Missing—nil.

Non-Commissioned Officers and men :—Killed—nil ; Wounded—1 ; Missing—nil.

Appendix C (1).

Numerical Return of casualties in Action in the Malakand and Buner Field Forces from the 26th July 1897 to the 23rd January 1898.

Corps or Department.	KILLED.					WOUNDED.										MISSING.		REMARKS.						
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Warrant Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers.	Rank and File.	Total killed.	OFFICERS.			NATIVE OFFICERS.			NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.			RANK AND FILE.			Total wounded.	Non-Commissioned Officers.	Rank and File.	Total Missing.	Total of killed, wounded and missing.	
							Dangerous.	Severe.	Slight.	Dangerous.	Severe.	Slight.	Dangerous.	Severe.	Slight.	Dangerous.	Severe.							Slight.
General Staff	1	1	2	1	3	4	
No. 1 Mountain Battery, R.A.	3	4	
" 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery	1	8	1	30	38	
" 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners	4	1	16	20	
" 5 Queen's Own Madras Sappers and Miners.	3	1	20	23	
" 3 Company Bombay Sappers and Miners	2	2	
11th Bengal Lancers	2	19	21	
Queen's Own Corps of Guides (Cavalry)	1	2	3	1	25	27	
1st Battalion, "The Queen's Buffs,"	3	6	29	
" "																								

N.B.—For nominal returns of casualties, vide Gazettes of India of October 2nd, December 4th, 1897, and February 26th, 1898.

Appendix C (2).

Nominal Return of British Officers Killed.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Action.	Date.	Nature of Wound.
Lieutenant (Deputy Assistant Commissary)	L. Manley ...	Commissariat Transport Department	Malakand	26th July 1897	Gunshot and sword wounds.
Lieutenant ...	H. L. S. Maclean ...	Guides Cavalry	Landakai	17th August 1897	Gunshot, thighs.
Lieutenant ...	R. T. Greaves ...	Lancashire Fusiliers	Ditto	Ditto	Gunshot and sword wounds.
Captain ...	W. E. Tomkins ...	38th Dogras	Markhanai	14th September 1897.	Gunshot, head.
Lieutenant ...	A. W. Bailey ...	Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	Gunshot, chest.
Lieutenant ...	V. Hughes ...	35th Sikhs	Dabar	16th September 1897.	Ditto.
Lieutenant ...	A. T. Crawford ...	Royal Artillery	Ditto.	Ditto	Gunshot.
Lieutenant-Colonel ...	J. L. O'Bryan ...	31st Punjab Infantry	Agrah and Gat	30th September 1897.	Gunshot, abdomen.
2nd-Lieutenant ...	W. C. Browne-Clayton ...	1st Royal West Kent	Ditto	Ditto	Gunshot.

Appendix C (3).

Nominal Return of British officers wounded.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Action.	Date.	Description of wound.	Nature of wound.
Major	W. W. Taylor	45th Sikhs	Malakand	26th July 1897	Dangerous	Gunshot, right side. Died, 28-7-97.
Lieutenant-Colonel.	J. Lamb	24th Punjab Infantry.	Gunshot, right thigh. Died, 23-8-97.
Major	L. Herbert	Deputy Assistant Adjutant General.	Severe	Gunshot, leg.
Lieutenant	F. W. Watling	Royal Engineers	Swordcut, leg.
Captain	H. F. Holland	24th Punjab Infantry.	Double bullet wound through back.
Lieutenant	E. W. Costello	27th July 1897	Dangerous	Bullet wound through back and right arm.
Do.	H. Ford	31st Punjab Infantry.	...	29th July 1897	...	Bullet wound, left arm.
Do.	H. L. S. Maclean	Guides Cavalry	...	28th "	...	Gunshot.
2nd-Lieutenant	J. D. P. Swinley	Severe	" face.
Lieutenant	A. A. Wynter	Royal Artillery	...	30th July 1897	...	Do.
Captain	F. M. Baldwin, D.S.O.	Guides Cavalry	Malakand	16th September 1897	...	Gunshot, ankle.
2nd-Lieutenant	J. V. Keyes	1st August 1897	...	" leg.
Lieutenant	H. B. Rattray	45th Sikhs	Chakdarra	...	Do.	...
Captain	H. I. E. Palmer	5th Punjab Cavalry.	Landakai	2nd August 1897	Severe	Gunshot, neck.
Lieutenant	H. A. Harrington	26th Punjab Infantry.	Markhanai	17th "	...	" wrist.
Do.	J. G. Gunning	35th Sikhs	Dabar	14th September 1897	Dangerous	" head (died 29th September 1897).
Captain	W. I. Ryder	2-1st Gurkhas	...	16th "	Severe	Gunshot, head; and swordcuts, back.
Lieutenant	G. R. Cassels	35th Sikhs	Slight	Gunshot, ankle.
Do.	F. C. Watson	Royal Engineers	Bilot	...	Dangerous	" head.
Brigadier-General	J. H. Wodehouse, C.B., C.M.G.	" Artillery	Nawagai	1st "	Severe	" left hand, and other minor wounds.
Veterinary Captain.	H. T. W. Mann	Army Veterinary Department.	...	20th September 1897	...	Gunshot, leg.
Captain	L. I. B. Hulke	The Buffs	Zagai	...	Slight	Contusion.
2nd-Lieutenant	G. N. S. Keene	Indian Staff Corps.	...	21st September 1897	...	Gunshot.
Lieutenant	R. E. Power	The Buffs	Dangerous	Do.
Major	R. S. H. Moody	Do.	Tangi	23rd September 1897	Slight	Gunshot, arm.
Do.	W. G. B. Western	Royal West Kent.	Agrah and Gat	30th September 1897	...	Do.
Captain	R. C. Style	Gunshot.
Do.	N. H. S. Lowe	Do.
2nd-Lieutenant	F. A. Jackson	Do.
Lieutenant	H. Isacke	Severe	Do.
Do.	E. B. Peacock	31st Punjab Infantry.	Gunshot, thigh.

NOTE.—Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, Guides Cavalry, was slightly wounded at Landakai on 17th August and Brigadier-General P. D. Jeffreys, Commanding 2nd Brigade, and Captain A. H. C. Birch, Royal Artillery, Commanding No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery, were also slightly wounded on the 16th September at Bilot, but are not returned as such.

Appendix C (4).

DETAILED LIST OF CASUALTIES IN THE MORE IMPORTANT ACTIONS.
(a) *Casualties at the Malakand, 26th July to 2nd August.*

Officers—

Killed (1)—

Lieutenant L. Manley, Commissariat Transport Department.

Wounded (19)—

Lieutenant-Colonel J. Lamb, 24th Punjab Infantry,—died of wounds.

Major W. W. Taylor, 45th Sikhs,—died of wounds.

Major L. Herbert, Assistant Adjutant General,—severely.

Captain H. F. Holland, 24th Punjab Infantry,—severely.

„ G. M. Baldwin, D.S.O., Guides Cavalry,—severely.

Lieutenant F. A. Wynter, Royal Artillery,—severely.

„ F. W. Watling, R.E,—severely.

„ E. W. Costello, 24th Punjab Infantry,—twice dangerously.

„ H. B. Ford, 31st Punjab Infantry,—dangerously.

„ H. L. S. Maclean, Guides Cavalry,—severely.

2nd-Lieutenant G. D. P. Swinley, 31st Punjab Infantry,—severely.

„ C. V. Keyes, Guides Cavalry,—slightly.

Also—

3 Native officers, 24th Punjab Infantry.

1 „ 31st „ „

1 „ No. 5 Company, Queen's Own Sappers and Miners.

2 „ Guides.

Non-commissioned officers and men—

Corps.	Killed.	WOUNDED.			
		Dangerous.	Severe.	Slight.	TOTAL.
No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery	...	1	...	5	6
11th Bengal Lancers	1	2	3	3	8
Guides Cavalry	1	3	3	6	2
24th Punjab Infantry	...	3	6	13	2
31st „	12	5	18	9	2
35th Sikhs	2	...	3	...	3
38th Debras	1	...	1
45th Sikhs	4	3	16	16	35
Guides Infantry	4	...	11	11	22
No. 5 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners	3	3	6	9	18
TOTAL	27	20	67	72	159

(b) *Casualties at Chakdarra, 26th July to 2nd August.*

Officers—

Wounded (1)—

Lieutenant H. B. Rattray, 45th Sikhs—severely.

Non-commissioned officers and men—

Corps.	Killed.	WOUNDED.			
		Dangerous.	Severe.	Slight.	TOTAL.
45th Sikhs	4	...	5	3	8
11th Bengal Lancers	1	...	2	...	2
TOTAL	5	...	7	3	10

*(c) Casualties at Landakai, 17th August.**Officers—**Killed (2)—*

Lieutenant H. L. S. Maclean, Guides Cavalry.

„ R. T. Greaves, Lancashire Fusiliers.

Wounded (2)—

Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, Guides Cavalry—(slight).

Captain H. I. E. Palmer, „ „ (severe).

Non-commissioned officers and men—

Corps.				Killed.	WOUNDED.			
					Dangerous.	Severe.	Slight.	TOTAL.
24th Punjab Infantry	3	3
31st „ „	1	...	1
45th Sikhs	1	1
Followers	2	2
TOTAL				1	6	7

*(d) Casualties at Markhanai, 14th September.**Officers—**Killed (2)—*

Captain Tomkins, 38th Dogras.

Lieutenant Bailey, 38th Dogras.

Wounded (2)—

Lieutenant Harington, 38th Dogras (mortally).

1 Native officer, „ „

Non-commissioned officers and men—

Corps.				Killed.	WOUNDED.			
					Dangerous.	Severe.	Slight.	TOTAL.
No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery	1	1
Guides Infantry	1
35th Sikhs	3
38th Dogras	1
Followers	2	2
TOTAL				4	7

*(e) Casualties in the Watelai Valley, 16th September.**Officers killed (2)—*

Lieutenant A. T. Crawford, R.A.

,, V. Hughes, 35th Sikhs.

*Officers, wounded (11)—*Brigadier-General P. D. Jeffreys, C.B. } Slightly, and not returned as wounded.
Captain A. H. C. Birch, R.A. ... }

,, W. I. Ryder, 2-1st Gurkhas... Slightly.

Lieutenant F. A. Wynter, R.A. ... Severely.

,, T. C. Watson, R.E. ... „

,, O. G. Gunning, 35th Sikhs „

,, G. R. Cassels ... Dangerously.

1 Native Officer, No. 8 Bengal Mountain

Battery ... Severely.

2 Native officers, 35th Sikhs ... 1 slightly and 1 severely.

1 Native officers, The Guides ... Dangerously.

Non-commissioned officers and men—

Corps.	Killed.	WOUNDED.			
		Dangerous.	Severe.	Slight.	TOTAL.
"The Buffs" ...	2	1	3	5	9
No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery ...	6	4	10	7	21
No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners. ...	4	4	7	4	15
Guides Infantry ...	2	2	6	2	10
35th Sikhs ...	22*	4	21	20	45
11th Bengal Lancers	2	...	2
Followers	3
TOTAL ...	36	15	49	38	105

* This includes 3 men missing.

*(f) Casualties at Damadolah, 18th September.**Officers—Nil.**Non-commissioned officers and men—*

Corps.	Killed.	WOUNDED.			
		Dangerous.	Severe.	Slight.	TOTAL.
35th Sikhs ...	1	3
38th Dogras ...	1	1
The Guides Infantry	1
TOTAL ...	2	5

*(g) Casualties at Zagai, 20th September.**Officers—*

Killed—Nil.

Wounded (4).

2nd-Lieutenant G. N. S. Keene, I.S.C., attached to "The Buffs," dangerously wounded.

Major R. S. H. Moody, Captain L. I. B. Hulke, and Lieutenant R. E. Power
The Buffs, all slightly wounded.

Non-commissioned officers and men—

Corps.	Killed.	WOUNDED.			
		Dangerous.	Severe.	Slight.	TOTAL.
The Buffs	6	2	8
38th Dogras	1	1	...	2
TOTAL	1	7	2	10

*(h) Casualties at Nawagai, 20th September.**Officers—*Killed—*Nil.*

Wounded (3)—

Brigadier-General J. H. Wodehouse, C.B., C.M.G., Commanding 3rd Brigade, Malakand Field Force, severely.

Veterinary-Captain H. T. W. Mann, slightly (contused by bullet striking his revolver).

Jemadar Mahadeo Singh, No. 3 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners, slightly.

Non-commissioned officers and men—

Corps.	Killed.	WOUNDED.			
		Dangerously.	Severely.	Slightly.	TOTAL.
No. 1 Mountain Battery, R. A.	4	4
The Queen's	1	2	2
11th Bengal Lancers	5	5
No. 3 (Bombay) Sappers and Miners	1	1
22nd Punjab Infantry	1	3	6	10
Followers	2	2	2	6
TOTAL	1	3	5	20	28

*(i) Casualties at Agrah and Gat, 30th September.**Officers. Killed (2)—*

Lieutenant-Colonel S. L. O'Bryen, 31st Punjab Infantry.

2nd-Lieutenant W. C. Browne-Clayton, Royal West Kent Regiment.

Wounded severely (3)—

Lieutenant H. Isacke, Royal West Kent Regiment.

Lieutenant E. B. Peacocke, 31st Punjab Infantry.

Jemadar Dip Sing, 31st Punjab Infantry.

Slightly (4)—

Major W. G. B. Western, Royal West Kent Regiment

Captain R. C. Style, Royal West Kent Regiment.

Captain A. H. S. Lowe, Royal West Kent Regiment.

2nd-Lieutenant F. A. Jackson, Royal West Kent Regiment.

Non-commissioned officers and men.

Corps.	Killed.	WOUNDED.			
		Dangerously.	Severely.	Slightly.	TOTAL.
Royal West Kent Regiment	3	3	4	14	21
31st Punjab Infantry	7	4	4	6	14
38th Dogras	1	2	1	4
Guides Cavalry	1	2	3
TOTAL	10	8	11	23	42

LIST OF HONOURS AND REWARDS.

Appendix D (1).

FIELD OPERATIONS, NORTH-WEST FRONTIER.

No. 671, dated Simla, 17th June 1898.

Extract from General Orders, Military Department.

With reference to the General Orders quoted in the margin, publishing despatches relating to the operations necessitated by late outbreaks in the North-West Frontier, the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council has much gratification in publishing, for general information, the subjoined despatch from the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for India:—

MILITARY,

No. 53.

INDIA OFFICE,

London, the 26th May 1898.

To His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council.

MY LORD,

I have considered in Council your Excellency's letter, No. 38, of 10th March 1898, in which you recommend the grant of the India Medal of 1895 for the various military operations that have recently taken place on the North-West Frontier. They commenced with the outbreak in the Tochi Valley on the 10th June 1897, and terminated on the 6th April last, a period which includes the punishment of the Darwesh Khel Waziris, the brilliant defence of the Malakand and Chakdarra, the operations in the Swat Valley, and Bajaur, the defeat of the Mohmands at Shabkadar and subsequently in their own country, the various actions on the line from Kohat to the Samana Range and Kurram, the short well-planned campaign against the tribes of Buner and Chamla, and finally the Tirah campaign against the powerful Orakzai and Afridi clans, resulting in their complete submission and compliance with the terms imposed by your Government. You recommend that the medal, with clasp inscribed "Punjab Frontier, 1897-98," should be conferred on all the troops in the field, and, in addition, clasps inscribed "Malakand, 1897," "Samana, 1897," "Tirah, 1897-98," to the troops engaged in these particular operations.

2. I have now the gratification of informing your Excellency that Her Majesty the Queen-Empress has been pleased to sanction your recommendation and that an Army Order notifying the grant of the India Medal in the manner proposed by your Government will shortly be issued.

3. It is also my gratifying duty to convey to you an expression of the high sense which Her Majesty's Government entertain of the moderation, judgment, and energy displayed by your Excellency in Council in dealing with these outbreaks, and to congratulate you on the success which has attended your efforts for their suppression.

4. Her Majesty's Government cordially concur in the terms in which, in your order of the 4th March 1898, you convey to his Excellency Sir George White your sense of the distinguished ability with which, both in the general direction of these operations, and throughout his term of office, he has discharged the responsible duties of the Commander-in-Chief in India. Great credit is also due to the military administration of your Government, to the officers of the Staff at Army Head-Quarters, and to the administrative heads and executive officers of the various departments, Civil and Military, whose duties, in circumstances of no ordinary difficulty, were carried out with much success.

5. Their acknowledgments are also due to General Sir W. Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., whose conduct, both in the military operations and in his dealings with the tribes, has been distinguished by his usual skill, energy, and judgment to Lieutenant General Sir A. P. Palmer, Major-General G. C. Bird, C.B., the late Major-General A. G. Yeatman-Biggs, C.B., and Major-Generals Sir Bindon Blood, K.C.B., and E. R. Elles, C.B., and the Brigadiers-General and other officers under their orders.

6. Her Majesty's Government especially desire to record their high appreciation of the gallant conduct and admirable qualities of the British and Native commissioned, warrant and non-commissioned officers and privates of Her Majesty's forces engaged in this campaign. The operations were carried on against a bold and active enemy, in a country presenting formidable difficulties to the movements of troops, and under the severest and most trying conditions of climate and exposure. That the determined opposition and extraordinary difficulties encountered were overcome in a manner which has excited universal admiration, was due to the distinguished bravery, the perfect discipline, the cheerful and resolute endurance of hardships shown by both British and Native soldiers and to the gallant leading and example of their officers. Their exertions have been crowned with conspicuous success, the frontier tribes have tendered their complete submission, and peace has been re-established on the North-West Frontier of India.

7. Her Majesty's Government deplore the loss of so many of Her Majesty's brave soldiers who have either fallen in action or died from the effects of field service. They

especially desire to record their admiration of the gallant conduct of the detachment of the 36th Sikhs, who were all killed fighting to the last in defence of the post of Saragharbi.

8. Her Majesty's Government have noticed with much satisfaction the excellent services of the Imperial Service troops who have fought side by side with Her Majesty's Army in this campaign, and taken their full share of its hardships. Their acknowledgments are due to the Chiefs of the Native States who placed their regiments and transport trains at your disposal, and also to the Native Princes, His Highness the Maharaja of Patiala, Major the Maharaj Rana of Dholpur, Lieutenant-Colonel the Maharaja of Kooch Behar, G.C.I.E., and Lieutenant-Colonel Maharaj Dhiraj Sir Pertab Singh, G.C.S.I., of Jodhpur, for their personal services on the Staff in the field.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble Servant,

(Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.

Appendix D (2).

Orders regarding Medal, War Services, and Gratuity.

"Her Majesty the Queen has been graciously pleased to command that the India Medal, 1895, with clasps inscribed 'Punjab Frontier, 1897-98,' 'Malakand, 1897'.....shall be granted to the troops employed in the recent military operations on the North-West Frontier of India as indicated below :—

Clasps inscribed 'Punjab Frontier, 1897-98.'—

(a)

(b) To all troops who proceeded beyond Jalala between the 26th July 1897 and the 23rd January 1898, inclusive.

Clasp inscribed 'Malakand, 1897.'—

(c) To all troops mentioned in clause (b) above, who took part in the defence relief of Malakand and Chakdarra between the 26th July and the 2nd August 1897, inclusive."*

Officer engaged in these operations were allowed to record their war services in the "Army List" and Records of service as under †:—

"North-West Frontier of India, 1897-98" followed by the word (b) Malakand, (e) Buner, by those who served with those forces. Under the above headings are recorded the following particular incidents:—

B.—(1) Defence of Malakand (G. G. O. 1089 of 1897.)

(2) Relief of Malakand (")

(3) Defence of Chakdarra (")

(4) Relief of Chakdarra (")

(5) Action at Landakai (")

(6) Operations in Bajaur (G. G. O. 1317 of 1898.)

(7) " in the Mamund country (")

C.—Attack and capture of the Tanga pass (G. G. O. 271 of 1891.)

REWARDS.

No 673.—The Governor-General in Council has much pleasure in announcing that the Right Hon'ble the Secretary of State for India has sanctioned the issue of a gratuity to all officers, non-commissioned officers and men, including Imperial Service troops, engaged in the recent operations on the North-West Frontier.

2. The gratuity will be issued at the rate of Rs. 24 per share for British, and Rs. 12 for Native, soldiers, according to the rank of the recipient, and will also be admissible to the heirs of those killed in action, or who died of disease during the operations, but no corps or individual shall be eligible for more than one grant of gratuity, whether employed in two or more expeditions or operations, or not.

* Army Order No. 77 of 1898 as amended by Army Order No. 96 of 1898.
† G. O. C. C. 510 of 1898.

3. Details regarding the number of shares admissible to each rank or class,* the mode in which payment of the gratuity will be made, etc., will be notified hereafter in Indian Army Circulars.

* By Special India Army Circular, dated 18th June 1898, the gratuity was issued as under:—

Shares.			
General ...	400	} With 100 shares extra if in Chief Command.	
Lieutenant-General ...	152		
Major-General ...	76		
Brigadier-General ...	57	} With 50 shares extra if in Chief Command.	
Colonel on the Staff ...	40		
Surgeon-Colonel ...	32		
Colonel ...	16		
Lieutenant-Colonel ...	12 shares.		
Brigade Surgeon-Lieut.-Col. ...	12 shares.		
Surgeon-Lieut.-Col. ...	7½ shares.		
Veterinary-Lieut.-Col. ...	7½ shares.		
Captain Major ...	12 shares.		
Surgeon-Captain ...	12 shares.		
Veterinary Captain ...	12 shares.		
Chaplain, Church of England ...	Senior Chaplain ... 16		
or Scotland ...	Junior " ... 12		
Chaplain, Non Conformist 12		
" Roman Catholic 12		
Lieutenant ...	7½ shares.		
Surgeon-Lieutenant ...	7½ shares.		
Veterinary-Lieutenant ...	7½ shares.		

Shares.			
Warrant Officers	4
Non-Commissioned Officers and Men—			
Class I	3
" II	2½
" III	2
" IV	1½
" V	1
NATIVE TROOPS.			
Native Officers above rank of Jemadars	10
Jemadars and Resaldars	4
Duffadars and Havildars	2
Naicks	1½
All others	1

Appendix D (3).

London Gazette, dated 9th November 1897.

War Office, 9th November 1897.

"The Queen has been graciously pleased to signify Her intention to confer the decoration of the Victoria Cross on the undermentioned officers, whose claims have been submitted for Her Majesty's approval for their conspicuous bravery during the operations on the North-West Frontier of India, as recorded against their names.

Regiment.	Name.	Acts of Courage for which recommended.
Indian Staff Corps ...	Major and Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Bellew Adams.	During the fighting at Nawa-Kili, in Upper Swat, on the 17th August 1897, Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Adams proceeded with Lieutenants H. S. Maclean and Viscount Fincastle, and five men of the Guides, under a very heavy and close fire, to the rescue of Lieutenant R. T. Greaves, Lancashire Fusiliers, who was lying disabled by a bullet wound and surrounded by the enemy's swords-men. In bringing him under cover he (Lieutenant Greaves) was struck by a bullet and killed—Lieutenant Maclean was mortally wounded—whilst the horses of Lieutenant-Colonel Adams and Lieutenant Viscount Fincastle were shot, as well as two troop horses.
16th Lancers ...	Lieutenant Alexander Edward Viscount Fincastle.	
Indian Staff Corps ...	Lieutenant Edmond William Costello.	On the night of the 26th July 1897, at the Malakand, Lieutenant Costello went out from the Hospital enclosure and, with the assistance of two sepoy, brought in a wounded Lance Havildar who was lying 60 yards away in the open on the football-ground. This ground was at the time over-run with swords-men and swept by a heavy fire both from the enemy and our own men who were holding the sapper lines.

MEMORANDUM.

Lieutenant Hector Lachlan Stewart Maclean, Indian Staff Corps, on account of his gallant conduct as recorded above, would have been recommended to Her Majesty for the Victoria Cross had he survived.

"London Gazette," dated the 20th May 1898.

WAR OFFICE;

May 20, 1898.

The Queen has been graciously pleased to signify Her intention to confer the decoration of the Victoria Cross on the undermentioned officers and soldiers, whose claims have been submitted for Her Majesty's approval, for their gallant conduct during the recent operations on the North-West Frontier of India, as recorded against their names:—

Regiment.	Name.	Act of Courage for which recommended.
Royal Engineers ...	Lieutenant Thomas Colclough Watson.	This officer, on the 16th September 1897, at the village of Bilot, in the Mamund Valley, collected a few men of the Buffs (East Kent Regiment) and of No. 4 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners, and led them into the dark and burning village to dislodge some of the enemy who were inflicting loss on our troops. After being wounded and driven back, he made a second attempt to clear the village, and only desisted after a second repulse and being again hit and severely wounded.
Royal Engineers ...	Lieutenant James Morris Colquhoun Colvin.	On the same occasion, after Lieutenant Watson had been incapacitated by his wounds from further effort, Lieutenant Colvin continued the fight and persisted in two more attempts to clear the enemy out of the dark and still burning village. He was conspicuous during the whole night for his devotion to his men in the most exposed positions under a heavy fire from the enemy.

Extract from the London Gazette of the 21st April 1899.

War Office, April 21, 1899.

The Queen has been graciously pleased to signify Her intention to confer the decoration of the Victoria Cross on the under-mentioned non-commissioned officer, whose claims have been submitted for Her Majesty's approval, for his conspicuous bravery during an engagement at Bilot, on the North-West Frontier of India, on the night of the 16th-17th September, 1897:—

Regiment.	Name.	Act of Courage for which recommended.
The Buffs (East Kent Regiment).	Corporal James Smith.	On the night of the 16th-17th September, 1897, Corporal Smith, with a party of the Buffs, responded to Lieutenant Watson's call for volunteers, and followed that officer into the burning village of Bilot, driving off the enemy with the bayonet. Afterwards, although wounded, he continued firing steadily and coolly, and also helped to carry the wounded to the place prepared for them. When Lieutenant Watson left, in order to fetch assistance for wounded, Corporal Smith held the position till that officer's return, exposing his life freely in watching the enemy and directing the fire of his men.

Appendix D (4).

The undermentioned non-commissioned officers and men were awarded the "MEDAL FOR DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT IN THE FIELD"—

Private James Lever The Buffs.
" H. Nelthorpe"
" C. Poile"
" F. Finn"
Colour-Sergeant W. J. Willis Royal West Kent Regiment.
Lance-Corporal J. McGee Ditto.
Private C. Collins Ditto.

Appendix D (5).

The undermentioned Native troops were awarded the "ORDER OF MERIT;" the special acts of gallantry for which awarded being set forth at length in the *Gazettes of India* mentioned.

Number and Rank.			Name.			Corps.
<i>Gazette of India, 15th January 1898.</i>						
...	Ressaidar	...	Tirath Ram	Guides Cavalry.
1131½	Dufadar	...	Tursum	Ditto.
1473	Sowar	...	Sirandaz	Ditto.
1408	Do.	Nazir	Ditto.
1413	Do.	Gurdit Singh	Ditto.
840	Kot Dufadar	...	Sadr-ud-din	Ditto.
1012	Dufadar	...	Sham Singh	Ditto.
1274	Sowar	Pir Mahomed	Ditto.
1297	Do.	Panjaba	Ditto.
2798	Lance Naick	...	Sawan Singh	24th Punjab Infantry.
3580	Sepoy	Wadhawa Singh	Ditto.
3758	Do.	Fatteh Singh	Ditto.
...	Subadar	Gopala	Ditto.
2507	Havildar	...	Mir Abas	Ditto.
3451	Sepoy	Mir Badshah	Ditto.
3404	Do.	Khiyat-din	Ditto.
3457	Do.	Mir Gul	Ditto.
2549	Havildar	...	Ali Gul	Ditto.
3345	Sepoy	Said Hassan	Ditto.
3288	Do.	Umar Khan	Ditto.
...	Subadar	Syed Ahmed Singh	31st Punjab Infantry.
650	Havildar	...	Fazalad Khan	Ditto.
1700	Lance Havildar	...	Ahmed Khan	Ditto.
730	Do.	...	Walidad Khan	Ditto.
1615	Naick	...	Ram Singh	Ditto.
1519	Do.	Dilawar Khan	Ditto.
1697	Sepoy	Fareed Baksh	31st Punjab Infantry.
2145	Do.	Khiwa Khan	Ditto.
2306	Do.	Shera	Ditto.
2445	Do.	Ruha Singh	Ditto.
1983	Do.	Fatteh Khan	Ditto.
1226	Bugler	Fazal Khan	Ditto.
1154	Havildar	...	Kushal Singh
1335	Naick	Atma Singh
1897	Sepoy	Kala Singh

Number and Rank.			Name.			Corps.
...	Sub-Major	...	Mangal Singh	45th Sikhs.
...	Jemadar	...	Uttam Singh
2636	Havildar	...	Jawala Singh
2587	Do.	...	Teja Singh
2631	Naick	...	Chanda Singh
3029	Lance Naick	...	Natha Singh
78	Naick	...	Hossein Mahomed	No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery.
22	Gunner	...	Gul Ahmed	Ditto.
55	Do.	...	Imamdin	Ditto.
595	1st Grade Assistant.	Hospital	Kashi Ram
2246	Havildar	...	Biaz	Guides Infantry.
3354	Lance Naick	...	Mir Jafir
4223	Sepoy	...	Sohbat Khan
...	Subadar	...	Ramasami	Q. O. Madras Sappers and Miners.
1450	Naick	...	Azhagiri	Ditto.
...	Dooly-bearer	...	Nallatambi	Ditto.
1842	Lance Dafadar	...	Partab Singh	11th Bengal Lancers.
2417	Sowar	...	Prém Singh	Ditto.
1920	Do.	...	Arur Singh	Ditto.
2349	Do.	...	Phangán Singh	Ditto.
2070	Do.	...	Lal Budin	Ditto.
...	Sub-Major	...	Safar Khan	Guides Infantry.
...	Subadar	...	Shahi Jan	Ditto.
3285	Sepoy	...	Nur Ahmed	Ditto.
1998	Do.	...	Dar Jan	Ditto.
3346	Sepoy	...	Juwahir Singh	Ditto.
3485	Do.	...	Bishan Singh	Ditto.
2870	Naick	...	Sant Singh	45th Sikhs.
2729	Lance Naick	...	Nand Singh	Ditto.
3038	Sepoy	...	Jeewa Singh	Ditto.
2829	Do.	...	Prem Singh	Ditto.
2833	Do.	...	Bola Singh	Ditto.
3491	Do.	...	Kahan Singh	Ditto.
...	Jemadar	...	Bahadur Singh	Q. O. Guides Cavalry.
1142½	Dafadar	...	Hayath Mohamed	Ditto.
806½	Do.	...	Bura Khan	Ditto.
1455	Sowar	...	Mohamed Khan	Ditto.
1219½	Do.	...	Alaf Khan	Ditto.

Number and Rank.			Name.				Corps.
<i>Gazette of India, 26th February 1898.</i>							
3375	Havildar	Ali Gul	Guides Infantry.
4223	Sepoy	Sohbat	Ditto.
2171	Lance Dafadar	...	Sant Singh	11th Bengal Lancers.
2472	Sowar	Indar Singh	Ditto.
253	Trumpeter	...	Jiwan	No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery.
...	Jemadar	Nawab	Ditto.
...	Do.	Ishar Singh	Ditto.
299	Driver	Nihala	Ditto.
314	Gunner	Fateh Ali	Ditto.
314	Do.	Magh Singh	Ditto.
64	Do.	Nur Muhammad	Ditto.
2345	Colonel Havildar	...	Mian Khan	Bengal Sappers and Miners.
3768	Naick	Natha Singh	Ditto.
...	Subadar	Mangal Singh	35th Sikhs.
1228	Lance Naick	...	Baryan Singh	Ditto.
985	Sepoy	Karram Singh	Ditto.
...	Jemadar	Sikandar Khan	Guides Infantry.
4317	Havildar	...	Alam Khan	Ditto.
4080	Sepoy	Muhammad Khan	Ditto.
4214	Do.	Kazam	Ditto.
4236	Do.	Darweza Khan	Ditto.
3909	Do.	Khawaja Nur	Ditto.
3858	Do.	Muhammad Afzal	Ditto.
3912	Do.	Dewa Singh	Ditto.

Appendix E.

Statement of money fines and weapons collected from the various independent tribes implicated in the late rising at Malakund and Chakdarra.

Names of clans from whom collected.				Money fines.	Breech-loaders.	Muskets and jezails.	Swords.	REMARKS.
Upper Swatis on right bank	Rs. 20,000	40	1,126	600	<p>(a) In addition to this sum a fine of Rs. 4,000 was imposed on the Talash Valley but was subsequently remitted in consideration of the large amount of green crops consumed in this valley during the constant passage of our troops through it. The fine on the Dosha Khels of Rs. 3,500 realised by the Nawab of Dir was not demanded from him. Rs. 3,000 of this Rs. 18,000 was sent in by the Nawab of Dir in jewelry.</p> <p>(b) Taken from Adinzai, Dos'ia Khel and Maidan.</p>
Upper Swatis left bank	45	800	600	
Dir clans implicated in the rising	(a) 18,000	7	(b) 500	(b) 450	
Thana Khan Khels	20,000	6	100	...	
Darra and Palli	5,000	5	
Aladand and Dheri	10,000	11	100	3	
Ranizais	22,000	...	850	30	
Sam Ranizais	350	...	
Salarzais (Bajaur)	20	200	...	
Shamozai Utman Khels	35	100	...	
Total	450	...	
Laman	2,000	...	300	300	
Mamunds	22	50	...	
Jandolis	40	30	...	
			TOTAL	97,000	231	4,956	1,983	

Appendix F.
Statement showing punishment inflicted on the Tangi and Barazai British villages for participation in Malakand attacks.

Village.	Tribe.	ANNUAL REVENUE.				CENSUS OF 1891.		PUNISHMENT INFLICTED.		REMARKS.
		Mafi.	Frontier remission.	Khalsa.	Inam.	Houses.	Popula- tion.	Money fine.	Forfeitures.	
Sangao	...	Rs. 3	150	147	Rs. ...	146	684	Rs. 300		Fine equivalent to the full annual revenue assessed : distributed over agriculturists only.
Mian Khan	...	4	190	186	...	163	863	380		
Pipal	...	21	135	154	50	167	741	360		Forfeiture of Frontier Remission subject to recon- sideration at expiration of a term of three years.
Kui	...	62	344	584	110	400	1,811	1,100		
Kharké	...	6	188	806	...	382	1,678	1,000	
Babozai	...	125	...	825	250	353	1,737	1,200	
Mata	...	1	...	499	...	215	1,023	500		Rs. 10 mafi exempted from forfeiture as the grantees reside elsewhere.
Shamozai	...	22	...	578	...	195	990	600		Rs. 1 mafi ditto
Ghazi-Baba	...	32	...	78	...	39	241	78		Rs. 11 mafi ditto
		276	1,007	3,057	410	5,518	
	Total					
Tangi	...	134	1,875	...	1,250	2,290		* Excluding Rs. 135 per annum enjoyed by Muhammad Afzal Khan, Jagirdar, who behaved well.
"	...	459	2,370*	3,860		
	Total	593	4,245	...	1,250	6,150	

Appendix G (1).

No. 4666—"Field Operations—Malakand," dated Simla, the 19th October 1898.

From—SURGEON-GENERAL A. A. GORE, Principal Medical Officer, Her Majesty's Forces in India,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief in India to forward for the information of the Government of India reports of the medical history of the late Malakand Field Force, by Surgeon-Colonels G. Thomson and J. C. G. Carmichael, who held the appointment of Principal Medical Officer of the force for different periods.

2. The following table shows the amount of sickness and mortality with the force :—

Details.				British Officers.	British Troops.	Native Troops.	Followers.
Average strength				217	2,494	4,979	2,940
Admissions	Number	105	2,370	2,623	826
	Per cent. to strength	48	95	53	28
	Per mille per annum	981	2,005	1,008	570
Deaths	Number	10	38	130	58
	Per cent. to strength	4.6	1.5	2.6	2
	Per mille per annum	93.4	32.1	52.9	40

3. British troops suffered about twice as much as Native troops, whilst the followers were the healthiest. The death rate, which includes those killed in action, was highest amongst Native troops.

4. The principal diseases were :—

Diseases.				British Troops.	Native Troops.	Followers.
Mumps	1	5	42
Simple continued fever	70
Enteric fever	42
Diarrhoea	44	135	17
Dysentery	111	551	123
Ague	1,093	758	235
Remittent fever	299	20	18
Venereal	127	28	25
Rheumatism	30	52	25
Debility	96	57	12
Heat stroke and heat apoplexy	63	*14	1
Chest affections	29	151	95
Abscess	18	42	19
Skin diseases	55	119	20
Injuries	105	†511	124

* 16 cases died out of hospital not included in this number.

† Not including 29 cases died out of hospital.

5. Malarial fevers (the most prevalent diseases) were due to malarial poisons, excited by exposure to heat and wet.

6. The heat at the beginning of the expedition accounts for the many cases of heat stroke and heat apoplexy.

7. The water-supply, especially at Khar, was the cause of a great deal of irritation of the bowels amongst the troops, while cold and exposure account for the many admissions for chest affections.

8. With the exception of a few cases of relapse and 58 of a secondary type, the cases of venereal were contracted locally.

9. Enteric fever was imported from Peshawar and Nowshera where the disease was prevalent.

10. As regards the sickness amongst the several corps, the 10th Field Battery was the healthiest and the Royal West Surrey Regiment the unhealthiest amongst British troops, the former having an admission rate equivalent to 48 per cent. on the strength and the latter 179 per cent., the difference being 131 per cent. Amongst Native troops the 10th Bengal Lancers was the healthiest with an admission rate of only 18 per cent. on the strength, and the 39th Garhwal Rifles the unhealthiest with a ratio of 106 per cent.

11. The several recommendations to improve the field medical service will be dealt with by the committee now assembled for that purpose.

Appendix G (2).

EXTRACTS FROM THE CHIEF COMMISSARIAT OFFICER'S REPORT.

No. 168-A., dated Murree, 30th April 1898.

From—MAJOR H. WHARRY, D.S.O., Chief Commissariat Officer, Malakand and Buner Field Forces,

To—The Commissary General, Punjab Command, Murree.

I have the honour to submit my report on the Commissariat and Transport arrangements of the Malakand and Buner Field forces.

I proceeded to Malakand on 1st August 1897, and arrived there the same day whilst the attack on the camp was going on.

Immediately after my arrival at Malakand, I caused the balances of food and grain to be checked, and took over what was fit for issue. The deficiencies and losses, &c., that had occurred prior to my taking charge were dealt with by the Chief Commissariat Officer, Peshawar, as Malakand was then under him. The balance of food in stock was found to be sufficient to last for 12 days only.

Besides the ordinary garrison, the Guides Cavalry and Infantry, 11th Bengal Lancers, 35th Sikhs, 38th Dogras, had been pushed up, and for these no supply arrangements had been previously made, as the whole of the transport that could be collected had to be given to the troops.

In the Malakand Commissariat godown, which had been looted by the enemy during the attack when Lieutenant Manley was killed, great confusion prevailed, besides which considerable damage had been done to the bags of food supplies, which were used round the camp for defensive purposes. On the fourth day after my arrival, the supplies that I had arranged for when at Nowshera, began to arrive, relieving all anxiety as to the sufficiency of food.

It was in the first instance decided, that the advanced depôt should be located at Malakand, but afterwards, under the orders of the General Officer Commanding, it was moved to Khar, where it was opened on the 9th August 1897.

One month's supplies had been ordered from India for the whole force, and another month's was to be kept at Nowshera as a reserve. The supplies were promptly despatched by range Commissariat officers, and were pushed up from Nowshera as fast as possible, to the advanced depôt.

It was subsequently ordered on 21st August 1897, that the reserves of food supplies to be kept at Malakand, Rustam and Nowshera should be as follows :—

- (1) At Malakand, 30 days' supplies for the Malakand Field Force (*viz.*, 1st and 2nd Brigades).
- (2) At Rustam, 15 days' supplies for the 3rd Brigade (formerly 1st Reserve Brigade).
- (3) At Nowshera, 30 days' supplies for the Malakand Field Force 1st and 2nd Brigades, and 45 days' for the 3rd Brigade.

The above orders were modified when the 3rd Brigade left to join the Tirah Field Force, and it was ordered that, after storing supplies equal to two months' consumption for the whole force at Malakand, future supplies should be regulated so that 45 days' reserve would be always maintained at Malakand, and 15 days' in transit to Malakand, and 15 days' kept in reserve at Nowshera and replenished periodically. A liberal supply of rum, limejuice and preserved provisions was also maintained at Nowshera and Malakand.

Fifteen days' stock of slaughter cattle, sheep and goats was originally maintained at Malakand for the 1st and 2nd Brigades, and one month's stock for the 3rd Brigade at Mardan, but eventually the following reserve for the whole force was kept at Malakand :— Cattle, 700 ; goats, 800 ; sheep, 600.

A reserve also of 15,000 maunds grain, 8,000 maunds pressed bhoosa was arranged.

All British corps were provided at Nowshera with 20 days' supplies before leaving for the front.

Free rations to Native troops and followers were issued beyond Mardan.

The column that relieved Chakdarra on 2nd August 1897 was equipped with mule transport and took three days' supplies with it. The garrison on relief was found to have

6 days' supplies in hand, and these were supplemented by a convoy sent out the next day. The relieving column went into camp at Amandara in the Swat Valley, where it was subsequently joined by the rest of the troops which constituted the 1st Brigade.

From Amandara the 1st Brigade proceeded on a 12 days' expedition into Upper Swat, and as the country to be operated in was unsuitable for camel transport, with which the whole force had been equipped, it became necessary to arrange for as many mules as possible by withdrawing the whole of those (excepting water mules) from the 2nd Brigade and the Malakand garrison. The battery baggage mules of No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, also had to be requisitioned for, for the use of No. 7 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, and No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery. The brigade in this way could only be equipped on the light field service scale, and marched on the 16th of August 1897, taking with it 12 days' supplies and 2 days' grain.

On return from Upper Swat, the mule transport with the 1st Brigade was handed over to the 2nd Brigade, which was then under orders to proceed against the Utman Khels, but this was subsequently countermanded, and the 2nd and 3rd Brigades were directed to move through the Bajaur Valley to co-operate with the Mohmand Field Force. To enable these two brigades to proceed as ordered, I had to establish an advanced godown at Chakdarra, and as soon as the force marched, a convoy of 21 days' supplies for it was moved up, and an advanced depôt was established at Panjkora, from which all their supplies were subsequently drawn.

The 2nd Brigade was completed with 10 days' supplies and 1 day's grain at Ghosam in the Bajaur Valley, one march beyond Panjkora, and the 3rd Brigade moved from Panjkora with 15 days' supplies and 2 days' grain, both taking a suitable proportion of tinned provisions and extras. These provisions, &c., it was thought, would be sufficient to see both brigades through to Shabkadar, but the operations against the Mamunds and the enforced halt of the 3rd Brigade at Nawagai necessitated fresh arrangements being made, and the Panjkora godown had to be re-formed after it had once been closed and had returned with all transport to Chakdarra.

The re-establishment of the godown at Panjkora, and keeping it and that established at Chakdarra filled up for a period of nearly two months, taxed our sources to their utmost, and it is very satisfactory to be able to report that 3 advanced depôt godowns, *viz.*, Malakand, Chakdarra and Panjkora, were efficiently worked with the establishment allowed for only one.

Our line of communication was lengthened from 60 to 70 miles the advanced brigades being at Inayat Kila and Nawagai, and both had to be fed from the Panjkora godown, which was some 40 miles beyond the first advanced depôt established at Malakand.

To keep the Panjkora godown replenished, no extra transport was given, and our difficulties were further increased by the withdrawal, for the Tirah Expeditionary Force, of the Government cart train between the base and Malakand, which left me without any line of communication transport for a line of over 100 miles. The maundage contract, on which I was entirely dependent for the carriage of supplies from the base to Malakand, fortunately worked well, and beyond this, the Brigade Transport had to be utilized, it was overworked, but this could not be helped. I did not ask for more transport, as I knew that large and urgent demands for Tirah Expeditionary Force had to be met.

After the departure of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, the 1st Brigade moved from Khar to Panjkora on 10th September 1897, taking 8 days' supplies, and on Khar being evacuated the advanced depôt godown was moved back to Malakand.

After halting 8 days at Nawagai until 22nd September, the 3rd Brigade marched to Kuz Chinarai to co-operate with the Mohmand Field Force, and eventually proceeded to Peshawar *via* Shabkadar, arriving there on 2nd October, the date up to which I had rationed it, and it was then struck off the strength of the force.

Whilst at Nawagai food supplies were drawn from Inayat Kila which was filled up by frequent convoys from Panjkora. The great scarcity of fuel was our chief difficulty here; houses were purchased for the wood they contained, and 50 camel loads of wood had to be brought up from Inayat Kila. The Political Officer could render us no assistance. Fodder and barley were obtained locally.

It was supposed that the Mohmand Field Force were arranging to assist our 3rd Brigade when at Nawagai in the matter of supplies, but, instead of this being the case, I was called upon most unexpectedly to provide food, &c., for some of the troops of the Mohmand Field Force, that were left at Kuz Chinarai attached to our 3rd Brigade. This caused me considerable inconvenience, as it necessitated a special convoy being sent from Inayat Kila to Kuz Chinarai, a distance of some 22 miles, and the transport was never able to return at a time when every animal was required by me.

The necessity for keeping the advanced godown at Chakdarra ceased on the return of the two Brigades (1st and 2nd) from Panjkora; it was therefore closed on the 27th October 1897, and transferred with establishment, &c., to Malakand, excepting 3 months' supplies for the Chakdarra garrison, which were stored inside the fort.

BUNER FIELD FORCE.

The arrangements made for the Buner Field Force were as follows.

Whilst the 1st and 2nd Brigades of the Malakand Field Force were encamped at Kunda, arrangements were made for the storage of 15 days' supplies for them at Mardan. The object of storing these supplies at Mardan was twofold; it was only one march from Kunda, and the force camped at the latter place were able to send in their transport to draw what was required, and at the same time, as the road to the Tanga and Umbeyla passes branched off at Mardan, it was most convenient spot to form a godown in case a forward move against the Bunerwals had to be made. All issues to the force at Kunda were immediately replaced from Nowshera, so that when the advance was ordered everything was ready.

The 2nd Brigade, equipped with camel transport, moved from Kunda direct to Katlung on 2nd January and the 1st Brigade equipped with mules marched the same day to Mardan.

A stage godown was established at Katlung by the time the 2nd Brigade arrived there. The Commissariat-Transport establishments, &c., from Jalala were transferred to this post, and 5 days' supplies for two brigades were sent there on carts from Mardan.

The 1st Brigade marched from Mardan on 5th January 1898, equipped entirely with mule transport for the carriage of kits and 7 days' supplies, besides two days' tinned provisions and two issues of extras. As it was anticipated that the Tanga pass would be attacked on the 7th of January 1898, I arranged to send with this brigade two days' supplies on camels, in addition to the above 7 days', for consumption on 5th and 6th January 1898, so that on arrival at Sanghao, it had 7 days' supplies intact, and was in a position to take the field at once, the camels only having to be left behind. The 2nd Brigade moved to Sanghao from Katlung on 6th January 1898, equipped with camel carriage and taking 5 days' supplies.

The 16th Bengal Infantry, No. 5 Company, Sappers and Miners and No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery from Dargai joined the force at Sanghao, marching with 9 days' supplies, so that they might also arrive with a clear 7 days' in hand. The 3rd Bombay Light Infantry was added to the force and took 5 days' supplies from Mardan.

The advanced depôt was moved up to Sanghao near the Tanga pass with a reserve of 10 days' supplies and opened there one day after the arrival of the force, and 15 days' reserve of supplies continued to be maintained at Mardan.

500 additional mules were received from Rawalpindi for this expedition, and were most useful in equipping the Rustam Column under Colonel Adams, that operated *via* the Pirsai pass. These mules enabled me to provide the Guides Infantry and 31st Punjab Infantry with complete carriage for their kits and 2 days' supplies for the whole column. Three days' supplies on camels also accompanied the column for consumption on the road and at Rustam.

The 2nd Brigade moved from Sanghao on 9th January 1898, *via* Rustam, to Surkhabi, at the entrance to the Umbeyla pass, taking with it rations to the extent transport was available.

The line of communication, *via* Katlung and Sanghao, to the Tanga pass was closed on the 15th of January 1898, and the advanced depôt transferred to Rustam on the 16th of January 1898, the stage godown at Katlung being moved with establishment on the same date to Kulakhet. The 914 mules that joined from the Tirah Expeditionary Force brought 5 days' supplies from Nowshera for the advanced depôt at Rustam, but they were not required. On completion of the operations in Buner, the godown at Rustam was moved back to Mardan, and the line was cleared on the 21st January 1898, the day the force was broken up. No grain, fodder or fuel was paid for during the time the troops were in Buner; the force helped itself from the Buner villages to all that was required.

GENERAL REMARKS.

I would suggest that the boxes containing preserved meat in future be clamped, as they can, at present, be easily opened and closed up again without this being detected. Many boxes on being opened in the field were found to contain less than they should have.

A larger percentage of 2 lbs. tins is necessary, and a proportion of 1 lb. tins also would be most useful. The provision of more small tins would be a little more expensive and slightly increase weight, but the extra convenience to the troops would more than compensate for this.

Limejuice was freely issued both to Europeans and Natives. It requires to be more carefully prepared, &c., than it is at present. In some casks it was very muddy, and one instance, hops were detected in the limejuice, which pointed to its having been put into a dirty beer cask.

A supply of Cavendish tobacco for British troops was maintained at Nowshera. The issue of dry leaf tobacco to Native troops was sanctioned. The total quantity of the latter demanded however was trifling, *vis.*, 347 lbs.

Fresh potatoes were procured from Nowshera and issued regularly. Onions, which were purchased locally, were usually issued to Native troops. They were much appreciated.

Cattle, sheep and goats could not be procured locally at the beginning of the operations owing to the unsettled state of the country. After the fighting had ceased and the villagers returned to their homes, as many as possible were purchased from them, but the greater number were obtained from Nowshera. A large number of cattle and goats died from pneumonia, the result of cold and exposure.

Baking powder was not used, as good bread was always available.

The biscuits supplied were generally good, though in some instances, on opening the tins, the contents were found mouldy. This was due either to defective tinning or to the biscuits not having been sufficiently baked.

Grain was obtained in the first instance from India, but afterwards in Bajaur large quantities of barley were purchased.

There was no difficulty in procuring fodder. Pressed bhoosa was not issued in the field, though, as a precautionary measure, a small reserve was maintained.

The issue of winter clothing, which was sanctioned after the 1st October, was made at Camp Muttashah in the Bajaur Valley. The establishments employed in the General Hospitals at Nowshera were supplied with field service warm clothing. The issue was sanctioned as a special case by the Government of India. All public followers employed at the base, who were under canvas, were provided with 1 warm coat, 1 pair of warm pyjamahs and 1 blanket each. At the close of the expedition these articles were withdrawn. Warrant and non-commissioned officers and men of British and Native corps who were employed at Nowshera in connection with the Malakand Field Force were supplied with field service warm clothing, the issue having been approved of by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

The General Officer Commanding is empowered, under paragraph 352, Field Service Code, to sanction renewals of clothing when necessary, and I would suggest that it be left also to his discretion to decide what clothing should be withdrawn, in case a campaign finishes before it is worn out, *vide* paragraph 354, Field Service Code, and also in the case of men invalided, &c., *vide* paragraph 355. A good deal of hardship might be avoided if such matters were left to be decided at the time on the spot. The amount realized by the sale of clothing withdrawn is usually trifling, and hardly repays the trouble of taking it back; it is seldom fit for storage.

I would again suggest the advisability of adding mule kajawahs to the bakery equipment for the carriage of bread. If troops are to get bread on the march, it must be carried from one camp to another for them. This is now done in gunny bags, and the loaves get a good deal damaged in consequence. In my opinion, it is a matter of the greatest importance that the British soldiers should always get a good and eatable loaf of bread.

Articles of brigade godown equipment should be packed in hinged boxes with hoops, &c., which can readily be opened when the contents are required. At present the lids of these boxes have to be nailed down before a brigade marches, and considerable inconvenience results sometimes in opening them again, besides which they get damaged from being constantly nailed down and opened.

A 2nd class base depôt was formed at Nowshera with the necessary establishment. The line of communications up to the 1st advanced depôt was under the control of the Base Commissariat Officer, who supervised all Commissariat and Transport matters connected therewith. Stage godowns, each under a non-commissioned officer, with an agent and usual establishment, were established at Mardan, Jalala and Dargai.

It is of the utmost importance that both officers and establishments for the base should get there as speedily as possible, otherwise confusion is likely to arise from stores, equipments, &c., arriving without a proper establishment being on the spot to take them over and dispose of them. Some difficulty was experienced in consequence of the base not being formed at Nowshera before supplies, &c., began to pour in, but this was unavoidable.

I would suggest, for consideration, the advisability of adding to the base depôt a section for the despatch of stores to the front. We already have a railway section, which receives over everything from the railway and makes it over to the sections concerned, and, similarly, I think a despatching section should be formed, which would receive over from the different sections such stores as are required to be despatched to the front. The despatching section would grant a receipt on the way bill form for what it takes over, and thus enable the section concerned to at once write off stores made over. The despatching section would, after receiving over stores, be responsible for their correct delivery to the 1st advanced depôt, and would deal with losses in transit, &c. The correct and punctual

despatch of stores to the field is a very important matter, and I think requires a special section to deal with it.

I would also suggest that the audit of base accounts would be greatly facilitated if each section of the base depôt submitted its accounts on the field system, every decade, direct to the Field Examiner, the officer in charge of the section being held responsible for their correct and punctual submission. The sectional officer's office should be in his godown, and the office work that would devolve on him could then be disposed of without his having to leave it. This system would do away with the large office now formed at the base, though some of the clerks would be required to be attached instead to sectional offices. The section accounts would then practically be dealt with in much the same way as those of a brigade in the field. If sectional officers had to send in accounts every 10 days direct to the Examiner, and Range Commissariat Officers in India sent an abstract of issues in field Commissariat form 9-A every 10 days, instead of monthly, receipts and despatches could be checked more promptly, and with greater ease, than at present.

Appendix G (3).

EXTRACTS FROM THE CHIEF TRANSPORT OFFICER'S REPORT.

Dated Camp Rawalpindi, the 5th April 1898.

From—CAPTAIN C. G. R. THACKWELL, Assistant Commissary General, Divisional Transport Officer, Malakand and Buner Field Forces,

To—The Chief Commissariat Officer, Malakand and Buner Field Forces.

I have the honour to submit the following report on the working of the Transport of the Malakand Field Force.

At the commencement of the operations there was much difficulty, but this was unavoidable, owing to the urgent necessity of pushing up troops to the relief of the beleaguered garrisons of Malakand and Chakdarra, before transport had been collected and organized. In many cases transport, detained in the morning, had to be used to equip troops proceeding to the front in the evening. There was, consequently, no time at Nowshera to organize the transport.

The transport allotted was the field service normal scale, hospitals being equipped with tongas for the carriage of sick.

A maundage contract had been entered into with Lorinda Mull, Rai Bahadur, for the carriage of stores, &c., between Nowshera and Dargai or Malakand. The rate agreed upon was 13 annas a maund for August, 12 annas for September, and 11 annas for October and November. This contract commenced on the 1st August, and worked well all through.

By 9th August a train of Government carts, to carry 500 maunds, was laid out between Nowshera and Khar (to which place the advanced depôt had been removed). As the Government carts had of necessity to be employed in bringing up troops, &c., the allotted number of camels and mules not arriving in time, it was impossible to start the train earlier. The carts were, on this account, laid out on the line from both ends, *i.e.*, carts which had brought regiments or stores up to Khar were placed at the stages nearest Khar on the return journey, and the line completed from Nowshera.

This train was afterwards strengthened as carts arrived at the base; but from the middle of August to 2nd October, all carts, with the exception of 212, were gradually withdrawn, and sent to Khushalgarh for the Tirah Expeditionary Force; and no provision, except the maundage contract from Nowshera to Khar entered into by you, existed for the transport work of the long line of communications.

By 14th August, one brigade had been equipped for operations in Upper Swat with entire mule carriage, carrying 12 days' supplies for men and 2 days' grain for animals: this was done by withdrawing the obligatory mules from all corps not in the brigade. As the mules carrying supplies became empty, these were utilised as riding animals for hospitals.

No communications were maintained with this brigade; and, consequently, the opportunity was taken of organising the camel transport, which was all collected at Khar. These animals were also employed at this time in carrying supplies to Khar from Dargai and Malakand, where there was sometimes a block owing to breaks in the cart road between Dargai and Malakand, or to camels, which had started from Nowshera laden with stores, being suddenly recalled for despatch to Peshawar, and having, therefore, to drop their loads and return at once to Nowshera.

A train of ambulance tongas was laid out between Nowshera and Khar for the carriage of sick, and worked well. It had been intended to lay out a dooly dāk also, but owing to other demands this arrangement could not be completed.

The work of this force was performed in the beginning of the operations with the following, aided by the maundage contract:—Mules, 3,467; camels, 3,306; carts, 757. But this number was gradually reduced by the despatch of carts for the Tirah Expeditionary Force, and the detaching of the 3rd Brigade at Nawagai to the Mohmand Field Force with carriage for 10 days' rations. On the 9th October, the available transport was only Mules, 3,171; camels, 2,353; carts, 212.

On 22nd September, the 3rd Brigade at Nawagai joined the Mohmand Field Force, completed with rations for 10 days, taking with it the following transport:—Mules, 310; camels, 890.

In addition to the above, 52 mules were, by order of the General Officer Commanding handed over to the Mohmand Field Force.

From 6th September, the strain on the transport was exceedingly heavy. Two mobile brigades had to be maintained in the field some 60 to 70 miles beyond Chakdarra, and not a single animal had been allotted or allowed for this long line; whilst an advanced depôt had to be maintained about 25 miles beyond Chakdarra. No help was asked for, as it was known that the Commissary General, Punjab Command, required every available man and animal for the Tirah Expeditionary Force.

The troops and all stores, &c., were withdrawn to the Swat Valley by the 29th October.

On return of the force, and after Chakdarra had been cleared of surplus stores, the camels were collected at Jalala and Dargai, at both of which places grazing was good, a few only having to be necessarily maintained at North Camp, Malakand.

The period of comparative rest which followed was of great benefit to the animals, and more particularly the camels, which were now suffering from skin disease, an ailment of annual occurrence at this season. This rest was temporarily broken by a small force having to be equipped with mules and camels, and sent into Utman Khel country. The difficulty of the pass was great, and a few camels were lost both in entering and returning from the country.

At the commencement of severe cold, application was made for jhools for hired camels. This was sanctioned and the issue promptly made. To this issue, in great part, may be attributed the improvement in the condition of the camels, which took place during the month of December.

When it was known that an expedition into Buner would take place, an addition to the mule and pony transport of the force was asked for, on account of the known difficulties of the passes. In response to this, 500 mules or ponies were arranged for by the Commissary General, Punjab Command, and 914 mules were detached from the Tirah Expeditionary Force, which, however, arrived too late to be of any use.

The force for Buner was equipped as follows:—*1st Brigade*.—All mules for baggage and 7 days' rations. *2nd Brigade*.—Water mules and camels. *Detached Force*.—All mules for baggage and 3 days' rations, with camels for the remaining requirements of the force.

In addition, camels were employed to carry extra supplies with the brigades, and also to bring up the advanced depôt with 10 days' supplies for the whole force to Sanghao.

On the 18th January, the troops commenced returning from Buner, and by the 21st idem, all the force was collected at Mardan.

On the 25th and 31st January, Casting Committees were held at Nowshera, and the following animals were cast and disposed of:—Mules, 19; ponies, 13; bullock, S. T., 25; bullocks, A. T., 2.

The remainder of the hired transport, not required for the force remaining behind, was, on receipt of orders from the Commissary General, Punjab Command, paid up and discharged.

The animals with the force remained healthy in the main throughout the operations. There were several sporadic cases, at different times, of foot and mouth disease on the line of communications, but these were dealt with promptly, and the disease never became epidemic. The camels suffered from skin disease during November, December and January, but it did not interfere with their work though it undoubtedly affected their condition. This disease is common all over India at this period among camels and was therefore unavoidable.

The order that compensation for casualties should only be given for such as occurred under extraordinary circumstances was rigidly adhered to, and with success. No discontent was apparent on the final discharge of the men; and the knowledge that the loss would ordinarily fall upon themselves made the owners far more careful in looking after their animals, and to this, in a very great measure, I attribute the small percentage (14·6 per

cent.) of losses. The camels were worked at a season when ordinarily the owners lay them up, considering the gain in working them to, by no means, compensate for the danger of loss. It will be remembered, too, how heavy the loss in these animals was after the Chitral Campaign of 1895, in the months of October and November, which loss was then attributed to the fact that they had been worked in the off season. The small loss, then, during the late Malakand and Buner Expeditions, is therefore noticeable (the percentage in the Chitral Relief Force was 27·16 not counting subsequent deaths) and can only be accounted for by the care and attention paid the camels by all concerned—officers, subordinates, and especially owners. I would therefore urge the continuance of the regulations under which the grant of compensation is only admissible in the case of extraordinary casualties. The high rate of pay is amply sufficient to cover all ordinary risks, provided the drivers look after their animals. In proof of the contentment of the camel owners, although no compensation for ordinary casualties was granted them, I may mention that when, after my return from field service, I was employed on camel hiring duty, the men collected by the Civil authorities were always willing to engage for service at Malakand, or in the Swat Valley, but positively refused to hire their animals out for work elsewhere.

I would again urge, what has been so often put forward by Commissariat officers, that all transport followers be granted the fighting man's scale of field service rations. I consider that by far the hardest work during a campaign falls upon our drivers and kahars. They are first up in the morning the last to arrive in camp—after which come stables and cleaning gear. When a force is stationary in camp, doing only picquets and convoy duty, the transport is out foraging or on convoy duty and the kahars carrying down sick and wounded. However idle the troops may be, the transport is always working. In addition to this, the drivers have also the night picquets in their lines. They have likewise to accompany the fighting line with reserve ammunition, and the kahars with their dandies do the same. The uniform cheerfulness and excellent conduct exhibited by these hard-working and poorly fed men, throughout the campaign, has been beyond praise; and I consider something to improve their conditions of service in the field is most desirable.

As followers very seldom on service are allowed tents, I would recommend the issue of a balaclava cap, and some cheap waterproof sheet to them. It is a wise policy to maintain men in health in the field, and a cheap one in the long run; whilst the importance of maintaining your transport in efficient state cannot be over-rated.

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